There was a Handbook that was written on 4GW called FMFM-1A, by Lind and others. It was painful to read, and hard to understand how some many bright and clever men could buy into such a poor idea.
There was a Handbook that was written on 4GW called FMFM-1A, by Lind and others. It was painful to read, and hard to understand how some many bright and clever men could buy into such a poor idea.
Last edited by Jedburgh; 12-16-2007 at 03:07 PM. Reason: Added link.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
4GW, in my view, is nothing more than a marketing tool/book selling device for people who aren't quite sure what to do with themselves on the weekend.
In all seriousness, 4GW ignores history (by claiming that the majority of its practices began with Mao), relies excessively on sound byte quotes from Sun Tzu and others, and can quite often be boiled down to a smoke and mirrors act. Boyd had some interesting ideas, but to me the greatest accomplishment of those ideas was prodding folks in the Marine Corps to look at how they thought about war and develop the MCDP 1 series.
4GW is really nothing more than non-kinetic maneuver operations accelerated by modern communication methods (specifically the internet) and boosted with a fluid organization taken from the anti-globalization folks and various terrorist networks. A method of organization and operations, but not necessarily a "new" way of war and certainly one that has been around since before the 20th century (look at the operations of the Cuban rebels before the Spanish-American war for just one example).
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
How the ***k did you know that! Wow. Small world. All true. A work of some 4 years, 3 drafts, a lot of sweat, and perhaps doubtful merit. Publisher extremely frustrated.
The infantry annex of FMFM-1A really worries me, as a friend of mine, very conversant with the ideas I promote, helped write it. He is an extremely gifted Royal Marine officer who risked his career by getting his rifle company to use some of my wild and whacky ideas in the field, which was vastly useful.
He then went to the US and became embroiled with Hammes, Lind and the whole 4GW thing. - so the infantry annex of FMFM-1A cause me some pain and confusion which I am still working through, as the bones of what is contained there is actually nothing to do with 4GW
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Wilf, this is the SWC, and we're made up of Infantrymen and IO's (amongst others), so word gets around:
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...6&postcount=2:
Besides, Rifleman has been posting your articles for months here, and you appear to have developed quite a following.
If you've had the "assistance" of real live Royal Marines to test your Doctrine out in the Field (the Marines being the way they are with their own "Right Way" of doing things) - a remarkable feat in itself -, then I'm certain whatever emerges will be eagerly read and discussed in all manner of places. The fact that your Doctrine will have received at least some degree of Field Testing (by Marines no less) will go some way to giving your Doctrine credibility with its audience.
Maybe we should get William Lind on here - not that he'd enjoy the reception that his ideas receive here; and I'm almost surprised that FM hasn't shown up yet. Yep, there could be some real fireworks on some threads here at the SWC then.
Forget the popcorn I say (sorry Ken, but I'll defer to your preferences in your case): if either FM returns or Lind were to show up, we'll need nothing less than whisky, beer chasers, and Cajun chicken wings - to start.
As do I.I don't know who you are, but I like you already....
I don't intend to take a position on the value of the content of what the 4GWers were (and still are) arguing. However, I do think they did an invaluable service in taking on the conventional wisdom regarding the future of warfare, primarily the dead hand of recent operational and strategic history, where past success and dominance were used to define the future, even if that future seemed headed elsewhere.
I do agree with the comments put forth by various folks that the notion of "generations" of warfare is too linear and imputes a sort of movement or evolution that does not occur. I don't know whether he still uses it now that he's at Carlisle, but Craig Nation, back when he was at SAIS, offered what I think was a far more compelling vision of the history of warfare, where different forms of warfare dominated in cycles, in an almost predictable fashion. Furthermore, the strength and dominance of a form at any given time was the key to the shift to a new cycle -- those who could not compete according to the current form were inspired to find a "new" way. Likely I'm butchering his argument a bit -- it's been a long time -- but this is the gist of it.
Cheers,
Jill
This is a nice troll. Lots of bait in the water, the chum line is ready.
By the way, Jill, I agree with your take.
"Speak English! said the Eaglet. "I don't know the meaning of half those long words, and what's more, I don't believe you do either!"
The Eaglet from Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland
I agree the intention was honest enough, but look where we are today. Boyd is applauded in ways that just make no sense given the evidence, and the facts. Lind came up with 4GW, which actually harmed understanding, and I won't even start on the OODA loopy garbage.
The intervening years have given us Maneuver Warfare, which once you actually break it down is an arbitrary collection of the obvious with a few attractive myths thrown in.
Wilf
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
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