Iran, Nukes and Diplomacy 2011-2013

[davidbfpo]

A Lowy Institute blog post:

what is equally staggering is the almost total absence of argument for complete nuclear disarmament in the Middle East....But even if you're suspicious of the ideological case for abolition, consider the pragmatic and ruthlessly realist case for arguing that, if Israel is going to insist Iran not get the bomb, Israel too ought to abolish its deterrent.

My logic is simple. With regard to Iran's nuclear program, Israel faces one of three possible futures:1) Israel has nuclear weapons but Iran does not; 2)
Both Israel and Iran have nuclear weapons; 3) Neither Israel or Iran has nuclear weapons. Which scenario is better for Israel's security?

Link:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/...bout-none.aspx

Hard to imagine Israel even considering this, but an interesting argument.

[davidbfpo]

A fascinating WSJ article: 'How Iran Went Nuclear' and subtitled:

Veteran weapons inspector Olli Heinonen on how the U.N.'s 'Stockholm Syndrome' has aided Tehran's drive for the bomb—and why an unsettling secret may be lurking in the Iranian desert.

Amazing that a "walk-in" gave two key clues as to what Iran was building. Then he notes:

People talk a lot about how intelligence has penetrated all this, but if you go back to the nuclear programs which have been revealed [elsewhere], they all came with a surprise. If there is no undeclared installation today..it will be the first time in 20 years that Iran doesn't have one.

There is more on Iran and the IAEA. Plus that perennial concern, Pakistan. Then he adds:

Saudi Arabia may already be on the move.

In 2011, the kingdom announced plans to build 16 nuclear power reactors by 2030. "That's actually a funny number," Mr. Heinonen says—just what a country would need to justify developing domestic fuel-cycle capabilities that could have both civilian and military uses. "If you want to maintain your own uranium enrichment, that's the right number. . . . It's a perfect match." He adds: "Remember, there was no one military program which took place without civilian. It's always under the civilian umbrella."

Link:http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000...pinion_LEADTop

[Rex Brynen]

Here are the results of another Israel vs Iran wargame, this time using the commercial board game "Persian Incursion" with modified rules to reflect the political and military situation as of early 2013:

http://paxsims.wordpress.com/2013/02/28/virtually-bombing-iran-and-limits-of-real-military-power/

[davidbfpo]

A "lurker" has responded to the earlier posting:

The author, David Feith, is the son of Douglas Feith, the #3 in the US DoD who took over production of "intelligence" to manufacture the case for invading Iraq in 2003. David Feith is even more strident in his views than his father.

Olli Heinonen, the former IAEA official, has an axe to grind with many of those with whom he worked and has spent years talking about - and, in my opinion, is hyping the Iran threat. A lot of his claims don't actually match the current intelligence.

The walk-in story is sensationalist rubbish. The Natanz tip came from the People's Mujahedin of Iran - the group whose paramilitary arm was on the US terrorist list until recently. Heinonen's story covers this up and actually doesn't add anything new.

[davidbfpo]

Who said that? The head of Israel's military intelligence, Major General Amir Kochavi. Was it reported by the MSM? No.

He said that, while Iran is developing its nuclear programme in 2013, it:

..has not yet decided to build a bomb.

Here's the catch: those who rely on Western media are unlikely to learn of this.

So with hat tip to Enduring America read on:http://www.enduringamerica.com/home/...-story-fr.html

[davidbfpo]

In what appears to be a very carefully worded letter to William Hague, UK Foreign Secretary, a parliamentary committee chair asks what exactly is the UK's policy?

Having read a little recently on the subject and listened to experts the letter appears to seek an explanation for those beyond the UK parliament, on the possible use of military force that the public will understand.

Link:http://www.parliament.uk/documents/c...0on%20Iran.pdf

[davidbfpo]

By one account, over the past fifteen years Iran’s nuclear programme has crossed no less than seven so-called ‘red lines’ set by the United States or Israel. As Iran has crossed these lines, it has incurred the most punitive and protracted countermeasures ever imposed on a suspected nuclear proliferator. But it has not faced conventional military action. More recently, however, the idiom of war-triggering red lines has become widespread and central to the discourse on Iran.

This Briefing Paper takes stock of the various war-triggering red lines that Iran’s adversaries have set, and those that they might later set, with a particular focus on those associated with a realistic risk of war. This paper does not endorse the wisdom of imposing these red lines, but rather seeks only to discuss what they mean, how they are expressed, and how they might be interpreted and misinterpreted.

As Iran’s nuclear programme has grown over time, policy-makers have been faced with the question of whether and where they should draw red lines for Tehran. The United States and Israel have already drawn red lines, effectively warning Iran that building nuclear weapons or accumulating too much uranium would trigger war. But even these supposedly clear threats are marked by areas of ambiguity. This leaves unanswered questions as to what would and what would not be seen as grounds for military action – and therefore what Iran might be deterred from doing.

Link to the seventeen page report:http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Iran_Red_Lines.pdf