Dominos of Democracy

[TT]

Onwards....

G) Then add to this that having the US military parked in Baghdad posed a serious threat to Iran and Syria – the US military only had to turn left or right, after the rather compelling demonstration of it capacity to fight and win. Syria and Iran were (and still are) critical supporters of two groups who are constant spoilers of any peace deal between Israel and the Palestinians. Thusly the US parked in Baghdad could very credibly pressure Iran and Syria to at least temper, if not out and out stop, their support for Hezbollah and Hamas to increase, significantly mayhap, the prospects of a peace deal between Israel and Palestine – which many people, probably erroneously, see as being the cornerstone of any transformation of the Middle East (and to some, the reason for the radicalization of dissidents [aka terrorists] in the ME).

H) And finally, of course, a final point was that such a demonstration of American power (hey, that the US took down a state with essentially three divisions – joint divisions mind – is a powerful demonstration of American power) would serve as a warning to other potentially problematic states that they should behave themselves lest they suffer the same fate (and worth mentioning is that the US military demonstrated that having chem weapons was not a deterrent when they invaded Iraq, undermining many states belief that chems were a poor man’s nuc).

Convoluted? Oh, yes. Could it have worked had the recognized the crux was the post conflict phase? Possibly, but unlikely, as the linkages while having some coherence were (are) way too contingent. Still, to be fair, Iran and Syria both moderated their behaviour in the months after Hussein was toppled (indeed, reportedly Iran stopped its direct drive for nuc wpns in the 6-8 months aftermath – cause and effect here is hard to make, though, as far as I know). And of course Khaddafi gave up his WMD programmes (had chems, had wanted a nuc) in the same period. So, maybe…?

So a short answer, distilled from the above, is that the Bush admin decided that the only way to transform the middle east was to destabilize it, knowing the consequences were uncertain and very certainly bloody, rather than carrying on the US had in the past. Iraq becomes democratic and the dominoe theory kicks in (over many years, mind). Bush frequently said that 50 years from now historians would judge him to have been right…… Or for an alternative short answer, what Ken said.

Which brings us back to A – few Americans, or heck, Brits, Canucks, French, whatever – would buy into B through H as a casus belli, it is way too convoluted even if logically coherent (sort of), but there is no question these publics (particularly the American public) would buy into using force to remove a threat, putative or otherwise, of a hostile state with nucs.

So to your main question, jcustis– what to read? Hard to recommend any one book, as they all have their pet theories. The above is derived from my reading the NYT (and others) at the time, as this was all in those papers if one read beyond the front page (which was all about WMDs). No conspiracy, just not openly articulated US policy. But it was there in the open. In any given book you read, though, you find most of the points I made above. Starting with the Woodward books (first two) is not a bad way to go, but read these with very, very large grain of salt…..

And probably, as the above is one persons view, read the above with a very large grain of salt too......(grin).

[jcustis]

And probably, as the above is one persons view, read the above with a very large grain of salt too......(grin).

Good points nonetheless TT. And remember, the Gaddis interview took place before the invasion.

[MikeF]

Onwards....

G) Then add to this that having the US military parked in Baghdad posed a serious threat to Iran and Syria – the US military only had to turn left or right, after the rather compelling demonstration of it capacity to fight and win. Syria and Iran were (and still are) critical supporters of two groups who are constant spoilers of any peace deal between Israel and the Palestinians. Thusly the US parked in Baghdad could very credibly pressure Iran and Syria to at least temper, if not out and out stop, their support for Hezbollah and Hamas to increase, significantly mayhap, the prospects of a peace deal between Israel and Palestine – which many people, probably erroneously, see as being the cornerstone of any transformation of the Middle East (and to some, the reason for the radicalization of dissidents [aka terrorists] in the ME).

Exellent points TT. Particularly G. Rereading it, it seems so obvious, but I had never considered it.

Thanks for taking the time to post.

v/r

Mike

[TT]

Jcustis - Gaddis did indeed understand before the invasion the 'democracy domino' theory at play. Not surprising as he is very astute (and always worth reading vice US strategy), plus this goal was, as I mentioned, out there in the public domain. But it was obscured as the Bush administration officially focused on three reasons: WMD, Hussein's links to terrorism, and the [humanitarian] liberation of the Iraqi people from an oppressive regime. Wolfowitz in an interesting interview with a Vanity Fair reporter (in late May or early June 2003) noted these three reasons, and said that for 'bureaucratic reasons' the admin focused on WMDs (he did not say what these bur reasons were but my guess is that it was the one which would convince the American public to support the invasion). Intriguingly, in the full transcript of the interview, he then starts to discuss a '4th' reason, in which he appears to start to say that the transformation of the Middle East was a goal; however, the interview is ended there and he never finished.

As everyone knows, once it was evident there were no WMDs (or links to terrorists, Mr.Cheney's favourite reason), the Bush administration shifted to arguing that the US goal was to 'Democratize' the Mid East - which made this reason appear to be a post hoc rationalization rather than it being one of many reasons that had always been present in the administration's thinking.

Also, in my typical absent minded way, one book I would highly recommend on that period but I forgot to note, is: Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Brookings Institution, 2003). Not about Iraq per se, but the authors capture well the shift in US foreign/security policy that serves as a framework for some of the thinking vis a vis invading Iraq.

MikeF - Gaddis also understood point G. As Jcustis mentions, Gaddis also recognized the role that preemption played. I focused in G on the impact of the invasion on Iran and Syria but for the US to engage in a preventative attack against Iraq sent a clear signal to any state that the US had the will and conventional military means to deal with anyone it perceived as a potential threat (as long as they did not have nukes), and members of the Bush Admin understood this. As an aside, of sorts, in the aftermath of the invasion Kim Jong-il vanished from public view for a number of months, resulting in speculation that he had gone into hiding fearing that the US would be after him next (that the US would attack N Korea is extremely dubious, as it seems to me the US, no matter which Admin, would be deterred by N Korea's capability to inflict massive human and physical destruction on Seoul by conventional means - there are, IIRC, over 10,000 N Korean artillery tubes able to strike Seoul).