Entropy,
there is no need to apologise, I didn't feel you were being condescending, and as an ex-FJ puke that accusation usually sits at my feet! To keep the chain going:

2. I totally agree that limited ISTAR assets must be used in accordance with mission priorities, especially as within this Theatre there is a paucity of ISTAR assets for the size of the task. My sense is that the border area (on both sides, but increasingly to the south and east) is rapidly assuming 'top' priority.

4. You are quite correct to highlight the broad character of the paper's argument. I hope there are some mitigating factors. First, the paper (hopefully) raises an issue (the increasing importance of the FATA/NWFP/border region) which needs close examination by those with all the relevant information before them (both in Theatre and in capitals); but it does not (cannot) provide the 'answer' to the 'question' that it poses. I can propose potential solutions (e.g. improve outpost protection and ISTAR coverage of the area) but I am not in theatre and do not have current access to classified data, so with an incomplete picture in view it would seem unwise to be overly prescriptive or presumptive in detail. Your point is well made: what is the resulting cost-benefit calculation if more effort is put into border ISTAR and/or interdiction? The answer is I don't know, and that analysis can only be conducted by ISAF commanders and Service chiefs back home, but that doesn't mean we shouldn't ask 'the question', particularly if it seems that the analysis has not taken place... I also take the point that the absense of detail doesn't strengthen the argument, but to surmise with detail which I would have to make-up (estimate/assume) might actually prove counter-productive. Lacking a compelling edge will limit the paper's usefulness, but if it acts as a catalyst to further debate/investigation then I'm happy.

Second (and more importantly), I do not use detail that might add weight to a case being made if I know it to be classified information or believe that it could be of use to opponents. This is obviously a concern we all have when discussing operational matters in the public domain. So I'm not going to describe how RAPTOR should be used and I have to accept that the case for it is diluted accordingly. But if an ISAF land commander now asks the RAF for information on it, for me, that would be progress. Unfortunately, by being 'vague' I have to accept that the paper may appear 'unfinished' and you correctly highlight areas where a classified paper should add compelling detail.

However, security concerns do not excuse an absence of definition (e.g. 'addressing'), which you also sensibly highlight. By 'addressing' here I mean preventing the defeat of an ISAF/Afghan outpost by cross-border raiding. This is important as the terrorist character of insurgent activities has diminished strategic effect, whereas the overrunning of an outpost does not. As we know where our own bases are this naturally allows for more focused surveillance etc, which brings it closer to the art of the possible.

With respect to CAS, the principle that we are considering is this: is it worth taking action which might cause short-term damage but long-term benefit? We all agree that judgment can/must only be made by commanderrs, but we have seen this principle applied in numerous ways in the ongoing campaigns:
- do we surge more troops to Iraq?
- do we put troops into dangerous communities in Joint Security Staions or Combat Outposts?
- do we conduct more foot patrols outside of our MRAPS?
- do we advance into areas which have been quiet but are of importance to the enemy?
It seems that although these moves initially involved taking greater casualties they led to much improved outcomes. The same principle applies to what we do with air assets (e.g. CAS/TIC). With all of the above there was no 'proof' available beforehand that the course of action would work, but that is why commanders exercise judgment. Observers like me on the outside looking in can't prove that more ISTAR activity at the expense of CAS is the best thing to do, but we can/should ask the question, particularly if it seems that discussion on the issue hasn't taken place.

With regard to interdiction and the scale of the problem I would like to add two points:
- historically, it has been the reverse of dimishing returns that has promoted interdiction as a policy, but that interdiction must be intelligently executed;
- the fact that infiltration can happen somewhere does not preclude our being focused on preventing it in key areas, e.g. the need for timely interdiction is tied to raiding against vulnerable outposts.

Finally, I wholeheartedly agree that the Soviet experience illustrates that mass/numbers alone will make little difference. If we do reposture assets for the burgeoning problem astride the Durand Line then we must do it intelligently, which is probably another thread...

Yours

Paul