The USMC in Helmand (merged thread)

[Steve the Planner]

jcustis:

I came to the conclusion about two months ago that the only viable way forward would be some form of provisional management like Brit provincial governance.

Maybe it is through UN, or NATO, but it has to be, in many areas, not local. Local may come later, but not on schedule.

That is the only effective way to stabilize and improve things consistent with US objective s and schedules.

It means US or foreigners as administrators in many of these places, and not just as advisers, and short-tour passersby. Maybe they can work themselves out of a job later, but not right away.

The rest is just window dressing--pretending that Karzai can do it, or that the US civilians have a plan.

As Rajiv's artcile said, the real power is the drug-dealer-backed police chief. He can bring ruthless justice of the same kind that led the folks to the Taliban in the first place.

It's a very sad situation.

I find it interesting that, at the same time as Afghanistan is still ship without a rudder, Iraq is just going through birth pains. Others think its bad, but, aside from the routine risks and dangers of that area, its their start.

But they were no more ready to start in 2006 than the Afghans are now. Byan Jabr running the death squads, etc...

The plan and action has to match the circumstances.

[Bob's World]

jcustis:

I came to the conclusion about two months ago that the only viable way forward would be some form of provisional management like Brit provincial governance.

Maybe it is through UN, or NATO, but it has to be, in many areas, not local. Local may come later, but not on schedule.

That is the only effective way to stabilize and improve things consistent with US objective s and schedules.

It means US or foreigners as administrators in many of these places, and not just as advisers, and short-tour passersby. Maybe they can work themselves out of a job later, but not right away.

The rest is just window dressing--pretending that Karzai can do it, or that the US civilians have a plan.

As Rajiv's artcile said, the real power is the drug-dealer-backed police chief. He can bring ruthless justice of the same kind that led the folks to the Taliban in the first place.

It's a very sad situation.

I find it interesting that, at the same time as Afghanistan is still ship without a rudder, Iraq is just going through birth pains. Others think its bad, but, aside from the routine risks and dangers of that area, its their start.

But they were no more ready to start in 2006 than the Afghans are now. Byan Jabr running the death squads, etc...

The plan and action has to match the circumstances.

Marjah doesn't need "fixed" though. We need to resist the urge make things more effective, make things more like us (ok, that's a bit of an oxymoron, but you know what I mean).

All we need to do is enable local solutions. Enable the development of governance that enjoys populace-based legitimacy. To impose "effective Westerners" would be, IMO, a disaster of the highest order. In fact, if I were a Taliban commander I would PRAY that the coalition attempted such a tact, as it would ensure I had a steady supply of rank and file fighters for my unit.

We need some things we are not too good at:
1. Patience
2. Willingness to cede control of outcomes
3. Astuteness to avoid being overly manipulated by the current government.
4. Ability to overcome our fears of what would happen if the current challengers to that government made inroads.

Even flying Karzai appointees in in USMC aircraft makes me cringe...the strategic communications of that are so hard to overcome. Far better to wait until the man could drive in in a small convoy of white hilux's with an ANA or ANP escort. Even better wait until the local siystem of Shuras could apoint their own governor.

General Nick is pushing hard to do the right things in the right ways, but we have the iniertia of good intentions that we must overcome first.

[Steve the Planner]

Bob:

Right. There are fifty ways to do things.

I just got rung up for my volunteer shift in Haiti (through American Planning Association/UN Habitat). Does that require a westerner, or just a western assistance?

I am sure my UN ground support and framework will be from Nairobi(UN Habitat HQ, or someone (lots of locals) with a compatible face and language), and will be locally inter-connected, along with the links to all the other efforts.

But you can't ask a local administrator who has no budget, cell phone, or bicycle to make any big effects alone.

I have a pick of the Roads Shop outside Samarra from 2008. Not a truck, a backhoe or a stick of furniture left. And lots of Americans pointlessly hammering on the Salah ad Din DG Roads for why he wasn't getting the roads up and running, and making big budget execution goals happen.

So we grabbed folks with helicopters and D-9s to help him get done what he needed done. Adding fun to it, he could not be seen with US mil without getting shot, so we had to do a lot of going-between. But that's one way to solve a particular problem in a particular circumstance.

Every time I show that pic to planners. they say: So that's why everything was all screwed up!

It ain't gonna work if it just can't work. We have a very bold civilian transformation mission in Afghanistan, and a tight schedule.

Patience and duration are the real key, but that doesn't match the mission and schedule.

While Zahir is still ordering tea cups, the time will pass.

For all I know, the refugees from Marjah, some who have ben in Kabul for years, might have kids coming back from Graduate Management School in Switzerland, and are ready to re-build the place (with family opium wealth), if security returns.

So, what's a viable way through that gets somewhere to outr schedule and goals (that isn't a complete waste of effort).

[Bob's World]

Marjah is not a disaster area, it is part the most affluent region of Afghanistan. It has simply not been under GIROA governance, but has been under the Taliban.

The Coalition was, and will continue to be a great help with the security efforts; but what governing is required there does not in any way justify a preemption of legitmate local authority. Particularlly when one understands the effects such actions have in stregthening the support to the insurgency among the populace.

What we do need to keep an eye to is mititigating to the degree possible actions by the new governance to dip their own fingers into the substantial Poppy profits from the region for personal rather than collective gain; or to "resolve" land disputes by evicting current owners of premium land and replacing them via the "friends and family" program.

To install a Western governance to resolve such land disputes based on the "facts" that could be presented in a hearing would be a PR, and therefore strategic, disaster.

As Jesus said, "Give unto Ceaser, that which is Ceasar's."

To parphrase, "Leave unto the Afghans, that which is Afghan."

[Steve the Planner]

Bob:

That's the rub.

First, you create security.

Then, return stability.

Which returns the population, which then has to deal with the stability system put in place and get past it to establish some level of self-rule and representation.

If what is coming in in the stability phase is to linked to too many other bad actors, or non-locals, how do the locals get rid of them later?

How does one hand the transition, fast and effective, without a provisional structure that is, on its face, temporary, and allows restoration of post-conflict local engagement that will be sustainable and improved?

If the g.o.b. gobs up the works, the result will not meet the mission objective.

Steve

[jcustis]

Which returns the population, which then has to deal with the stability system put in place and get past it to establish some level of self-rule and representation.

If what is coming in in the stability phase is to linked to too many other bad actors, or non-locals, how do the locals get rid of them later?

How does one hand the transition, fast and effective, without a provisional structure that is, on its face, temporary, and allows restoration of post-conflict local engagement that will be sustainable and improved?

And therein lies one of the reasons why I scratch my head. Once you've got stability and the population back, so long as essential services are turned back on (were they ever there at all???), does it truly require a local governance component that may turn corrupt and untidy? What if the services came, and the people continued to go on living live as they saw fit.

You see (and I'm using my oustide voice hear again), this goes precisely back to the Sanctuary Denial thread we were kicking around some while ago. Why were the Taliban in Marjeh, and why did the people allow them to dwell among them? Was it coercion/co-option, tribal, familial, or simply "I hear you my brother," support?

Has anyone seen the answer to those questions? Have those questions even been asked. We really need to peel back that layer before we assume that a government in the box is really going to resolve the pure root causes of acceptance of the Taliban. Too often in that corner of the world we continue to assume that the people comply because they are afraid...it ain't always that simple.

[Steve the Planner]

jcustis:

How do the locals see us? What-if any- problem do they have for which we bring a valuable solution?

Unfortunately, the Taliban was there because they were less ruthless that the Police Chief, and it was a prosperous little poppy-based rural economy that didn't ask for much, or get much.

We brought danger, destruction, and the possible return of the bad guys. Next, we want to bring something of value, instead.

What is it?

[Infanteer]

Why were the Taliban in Marjeh, and why did the people allow them to dwell among them? Was it coercion/co-option, tribal, familial, or simply "I hear you my brother," support?

Perhaps the problem is viewing the "Taliban" as something separate from "the people"? Perhaps the Taliban existed in Marjah (and everywhere else) because they are, to any degree, of the people?

Bob's World spoke of two insurgencies - a revolutionary one (Quetta Shura) that views itself as a legitimate replacement for Karzai's government, and a reactionary one which is localized resistance to both foreign forces (to a larger degree) and northern suzerainty (to a lesser degree). Every village has its own "insurgency" for its own reason - police robbed them, ISAF destroyed their fields, mullah preaches a good line about the duties of expelling infidels, airstrike killed some villagers, it's the Pashtun thing to do, etc, etc. In essence, there are hundreds of small, reactionary insurgencies going on at the same time. The overarching revolutionary insurgency is the glue that binds these together. It takes all these grievances and turns them into "The Taliban" and can supply them with some extra horsepower. The best term for this I've seen is a "Pashtun Intifada".

Apply that to Marjah (or Panjwayi, or Arghandab, or Kunar) and you'll probably get your answer of why the Taliban were allowed to exist in the area.

My 2 cents.