Very well.Originally Posted by William F. Owen
You quote Clausewitz as stating that means is "Combat."
He also says the following (from the Paret translation)
"Creation and maintenance [of fighting forces] are obviously only means; their use constitutes the ends."
"The original means of strategy is victory"
"Individual engagements with particular aims are to be classified as means"
"A set of secondary objectives may serve as means to the ultimate goal"
"Surprise, therefore, becomes the means to gain superiority..."
"The simultaneous use of all means intended for a given action appears as an elementary law of war."
So, you can quote Clausewitz to me all you like. A broader synthesis of his ideas, which does not rely on the exact wording of whatever translation you are reading, is a more convincing argument than "Clausewitz said XYZ."
There are two types of people in this world, those who divide the world into two types and those who do not.
-Jeremy Bentham, Utilitarian Philosopher
http://irondice.wordpress.com/
Well now let me piss everybody off. I say this.
1-Ends=Strategy because it decides what Objectives (Centers of Gravity to attack).
2-Ways=Tactics or how many ways can you organize your means to attack the COG's.
3-Means=the available weapons and troops to do it with.
Here's the explanation. Paret translation, book one, chapter two, page 95. Tell me what it says! This where Clausewitz defines "means" in terms of Ends, Ways and Means, not just uses the word "means."
No he's not. You are misleading him. This explains why most people do not understand strategy, and that would be 99% of the broader military community.You're on the right track. Mr. Owen will disagree with you, but even he will admit that 99% of the broader military community embraces this meaning of ends, ways, and means.
If you think that means is "resources" then you will never be able to explain the fundamental relationship between tactics and strategy.
based on that, the side with the most resources wins. Strategy is a not a bridge between politics and equipment.
Last edited by William F. Owen; 12-15-2010 at 02:12 PM. Reason: spelling
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Ya Allah!! No!
Ends is the Policy. It is the "end state" you seek. (destination)
Ways is how this will be sought. (journey, route,)
Means is the application of the ways. (walking, swimming, riding)
Strategy links Policy with Tactics. This is why tactics must support the Policy, and the strategy can only be effective in tactics.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
That is solid gold IMO. That is why Guerrilla forces are willing to take the risk of spitting in Superman's face. They know how to organize their fighters into Kryptonite.
In a perfect world I would agree, but this is America we don't do Policy, we don't plan stuff because that is Commonism(I spelled it right) and we don't do Commonism. We do the Invisible Hand Thing, so I think the best we can do is pick the right target and let that be the End.
Funnily, the procurement of B-17 bombers was initially officially justified with the need to defend the U.S. against hostile navies...
--------------
@Wilf:
Tell me the book & chapter for the way, means, ends stuff in "Vom Kriege" and I'll look up the German original.
He most likely choose one of two German words for "means" - they are both more specific in their meaning than "means".
So will I on that interpretation
and I'll also agree with Wilf that a large percentage -- not 99 but a bunch -- of the broader military community is out to lunch on a lot of things.
That is primarily due to the fact that they have other, more important to them, interests. Thus they only focus peripherally and as deemed necessary (or only when forced for too many...) on things militaire. Ponder that.
Describing 'means' as resources is totally inadequate. Methods would be far better word in that overly simplistic definition of strategy...
I can get a twofer out of this, you quoted Bob's World:While I agree with Bob on many things, I have to point out that while certainly part the stated intent of SF and lesser SOF was to be able to provide strategic effects, the actuality is that only quite rarely will they actually do or have done that.Originally Posted by Bob's World
They are called strategic bombers because they were intended to be employed to product strategic effects. The same is true for SOF.:
They and the bombers are yet another case of the continuum that is warfare and are more proof the direct application of a 'strategic tool' to tactical applications is far more common than is the reverse, a tactical item or effort having a strategic effect.
As Fuchs illustrates, things nominally designed for a specific role -- quite often hewing to the 'strategic' in the political justification -- are most often used as tactical methodology and requirements of the moment happen to dictate. Flexibility is super critical...
As an aside, one of my recurring arguments with Bob's World is that the US does not do Grand Strategy, the political milieu won't stand for it. Regardless, the Pols do however like to be seen as 'strategic thinkers'...
Ken,
We do hate to constrain ourselves, and certainly a Grand Strategy does that, as well as guide our policies and actions.
One of my favorite insights on this topic is from a discussion shared by David Eisenhower that he had with is father, Ike.
What Ike said, was in essence, that the most important aspect of Containment was not the containment of others, but the containing effects it had on ourselves.
I would submit that since the fall of Soviet Union the US has been feeling a whole lot less "contained," with our global behavior becoming increasingly outrageous over the past 20 years. OEF-P from its very beginning was contained by strict rules that protected the sovereignty of that country. Most of the good of that campaign comes as a result of actions shaped to fit within those tight parameters. OIF and OEF-A began without such constraints, allowing us to act in ways that have done us as much harm as good.
But yeah, Grand Strategy is often more concept than reality. Too inconvenient. Too difficult to formulate or adhere to.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
We do well not to cherrypick, which is
a cheap lawyer's trick (and we certainly don't want to be that
Actually, the 2009 SSI monograph uses "blitzkrieg" 10 times - of which this on p.34 (p.42 pdf) seems material to the present conversation:
RegardsThe Germans in the interwar years did not, as far as can be determined, recognize the term “operational art.” The independence that commanders enjoyed under freie operationen to sequence tactical actions in pursuit of higher-level objectives meant that the role that we currently ascribe to operational art existed in the broad fabric of the German understanding of war and consequently in their preparation of leaders and training of staffs. World War II German operational art was therefore seen in praxis rather than in doctrine.
Advanced combined arms tactics applied by aggressive leaders sometimes exercising considerable personal initiative to create and develop deep penetrations, followed by wide envelopments to encircle, isolate, and destroy large enemy groupings, was the German way of war. It was shared by the German military in a sufficiently broad sense apparently that it did not warrant comprehensive theoretical examination. The contribution of German theorists following World War I was therefore not in operational art, but in the development of an approach to combined arms tactics that was startlingly effective and which closely fitted the requirements of the German way of war.
The employment of these combined arms tactics to execute annihilating cauldron battles came to be known in the Anglophone world as “Blitzkrieg.” The execution of Blitzkrieg in attacks on France and Russia, in turn, demonstrated both its power and its limitations.
Mike
The last issue, I think...
That said, I agree wholeheartedly with your contentions on our very, very foolish last couple of decades or so -- though I'd go rather strongly for for 31 years rather than 20.
See my previous post. Clausewitz uses the word in multiple contexts.
You focus on the word. I focus on the idea.
The relationship explained by EWM is not that of strategy to tactics, rather, it is balancing strategic goals with the resources available to achieve them along with the methods to be used.
You must have resources to execute a strategy. How does your construct link resources and methods to the end state? It does not. It neglects resources all together.
Balancing a strategy with available resources is the essence of strategic thought. You disagree no doubt. Fair enough.
Your ideas are obviously apart from the mainstream. Your argument is an uphill battle, but I wish you well. I'm frankly ready to move on to more interesting ideas.
Best of luck.
There are two types of people in this world, those who divide the world into two types and those who do not.
-Jeremy Bentham, Utilitarian Philosopher
http://irondice.wordpress.com/
I'm sure Mr. Owen will still tell you blitzkrieg is imaginary.a cheap lawyer's trick (and we certainly don't want to be that
Actually, the 2009 SSI monograph uses "blitzkrieg" 10 times - of which this on p.34 (p.42 pdf) seems material to the present conversation:
There are two types of people in this world, those who divide the world into two types and those who do not.
-Jeremy Bentham, Utilitarian Philosopher
http://irondice.wordpress.com/
from Book 1, chapter 2:
(I blame all cruel grammar and confusion on CvC's original text, as usual!)
"Es ist auch keineswegs schwer, in der Betrachtung die eine Tätigkeit von der anderen zu trennen, wenn man die bewaffnete und ausgerüstete Streitkraft als gegebene Mittel betrachtet, von denen man, um sie zweckmäßig zu gebrauchen, nichts zu kennen braucht als ihre Hauptresultate.
Die Kriegskunst im eigentlichen Sinn wird also die Kunst sein, sich der gegebenen Mittel im Kampf zu bedienen, und wir können sie nicht besser als mit dem Namen Kriegführung bezeichnen."
It is not at all difficult to separate an activity from another one in the consideration, if you consider an armed and equipped force as the given means, about which, to employ them purposefully, you don't need to know more than their main results.
"Welchen allgemeinen Namen man ihnen geben will, lassen wir dahingestellt sein, aber man sieht, daß Artillerie, Befestigungskunst, sogenannte Elementartaktik, die ganze Organisation und Administration der Streitkräfte und alle ähnlichen Dinge dahin gehören. Die Theorie des Krieges selbst aber beschäftigt sich mit dem Gebrauch dieser ausgebildeten Mittel für den Zweck des Krieges. Sie bedarf von den ersteren nur die Resultate: nämlich die Kenntnis der von ihr übernommenen Mittel nach ihren Haupteigenschaften."
[Artillery, fortress art, so-called elementary tactics, the whole organisation and administration of forces and all similar things]. The theory of war itself is concerned with the use of these accomplished means for the purpose of the war. It requires of the former only the results: the knowledge of the adopted means and their main characteristics.
"Ob nun gleich dies Prinzip sich auf einen guten Grund stützt, auf die Wahrheit, daß das Gefecht das einzige wirksame Mittel im Kriege ist: ..."
[...] this principle rest on one good foundation, on the truth, that the engagement is the only effective means in war: ...
"Die Theorie hat also die Natur der Mittel und Zwecke zu betrachten.
In der Taktik sind die Mittel die ausgebildeten Streitkräfte, welche den Kampf führen sollen. Der Zweck ist der Sieg."
The theory has thus to consider the nature of the means and the purposes.
In tactics are the means the accomplished forces, which do the fighting. The purpose is the victory.
"Die Strategie hat ursprünglich nur den Sieg, d. h. den taktischen Erfolg, als Mittel und, in letzter Instanz, die Gegenstände, welche unmittelbar zum Frieden führen sollen, als Zweck."
The strategy has originally only the victory, i.e. the tactical success, as means and as last resort, the subjects/objects/things, which shall lead immediately to peace, as purpose.
"Die Eroberung einer Stellung ist ein solcher auf das Terrain angewendeter Gefechtserfolg. Aber nicht bloß die einzelnen Gefechte mit besonderen Zwecken sind als Mittel zu betrachten, sondern auch jede höhere Einheit, welche sich in der Kombination der Gefechte durch die Richtung auf einen gemeinschaftlichen Zweck bilden möchte, ist als ein Mittel zu betrachten."
The capture of a position is such a engagement success applied to terrain. Yet not merely the individual engagements with special purposes are to be considered as means, but also every higher unit, which in the combination of engagements might form by the direction at a common purpose, is to be considered as means.
The answer is "It depends."
Tactical view: means = material things
Strategic view: means = tactical successes
We could debate the intentions of what Clausewitz, Halleck, and various military leaders really meant to say in their writings from now until doomsday. As far as I know the U.S. Army did not define distinct levels of war, tactical and strategic, until the first version of FM 100-5 published shortly before Pearl Harbor (though I admit it may have come somewhat later). As official U.S. Army doctrine the operational level of war dates from 1982.
Right up through the Vietnam conflict the title page of FM 100-5 had the subtitle of Field Service Regulations to show that the new field manual format was replacing (and/or was the equivalent of) the old U.S. Army Bible that had gotten us through the Indian Wars but had proven to be inadequate in 1917-18. In a similar way the Infantry Drill Regulations stopped being a way to fight after WW I and turned into FM 22-5, purely for ceremonial purposes, and the how-to-fight doctrine began appearing in the new FM format.
Last edited by Pete; 12-15-2010 at 09:38 PM. Reason: Add "equivalent of."
Essence -- or straitjacket?
Mulberry harbors did not exist in January 1943 when the Allies agreed to invade western Europe, yet, by June 1944, they were available.
Contrary to your statement, a good strategy may call for 'resources' that need to be finessed, developed or obtained. Constraints imposed by 'available resources' doomed US strategy in both Korea and Viet Nam -- and the jury's still out on the latest two.
As the Actress said to the Bishop, "it's not what you have, it's how you make up your shortfalls."
Actually, the Mulberry Harbour hardware wasn't created out of thin air by a genie either. Many resources were invested, IIRC including pre-war ships.
True and there were massive construction contracts
for the Mulberries and the Caissons. Many Companies all over the UK were involved. Of course there was no Genie, there never is. It was an idea that followed the Dieppe debacle and no one is totally sure whose idea it was but the fact remains -- a strategy produced a need for an unheard of, unknown resource, a rather massive resource and that resource was conceived, designed and and prepared in a little over a year. The fact that it made use of other, existing resources is immaterial.
The point was and is that strategy should be conceived without regard to resources. Strategy is often matched to resources available. A far more preferable idea is to make resources match the strategy. Not always possible but should always be the first choice...
Gents, this is getting somewhat pedantic. Let me clarify.
a.) Is Strategy the link between Policy and Tactics? YES/NO
b.) Is that commonly/usefully expressed as "Ends Ways and Means." YES/NO
Colin S. Gray (and many others) calls Policy, Strategy and Tactics, "The Strategy Triad."
Essentially the counter argument (ML) says, as Means is Logistics/Resources, Ends Ways and Means is not an expression of the triad. It's something different. Strategy is Policy, Strategy, and Logistics.
I didn't make this up. I was taught it. It is the main stream view amongst those who know what strategy actually is. It's in the books. IF you think something different, then write an article on any length you requires, arguing that statement A is not connected to Statement B, and I'll get it published in Infinity Journal, and we can see who wants to rebut the argument, in addition to myself!
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I think existing Clausewitz scholarship using the Paret translation leaves no real ambiguity as to what Clausewitz meant. This is why I strongly recommend that folks read Gray or HR Smith before they dive into Clausewitz.
As an aside, the Oxford Concise first definition of "Means" is "that by which a result is brought about."
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
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