Philippines (2012 onwards, inc OEF)

**Dayuhan** · 09-14-2013

Indonesia hasn't been much involved so far; the Malaysians have been trying to act as a broker, but of course there's a fair bit of mistrust on the Philippine side, given the Sabah claim (fairly dodgy, but many Filipinos remain emotionally attached to it) and the history of Malaysian support for the MNLF in the 70s. It might be possible for Indonesia to play a role, but it's hard to see what they could do about this incident.

MANILA, Philippines—After five days of heavy fighting, Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) Chair Nur Misuari and Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin have agreed to observe a ceasefire and discuss a “peaceful settlement” of the crisis in Zamboanga City, Vice President Jejomar Binay said Friday night.

Gazmin denied this soon after, and the fighting went on unabated. The Vice President belongs to the opposition party, and may have been trying to grab a bit of TV time.

CAUSES OF THE SUDDEN ERUPTION OF FILIPINO-MORO WAR IN ZAMBOANGA CITY

The Filipino-Moro war raging now in Zamboanga City between the colonial Philippine occupation soldiers and the Bangsamoro freedom fighters of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) could not have occurred if the present Aquino government respected only the September 2, 1996 MNLF-OIC-GRP Jakarta Peace Agreements.

The MNLF really has only themselves to blame: after the '96 agreement they descended into factionalism and the leaders who were able to gain official positions were too busy at the feeding trough to look after the mass base, much of which splintered away to the MILF, ASG etc. Now of course the MNLF sees themselves being boxed out of the process and they want to push their way back in. While they have degraded to a large extent they still have sufficient force to make a mess, and if they get money they can raise more... sub-leaders and their troops in the region change allegiance very easily and will follow the money.

Where the money comes from is another question. There are strong suspicions that the fighting is related to events in Manila, where a huge corruption scandal has been unfolding. A number of those in the center of the scandal are core opposition members, including some figures who have been at or near the center of events for a long time. Some of these individuals are known to have been involved in coup plots in the past, some are well connected in both the military and the rebel movements.

There's suspicion that the Kiram incursion in Sabah was actually staged to embarrass Aquino (it succeeded) and diminish his hold on government (less successful), and there are suspicions that this incident in Zamboanga is a shot across the bow: lay off the untouchables or more of the same will follow.

Interesting times...

**Bill Moore** · 09-14-2013

Originally Posted by Dayuhan

Indonesia hasn't been much involved so far; the Malaysians have been trying to act as a broker, but of course there's a fair bit of mistrust on the Philippine side, given the Sabah claim (fairly dodgy, but many Filipinos remain emotionally attached to it) and the history of Malaysian support for the MNLF in the 70s. It might be possible for Indonesia to play a role, but it's hard to see what they could do about this incident.

Gazmin denied this soon after, and the fighting went on unabated. The Vice President belongs to the opposition party, and may have been trying to grab a bit of TV time.

The MNLF really has only themselves to blame: after the '96 agreement they descended into factionalism and the leaders who were able to gain official positions were too busy at the feeding trough to look after the mass base, much of which splintered away to the MILF, ASG etc. Now of course the MNLF sees themselves being boxed out of the process and they want to push their way back in. While they have degraded to a large extent they still have sufficient force to make a mess, and if they get money they can raise more... sub-leaders and their troops in the region change allegiance very easily and will follow the money.

Where the money comes from is another question. There are strong suspicions that the fighting is related to events in Manila, where a huge corruption scandal has been unfolding. A number of those in the center of the scandal are core opposition members, including some figures who have been at or near the center of events for a long time. Some of these individuals are known to have been involved in coup plots in the past, some are well connected in both the military and the rebel movements.

There's suspicion that the Kiram incursion in Sabah was actually staged to embarrass Aquino (it succeeded) and diminish his hold on government (less successful), and there are suspicions that this incident in Zamboanga is a shot across the bow: lay off the untouchables or more of the same will follow.

Interesting times...

Sadly, all you suspicions are quite possible, and while some like to say all politics is local that is far from practice in the real world. Internal national level politics in Manila may ultimately be more important than local politics in the south. I'm not venturing any guesses on the future in this case, because this event can play out as a catalyst for second and third order effects in a variety of ways (both for the better and worse). Three steps forwards, two backwards, that is the nature of these conflicts.

**Dayuhan** · 09-15-2013

I wouldn't say the national level is more important, just that it's a factor. Manila factions can't just conjure up tension or trouble in the south, but they can manipulate existing local tension to some degree, especially when money is involved it usually is). It's been likely for a long time that the MNLF would emerge as a spoiler in the Government-MILF talks, but the timing of this incident, and that of last February's eccentricity, suggest that a Manila hand may be stirring an already frothing pot.

**Bill Moore** · 09-15-2013

Originally Posted by Dayuhan

I wouldn't say the national level is more important, just that it's a factor. Manila factions can't just conjure up tension or trouble in the south, but they can manipulate existing local tension to some degree, especially when money is involved it usually is). It's been likely for a long time that the MNLF would emerge as a spoiler in the Government-MILF talks, but the timing of this incident, and that of last February's eccentricity, suggest that a Manila hand may be stirring an already frothing pot.

Fair enough, but you cannot get to a sustainable solution without Manila. It is all interconnected in many ways.

**Dayuhan** · 09-16-2013

Originally Posted by Bill Moore

Fair enough, but you cannot get to a sustainable solution without Manila. It is all interconnected in many ways.

Manila might be part of a solution if it chose to be, but the will isn't there.

Mindanao's problems are irretrievably connected to the scourge of big man politics, and to the effective exemption from law enjoyed bu those who represent the state. The real challenge for Manila is not bringing the rebels and bandits within the rule of law, it's bringing its own agents within the rule of law.

Unfortunately, Manila and it's many factions generally don't want to do this (whether or not they could even if they wanted to remains a matter of some doubt, but we won't know unless they find the will). The big men are useful. When you need a trusty baron to deliver 165% of the votes in his jurisdiction to your cause, you look to Mindanao and make a deal (ask Gloria Arroyo about that). When you need to make trouble for your political antagonists, you make a deal in Mindanao. Manila leaders have generally found the status quo to be something they can manage to their own interest, and over generations of that the Mindanao political culture has taken on a life of its own and will be no easy thing to stamp out.

On the matters referred to above, we now have this:

http://www.tribune.net.ph/index.php/...-decision-made

That's an open threat to Aquino: lay off on the corruption cases, or else.

**Dayuhan** · 02-28-2014

Just back from some time in Lanao del Sur, one of those places the Embassy tells you to never ever even think about going. Wasn't there for research, or to reach any deep conclusions, but there was a bit of casual observation...

Awake early one morning, before dawn, up on a hill watching lights come on down on the plateau in the town of Wao. Inevitably the scratchy loudspeaker as the muezzin emerges with morning prayers, followed by a series of community announcements... and after that, a rousing if distorted recording of Lady Gaga doing Bad Romance. Muslim Filipinos are still Filipinos, and if anyone in Saudi Arabia is sending money to bring that particular mosque over to Wahhabi austerities, they aren't getting their money's worth.

Wao isn't really typical of anything, but in Central Mindanao the atypical is typical. The town occupies a corner of Lanao del Sur, between Bukidnon (dominated by Christian settlers) and Muslim-dominated North Cotabato. It's cut off from the heavily MILF-dominated easterm portion of Lanao del Sur by a densely forested mountain range. The once dominant Muslim Maranao are now about 30% of the population. The other 70% is an ethnolinguistic halo-halo of settlers from around the country and a few thoroughly downtrodden remnants of indigenous hill tribes.

Local officialdom is quick to claim an exception to the rule, with Christian settlers and Muslims living peacefully side by side. They still think it necessary to supply outsiders with armed escorts; in our case a dozen or so militiamen. Their fondness for alcohol was a bit disturbing, but at least they didn't have the magically bullet-proofing amulets and glazed over stares I've seen elsewhere. I don't know if they were there because the officials thought them necessary or because they thought we thought them necessary... they did not seem to be expecting trouble, and their presence seemed pretty perfunctory.

Muslims and Christians lived in geographically distinct neighborhoods in town, in separate villages in the countryside. Some visible blending, but still a very distinct separation at the most basic level. Local officials were pretty diplomatic, but the militiamen were pretty blunt about the perception that the place is peaceful because they (the Christian settlers) are warriors who take no $#!t from the Muslims and keep them in line.

I did slip the leash and get into town alone at one point. I tried to open some conversations with Muslim vendors and in a Halal eatery. Usually that's not too difficult; people are naturally curious about a white guy who speaks languages. The people I talked to seemed very reserved and even a bit suspicious; it was hard to get them even into the small talk stage, let alone relax things to a point where conversation could be directed... hence little observation of perception in that quarter.

The most visible dichotomy was not between Muslim and Christian, but between rich and poor. The area is extremely fertile: rolling plateau dominated by large fields of pineapple, corn, sugar cane, and rubber. One of the few places in the Philippines where I've seen large tractors and other agricultural equipment deployed on a large scale. Very little food production for local consumption, and rather low efficiency: no intercropping in rubber plantations, reject pineapples left to rot in the fields, etc. Despite substantial agricultural resources, the large majority that does not own land live in really abject poverty, a pretty dramatic contrast to the egalitarian, highly intensive, and hyper-efficient production up here in the northern tribal country.

In short, while the observations and conversations were generally casual, the impression I came away with was of a place where the inherent potential for tension between the many dirt-poor landless laborers and the few relatively affluent landowners is re-directed into enduring tension between indigenous Muslims and Christian settlers. As is the case in much of Mindnaao, this is encouraged by local elites on their sides, who would rather see their people directing fear and suspicion at "the other" than questioning the extreme economic inequalities that prevail within their own social groups.

Could say much more, but that's already probably too much...