The Warden Collection (merged thread)

[Fuchs]

Saddam Hussien (dead),
the electrical system non-functional,
roads and bridges unable to support mobility,
military officers demoralized or defecting,
air defense unable to interfere with US operations

Let's use this as an example (and I read '91 here):

Two approaches to air war:
'True' strategic air war with the intent to break the enemy government('s will to resist) directly with air power
and
operational air war in support of other arms; usually land support of a land campaign, rarely (Pacific War) primarily support of naval warfare. This may include bombing industries if those industries supply the OPFOR.


Saddam Hussein was caught in a miscalculation.
His withdrawal (the mission to be accomplished under UN mandate) would almost certainly follow if he understood his mistake. Offering him a way out that saves his face would likely reduce his resistance once he grasps the situation (and hurry the process up).


So what needed to be done? He needed to be convinced that the situation is serious. Air power eventually achieved this when he ordered a withdrawal (ground offensive was accelerated to interfere with the withdrawal iirc).

It did actually not take much to convince him that the coalition was serious. Diplomats could have paved him a nice way out of the mess and air power could have demonstrated political resolution with actual attacks. Those actual attacks could have been directed against his counter-strike capabilities in order to minimise the mess; attack aircraft airbases, SCUDs (the latter did eventually fail, of course), suppress long-range artillery (longer range than the ubiquitous D-30's).
This would have required some self-support of air power in form of the strike package support; SEAD, AEW, ECM...
The bombing of barracks, bridges, palaces, electrical nodes, tanks and bunkers was not strategically necessary (the CAS at Khafij was tactically useful, though).


Now another version; air power in support of decisive land operations.
The scenario is roughly the same, but the decision is expected to lay in the hands of the ground forces (assumption: Hussein is too stubborn to yield to air power alone.
Air power softens up and deceives in order to prepare for a decisive land campaign advance: A near-encirclement of the occupation forces in Kuwait would almost certainly force Hussein to accept the need to withdraw. Alternatively, the encirclement could be completed in a more Clausewitzian approach of disarmament.


It should be obvious in both cases that I'm not intent on destroying a card house with some smart moves; I'm intent on defeating the will.
I look at personal preferences and assume somewhat purposeful decision-making within the limits of typical psychological malfunctions (such as cognitive dissonance or problematic group dynamics).
An enemy head of state only needs to be attacked if it itself is the problem or if by assumption a successor would be more inclined to bow to our demands. Aggressor politicians deserve a high explosive event, but killing them makes it damn hard to negotiate an armistice with them in the following days and weeks.

-----------------------------------
The 2nd kind of air warfare (in support of a decisive surface campaign) isn't truly strategic in my opinion, but rather a support campaign that works through the economy/infrastructure (WW2 examples). It's working only very directly towards victory:
Air power succeeds to pave the way for its exploits (SEAD, air superiority fight), air power affects the enemy at home (supply flow to OPFOR reduced), blue surface forces defeat red forces in battle more easily, red government accepts that it was overpowered militarily, its will is broken.
That's often way too indirect because more direct, more elegant, approaches are available.

[Cliff]

Let's use this as an example (and I read '91 here):
Saddam Hussein was caught in a miscalculation.
His withdrawal (the mission to be accomplished under UN mandate) would almost certainly follow if he understood his mistake. Offering him a way out that saves his face would likely reduce his resistance once he grasps the situation (and hurry the process up).

Uhhm, this is the guy who killed hundreds of thousands of his own folks in the Iran-Iraq war...

So what needed to be done? He needed to be convinced that the situation is serious. Air power eventually achieved this when he ordered a withdrawal (ground offensive was accelerated to interfere with the withdrawal iirc).

It did actually not take much to convince him that the coalition was serious. Diplomats could have paved him a nice way out of the mess and air power could have demonstrated political resolution with actual attacks. Those actual attacks could have been directed against his counter-strike capabilities in order to minimise the mess; attack aircraft airbases, SCUDs (the latter did eventually fail, of course), suppress long-range artillery (longer range than the ubiquitous D-30's).
This would have required some self-support of air power in form of the strike package support; SEAD, AEW, ECM...
The bombing of barracks, bridges, palaces, electrical nodes, tanks and bunkers was not strategically necessary (the CAS at Khafij was tactically useful, though).

You assume Saddam is a rational actor who cares about his people... I think that's a false assumption. Also, the second objective was to make sure Saddam could no longer threaten his neighbors - hence the CAS and AI. Your "demonstration" sounds a lot like McNarma and LBJ's "sending signals"... Most of the electrical and bunker targets were intended to degrade C2 of the Iraqi IADS, which is neccessary to do the rest of your list.

Now another version; air power in support of decisive land operations.
The scenario is roughly the same, but the decision is expected to lay in the hands of the ground forces (assumption: Hussein is too stubborn to yield to air power alone.
Air power softens up and deceives in order to prepare for a decisive land campaign advance: A near-encirclement of the occupation forces in Kuwait would almost certainly force Hussein to accept the need to withdraw. Alternatively, the encirclement could be completed in a more Clausewitzian approach of disarmament.

Again, I think you assume a lot about Saddam.

It should be obvious in both cases that I'm not intent on destroying a card house with some smart moves; I'm intent on defeating the will.
I look at personal preferences and assume somewhat purposeful decision-making within the limits of typical psychological malfunctions (such as cognitive dissonance or problematic group dynamics).
An enemy head of state only needs to be attacked if it itself is the problem or if by assumption a successor would be more inclined to bow to our demands. Aggressor politicians deserve a high explosive event, but killing them makes it damn hard to negotiate an armistice with them in the following days and weeks.

You are confusing Warden's model, Fuchs. Attacking the leadership ring doesn't neccessarily mean you kill them... you just have to affect them.

The 2nd kind of air warfare (in support of a decisive surface campaign) isn't truly strategic in my opinion, but rather a support campaign that works through the economy/infrastructure (WW2 examples). It's working only very directly towards victory:
Air power succeeds to pave the way for its exploits (SEAD, air superiority fight), air power affects the enemy at home (supply flow to OPFOR reduced), blue surface forces defeat red forces in battle more easily, red government accepts that it was overpowered militarily, its will is broken.
That's often way too indirect because more direct, more elegant, approaches are available.

Again, you seem to agree with Warden, but just don't like the way he wrote his arguement. The last line is pretty much his 5 rings model in one sentence...

V/R,

Cliff

[Fuchs]

Uhhm, this is the guy who killed hundreds of thousands of his own folks in the Iran-Iraq war...

...this didn't seem to bother us and was not the subject of the '91 conflict.

You assume Saddam is a rational actor who cares about his people... I think that's a false assumption.

No, I assume Saddam was a mostly rational actor who cared about his power. There are many ways how someone like that can be threatened without threatening his people much.
The more someone wants to keep, the more you can threaten. The more you have destroyed already, the less you can threaten with destruction.

Also, the second objective was to make sure Saddam could no longer threaten his neighbors - hence the CAS and AI.

This was pointless, for Turkey was in NATO, Syria and Iran were powerful enough to defend themselves, Jordan is too close to Israel and it wouldn't have required a second lesson to teach him not to touch Kuwait or Saudi-Arabia. Who's left? Qatar and Bahrain? Same as Kuwait, plus he lacked the transport to invade them.
His ability to threaten neighbours would have been gone by a mix or military and political reasons anyway - without destruction of most of his heavy weapons.

Your "demonstration" sounds a lot like McNarma and LBJ's "sending signals"...

They were in the trap that they demanded too much, were seen as wanting to achieve even more (indirect rule) and being unable to hit most of the factories that produced for the war effort. The failure of a recipe under such conditions means nothing unless another recipe is known that would not fail.

Most of the electrical and bunker targets were intended to degrade C2 of the Iraqi IADS, which is neccessary to do the rest of your list.

I consider this as overrated. The Iraqi air defences were susceptible in many ways. The effort against the C2 was redundant.

You are confusing Warden's model, Fuchs. Attacking the leadership ring doesn't neccessarily mean you kill them... you just have to affect them.

...which will work about as well as the Bomber Command's bombing reduced work morale unless you have a good idea what effect has the best probability of success. That's what it's all about.
And someone here had hinted at killing leadership, that's why I referred to it.

Again, you seem to agree with Warden, but just don't like the way he wrote his arguement.

No, I don't agree at all, even if conclusions from my model can be misunderstood to be close to his.

I don't think they were shining examples of airpower strategy - especially the Luftwaffe.

They were example of good bang for the buck, success under adverse conditions and focus on the important.

Luftwaffe in May '40 (France Campaign) focused on one thing only: The success of the land campaign. It began with some pressure on the French air force and a fake Schwerpunkt and proceeded with all might to support at the real Schwerpunkt - Sedan. Only a few per cent diversionary missions were about something else than supporting the land campaign.
This choice of focus was proved to be correct in the process.
It was a peer/peer conflict (actually, Germany was even a bit weaker), the Luftwaffe was not clearly superior in quality (its losses were higher than the French and British ones!) - the one thing that deserved them a place in air war history as first greatly successful air campaign was the focus on a single mission.

Compare this with the miserable targeting of '99.
What exactly was the purpose of destroying a railway bridge if there were no army movements anyway?

[Steve Blair]

While the Flying Tigers and Luftwaffe in May '40 accomplished great things, I don't think they were shining examples of airpower strategy - especially the Luftwaffe. But this is distracting us from the real point - your argument for better use of resources is exactly what Warden is arguing for - so you agree with his ends but not his means?

Warden's use of the Luftwaffe to illustrate his examples is one of the points (IMO) where he really goes off the rails. The Luftwaffe did exactly what it was designed to do, because the Germans had a different conception of airpower based on their experiences in World War I. Was it in line with Warden's vision? No. Does that automatically make it wrong? Certainly not.

Warden continues to chase the myth of warfare on the cheap (from our perspective, at least). He is also far too wedded to the idea that airpower can be decisive in any area, and if it can't we shouldn't get involved. If you read "The Air Campaign," you would think that the Air Force won the war in the Pacific all by itself and that the Battle of Britain was a failed defensive campaign. Warden is also (again IMO) far too linked to the idea that kinetic efforts should be divorced from political considerations, and far too often falls back on the "politicians tied our hands" argument when airpower doesn't work as advertised. Warden's theories work well in computer games, but I really think they fall short when put to the real world test.