Ten myths about Afghanistan

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Circling the Lion's Den blogsite.

In 1988, the Soviet army left Afghanistan after a concerted campaign by the western-backed mujahideen. But since then, many enduring myths have grown up about the war-torn country. In his new book, Jonathan Steele sorts the fact from the fiction and to a list of the myths:http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011...ut-afghanistan

1. Afghans have always beaten foreign armies, from Alexander the Great to modern times.
2. The Soviet invasion led to a civil war and western aid for the Afghan resistance
3. The USSR suffered a massive military defeat in Afghanistan at the hands of the mujahideen
4. The CIA's supply of Stinger missiles to the mujahideen forced the Soviets out of Afghanistan
5. After the Soviets withdrew, the west walked away
6. The mujahideen overthrew Kabul's regime and won a major victory over Moscow
7. The Taliban invited Osama bin Laden to use Afghanistan as a safe haven
8. The Taliban were by far the worst government Afghanistan has ever had
9. The Taliban are uniquely harsh oppressors of Afghan women
10. The Taliban have little popular support

Some surprises within!

[Steve the Planner]

Good article.

Back to basics. In olden days, Bactria was fabulously wealthy and important.

Lapis lazuli was important for rich empires far away, and only came from Afghanistan.

Control of the silk road was a huge value in itself. Camels and traders had to sleep safely between legs on the trip, and the caravanserais (truck stops and hotels) were, of themselves, intrinsically valuable.

Plenty of reasons why, in olden days, the territory of Afghanistan was important, valuable, and WAS controlled/partnered/brokered with by its neighbors.

Blue stones are pretty worthless until you trade them with someone else for other good stuff (food).

Silk Road economics and relevance collapsed through climate changes and the European maritime commerce period, when interest and control shifted southward.

Much of the "Big Game" issues, which came long after the value proposition had expired, were for reasons of their own, and not intrinsically valuable to anyone.

It is no surprise that, in recent centuries, none of the "Bog game" players was seriously interested in committing the resources to hold this place for sustainable reasons.

The World always changes, as do the merits for any campaign.

If the merits are fleeting, the campaign will be.

[G Martin]

Thanks for sharing that. If we questioned our assumptions more we might have already incorporated many- if not most- of the implications of these myths into our planning. I submit we have not- and that has hurt us tremendously.

[davidbfpo]

A comparative article that IMO sits well here, although I will cross refer on the Soviets in Afg thread and is sub-titled:

On 7 October 2001, American-British air raids and Special Forces spearheaded an invasion of Afghanistan that resulted in the removal of the Taliban regime and the country’s occupation by the Nato-led International Security Assistance Force (Isaf). Ten years later, Bruno De Cordier ponders to what extent this episode bears any similarity to the decade-long Soviet occupation of the country.

It ends with:

In a way, both projects were to some degree sincere and well-meant. Yet both were roughly confronted with the limits of voluntarism, especially as what they wanted to build has and had little social base in the country. As one Afghan parliamentarian from Ghazni told me, “they both relied too long on the wrong Afghans, the sort of people that they wanted everyone to be and not those that are our real society.”

Link:opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/bruno-de-cordier/parallel-frontlines-ten-years-of-soviet-and-american-occupation-compar

[MikeF]

A comparative article that IMO sits well here, although I will cross refer on the Soviets in Afg thread and is sub-titled:

It ends with:

Link:opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/bruno-de-cordier/parallel-frontlines-ten-years-of-soviet-and-american-occupation-compar

David, you might also be interested in this one

This official describes the Pro Soviet politicians in Afghanistan as “a bunch of quislings who require 100,000 troops to protect them

Why Carter Renewed Plan for Afghanistan transition

[davidbfpo]

MikeF,

It is a long time since I was reading on the pre-Soviet era in Afghanistan. My recollection is that in the cities there was a significant support for change, not necessarily Communist or pro-Soviet and following Afghan tradition very factional. IIRC 'Flag' and 'Parcham' were their names.

Secondly I recall meeting in Peshawar in the early nineties an Afghan observer who related the story of the local reaction to the first wave of Afghan refugees from the cities, who were professionals, middle class and quite sophisticated - who quickly settled in or moved on, abroad or to other cities. Years later when rural Afghans arrived they were stunned at how different they were, who settled in huge refugee camps around the city.

I'm not surprised at the US official's remark, but I have my doubts that then the USA had really in depth knowledge of what was happening in Afghanistan. Did the USA not then rely on Pakistan's ISI for much of their information and understanding?

As the opening post here referred to the 'Quisling' regime managed to stay in power for two if not three years after the Soviets left.