Operationalizing The Jones Model through COG

[Bob's World]

All of this is complex stuff. The Model I have worked up is intentionally designed to provide a simple, general framework to help sort through all of that complexity to focus on what is really important.

Also obvious, is that we all look at these problems through our own lenses, burdened by our own baggage. I certainly include myself in that assessment.

Take Wilf for example (please, god help me, somebody take Wilf!! ) We all know that he sees insurgency as war, and that popular discontent is only insurgency once it goes violent. At which point the military is sent in to defeat the violence. No more "insurgency." On the Jones mode I recognize that all of this happens on a continuum; and that there are, I believe, common factors, (as measured by the populaces perception, and yes, Dayuan, at some point one does have to make an assessment themselves of how it is they understand that popular perception to be).

So as governance gets more "Poor" the natural trend is for violence to rise. A leader of the dissident groups may opt for a non-violent approach, as Dr Maria Stephan advocates in her work. History shows that it is twice as likely to produce change where no legal means for change exists than violent approaches are. Or a governmental leader may have such charisma, like Mr. Obama, that the populace is temporarily satisfied with what would otherwise be assessed as poor; or greater external threats, like a WWII going on, may cause a populace to accept greater poorness; or the military may suppress violence and create a perception of goodness.

So, yes, the British Empire was very much an economic empire, of which the US Empire is derived. Cost/Benefit analysis and spread sheets driving decisions. Did the China or India become less productive? Did the Middle East begin to produce less oil or the Suez canal become less important? Did the American Colonies become less productive and show less potential? No on all counts. Sure, not all moved all the way up the Jones model into full blown, in your face classic insurgency. Some only moved so far as to make the Juice no longer worth the proverbial Squeeze. The Costs of occupation exceeded the Benefit of Occupation. Certainly factors at home, like the great costs and disruptions of WWI and II factor in, but if the colony could have contributed to digging out of the hole it would have been retained. Those major disruptions served to shift the equation adequately so as to allow the suppressed to make the cost exceed the benefit and prevail.

Now, Dayuhan says how can Saudi Arabia (The decisive point for GWOT IMO) be brought into such conversations, they receive no support from the US, the opposite is true he says. Really? The Saudis sell us discount oil in exchange for our commitment to defend them against all threats, foreign and domestic?? I know the Gulf War was a while ago, but I still remember. The Saudis have three great fears: 1. Iran. 2. Shia in general, but particularly the large oppressed Shia populace whose lands lay within Saudi Arabia atop half of their oil. 3 There entire oppressed populace as a whole. When it comes to countering insurgency, the Saudis never let the grass grow too tall. The should be pros at this, they have been doing it since their inception. Now they get to do it with the full blessing and sanction of the US because they call it "counterterrorism."


Now, entropy points out the importance of control. But I think you really need to assess just what you mean by control. Is control the ability of the state to prevent popular action, or is control the willingness of the populace to submit to government policy and rules????

Does a jockey "control" his horse? Yes, but the horse could turn and kill the jockey whenever it chose to do so.

Does a single police officer in an intersection "control" traffic? Yes, but again, only so long as the populace driving the cars consents to submit to his rules.

Bottom line is that control is a tenuous thing, and is really more of a misnomer than most of us probably think about when we use the word. I am sure I could plot another line on my model to show how much effort must be exerted by a government to "control" as governance moves from "Goodness" to "Badness."

Oh, and yes, I do use "Despotism" interchangeably with "Poor Governance." I am a huge fan of the American story, of the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution and our Bill of Rights. These documents are ground zero for anyone who wants to study Insurgency and COIN. If they are not on your shelf next to your Galua and Kitson, you missing some critical links in your chain of knowledge.

The US was born of insurgency. We formally recognize the duty and right of a populace to rise up in insurgency when faced with Despotism. Powerful stuff. Then we added a Bill of Rights that when one reads with the eyes of an insurgent/counterinsurgent, one sees how it was designed to specifically prevent a government from doing things that were key to the causal perceptions of Poor Governance going into the revolt with England; and also in preserving key powers and rights in the populace to allow them to always be so informed, so strong, as to keep any government in check.

Good input guys.

[Entropy]

Col. Jones,

By "control" I generally mean the ability to enforce your governance (whatever it is) and prevent competitors. In your example it's not enough, in my view, to simply provide a justice system - even one that's perceived as superior to the Taliban's - one must also have the capacity to enforce adherence to that system's decisions as well as to credibly prevent competition ranging from vigilantism to a full-blown shadow government.

In other words, building a system of justice is not the same thing as actually providing justice. For the latter you need much more than judicial institutions. "If you build it, they will come" does not apply.

We can build courthouses, we can train people to operate a judicial system and teach them the concepts of law, etc. All that is wasted if the Taliban can come in, post a bunch of night letters and assassinate a few judges as examples. If you can't prevent the Taliban from doing that, then what credibility do you have with the populace? Why should they trust your justice system if you can't even do that?

So I'm skeptical that it's possible to focus on one discrete part of government (ie. Justice) and work only on that. I'm skeptical that one government good can be singled out and improved or implemented without improving the governance system more generally. Governance is probably more interrelated that it initially appears.

[slapout9]

We can build courthouses, we can train people to operate a judicial system and teach them the concepts of law, etc. All that is wasted if the Taliban can come in, post a bunch of night letters and assassinate a few judges as examples. If you can't prevent the Taliban from doing that, then what credibility do you have with the populace? Why should they trust your justice system if you can't even do that?

That is one point where the old Special Forces model would be superior to what is being done today. WE (USA) wouldn't being building, doing or fighting anybody or anyone except in immediate self defense. WE would be teaching the Afghans to do it through Guerrilla forces-CA units-and PSYOPS. If the Taliban showed up with a night letter they would get their throat cut by an.....Afghan village resistance fighter..... not a US soldier. In the old school the US wouldn't even use a term like "winning" because the mission is to teach the indigenous population to win not for us (USA) to win because if we did it would destroy the credibility of the local government. My 2 cents.

[Bob's World]

Col. Jones,

By "control" I generally mean the ability to enforce your governance (whatever it is) and prevent competitors. In your example it's not enough, in my view, to simply provide a justice system - even one that's perceived as superior to the Taliban's - one must also have the capacity to enforce adherence to that system's decisions as well as to credibly prevent competition ranging from vigilantism to a full-blown shadow government.

In other words, building a system of justice is not the same thing as actually providing justice. For the latter you need much more than judicial institutions. "If you build it, they will come" does not apply.

We can build courthouses, we can train people to operate a judicial system and teach them the concepts of law, etc. All that is wasted if the Taliban can come in, post a bunch of night letters and assassinate a few judges as examples. If you can't prevent the Taliban from doing that, then what credibility do you have with the populace? Why should they trust your justice system if you can't even do that?

So I'm skeptical that it's possible to focus on one discrete part of government (ie. Justice) and work only on that. I'm skeptical that one government good can be singled out and improved or implemented without improving the governance system more generally. Governance is probably more interrelated that it initially appears.

Read the paper. There are 4 causal perceptions as assessed through the eyes of the populace. Does the populace perceive that the system of law as applied to them to be just. In the example the way determined to help build this perception is through providing quality justice workers, retaining them through good pay, keeping them safe in secure homes and offices, and putting them where the populace has access. It's just an example, not a universal cure for perceptions of injustice. You must assess all perceptions and strive to work all of them.

I would argue, however that you have "control" as a first order effect or even a task; whereas I see it as a second order effect. So you might put is in the CR box, I would have it in the CC box. IF one can produce Good Governance, then one will have "control" over their populace. One can have very Poor Governance indeed, and exert extreme control (task) over the populace to keep them in line. That is no state I want to live in. You just described a dictatorship. Oh, like the Saudis. They control the populace. No place I'd want to be a citizen of.

Here in Afghanistan we don't focus on building perceptions of Justice, in fact we are focusing on imposing "Rule of Law" instead. God how I hate that phrase, and I am a former Prosecutor. It smacks of the "control" you speak of. I for one do not want to live in a state that exists to control my behavior. Obviously they all do to some degree, or it is Anarchy, but it is all in the degree and the means applied. Good Governance is a nuance one must always be tuned into, or you can quickly find that what once worked is no longer producing the same effect and you are slipping in the wrong direction.

[Dayuhan]

at some point one does have to make an assessment themselves of how it is they understand that popular perception to be).

Of course we make assessments. When we propose to act on those assessments, though, we do well to remind ourselves that we are acting on our own assessments, which are colored by our own prejudices and preconceptions. We are not acting on behalf of a foreign populace.

So as governance gets more "Poor" the natural trend is for violence to rise. A leader of the dissident groups may opt for a non-violent approach, as Dr Maria Stephan advocates in her work. History shows that it is twice as likely to produce change where no legal means for change exists than violent approaches are.

As I said before, non-violent political action is extremely effective if the cause in question has widespread public support. It wouldn’t have worked for Timothy McVeigh in the US, and it wouldn’t have worked for OBL in Saudi Arabia, for the same reason: they didn’t have the level of support required to make non-violent action effective. Most terrorist groups are in this position, that’s why they resort to terrorism. 300 people waving signs outside a capital is a joke. 300 people going on strike is barely noticed. 300 people setting off bombs in public places is a major event. So if 300 people want a major event, what do they do? Pretty obvious, really.

Now, Dayuhan says how can Saudi Arabia (The decisive point for GWOT IMO) be brought into such conversations, they receive no support from the US, the opposite is true he says. Really? The Saudis sell us discount oil in exchange for our commitment to defend them against all threats, foreign and domestic?? I know the Gulf War was a while ago, but I still remember. The Saudis have three great fears: 1. Iran. 2. Shia in general, but particularly the large oppressed Shia populace whose lands lay within Saudi Arabia atop half of their oil. 3 There entire oppressed populace as a whole. When it comes to countering insurgency, the Saudis never let the grass grow too tall. The should be pros at this, they have been doing it since their inception. Now they get to do it with the full blessing and sanction of the US because they call it "counterterrorism."

I don’t think there is a decisive point for GWOT, because I don’t think there is a GWOT: the term was invented because it made a good sound bite and has persisted with little question, but I don’t think any such thing really exists.

Do the Saudis sell us discount oil? Since when? As far as I know we pay market price for Saudi oil. Once upon a time they used to shave a few cents to keep the market share, which they found useful in diplomatic situations, but they don’t do that now.

Of course we protected the Saudis from external aggression, and of course we’d do it again in the unlikely event that they were threatened by the Iranians. That’s not defense of the Saudi regime, it’s defense of our own interests: letting the bulk of the Gulf oil reserves fall under the control of an overtly hostile power is not and would not be an acceptable outcome for the US, no matter how we feel about the Saudi government. We could threaten that we won’t come to the aid of the Saudis in the event of foreign aggression if they don’t do what we want, but the threat would be hollow, we and they both know it… and it’s not likely that such a threat would earn us any points with any segment of the Saudi populace. Rather the opposite.

Do we have a commitment to defend the Saudis against domestic threats? Not that I know of… and again, threatening to withhold such defense wouldn’t mean much, as the Saudis don’t face any internal threat that they can’t manage themselves. The only time I recall the Saudis asking for external help with an internal security issue was during the seizure of the Grand Mosque back in ’79… and they asked the French. Again, there’s no leverage here that’s going to force the Saudi regime to change their domestic policies.

Of course the Saudis buy arms from us, but those deals are as much to our advantage as theirs: we need the income and the jobs and if we stopped selling the Saudis could buy hardware elsewhere with the greatest of ease.

The Saudi regime’s relationship with its populace is in any event far better today than it was in the 90s, when the economic dislocation of the oil glut and the American military presence provided continuing irritants. The regime dealt with the problem in a most American way: they threw money at it. Lots of money, hundreds of billions. Since the oil price surge the Saudis have poured huge amounts into public sector salary increases, job-creating industries, infrastructure, schools, housing, health care, etc, etc. Of course it’s a straight buyout, but it’s been pretty successful at buying popular passivity. The royals seem to think that most of the populace is quite ok with being ruled by a medieval anachronism as long as the medieval anachronism delivers the goods. So far it looks like they’re right. Of course they haven’t pleased everyone, nobody ever does. Of course it’s not a permanent solution… but that’s not our problem, it’s theirs.

I very much doubt that any portion of the Saudi populace wants to see the US pressuring the Saudi government to do anything. No matter how well-intentioned such pressure actually was, it would be invariably interpreted as self-interested meddling and would provide a propaganda bonanza for anti-American forces. As in many other areas, foreign support for a reform agenda can actually discredit that agenda by making it seem like something that was initiated from the outside.

I’m curious, though… what exactly do you think we could do to force the Saudis to modify their domestic policies, and what specific modifications in Saudi domestic policy would you seek?

Oh, and yes, I do use "Despotism" interchangeably with "Poor Governance."

I'm not sure the equivalence is valid. Certainly by our standards all despotism is bad governance... though as you've said yourself, our standards don't matter, and if the populace is ok with what we think despotic, it's none of our business. But can you not imagine a circumstance in which governance is neither despotic nor good? What if governance is simply inept, or missing? That's not necessarily despotism, but it's not good governance either.

All despotism may be bad governance, but I don't see how that makes all bad governance despotism.

I am a huge fan of the American story, of the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution and our Bill of Rights.

So am I. Brilliant documents, and they've done wonderful things for us. If you want to go on a mission to bring them to the rest of the world, though, please stop the train and let me off, because I see a monumental crash coming.

[Bob's World]

My point was that the Saudis DO NOT sell us discount oil in exchange for commiting our national treasure, reputation and blood to their continued defense. They see it as their right.

The Saudis look at the American Military and Oil Industry Engineers, and perhaps even our leadership, in the same way they look at the thousands of Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Philippino, etc workers they import to deal with other dirty work that is beneath them.

Most Saudi's want moderate reforms, such as a judiciary not controlled by the King (Justice, anyone?); Others would like to have some voice (Hope) in the system; others greater equality (Respect); many perceive (and this perception is targeted heavily by OBL, who is not a Saudi insurgent, he is conducting UW to incite and leverage the Saudi populace to rise up) that the King would not be such a bad guy but that he has lost his way in eroding his support to what the people want in favor of his relationship with the US, thereby calling his (legitimacy) into question.

I also would never promote pushing US Values onto others; principles that we buy into perhaps, but always urge that we resist the tendency to see how we do something as the way everyone else needs to do the same things (Democracy, womens rights, corruption, etc) We come across as judgmental A-holes when we do that. My point is that the documents I mention have powerfull COIN mechanism woven into them due to their origin in Insurgency. There are great lessons for those who look and think.

Every culture is different and needs to develop guiding documents and forms of govenrance that work for them. But there are principles that can be derived from American documents that are proven effective in the prevention of Governmental abuses and the resultant insurgency that comes from such abuses. (and no, the American Civil War was not insurgency; there are lessons there as well. But anytime an emotional, economic issue divides a country geographically, it is a red flag that all should take seriously).

[Dayuhan]

My point was that the Saudis DO NOT sell us discount oil in exchange for commiting our national treasure, reputation and blood to their continued defense. They see it as their right.

Possibly they simply see it as a mutual interest, which it is. We defend the Saudis against external aggression because it is in our interest to do so. Why would we expect to be paid, or given concessions, for acting in our own interest?

Most Saudi's want moderate reforms, such as a judiciary not controlled by the King (Justice, anyone?); Others would like to have some voice (Hope) in the system; others greater equality (Respect); many perceive (and this perception is targeted heavily by OBL, who is not a Saudi insurgent, he is conducting UW to incite and leverage the Saudi populace to rise up) that the King would not be such a bad guy but that he has lost his way in eroding his support to what the people want in favor of his relationship with the US, thereby calling his (legitimacy) into question.

I wouldn't presume to know what most Saudis want.

I do know that in the 90s many Saudis believed (and stated) that there was a connection between the continued American military presence and the painfully low (for them) price of oil. That perception was inaccurate, but it was widespread and had an extremely negative impact on Saudi perceptions of the US. There was a widespread belief that the US troops would never leave, that the US would never allow Saudi Arabia to get what they saw as a fair price for oil, that the US would never allow Saudi Arabia the international position that they thought it deserved, that the US would ultimately begin converting Muslims and violating the holy places, etc. Those beliefs created a great deal of resentment and friction. They are also gone. The American troops are gone, the holy places are unviolated, no conversions happened. The price of oil soared, and the US just paid up, like everyone else. At the height of the oil price spike President Bush went to Riyadh to ask the king to pump more oil; the King told him that the problem was speculation, not supply, and refused. The regional implications of that visit, long forgotten by most Americans, are profound. The claim that the US controls the king is empty, and everyone knows it but the most blinded religious extremists.

I don't think any significant number of Saudis see any connection between US influence and their own complaints with the local justice system... or any other local issues. There's a great deal of internal conflict on these issues, generally between (relative) progressives and the religious traditionalists, but the US has no real influence on internal affairs. I've heard all kinds of accusations directed at the US by Saudis, many of them pretty wild, but I've never heard anyone claim that the US is obstructing reform in the Saudi justice system. I've heard a lot of complaint about US pressure to reform that justice system in accord with our view of human rights, but nobody saying that the US is preventing change or reform.

I repeat... what exactly do you think we could do to force the Saudis to modify their domestic policies, and what specific modifications in Saudi domestic policy would you seek?

Every culture is different and needs to develop guiding documents and forms of govenrance that work for them. But there are principles that can be derived from American documents that are proven effective in the prevention of Governmental abuses and the resultant insurgency that comes from such abuses.

Possibly so, and there are lessons as well in the founding principles and experiences of many other nations. If others choose to learn from these, or use them as models, all well and good. We can't force anyone to do that, and if we try to push anyone in that direction we're likely to end up driving them away from it. People don't like to be pushed, and it's not our role or responsibility to be telling others how to govern themselves. To help, perhaps, if we're asked to help... and even then we have to be very careful and very restrained. But to take the initiative in some sort of behaviour modification program aimed at other nations... nothing there but trouble, I'm afraid. If we go around telling people not to despair, we are coming to save them with our carrots and our sticks, I really don't anticipate a very positive reaction.

[slapout9]

Possibly so, and there are lessons as well in the founding principles and experiences of many other nations. If others choose to learn from these, or use them as models, all well and good. We can't force anyone to do that, and if we try to push anyone in that direction we're likely to end up driving them away from it. People don't like to be pushed, and it's not our role or responsibility to be telling others how to govern themselves. To help, perhaps, if we're asked to help... and even then we have to be very careful and very restrained. But to take the initiative in some sort of behaviour modification program aimed at other nations... nothing there but trouble, I'm afraid. If we go around telling people not to despair, we are coming to save them with our carrots and our sticks, I really don't anticipate a very positive reaction.

Important points and I think you and Col. Jones are closer to the same concepts than you think. If you use the Jones model as I understand it, all you would be doing is helping that country establish the good government that it wants not what we (US) want. The real problem as I see it is if you ask a local population the 4 questions we (US) may get answers that we don't like. And because of that we may have to face the fact that sometimes we should just leave people (other countries) alone.

[Bob's World]

A couple of minor, yet significant refinements:

I believe that an essential concept for understanding insurgency, and by correlation, being able to design and implement effective COIN campaigns, is that of "Conditions of Insurgency" that are present in every society, but that fluctuate based upon popular perceptions of governance.

My definition as I currently think of this concept:

"Conditions of Insurgency: A state of mind. The conditions of insurgency arguably exist to some degree within every populace. In most cases such conditions are benign in that they are not strong enough to support the rise of a significant insurgent organization, even if manipulated by outside actors conducting UW or by ideological themes designed for this audience. As perceptions of poor governance increase so does the degree of the conditions of insurgency. Left unchecked these conditions are apt to be exploited by internal and/or external parties for purposes of their own that may or may not have the welfare of the affected populace in mind. Conditions of insurgency are caused by the government and assessed through the perspective of the populace."

And an updated chart to show what this might look like:

[slapout9]

Bob, so what would be an outline to counter these conditions?