Originally Posted by Ken White
Ah. The wisdom of the ages. Well said, Ken. The goal in Afghanistan should be a stable Islamic state that is a partner in the WoT and is not dependent on narco-economics. Please flush the idea of a secular, 'moderate' Islamic republic and deal with the only IO venue fit for fostering concord (mosque preaching) and the only operable unifying principal (Islam).
"Its easy, boys. All we have to do is follow my simple yet ingenius plan..."
One might suggest that in addition to the "western analogous filter" you identified earlier, one can add the concept of a "state." I would agree that Islam is the "only hope for a unifying principle" but seriously doubt it is unifying enough to hold "Afghanistan" (a state whose unnatural borders were drawn by outsiders) together for any significant length of time. Even if the US were to somehow succeed in establishing such a state, Afghanistan's neighbors will be sure to meddle as they always have once the US departs.
So while the goal you've provided is theoretically more achievable than a western-style secular democracy, it's one that I think is not ultimately in America's interest, nor a goal the US can husband into existence even it it were.
Entropy:
your post assumes two things;
1. Afghans will remain unchanged by the information revolution;
2. Partnering with the empire will not bring about deliverable advantages for the infant Afghan state.
IMO the greatest obstacle to a stable Afghanistan is the poppy industry. Legitimate industry has a funny way of dispelling illegitimate commerce. Look at South Korea, a nation with virtually no natural resources - and is now a top 10 world economy since US intervention.
Have hope, folks. And think 1776, not 2001.
1776? Wouldn't that be when the backwater locals rose up against the beneficent Empire and the foreign troops that sought to uphold the rule of law?
Or was it the revolution of rebellion against imposed religious ideology in favor of self-determination?1776? Wouldn't that be when the backwater locals rose up against the beneficent Empire and the foreign troops that sought to uphold the rule of law?
No.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Depends.
Not the diaper; depends on whether you accord to the Scotch Irish view of that rebellion or not...
I certainly don't assume #1. But at the same time I don't assume the information revolution is going to make the creation of an enduring and viable central authority (of whatever stripe) in Afghanistan any easier.
As for #2, no, I don't assume partnering won't bring advantages, but then again I don't assume that it will bring advantages either. The problem, as I see it, is not so much supporting a nascent Afghan state (which is what we're doing), but making that state legitimate in the eyes of the populace that State purportedly represents.
And I see little similarity between South Korea and Afghanistan. The history, culture and geographic position of each are wildly different.
Ken,
Not necessarily inimical, but little in the way of clear benefit for the US, especially considering the cost in blood and treasure. Some kind of central and stable government would be nice, but does it pass a cost-benefit test? A lot depends on what US strategic goals are or should be. Are they limited to dealing with the threat from AQ and associated groups or something more?What in that is inimical to our interest?
History, for one thing. There have been many attempts at the creation of some kind of "Afghan" state and all failed. Attempts with foreign sponsors failed spectacularly. Tribal societies in general do not have a good history of enduring central authority. Given enough time - generations - it might be possible, but I agree with Eden's last sentence (which you quote above) and that is only one difficulty. One of the many other elephants in the room is Pakistan, which does not want a strong Afghanistan, nor one that it can't control. Pakistani fears are not unjustified from their point of view. Pakistan can, will and is playing spoiler in our nation-building efforts in Afghanistan.Why cannot the US and the rest of the coalition in Afghanistan do that?
So I don't have much hope for the long-term prospects of an Afghan state, but that doesn't mean it's not useful to try for the time-being.
I don't think similarity was the point; I think his aim was the benefit -- or not -- of US intervention and the resultant relative stability (important word, relative...). Stability in N.Asia and S. Asia are two very different things.Our intervention and long stay in Korea was and is of little clear benefit to the US. Kosovo? Even Viet Nam. We do a lot of things that are of little clear benefit to us; have for years.Not necessarily inimical, but little in the way of clear benefit for the US, especially considering the cost in blood and treasure.Good question does it? What are the benefit parameters and over what period of time will they be measured (note future tense)?Some kind of central and stable government would be nice, but does it pass a cost-benefit test?Not having been a fly on the wall at Foggy Bottom or the Five Sided Funny Farm much less the WH or Camp David, I can't answer your question. I can say from my perspective that the strategy is far more encompassing than either Afghanistan or Iraq; that Iraq is mostly about attacks on US interests worldwide that originate in or from the ME and Afghanistan is mostly about attacks on US soil --plus we intend to repair our earlier failing of helping remove the Russian and then abandoning the area. In short, our presence may or may nor bring added stability -- we've already discovered our absence guarantees less stability...A lot depends on what US strategic goals are or should be. Are they limited to dealing with the threat from AQ and associated groups or something more?History is a good thing, it teaches many lessons. One thing it teaches is that the Afghans like to fight each other but have achieved a balancing act of relative calm on occasion.History, for one thing. There have been many attempts at the creation of some kind of "Afghan" state and all failed.True, thus our ultra light hand in the area -- which IMO is good and I disagree that a large amount of troops infused will be a pure benefit.Attempts with foreign sponsors failed spectacularly.True; onlly as they transition to post-tribal does that occur.Tribal societies in general do not have a good history of enduring central authority.Or even probable; the number of generations required then becomes the issue. I'd have put it at five or more five years ago; now it may be possible in a couple.Given enough time - generations - it might be possibleIf you noticed, I politley disagreed with that contention. I still do. The American people as a whole are far more tolerant of stuff like this than the media and the academics (and too many Generals...) think. NATO is another subject and will probably be less tolerant but I doubt that will have much effect on the US effort....I agree with Eden's last sentence (which you quote above) and that is only one difficulty.I totally agree and as R.A. and I agreed some time ago, something needs to be done about that. My sensing is that we are starting to get slowly pissed. We'll see.One of the many other elephants in the room is Pakistan, which does not want a strong Afghanistan, nor one that it can't control. Pakistani fears are not unjustified from their point of view. Pakistan can, will and is playing spoiler in our nation-building efforts in Afghanistan.It is not our job to bring stability of any sort at any level to South Asia -- but someone has to try. We had the audacity to do that. Whether we will be successful or not is TBD. Either way, the long term prospects of an Afghan state are IMO a tertiary issue at most.So I don't have much hope for the long-term prospects of an Afghan state, but that doesn't mean it's not useful to try for the time-being.
Last edited by Ken White; 08-02-2008 at 02:52 AM. Reason: Typos
Is McCaffrey's report ...
open-source, online ? I'd like to read what he says - not what he is said to have said. So, if there is a url to the report, please.
Otherwise, I'm staying out of this one, where I've found out that:
1. My French-Canadian ancestors and relatives started the American Revolution. Not so; but they could have prevented it if Coulon had executed Washington at Fort Necessity.
2. The Revolution was started by the Scotch-Irish. That I can believe, since my wife is 1/8th Scotch-Irish (Blair).
Seriously, an interesting discussion, which is most timely in light of current, breaking events.
Entropy:
Thanks for clarifying your positions. I would like to respectfully respond...
The information revolution overcomes the problem of linkage with outside forces. It may help the central gov't in Afghanistan promulgate its messages for national unity/identity in the long run. The erection of a serviceable and truly transnational information infrastructure is still a generation away.
The text I bolded above is the classical definition of a COIN problem statement. Winning legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghans (not a monolithic entity) requires vigorous cultural, religious and economic engagement. There is no strategy for achieving success in a COIN fight in Afghanistan that does not include Islam.
As for Korea, while I do not intend to conflate apples/oranges here, Korea had few connections with the outside world, a devastated infrastructure, had just emerged from a brutal Japanese occupation, had little natural resources and hostile powers on its border. There are some similarities between the two models IMO.
I guess that would explain why we still have a significant cigarette smuggling problem, which, BTW, I suspect will get worse as the taxes on tobacco are boosted even more.
Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris
Why?
Actually, two whys:
What in that is inimical to our interest?
Why cannot the US and the rest of the coalition in Afghanistan do that?
MSG Proctor where have you been hiding......that is some Strategic Stuff you got there
So in other words most here agree that the war is lost because its objective of a stable, power monopoly central state that keeps AQ out won't happen?
A victory (using unaspiring definitions of victory that I usually don't share) would then only be possible if the very goals of the war were changed by our governments (especially deleting the "secular" and allow sharia - you know that won't happen).
What's the difference to just leave and let the civil war parties fight on, supporting the non-Taleban civil war parties along the late 2001/early 2002 invasion model?
It's not like all warlords had disappeared, after all. Afaik they're just saving their forces for the final fights after the Westerners left, just like most militias in Iraq do afaik.
I don't think that's what anyone said.
You have a bad tendency to try to apparently misquote or misunderstand others...
No one said that; what was said was that it would not accord to the western 'democratic' vision.I believe that...A victory (using unaspiring definitions of victory that I usually don't share)First place, there's no such thing as 'victory' in a COIN operation, all one can do is achieve an acceptable outcome, I see no difficulty in obtaining that in Afghanistan...would then only be possibleSince our governments are adapting on a daily basis to realities on the ground, I think that's quite incorrect. Since Sharia is already in effect in Afghanistan, I'm curious as to on what you base that statement....if the very goals of the war were changed by our governments (especially deleting the "secular" and allow sharia - you know that won't happen).Probably true; they have long memories over there. However, the answer to your question is generational change and hopefully improvement in attitude. We're there to antagonize and thus accelerate that change from five or more to about two generations-- your kids will see the result. Be patient..It's not like all warlords had disappeared, after all. Afaik they're just saving their forces for the final fights after the Westerners left, just like most militias in Iraq do afaik.
SlapOut9,MSG Proctor where have you been hiding......that is some Strategic Stuff you got there
Thanks, I'm nobody and I know nothing, I am doing PSAs for CH(COL) Kenneth Sampson's brilliant strategy published in his War College monograph attached to reply #11 in this thread.
I am certainly not an expert on Afghanistan (although COL Sampson is) but have extensive experience in helping unravel the religious arteries and veins in Iraq. We have no hope of any kind of success at all with any anchor point that is antagonistic to [traditional, more orthodox expressions of] Islam. We have every reason to hope and expect progress and long term partnerships with Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the greater Islamic world if we can adapt to conditions that allow Islam to inform democracy.
There are no panaceas, no silver bullets, no ready-made solutions in Afghanistan. The subject of this thread questions the wisdom or utility of a "Surge" of forces in OEF to stop the hemmorraging there similar to the way the Petraeus strategy did in OIF in 2007. My opinion is that the surge of forces informed by the right IO strategy can be highly successful. The ONLY truly transnational values in Afghanistan now are the common creed of Islam; the only transnational 'media' that exists is the Mosque sermon.
People much smarter than me can make the case that religion can be a potent force in fueling nationalism, and nationalism in this stage of the Afghan Republic's infancy would probably be a good thing.
I agree with Ken White's assessment that lasting, enduring change will take 20-40 years, but these concrete steps must surely be part of that strategy:
1. Co-opt the Islamic scholars, preachers and prayer leaders by forming councils and federations for mutual advantage;
2. Distribute mass media infrastructure to link Afghans together in purpose and identity;
3. Promote literacy;
4. Reward Afghan military leaders that lead well and demonstrate loyalty to the Afghan ideal;
5. Involve the UN/NATO in replacing the poppy trade with a legitimate commodity for international trade. This may involve outrageous sums of subsidies from donor nations (probably already underway, at least from our government's standpoint).
OK, I'm off my soapbox for a while. Kudos to all for a stimulating discussion....
The goal in any nation building effort ought to be a stable state. All of the rest: source of stability, partnership in GWOT, source of economic power needs to be flushed with the list in the second sentence. Otherwise, the US effort (or any other "state stablizing/building" intervention by any country/coalition that is imbued with the latest instantiation of the huiman predilection for "missionary zeal") will be palliating short term suffering at the expense of introducing the seeds of long term instability.
Western states have been doing this kind of misguided crap for at least 4 centuries now; one would think they might have smartened up a little by now.
The most important thing, IMHO, about the aftermath of the American Revolution is that the 13 colonies figured out for themselves what kind of nation they wanted as/after they succesfully got the armies of George III to depart. While they had French help in ejecting Howe, Clinton, Cornwallis, et. al., they had no such help in writing the Declaration of Independence, Articles of Confederacy or Constitution. Maybe the ISAF/US coalition should try taking a page from American history and allow the Afghans to practice some self-determination instead of cramming its interpretation of stability and civilization down their throats.
Last edited by wm; 08-02-2008 at 03:53 PM. Reason: typo fixes
Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris
What he said...
Too logical, though, I suppose...
Such as Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen? I think your view of Islam as a unifying force is somewhat inappropriate for Afghanistan. It is certainly a major factor, but it is not the single unifying symbolic force you appear to assume it is. If you want to talk about symbols of national unity, you would be better off discussing the Afghan monarchy.
It would have been nice if that had happened at the 2003 Loya Jirga. Still and all, you are quite right that the ISAF/US coalition needs to agree to Afghan self-determination.
Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Senior Research Fellow,
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
Carleton University
http://marctyrrell.com/
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