Ukraine (closed; covers till August 2014)

[OUTLAW 09]

Didn't you just post this piece suggesting that in some quarters at least there's a perception that Putin's popularity is sliding?



Putin is increasingly between a rock and a hard place: nationalists will still give him credit for taking Crimea, but in politics you're only as good as your last show, and if he doesn't act in the Ukraine he will be accused of abandoning his proxies (an accusation with which Americans will feel some sympathy). If he does move, the oligarchs and the licit and illicit business community will accuse him of risking damage to both the Russian economy and to their individual economies. In short, he's moving into a situation where different sides of his support base have widely divergent interests and demands. Not a comfortable place to be.



Color revolutions specifically threaten governments where the populace does not feel that it has the ability to change the government, typically dictatorships and pseudo-dictatorships. Where the populace has confidence in the electoral system, they may take to the streets when they see lousy government, but they generally won't directly try to overthrow the government, because they know that in due time they can overthrow it legally with a lot less risk and trouble. I think you'll find that the key determinant that pushes public unrest to the color revolution level is less public perception of bad governance than the public's confidence in existing mechanisms for changing governance. Democratic governments need to be worried about being voted out if they don't deliver good governance, but they face much less threat from color revolutions than countries that are either non-democratic or where the public has little or no confidence in the nominally democratic mechanisms.



I suppose that's why they don't bother publishing RT in English, or hiring stooges to pack the comments sections of English-language publications...

Propaganda is advertising by another name. As with any type of advertising, the measure of success is not the structure of your campaign or the number of people it reaches. The only relevant measure of success is sales of the product. The Russian propaganda campaign is extensive and the structure of it is fairly sophisticated. The content remains extremely crude, and structure without content gets you nowhere. The question remains... who is being convinced, and where? That question can only be answered with actual evidence... market research as it were. Anecdotal evidence doesn't count.

Dayuhan--thanks for finally agreeing even if you take 2000 words to agree and a couple of roundabout thought processes. You need to shorten the thoughts.

You really do need to understand the use of propaganda---we use classify it --white, grey and black and believe me the white sometimes actually appears to be the truth. Doubt seriously if you have ever worked in a section that drove propaganda---it would open you eyes and make you even question articles that you quoted in the past.

Really go back and dig out the chart I posted here in this thread about the extent and depth of their info war and then tell me it is not and or was not grabbing.

Then come back with comments focused on the extent of that chart and the campaign it outlines and then ask yourself can I even trust the materials I myself find good?

And Dayuhan---finally write something that you yourself put together---cutting and pasting is now a great research tool- if you like Microsoft--and it is if one likes to debate. Debating wastes time and effort these days as it in the end tends to go nowhere.

[OUTLAW 09]

From JCoS General Dempsey:

“You’ve got a Russian government that has made a conscious decision to use its military force inside another sovereign nation to achieve its objectives,” he said. “They clearly are on a path to assert themselves differently not just in Eastern Europe, but Europe in the main, and towards the United States.”

So Dayuhan---just what does this statement say from the highest thinker in the US military? It tends to support the concept of the new Russian military doctrine does it not with it's use in supporting political warfare.

[OUTLAW 09]

Dayuhan---part of the problem with propaganda is at what point does a national leader start to believe his own "press" or reverse asked at what point does in fact the propaganda reflect the thinking of a national leader?.

Currently I think Putin is all in and he is doing everything possibly short to armed invasion to support the Russian mercenaries because to not do so violates his own propaganda and that would be then viewed as a defeat.

In the world of international relations when one country actively uses indirect fire support ie artillery strikes to support combatant mercenaries across the border then in fact that can and is often interpreted as an act of war by the country firing the artillery.

Now do you understand Dempsey's comments? Then it can no longer be assumed that Putin is playing by the international rules but by his own and they can in fact be determined to be extremely dangerous---this is no longer a game of "self determination" based on ethnicity and language it is about a wannabe superpower who has lost control of his proxy and that proxy is dragging that superpower down a rat hole again based on the superpower believing his own "press".

Militants had attacked positions of the Ukrainian marines near Diakovo on the south of the Luhansk region. The attack was carried out after more than an hour of shelling of the position from the territory of the Russian Federation.

This was reported to UkrInform by a soldier of an airmobile brigade soldier, which was attacked.

«Just repelled an attack of militants. We were shelled by mortars and AGS. There are no killed or wounded on our side. For now all has subsided,» — he said.

According to the soldier, before the attack the position was shelled for more than an hour from the territory of the Russian Federation. The marine assumed that the shelling was carried out from a 152 mm self-propelled artillery system «Acacia».

He also pointed out that the Ukrainian military did not open retaliatory fire as «it is Russia there».

[Firn]

Through the fog of war the current situation is more or less like that:



The yellow area is territory formerly controlled to a large degree by the (Pro)Russians. The liberated areas of the two oblasts are generally less densly populated then the remaining one, although it is quite likey that at least 200.000 have left it.

With the considerable difficulties to find willing soldiers among the roughly 2 million people living still in (Pro)Russian areas and the Ukrainian successes the great influx of Russian men and Russian weapons becomes quite understandable from a purly military point of view. The Ukrainian government can still directly recruit, with obvious difficulties of course, men and women out of an area with 40 millions people.

[OUTLAW 09]

This is the swing in public opinion within Germany that Putin and his info war guys cannot understand.

Prior to the polling released this weekend only about 18-23% depending on the week done supported any form of really hard sanctions that would cost German jobs.

Polling released this weekend after the crash indication a swing to 52% of all Germans asked are in favor of hard sanctions being applied to Russian even and this is the key even if it costs German jobs and the economy slows. Pollers indicate that anger towards Russia is actually climbing and anticipate seeing higher numbers next week.

That is a massive shift in the German public opinion which has been rather neutral in the whole matter and has to a degree responded to the information war directed at them by Russia.

Critical for Putin is ----Merkel tends to follow her population's wishes.

Couple this with the same negative attitude by the Dutch the largest single trading partner of Russia also indicating they want harder sanctions--Putin has an economic problem now on his hands he can no longer control by his info war.

http://www.spiegel.de/politik/auslan...-a-983083.html

[JMA]

52% in favour of 'hard sanctions'... does anyone know what the other 48% want?

This is the swing in public opinion within Germany that Putin and his info war guys cannot understand.

Prior to the polling released this weekend only about 18-23% depending on the week done supported any form of really hard sanctions that would cost German jobs.

Polling released this weekend after the crash indication a swing to 52% of all Germans asked are in favor of hard sanctions being applied to Russian even and this is the key even if it costs German jobs and the economy slows. Pollers indicate that anger towards Russia is actually climbing and anticipate seeing higher numbers next week.

That is a massive shift in the German public opinion which has been rather neutral in the whole matter and has to a degree responded to the information war directed at them by Russia.

Critical for Putin is ----Merkel tends to follow her population's wishes.

Couple this with the same negative attitude by the Dutch the largest single trading partner of Russia also indicating they want harder sanctions--Putin has an economic problem now on his hands he can no longer control by his info war.

http://www.spiegel.de/politik/auslan...-a-983083.html

[OUTLAW 09]

52% in favour of 'hard sanctions'... does anyone know what the other 48% want?

JMA--it was a mix---will chase down the other percentage.

[OUTLAW 09]

Looks as if the Russians are talking a more directive control of the separatist movement--pushing the locals to the side.

So goes the illusion that it was all about the locals to begin with---led yesterday to the Ukrainian comment--and they believed the propaganda and now get this for their dying for the self determination idea?

Russian might have just split the separatists as one of the top ex Alpha Commanders who initially indicated that the insurgents did have a Buk is reported to have taken his troops off the battlefield with the appearance of Russian individuals taking over the movement.

The direct Russian control of this is becoming apparent the longer this goes on.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/...0FW07020140727

[OUTLAW 09]

It seems when Russian soldiers upload their photos to the Russian equivalent of Facebook they did not seem to know that the uploaded photos show the date/time stamp as well as a geo tag with the grid coordinates where the photo was taken.

This same particular solider uploaded a whole series showing his artillery unit firing into the Ukraine-and claiming they were firing into the Ukraine--which has been the OSINT confirmation to the classified side that the US has been referring to when they talk about Russian shelling of the Ukraine.

Now in their news agency RIA from today ---the "poor" Russian solider is complaining that maybe his account has been hacked as he has heard about such things happening from the West. Great new excuse---hey it was not me I have been hacked!---but the photos are real.

Surprised the GRU has not thrown him in a deep dark jail somewhere in Siberia. But again he is just an artilleryman.

Dayuhan---this is an excellent example of social media being turned around as a piece of information warfare from both sides with now the Russians backpedalling.

http://en.ria.ru/russia/20140725/191...otos-Says.html

[OUTLAW 09]

Through the fog of war the current situation is more or less like that:



The yellow area is territory formerly controlled to a large degree by the (Pro)Russians. The liberated areas of the two oblasts are generally less densly populated then the remaining one, although it is quite likey that at least 200.000 have left it.

With the considerable difficulties to find willing soldiers among the roughly 2 million people living still in (Pro)Russian areas and the Ukrainian successes the great influx of Russian men and Russian weapons becomes quite understandable from a purly military point of view. The Ukrainian government can still directly recruit, with obvious difficulties of course, men and women out of an area with 40 millions people.

firn--watch for the recapture of Horlivka--that one is critical to the UA ---that is the key Russian resupply LOC- transit point to the Donetsk--if that is cut then the supplies have a much harder time getting into the Donetsk.

What is interesting is how this envelopment is steadily moving forward---looks like the airborne units, their SF and the old Alpha units are taking the fight forward followed up by the UA and the NG to hold and clear.

[Shchors]

You just attached a report from the military judge advocate in the Dnipropetrovsk military district regarding ongoing investigations into instances of Ukrainian armor falling into the hands of the Russian separatists on the territory of Ukraine (there is the suspicion that certain military personnel at arms depots allowed these losses without a fight) I agree that these pieces of equipment fall well short of 100. But what does that have to do with Russian armor sneaking across the border into the Donbas? Video evidence of such incursions are multiple and overwhelming. I fail to see your point. And why should I read anything in Wikepedia? By the way, thanks for attaching this document. If authentic, it is a valuable source for future citation.

[AmericanPride]

So Dayuhan---just what does this statement say from the highest thinker in the US military? It tends to support the concept of the new Russian military doctrine does it not with it's use in supporting political warfare.

My question is why (1) why did it take this long to formulate a response and (2) if Russia is such a threat, why do 20-year old war plans need to be 'dusted off'? Why aren't there current plans already in place? As I see it, U.S. foreign policy towards Russia (and in general) is (still) reactionary equipped without foresight.

What is a direction Russian intervention in your opinion? What isn't open-ended to this war, with the Crimea occupied by Russia and Russian men and Russian weapons reinforcing Russias shadow armies lead by Russian veterans with it's limited local support while the Russian army shells Ukrainian forces from Russia proper?

I look at Crimea and eastern Ukraine as separate conflicts - not because the belligerents are different but because I think Russia's goals are different; hence the different strategy for Crimea (direct occupation) and eastern Ukraine (proxy insurgency). There's a continuum of commitment and intervention, with no interference on one end and formal, overt military operations on the other. Though it strains credulity in the West, Russia can still claim a measure of deniability and that gives them the political space to push for a negotiated settlement. Outright occupation would raise a lot of questions about the end-state and place a great burden upon Russia's credibility as a great power (and yes, I would argue Russia is a great power, ranked #3 after the U.S. and China).

AP--this has been a battle of values and will be going forward much as the Cold War was about the battle of ideologies. By the way the US is an hegemon---via it's global economic power just check the current set of sanctions against Russia.

This isn't a battle about values. It's a battle about the future of a country that has for 20 years attempted to maintain a delicate balance between two competing power centers. Its economic crisis triggered a political one, sparking a security one. And no - the U.S. is not a hegemon, otherwise it would have imposed its interests in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Ukraine. The U.S. is by far the world's most significant power, but it does not have the capabilities to impose its will on every single country or combination of countries. Those capabilities peaked in the 1990s and the Iraq War marked the start of relative decline.

A considerable problem of the Kremlin is of course that propaganda intended for Russian consumption, which is far to wild and crazy for almost all Western audience, still reaches across borders. In the case of MH17 it certainly hit the national news in Italy and Germany. In short the strategy is clear but the execution difficult and sometimes sloppy.

That'd be an interesting case study about blowback of information operations in the contemporary environment.

[OUTLAW 09]

This is the 16th version released by the Russians today by RIA as they attempt to side track the accusations that the Russian mercenaries shot down the airliner.

Appears now that the US supports the Russia released version that it was the Ukrainians. Not sure how the Russians some how think the US indirectly admitted it--but again it was that unnamed Russian Defense Ministry guy.

Information was released to day by the black box analysis team---the plane was hit by a missile explosion that went completely through the aircraft.

MOSCOW, July 27 (RIA Novosti) – The United States has indirectly admitted that Kiev’s air defense systems were present near Donetsk when the Malaysia Airlines plane crashed, thus confirming the data of Russian satellites, a senior source in the Russian Defense Ministry told RIA Novosti on Sunday.

"In his statement, the White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest implicitly acknowledged that Ukraine’s air defense systems had been present in the Donetsk area, although he claimed they had not been operating," the source said, commenting on Earnest’s words that the missile that hit the flight MH17 was launched from the area controlled by the militia.

The source stressed that the United States thus confirmed the authenticity of the data, provided by the images from Russian satellites at a special briefing of the Russian Defense Ministry on July 21. It was stated during that briefing that Ukraine’s air defense forces had four Buk-M1 missile systems near the city of Donetsk.

[OUTLAW 09]

My question is why (1) why did it take this long to formulate a response and (2) if Russia is such a threat, why do 20-year old war plans need to be 'dusted off'? Why aren't there current plans already in place? As I see it, U.S. foreign policy towards Russia (and in general) is (still) reactionary equipped without foresight.



I look at Crimea and eastern Ukraine as separate conflicts - not because the belligerents are different but because I think Russia's goals are different; hence the different strategy for Crimea (direct occupation) and eastern Ukraine (proxy insurgency). There's a continuum of commitment and intervention, with no interference on one end and formal, overt military operations on the other. Though it strains credulity in the West, Russia can still claim a measure of deniability and that gives them the political space to push for a negotiated settlement. Outright occupation would raise a lot of questions about the end-state and place a great burden upon Russia's credibility as a great power (and yes, I would argue Russia is a great power, ranked #3 after the U.S. and China).



This isn't a battle about values. It's a battle about the future of a country that has for 20 years attempted to maintain a delicate balance between two competing power centers. Its economic crisis triggered a political one, sparking a security one. And no - the U.S. is not a hegemon, otherwise it would have imposed its interests in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Ukraine. The U.S. is by far the world's most significant power, but it does not have the capabilities to impose its will on every single country or combination of countries. Those capabilities peaked in the 1990s and the Iraq War marked the start of relative decline.



That'd be an interesting case study about blowback of information operations in the contemporary environment.

AP---not to go leftist on you but you really do not think that the economic power wheeled by the US government is not hegemon in nature.

Let's see what would foreign banks that have been hit by US fines for hundreds of millions of dollars for embargo violations say to your statements especially since they do not do business in the US--but in the end pay if they want to not be cut out of the USD clearing house process in NYC or to float loans in NYC.

Ask all the major participants of WW1 who financed the war to include Russia?

[OUTLAW 09]

It seems when Russian soldiers upload their photos to the Russian equivalent of Facebook they did not seem to know that the uploaded photos show the date/time stamp as well as a geo tag with the grid coordinates where the photo was taken.

This same particular solider uploaded a whole series showing his artillery unit firing into the Ukraine-and claiming they were firing into the Ukraine--which has been the OSINT confirmation to the classified side that the US has been referring to when they talk about Russian shelling of the Ukraine.

Now in their news agency RIA from today ---the "poor" Russian solider is complaining that maybe his account has been hacked as he has heard about such things happening from the West. Great new excuse---hey it was not me I have been hacked!---but the photos are real.

Surprised the GRU has not thrown him in a deep dark jail somewhere in Siberia. But again he is just an artilleryman.

Dayuhan---this is an excellent example of social media being turned around as a piece of information warfare from both sides with now the Russians backpedalling.

http://en.ria.ru/russia/20140725/191...otos-Says.html

The Russians were complaining that the shelling story was an American fake as they were relying on social media---now the US has released overhead satellite imaging---grainy due to covering capabilities.

Wonder what they will use as an argument now?

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/...265_story.html

[BrentWilliams]

That appears to be the case at the moment. The Ukrainian advance has proceeded surprisingly well given their initial poor performance at the outset of the conflict. I doubt Russia will intervene directly in the east - not out of fear of U.S. sanctions, but because of the uncertainty that lies in an open-ended conflict with Ukraine. Russia's most notable military successes since 1991 have been rapid, decisive campaigns with clearly defined political objectives. I don't think there's a clear political outcome that could emerge from Russian intervention in the east - the first sign of that was Moscow's refusal to extend annexation after the Donetsk referendum though it accepted the Crimean one. The Russians do not want to be involved any more than they have to be.

I also don't think the Ukrainians will push into Crimea. That's already occupied territory and formally annexed by Russia. Attacking Crimea would compel the Russians to further escalate the conflict to protect its own credibility and would give the pretext for the 30,000 Russian soldiers on Ukraine's border to come streaming across.

The resignation of the Yatsenyuk government is a clear indicator that even with military victory, Kiev still faces many internal challenges. Defeating the insurgents militarily will alone not solve Ukraine's fundamental political problem. Yatsenyuk claimed that the coalition collapsed because his allies did not want to take part in the painful political process of imposing austerity measures on the Ukrainian economy (especially in a time of insecurity). That's not a surprise, since the origin of this crisis in the first place was Yanukovych's inability (or unwillingness) to resolve that problem too.

If the only variable in the equation for Putin is the military variable, this is an easy win. It is very doubtful that the population in Eastern Ukraine would resist Russia directly taking control of the area. All things being equal, I doubt they would vote for it and would rather stay part of Ukraine, but if Russia moved decisively into eastern Ukraine, I doubt you are going to have much resistance from the local population.

Given that, what is constraining Russia from acting? It isn't an armed threat from the west. Again, I don't see the west directly becoming involved in the conflict. At the most, they could start to provide weapons and training. However, until Russia crosses a boarder with a NATO country, I couldn't imagine anything else.


I would suggest the one factor constraining Russia is that it is virtually dependent on the economy of Europe while Russia could only inflict some economic pain on Europe. Yes Russian energy is important. But it is also important for Russia to sell that energy and Europe is rich enough to allow the market to adjust to get energy from other places. Russia's biggest export partner by far is the European Union. If Europe gains the will to enact real sanctions, the Russian economy is destroyed. Europe will feel some pain but it won't last as the markets adjust.

We like to have these preconceived notions. We aren't doing anything, etc. I would suggest, in this situation, the United States perfectly doing what it should. Allow Putin to hang himself with his BS. Russia has every reason to fear real political will coming from Europe.

[Firn]

According to Interpretermag live-blog and rather responsive map guys at wikipedia there has been a big Ukrainian offensive. A northern thrust, bypassing Horlivka furhter east, and southern thrust have almost cut off the Donetsk area from Luhansk one. It is of course important to remain sceptical, and wait for confirmations. If the offensive succedes and the gains get consolidated this would be a heavy blow for the Russian ambitions, especially around Donetsk.

The (Pro)Russian spokesmen are denying the extent of the recent gains, we will see. Lots of confusion, as so often and a considerable fog of war.

[davidbfpo]

I have been asked by regular poster to reorganise the threads on the conflict between Russia and the Ukraine. This should keep it more accessible and organized.

My plan:

1. move all the Ukr threads into Europe arena
2. start all the new threads, 1st August next weekend?
3. Ukr international diplomacy
4. Ukr military
5. Ukr pol-econ
6. leave alone the Info Ops thread, but move to the Europe arena
7. close the existing threads

How does that sound? It would be good to get feedback from other users.

[Dayuhan]

Dayuhan--thanks for finally agreeing even if you take 2000 words to agree and a couple of roundabout thought processes. You need to shorten the thoughts.

That's actually amusing, coming from someone who habitually writes 4-5 sequential posts on the same topic. I'd suggest composing your thoughts and writing a single post or reply, not a long string of them, as a courtesy to both the participants and the casual readers.

Really go back and dig out the chart I posted here in this thread about the extent and depth of their info war and then tell me it is not and or was not grabbing.

I recognize the extent and depth. What I'm trying to get you to recognize is that despite the extent and depth, the quality of the content remains crude and amateurish. Content matters: extent and depth do nothing for you if the message is poorly crafted or utterly incredible. Extent and depth do not in themselves determine whether or not a campaign "grabs": saturating the audience with a message that only a true-blue fanatic can believe is actually counterproductive, as it diminishes credibility.

So Dayuhan---just what does this statement say from the highest thinker in the US military? It tends to support the concept of the new Russian military doctrine does it not with it's use in supporting political warfare.

Yes, we all see this. We also see that it's not working very well for him. Given that this "new doctrine" only seems applicable to bordering states with substantial Russian-speaking populations and given that it doesn't look to be producing results, is it something we need to be rending our garments over?

Currently I think Putin is all in and he is doing everything possibly short to armed invasion to support the Russian mercenaries because to not do so violates his own propaganda and that would be then viewed as a defeat.

Yes, I agree. The problem with that - and again this is a situation familiar to Americans - is that you can reach a point where the proxies simply can't win, no matter how much support they get. At that point you either write of the proxies and face accusations of betrayal, or intervene directly and face the consequences. In Putin's case the consequences could be most unpleasant, as the oligarchs and the business community (licit and illicit) seem adamantly opposed to direct intervention and they are a key part of Putin's support base. Not a happy place for Putin.

[JMA]

My question is why (1) why did it take this long to formulate a response and (2) if Russia is such a threat, why do 20-year old war plans need to be 'dusted off'? Why aren't there current plans already in place? As I see it, U.S. foreign policy towards Russia (and in general) is (still) reactionary equipped without foresight.

Its the gutless politicians...

The US military may have many shortcomings but they will have workable contingencies for just about every scenario... world wide.

Once the politicians have finished pulling everything apart and modifying it all the plan is guaranteed to be unworkable.

That's your system... its broken.