Economics and Irregular Warfare

[Schmedlap]

Many of my experiences with the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP),as well as development programs in general, were and are different than your description.

I don't doubt it. But I was speaking to the intended use and to the guidance that we received for it. It's nothing new for a tool to be used differently than intended, whether it's a poncho liner, Command Launch Unit, or CERP. But even going beyond intended use, I would go a step farther and say that, in this case, I think the intent is correct. CERP is a poor tool for economic development. I think we learned that lesson over a couple of years, which led to the explicit instructions we received in 2007 to think small and short term.

The CERP and USAID links I provided in my post emphasize the importance of synchronized development systems which strive for unity of effort. Only time will tell, however, if the costs and benefits of our coalition development efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan will have surpassed, equaled, or fell well short of the costs and benefits of the ~13 billion USD Marshall Plan (1952 US GDP ~358 billion?).

I did not plow through the entire 90+ page CALL document, but in skimming it I noticed some dramatic differences between that CALL unclass treatise on MAAWS and the one that I used in theater (our command's SOP) that discussed numerous lines of funds available to us (not just CERP).

I did read the entire GTA (all two pages). The GTA, unless I really misunderstood, supports the guidance that we received in 07. I see only one mention of economic development and it is in the lower left of the first side of the GTA, mentioning that CERP can support a long-term goal of helping to develop indigenous capacity for a viable market economy. I think even that is a bit presumptuous. CERP is short-term funding (usually lump-sum) for a short-term project. Perhaps a good planner can pull off a bunch of projects done in a coordinated manner like you did in 04. Likewise, I guess if you give an artist some art supplies and he's in the right mood and something inspires him, then he can create a masterpiece. For the rest of us, we need to assume more modest goals and realize that conditions are usually inadequate to do much.

On that point, I would like to reiterate my earlier assertion...

Economic development should not fall upon the shoulders of a company or battalion that could unexpectedly receive orders to operate in a new AOR at any given time, either by redrawing boundaries or relocating. It should be handled by higher level units that have more direct communication with higher level political operatives and more direct channels to other agencies within our government - which allows them to tap into greater and more diverse funding sources.

I think the lack of continuity in an AO prevents long-term economic planning at the BN & below level. Even if a unit spends an entire year in an AO, they're still getting their bearings within the first month and they're not likely to plan projects that will extend beyond their tour. That leaves you with about 8 to 10 months to work with. That's not long-term. And the lack of continuity resulting from yearly RIP/TOAs and/or redrawing AORs makes long-term planning nearly impossible. I've done 8 RIP/TOAs at Bn & below (4 deployments, with a RIP/TOA at each end) and observed several others. Continuity always gets talked about, but it never happens.

[Surferbeetle]

…and branches (Forests in the Air tab)

From the Commander in Chief:

This strategy is grounded in a clear and achievable goal shared by the Iraqi people and the American people: an Iraq that is sovereign, stable, and self-reliant. To achieve that goal, we will work to promote an Iraqi government that is just, representative, and accountable, and that provides neither support nor safe-haven to terrorists. We will help Iraq build new ties of trade and commerce with the world. And we will forge a partnership with the people and government of Iraq that contributes to the peace and security of the region.

From FM 3-24

THE NATURE OF COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS
5-1. Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations require synchronized application of military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions.

5-3. COIN operations combine offensive, defensive, and stability operations to achieve the stable and secure environment needed for effective governance, essential services, and economic development. The focus of COIN operations generally progresses through three indistinct stages that can be envisioned with a
medical analogy:

• Stop the bleeding.

• Inpatient care—recovery.

• Outpatient care—movement to self-sufficiency.

Understanding this evolution and recognizing the relative maturity of the operational environment are important to the conduct (planning, preparation, execution, and assessment) of COIN operations. This knowledge allows commanders to ensure that their activities are appropriate to the current situation.

INITIAL STAGE: “STOP THE BLEEDING”
5-4. Initially, COIN operations are similar to emergency first aid for the patient. The goal is to protect the population, break the insurgents’ initiative and momentum, and set the conditions for further engagement. Limited offensive operations may be undertaken, but are complemented by stability operations focused on civil security. During this stage, friendly and enemy information needed to complete the common operational picture is collected and initial running estimates are developed. Counterinsurgents also begin shaping the information environment, including the expectations of the local populace.

MIDDLE STAGE: “INPATIENT CARE—RECOVERY”
5-5. The middle stage is characterized by efforts aimed at assisting the patient through long-term recovery or restoration of health—which in this case means achieving stability. Counterinsurgents are most active here, working aggressively along all logical lines of operations (LLOs). The desire in this stage is to develop and build resident capability and capacity in the HN government and security forces. As civil security is assured, focus expands to include governance, provision of essential services, and stimulation of economic development. Relationships with HN counterparts in the government and security forces and with the local populace are developed and strengthened. These relationships increase the flow of human and other types of intelligence. This intelligence facilitates measured offensive operations in conjunction with the HN security forces. The host nation increases its legitimacy through providing security, expanding effective governance, providing essential services, and achieving incremental success in meeting public expectations.

LATE STAGE: “OUTPATIENT CARE—MOVEMENT TO SELF-SUFFICIENCY”
5-6. Stage three is characterized by the expansion of stability operations across contested regions, ideally using HN forces. The main goal for this stage is to transition responsibility for COIN operations to HN leadership. In this stage, the multinational force works with the host nation in an increasingly supporting role, turning over responsibility wherever and whenever appropriate. Quick reaction forces and fire support capabilities may still be needed in some areas, but more functions along all LLOs are performed by HN forces with the low-key assistance of multinational advisors. As the security, governing, and economic capacity of the host nation increases, the need for foreign assistance is reduced. At this stage, the host nation has established or reestablished the systems needed to provide effective and stable government that sustains the rule of law. The government secures its citizens continuously, sustains and builds legitimacy through effective governance, has effectively isolated the insurgency, and can manage and meet the expectations of the nation’s entire population.

From the CERP GTA 90-01-017

Short-term goals:

• Provide security to local populace

• Restore essential services and meet humanitarian needs

Long-term goals:

• Develop indigenous
  capacity for:

1. Essential services
2. Viable market economy
3. Rule of law
4. Democratic institutions
5. Robust civil society

But I was speaking to the intended use and to the guidance that we received for it. It's nothing new for a tool to be used differently than intended, whether it's a poncho liner, Command Launch Unit, or CERP. But even going beyond intended use, I would go a step farther and say that, in this case, I think the intent is correct. CERP is a poor tool for economic development. I think we learned that lesson over a couple of years, which led to the explicit instructions we received in 2007 to think small and short term.

The nesting of intent displayed in the Presidents speech, FM 3-24 (and other FM's which include Civil Affairs FM's), as well as the GTA allows for a graduated response as conditions permit. I salute you and thank you for your service to include four tours in tough areas.

I think the lack of continuity in an AO prevents long-term economic planning at the BN & below level. Even if a unit spends an entire year in an AO, they're still getting their bearings within the first month and they're not likely to plan projects that will extend beyond their tour. That leaves you with about 8 to 10 months to work with. That's not long-term. And the lack of continuity resulting from yearly RIP/TOAs and/or redrawing AORs makes long-term planning nearly impossible. I've done 8 RIP/TOAs at Bn & below (4 deployments, with a RIP/TOA at each end) and observed several others. Continuity always gets talked about, but it never happens.

This is a pithy observation and something that requires an institutional/systematic fix as opposed to the consistently ad-hoc, stovepiped, and fragmented knowledge management solutions we are forced to cobble together downrange.

When we covered enterprise resource software in business school I thought back to my paperless office days back in the 80's at a multinational bank and compared both experiences with my knowledge management experiences with the Army in Iraq...yes...we certainly have come along ways from typewriters, alps printers, and multimate run on 386 chips but it is 2009, we are the American Army, and we do have access to integrated knowledge management software/geographic information systems after all...

Arcview with SQL Server or Oracle would allow for interactive maps with all layers tied to a database...(I do not have a financial interest in any of these companies)

A geographic information system (GIS) integrates hardware, software, and data for capturing, managing, analyzing, and displaying all forms of geographically referenced information.

GIS allows us to view, understand, question, interpret, and visualize data in many ways that reveal relationships, patterns, and trends in the form of maps, globes, reports, and charts.

A GIS helps you answer questions and solve problems by looking at your data in a way that is quickly understood and easily shared.

GIS technology can be integrated into any enterprise information system framework.

[Bill Moore]

What I find most interesting about these posts, with the possible exception of Slapout's last post is the discussion of economic development separate from the COIN effort.

This is the fallacy with the lines of operations approach to military operations and USG strategy in general. Instead of developing and executing a strategy (not talking strategic level, but rather clear operational objectives and integrated plans for achieving those objectives instead of everyone doing their own line of operation independently, what I call lines to no where).

If you're waging a COIN effort, then is it wise to support economic development blindly and haphazardly, or better to integrate economic development as part of the over all COIN strategy?

We can use economic development as one form of influence to shape specific populations.

Use economic development to influence a populace if at all possible. Identify a project of value (the people will tell you what it is, you don't determine it), ensure you can deliver, then tell them what the cost is (no IED attacks upon coalition forces for 2 weeks and we'll start on it (you better deliver), and as long as no IED attacks are the norm we'll continue to work on it.

This is only one example. I think we need to take a step back and relook how we better integrate economic development with the COIN strategy. Perhaps this being done in Afghanistan, but from what I'm reading it is not apparent.

If they have essential services restored, what else do we need to do? Why are we doing it? Are we giving them a free lunch, or are we getting a desired result? What effect is it really having?

[Surferbeetle]

With a H/T to Registan; The Design Observer Group: Between Mission Statement and Parametric Model by Tim Love

So where are we? What do we need to do to synthesize the powerful formal possibilities of parametric modeling with the need to realign disciplinary priorities? This is a large question, which I’ll explore in future articles. For now I’ll suggest that one approach is to better understand the complexities and pressures of mainstream practice. How do existing professional power structures, working with real clients and regulatory frameworks, encourage certain kinds of design production and inhibit others? Why does the DNA of almost every office building in North America — maybe the world — consist of the same center-core diagram with the same ungainly and clumsily dimensioned floor plan, no matter how sophisticated the skin? Why are the majority of new public school buildings soulless and isolated object-buildings surrounded by acres of parking lots and sports fields? Why do super-sized arterial roads, and the retail big boxes that line them, continue to be developed when the landscapes that result are so banal, and widely reviled as such? My hunch is that if design pedagogy began to engage these everyday conditions, whether in the market-driven economy or through the mechanism of public funding (or a combination of the two), then a new design-focused pedagogy would emerge, one that would gain intellectual weight through the relevance of the problems. Such a context might inspire designers to use sophisticated professional tools — including parametric modeling — to produce truly new and meaningful paradigms.

[slapout9]

Perhaps this being done in Afghanistan, but from what I'm reading it is not apparent.

IMO the real 800 pound Guerrilla in A'stan is the Economy. Without a stable Economy no country can survive.......Including the USA.