What bugs me about this whole thing is that SF has a number of mountain teams who are trained and equipped to do this exact mission but the risk adverse nature of the command has precluded their use. As a result, these mountain teams are suffering some degree of atrophy in their mountain skills as the experienced mountaineers rotate out or retire. The mountains of Afghanistan have SF mountain team written all over them. It is long over due that we start using them that way.
SFC W
Maybe new Commander in AFG remedies this.Originally Posted by Uboat509
Sir, what the hell are we doing?
Absolutely. Commanders have gone to great lengths to mitigate risk over the last year or two, in my opinion to the detriment of the mission. While I agree with jcustis's assessments on the danger of such missions, we wouldn't need to do too many before the point sunk in that the Tora Boras, among other mountain ranges, are not a safe haven.
Of course, it would only take one messed up mission to turn public opinion strongly against them.
I guess that's why I'm not in command.
I'm curious as to why you'd say SF team, as opposed to regular line formation troops...maybe with some additional training...but normal infantry operating in a "distributed operations" fashion (geesh, I almost threw up a little in my throat while typing that).The mountains of Afghanistan have SF mountain team written all over them.
The additional skill sets required are most likely minimal, and probably fall into the following areas:
-Some basic tracking skills
-CAS (achievable with a JTAC)
-a little bit of mountaineering, if for just the stamina effects alone
-Long-rang comms (achievable with just about any communications NCO worth his salt)
It's not as though these rat lines run across heights the likes of K2. I admit that I am not familiar with mountain troop training standards, but are we actually talking about mountains, or just a multitude of ridgelines and hills under a couple thousand feet?
In Afghanistan we're talking real mountains
and some -- not all -- the rat lines are almost K2 like.
The Army has a Division called the 10th Mountain Division. Its first Regiment was the 87th Mountain Infantry, formed at Ft Lewis WA and trained in the Cascades. They later went to Camp Hale Colorado and were the basis for the formation of the 10th Mountain Division. Camp Hale stayed the home of the Mountain Warfare School until 1965 when it was deactivated because the short sighted Army and the Congress that pays for it couldn't see past Viet Nam.
When the 10th Mtn was reactivated instead of going to Camp Hale where there are real mountains, better even than Pickle Meadows, they got sent to upstate NY for political reasons. Now they get to train in the hills -- not mountains -- hills around Plattsburgh. Or they can go to Mountain training at the ArNG Mountina School in Vermont -- more hills...
The 10th SF is located at Fort Carson, CO, not far from where Hale used to be -- and they train in the Rockies. So do the other Groups; the GPF not so much, it's a dollar thing. the 12 Man A team or even several of 'em don't cost as much as a 700 plus bod Inf Bn......
Still your point is well taken -- and Infantry Bn can learn all the Mountain stuff they need in 90 days to be reasonably proficient -- place, there are supposed to be Ranger School graduates in most infantry units and the get a little 'mountain' training. It isn't rocket science...
As late as 2007, any tactical use of helicopters in RC-East had to be approved by a general officer. Before a request could be presented to the general, it had to be vetted by the staff, to ensure the general's valuable time was not wasted. If there was any possibility of collateral damage, add in another layer of review. Minimum time: 8 hours on a good day. Tough to take advantage of fleeting opportunities when the command can't let go. Hopefully, things are better now.
Helicopters also have a tough time flying in those mountains in most weather conditions, as the lift capacity drops off very quickly at high altitudes. Even if they can get there, they are limited in what they can carry in terms of troops, ammo, weapons, etc.
Once you drop the troops, they immediately suffer from a mobility mismatch. They cannot maintain contact with the enemy under the weight of all that armor, ammo, and other 'essential' items. Every platoon dropped also sucks up helicopter support as long as it remains deployed for purposes of resupply and evacuation.
So, while the idea of an airborne QRF briefs well, it is of limited utility for border interdiction in that terrain, especially given the paucity of resources.
I think you would be disappointed with the current time frames.
Last edited by IntelTrooper; 05-12-2009 at 06:59 PM. Reason: OPSEC
Border interdiction in COIN
It's all in the link:Border Interdiction in Counterinsurgency: A Look at Algeria, Rhodesia and Iraq
This is a 2006 USCGSC thesis and why in this thread? One cited example is the Morice Line; the threads on Rhodesia do not cover borders and Iraq is too big to find a home.
Just appeared on a BSAP History emailing and not read.
Last edited by Jedburgh; 03-16-2010 at 05:50 PM. Reason: Fixed link.
davidbfpo
Missing the key point
The Afghan Border Patrol is already established in most of the key crossing areas.
Remove the ETTs from the ANA and put them with the Border Patrol partnered with an equivlent US force.
You will never have a "line" like israel is attempting. But an active, mentored and supplied force conducting traditional raids/patrols/ambushes in cooridination with Pakistan would have enormous effects.
We aren't getting our money's worth out of the ANA.
Its become a self-licking ice cream cone. We are creating the ANA to create the ANA. The idea of using it as a fighting force appears anathema to most US mentors and commanders.
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