Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
I'm also curious. Where do you think they might work?
They seemed to work pretty well in phases I-III of OIF and even Col. McMaster concedes the point to some extent several times in his essay. One example:

The major offensive operation that quickly toppled the Hussein regime in Iraq clearly demonstrated the possibilities associated with new technology, as well as the effects that improved speed, knowledge, and precision can have in the context of a large-scale offensive operation.
However, the initial phases of the operation also revealed important continuities in warfare that lie beyond the reach of technology. Unconventional forces will continue to evade detection from even the most advanced surveillance capabilities. Moreover, what commanders most needed to know about enemy forces, such as their degree of competence and motivation, lay completely outside the reach of technology.
I don't disagree at all with the above. However, in the end, Saddam's attempts at an unconventional strategy and use of unconventional forces to defend Iraq and his regime failed spectacularly. Col. McMaster is completely correct about the limits of surveillance and technology against unconventional forces, but they proved very useful against his conventional forces.

True but force structure has a significant effect on what your forces can be successfully committed to do.
Sure, but the case he points out was Iran - what force structure will help us coerce, deter them? One more focused on LIC/COIN or one more focused on HIC? Ironically, it was after what appeared to be the complete success of OIF in mid-2003 that Iran put forward a tentative offer for a grand rapprochement with the US.

I think there's much more to it. Planning failures and command disconnects (regrettably to include some parochialism...) were also involved.
Oh I agree - there is always more to the story and I agree with your points, but the fundamental problem of putting forces into and sustaining them in a landlocked country with no infrastructure remained. And of course there was the political pressure to act sooner which, IMO, also helped push the plan toward using locals.