The USA and the Middle East: Great Sacrifices, Small Rewards

[KingJaja]

Let me summarize this is simple words.

There's a lot at play here, not just "terrorism". Quite simply the post-colonial order is dying.

But whose "post-colonial order"? Quite simply the British & French post-colonial orders (that the US simply took over in the Middle East & much of Africa).

How does America deal with this? Conceptually a bit difficult - as it's closest allies are the 2 biggest colonial powers in history, but more than that - US will have a serious problem "thinking out of the British & French colonial box".

The great problem of the Cold War is this - it presented Washington with a binary world. So Washington was spared the inconvenience of deeply questioning the foundations of the post-colonial order established by UK and France.

Unfortunately, US no longer can afford that luxury. This is a more complex World, not simply a World where Washington defends Western interests (i.e. UK doesn't simply goad US to remove Mossadegh in Iran & France doesn't simply goad US to intervene in Iraq).

I'm African and in a few decades, we'll experience something similar - just like Sykes-Picot underpinned the colonial order in the Middle East and is being challenged. Globalization will force a challenge of the Berlin conference.

Britain and France will try to goad US to protect their spheres of influence in Africa, but will US see clearly enough to understand the complexities - or will they seek the easy way out - sticking with their "allies"?

[Dayuhan]

There's a lot at play here, not just "terrorism". Quite simply the post-colonial order is dying.

But whose "post-colonial order"? Quite simply the British & French post-colonial orders (that the US simply took over in the Middle East & much of Africa).

How does America deal with this? Conceptually a bit difficult - as it's closest allies are the 2 biggest colonial powers in history, but more than that - US will have a serious problem "thinking out of the British & French colonial box".

The great problem of the Cold War is this - it presented Washington with a binary world. So Washington was spared the inconvenience of deeply questioning the foundations of the post-colonial order established by UK and France.

I agree that the post-colonial order is dying, but I think you're overrating the influence of former colonial powers on that order. In the Middle East the post colonial order has been dominated by long-lasting dictators like Assad, Gaddafi, Hussein, etc, and by the royal families of the Arabian peninsula. The dictatorships are expiring, with unpredictable results that may or may not include the redrawing of borders. The monarchies seem more durable, for a variety of reasons, though how much more durable remains to be seen.

Post-colonial dictatorships will inevitably fall, and the process of political evolution that was interrupted by colonization will resume. he challenge for the US in all of this is to determine where US interests actually lie (to the extent that there are any) and to develop practical and achievable goals. I think commitment to the British and French is less an issue here than the traditional US confusion over interests and goals.

In parts of the Middle East the US does have a clear economic and strategic interest: oil. That doesn't necessarily translate into good decisions, but at least it produces a bit of clarity where goals are concerned. In other parts of the Middle East (e.g. Syria) and in most of Africa, the US has no compelling economic or strategic interest in place, which creates confusion over goals. When the US does act in these areas it tends to do so on vague "humanitarian" grounds, with limited commitment and sustainability, as will always be the case when there's no compelling national interest involved.

Britain and France will try to goad US to protect their spheres of influence in Africa, but will US see clearly enough to understand the complexities - or will they seek the easy way out - sticking with their "allies"?

The US doesn't really need to understand the complexities; they just need to be able to determine where their own interests lie, if there are any interests at stake. As is always the case with a status quo power, the US tends to reflexively prefer the status quo, which is not necessarily an advantage. The US is also heavily driven by domestic politics, especially where no discrete national interests at stake, and is inclined to act, often hastily and without defined or practical goals, when a situation gets a lot of media attention. This confusion is to me more a problem than anything the British or French are doing.

Ultimately I'd say the best US policy will be the one the US adopted toward post cold war Latin America and SE Asia: back off and let them work it out for themselves. Solving other people's problems is not our responsibility and we generally do a piss-poor job of it, largely because we're never quite sure what we're doing there in the first place.

[CrowBat]

...The great problem of the Cold War is this - it presented Washington with a binary world.

...yet the core of the problem is that this was never the case. Yes, it 'simplified things' to call people like Nasser or Assad 'Soviet puppets', but that never made such statements truth. Indeed, especially because of people like Nasser and Assad, plus quite a few others, if there was ever an area where the Cold War was anything but bi-polar, then it was the Middle East.

Eisenhower administration understood this very well and run appropriate - and even-handed - policies. To a certain degree, even that of Kennedy did. The 'change' came with Johnson and especially Nixon. It's since that time, that the USA began considering the situation in the Middle East through the prism of Cold War, i.e. as bi-polar. But, that was a result of Johnson and then Nixon introducing the practice of abandoning genuine US interests and replacing these with those of Israel (meanwhile this is reaching proportions where one could save billions by disbanding the State Department and letting Tel Aviv do what it is de-facto doing ever since, i.e. run the US foreign policy).

So Washington was spared the inconvenience of deeply questioning the foundations of the post-colonial order established by UK and France.

Nope. Johnson (and then Nixon) introduced the practice of explaining the Middle East through the prism of Cold War in attempt to offer an excuse for abandoning US, British, and French security guarantees for territorial integrity of all the countries in the Middle East and openly siding with Israel.

Simplified (yet specific): they needed an excuse for taking sides and escalating the Arab-Israeli conflict through deliveries of hundreds of F-4s and A-4to Israel when these were entirely unnecessary, and do so in face of fierce opposition from the State Dept. and (particularly) the Pentagon. Declaring Arabs for 'Soviet clients' was the simpliest solution for this, and then one 'everybody understood'.

Britain and France will try to goad US to protect their spheres of influence in Africa, but will US see clearly enough to understand the complexities - or will they seek the easy way out - sticking with their "allies"?

The UK is well beyond the point where it can dream about protecting its spheres of influence anywhere. On the contrary, the French are doing quite well (read: usually far better than the USA) in protecting their interests in Africa.

The latter means not that these policies are the best for all the locals, of course.

With a handful of exceptions, the USA is so far doing only one mistake after the other, and getting involved in ever more affairs that make absolutely no sense - except for opening specific (dubious) sources to certain diamond handlers and (to a lesser degree) to the mining/oil sector.

[Wyatt]

With a handful of exceptions, the USA is so far doing only one mistake after the other, and getting involved in ever more affairs that make absolutely no sense -

You must be omnipotent if you have a grasp on the totality of US foreign policy and its implementation.

[CrowBat]

Perhaps. But frankly: I neither care nor have a clue (if one has to be 'omnipotent' or not).

What I do is to study 'obscure' air forces in the Middle East and Africa (sometimes Asia too, see Modern Chinese Warplanes, praised as providing 'the objective and detailed description of China's air forces that has long been missing', by nobody else but Norman Polmar in his review in Proceedings, from June 2013), reasons why they become what they are, why are they equipped and trained the way they are, how they operate, what are their 'lessons learned' etc. Nowadays often outright despised, I consider this practice a follow-up of highly respected 'know your enemy' studies from the 1970s and 1980s.

It might sound surprising at first, but most of the times the air forces in question are developing in the way they do precisely as effect of US foreign policy.

And most of the times that foreign policy has the qualities of what one can only expect to be produced in some kindergarten.

'Classic' example - and then related to the Middle East: I wanted to find out why various Arab air forces began buying 'MiGs' (i.e. Soviet-designed aircraft), their experiences with these, lessons learned etc. That's how the book-series 'Arab MiGs' came into being (here and here the links to Volume 1; presently, we're in the process of putting finishing touches on Volume 5, which is to cover the first few days of October 1973 Arab-Israeli war and is due out in late October this year).

To my big surprise, it turned out this story began with the USA. Why? After Nasser rose to power, he opened peace negotiations with Israel, and negotiated a withdrawal of British troops out of Egypt. Talks with Israel were going on when the clique around Ben Gurion decided to sabotage these negotiations through a series of terrorist attacks on US and British representatives in Egypt (see 'Lavon Affair'). After that, pursuing Ben Gurion's policy of Zionist expansionism (nicely and frankly described to US representatives already in 1947), the Israeli military launched a series of raids against Egyptian border posts too. Under pressure to protect his country, Nasser turned to USA with request for arms (plus economic aid). Washington conditioned delivery of these on Egyptians providing bases for US military. This condition was something Nasser simply could not accept.

Why? Egypt was just about to get rid of British bases and nearly a century of British influence (plus few mileniums of foreign occupation in total). Nobody in Egypt wanted foreign troops in the country any more and thus no sane Egyptian politician could afford letting any other foreign power station its troops in the country.

Result: when Americans turned him down, and British refused to deliver, Nasser turned to China. When China proved unable to deliver, he turned to Czechoslovakia - because this was the very same party that was arming Israel during the 1947-1949 Arab-Israeli War. The Czechoslovaks agreed to deliver, yet what they had to deliver were 'only' locally-manufactured variants of MiG-15s etc. And so the story of 'Arab MiGs' (a title that symbolises a period of - more or less 'intensive' Soviet involvement- and thus the Cold War in the Middle East too) began. Not trough Egyptian, not through Soviet, but through ill-advised foreign policy of the USA.

Would you describe such negotiations of the administration in the DC for 'clever' or 'well-advised'? Am I 'wrong', perhaps even 'anti-USA' (and, oh, what a horror: 'anti-Israel') if I frankly state that I do not think they were 'clever' or 'well-advised'?

And must I be 'omnipotent' to research, assemble and put this story within its proper context, and draw corresponding conclusions?

[Dayuhan]

I wouldn't know about omnipotent, but if you're seriously claiming to be able to deduce the totality of US policy in the Middle East purely by studying obscure air forces, that could be interpreted as a claim of omniscience... or as a few other things.

[CrowBat]

One thing is sure: I definitely have no trace of comparable skills in denying the obvious - like you do.