Organizing for COIN at the Company and Platoon Level

[Rex Brynen]

Good units don't do dumb stuff. That simple. There will always be an occasional soul that wants to be abusive or stupid; if it isn't tolerated, his fellow Troops will stop him before it even becomes an NCO issue.

This holds true, of course, when the unit command views abuse towards the local population as undesirable--as opposed to a situation where it is considered or accepted part of a general strategy of intimidation, and encouraged.

A friend of mine, who served as an IDF paratrooper in the late 1980s, once noted that in this sense there were very different ROEs in the West Bank and in Lebanon. In the former, there were both formal and informal constraints on brutal behaviour. In the latter (pre-withdrawal), a much higher level of intimidation was standard procedure, even among the elite and highly disciplined units (not everyone plays by FM 3-24 rules).

[Ron Humphrey]

units (not everyone plays by FM 3-24 rules).

Those who represent order to others cannot do so without being accountable to order themselves. Lead by example or don't lead. Anything else leads to temp fixes without long term benefits

Just my 1 1/2

[Ken White]

This holds true, of course, when the unit command views abuse towards the local population as undesirable--as opposed to a situation where it is considered or accepted part of a general strategy of intimidation, and encouraged.

However, I suppose it boils down to what one's definition of a 'good' unit is...

I'll acknowledge that a strategy of intimidation might alter that bit but my guess is that such change would not be significant.

A friend of mine, who served as an IDF paratrooper in the late 1980s, once noted that in this sense there were very different ROEs in the West Bank and in Lebanon. In the former, there were both formal and informal constraints on brutal behaviour. In the latter (pre-withdrawal), a much higher level of intimidation was standard procedure, even among the elite and highly disciplined units (not everyone plays by FM 3-24 rules).

Elite is generally a misnomer applied to combat units and carries no connotation of especial competence or quality. I've seen 'elite' units that were tactically incompetent and most of 'em tned to breed disciplinary problems. Based on what I've seen, highly disciplined and the Israeli Army are sort of incompatible -- that BTW is no insult, all citizen armies tend to be understandably a little lax, goes with the territory. The US Army was from 1941 through 1972 officially and, today, 36 years later is just coming out of that.

I agree with Ron, that's really the determinant.

[jmm99]

This post may belong in the "History Channel" - or there may be another thread covering Tom Odom's 2005 article (if so, I apologize for posting here).

Found Tom Odom's 2005 article, "Transformation: Victory Rests with Small Units", in surfing to another article found in a reading list, which led to the index here:

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview...exmayjun05.asp

I was struck by what seemed a similarity in the platoon structure proposed in the article, and the company structiure of the Compagnies franches de la Marine (CFM), the independent companies of the [Ministry of the] Marine. Those companies, many serving in Canada, were of platoon size.

The force structure adopted by the CFM in Canada served them well for 70 years (1685-1755).

The theoretical CFM TOE was something like this:

(cite - tbs)
"A full Marine compagnie consisted of a capitaine, a lieutenant, an enseigne en pied, an enseigne en second, up to 3 cadets, 2 sergents, 2 carporaux, 2 anspessades, 1 to 3 musicians (1 or 2 drummers and rarely a fifer) and 43 fusiliers (58 after 1756)."

That is a total of 50 men (65 after 1756) - plus commissioned officers and cadets.

The reality was different, because of the reduction in the number of private soldiers. The number of officers and NCOs was not reduced, perhaps a bit enhanced.

Archives nationales, France, Archives des colonies
Série C11A, Correspondance générale, Canada.
vol. 28, fol. 312-312v.

Liste des officiers du détachement des Troupes de la Marine en Nouvelle-France, 1708.
Dans la compagnie de Lorimier,
De Catalogne, lieutenant
De Mosener, enseigne
Langer, lieutenant réformé
2 sergents
3 caporaux
3 anspessades
19 soldats

Commentaire sur la liste des officiers
Lorimier :
«sest corrigé de la bouteille, a esté bon officier, cest faict baucoup daffaire[?] et est presque hor destat de servir»

Lorimier apparently was a second generation Marine - depending on how one interprets "capitaine dans les troupes de la marine" vs. "capitaine de marine" in ca. 1700 French usage.

(gen notes - jmm)
LORIMIER DE LA RIVIÈRE, GUILLAUME DE (Lorrimier, Lormier), capitaine dans les troupes de la marine, seigneur des Bordes (Boynes [10 km au sud-est de Pithiviers]) dans le Gâtinais, commandant du fort Rolland; né vers 1655, fils de Guillaume de Lorimier, seigneur des Bordes [40 km au sud des Boynes] et capitaine de marine, et de Jeanne Guilbaut, de la paroisse Saint-Luc et Saint-Gilles de Paris. Il épousa Marie-Marguerite Chorel de Saint-Germain, dit d’Orvilliers, à Champlain, le 27 janvier 1695. Il fut inhumé le 29 juillet 1709, à Montréal.

The same construct also appears in the field, with an even larger ratio of officers (15, including cadets) to soldiers (20, presumably including NCOs) in an expedition where Céloron de Blainville was the capitaine mentioned below.

(cite - tbs)
"With a detachment composed of one Captain, eight subaltern officers, six Cadets, one Chaplain, twenty soldiers, one hundred and eighty Canadians and about thirty Indians," Céloron de Blainville left La Chine at the head of the rapids of the St. Lawrence above Montreal, on June 15, 1749. By July 6th, he had reached Fort Niagara. The next day men, supplies, and canoes began to move over the Niagara portage to Lake Erie, under the direction of Contrecoeur. The expedition pushed down La Belle Riviere, which was intended to impress the Indians with French military power."

Of course, they had to ride herd on 180 Canadians (who probably had their own militia officers), and the 30 Indians.

A balanced view of the French-Canadian militia is found in Jay Cassel, "The Militia Legend: Canadians at War, 1665-1760", in Canadian Military History Since the 17th Century, Proceedings of the Canadian Military History Conference, Ottawa, 5-9 May 2000 (National Defence 2001), pp. 59-67.

Cassel notes (pp. 63-64):

"Within it, the Canadian militia had an elite. This core was what the Canadian high command relied on for the most important military projects. In the 1680s Denonville and Champigny noted that coureurs de bois were best suited for war against the Iroquois. [22] In 1716, when he prepared for his successful campaign against the Fox, Louis de La Porte de Louvigny selected 225 marines and militiamen in Montreal and added 200 at Detroit and Michilimackinac. [23] The militiamen who excelled at war were a smaller core of tough fighters, many of whom spent their time out west - as Pouchot tells us. This group sustained the militia’s reputation for combat effectiveness."

[22] Champigny au ministre, 6 nov 1687, AC C11a 9: 13; Denonville au ministre, 27 oct 1687,
Ibid., 133; Callières au ministre, 1688 AC C11a 10: 148-9.

[23] Vaudreuil au ministre, 14 oct 1716, AC C11a 36: 72v.

I suspect that CFMs were augmented by engaging individual Canadians at the going rate for voyageurs (which was much higher than a soldier's pay). If so, the CFM included both regular military and what we today would call PMC's. Of course, the "civilian" engagés were subject to the military command structure; so, various present-day legal issues were avoided. Have to research that one further.

I'm curious if, in researching the article, the CFM was considered. Not saying it should have been considered, since citation of a 300+ year old military concept is not likely to impress the PTB.

BTW: I liked the article - and studied it.

[Tom Odom]

Thanks for the kind words.


What really drove that article were several critical factors:

A. Transformation as it was put forward then and in its after effects did nothing for units below brigade.

B. Demands placed on company and below on a non-linear battlefield replicate the demands placed on battalions and even brigades. I was trying to offer a concept company that would have the depth and the flexibility to operate semi-indepently while maintaining its own security and providing more of its own indirect fire support and CS security.

C. Our personnel system is individual focused versus unit focused. As soon as a leader starts to get good at what he does, he changes jobs and will in most cases never do that same jpb again. That has long been the officer model; what is truly tragic is its application to the NCO corps. The consequence is that our critically limited combat maneuver forces remain on a 1 to 2 year learn and then start again to relearn cycle for their leaders. Remember that I wrote this in 2005-2005; personnel issues since then make it even more pressing.

Best

Tom

[William F. Owen]

B. Demands placed on company and below on a non-linear battlefield replicate the demands placed on battalions and even brigades. I was trying to offer a concept company that would have the depth and the flexibility to operate semi-indepently while maintaining its own security and providing more of its own indirect fire support and CS security.

I actually re-read the article the other day when I was doing some print outs. - and the comment you make here is excellent, but there is a flip side to this COIN (pardon the pun).

While I accept that operations may well become more dispersed (if not highly dispersed), it does not automatically follow that assets, or even functions, should flown down to the company. - but I used to think it did!

It could be that we need to get rid of units all together and have formations controlling and supporting up to 9-12 companies. This has benefits when it comes to things like Support Helicopters and UAVs. Also, S1, S2 and even S4 functions are not especially sensitive to spans of command so with the advent of good secure HF and distributable digital data, some things that used to take collocated specialist personnel might now be done more remotely. - I think.

[jmm99]

That art is appellate lawyer jargon for the techniques used to convince the Powers That Be to reverse a long-established precedent.

1. The old precedent has been overturned in related areas by recent transformations (your Point A).

2. Overturning the old precedent in those related areas has caused changes in the subject area, requiring transformations there which cannot be accommodated by the old precedent (your point B).

3. A positive value will result from the new precedent, which is not and cannot be realized under the old precedent (your point C); and BTW, since I wrote the main brief, changes make it even more crucial to adopt the new precedent (the PS to your point C).

Great advocacy technique.

At which point, your bean-counter opponent will say.

"Now, we're paying for 1 LT per platoon. This lunatic wants us to pay for 1 CPT and 2 LTs per platoon - with corresponding increases in NCO costs."

"And, BTW, if we use our funds there, we will have to cut appropriations for the SuperDooper 3000XBQ Project, which will give us a single vehicle to be used for all conceivable land, sea (surface & below) and air operations - and even allow us to attack the Martians - and can be run completely from the SuperDooper 4000GFZ computer right over there - which can even think for itself."

To paraphrase one of my law profs: "Courts often miss the obviously correct and logical answer because of trained indifference."

[tankersteve]

Gentlemen,

Fairly new to this forum so I'll keep it short.

In Iraq, a great amount of our deployed formations are heavy brigade combat teams. There are only 4 infantry companies in these brigades. These companies are relatively (key word) easy to 'organize' for COIN since they are robust and fairly large. However, there are also 4 tank companies (62 men, pure), 3 cav troops, and an engineer company, to list the maneuver companies. Any specific thoughts on how to maximize our manpower to achieve similar effects?

I will tell you from personal experience that the tank companies have to be significantly boosted through task/organization IOT maintain continual operations, even to include self security and a constant patrol presence.

Appreciate some thoughts here.

Tankersteve

[JMA]

Worth having another look at the 'Odom option' I suggest.

This post may belong in the "History Channel" - or there may be another thread covering Tom Odom's 2005 article (if so, I apologize for posting here).

Found Tom Odom's 2005 article, "Transformation: Victory Rests with Small Units", in surfing to another article found in a reading list, which led to the index here:

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview...exmayjun05.asp

I was struck by what seemed a similarity in the platoon structure proposed in the article, and the company structiure of the Compagnies franches de la Marine (CFM), the independent companies of the [Ministry of the] Marine. Those companies, many serving in Canada, were of platoon size.

The force structure adopted by the CFM in Canada served them well for 70 years (1685-1755).

The theoretical CFM TOE was something like this:



That is a total of 50 men (65 after 1756) - plus commissioned officers and cadets.

The reality was different, because of the reduction in the number of private soldiers. The number of officers and NCOs was not reduced, perhaps a bit enhanced.



Lorimier apparently was a second generation Marine - depending on how one interprets "capitaine dans les troupes de la marine" vs. "capitaine de marine" in ca. 1700 French usage.



The same construct also appears in the field, with an even larger ratio of officers (15, including cadets) to soldiers (20, presumably including NCOs) in an expedition where Cloron de Blainville was the capitaine mentioned below.



Of course, they had to ride herd on 180 Canadians (who probably had their own militia officers), and the 30 Indians.

A balanced view of the French-Canadian militia is found in Jay Cassel, "The Militia Legend: Canadians at War, 1665-1760", in Canadian Military History Since the 17th Century, Proceedings of the Canadian Military History Conference, Ottawa, 5-9 May 2000 (National Defence 2001), pp. 59-67.

Cassel notes (pp. 63-64):



I suspect that CFMs were augmented by engaging individual Canadians at the going rate for voyageurs (which was much higher than a soldier's pay). If so, the CFM included both regular military and what we today would call PMC's. Of course, the "civilian" engags were subject to the military command structure; so, various present-day legal issues were avoided. Have to research that one further.

I'm curious if, in researching the article, the CFM was considered. Not saying it should have been considered, since citation of a 300+ year old military concept is not likely to impress the PTB.

BTW: I liked the article - and studied it.