Marines Give Modular Tactical Vest (MTV) Thumbs Down

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Matt,
Yes, I'm a believer in letting leaders tailor their load to the conditions of METT-TC. For non-military readers - Mission describes who is going where to do what to whom and why (could be enemy, terrain or friendly focused); Enemy - gets to the composition and disposition of the enemy; Terrain- looks at the impact of terrain and weather on operations - we often use obstacles, avenues of approach, key terrain, cover and concealment and observation; Troops - what are the types and quality of your own units and men; Time - how does time factor into the mission - can you take your time, should you, what advantages do the different takes on time offer you or offer the enemy; Civilian - what impact will civilians have on your operations - does the interaction with civilians mean you should include certain things on your load or exclude certain things?

The key is getting leaders to think through METT-TC, really I think this best happens at the company level and below during TLPs (the 8 step Troop Leading Procedures) and is checked by both the individual and the front line leaders when they do PCIs (Pre-Combat Inspections) - which ensure folks remembered to bring the things identified as needed for the mission - and potentially did not bring things that either might be compromising, or superfluous to the mission), and when they do PCCs (Pre-Combat Checks) where radios are checked for current fills, weapons and vehicles are checked for functionality, members are checked to ensure they know routes, key locations, and unit SOPs etc.

Now after awhile, if a unit is small, and homogeneous, and is conducting missions that SOPs can be developed for, it's prep time for unforeseen opportunities can go down - i.e. an IP station down the road gets hit with 2 SVBIEDs and your IA BN is responding to their aid, and they are leaving in 5 minutes - and you are headed out with them. Here is where contingency bags, full of lots of "what if" goodies might come in handy - gear that might not be part of the norm, but is good to have when conditions point to the unexpected (some of these might be left in the vehicles if you have secure storage - and just PCI'd as required - another SOP).

To talk a little bit about what Boot said and I had mentioned earlier, we were also unique, from the some of the other units operating in the AOR. For starters we had four field grade officers, an 03 and a 1SG as the team' core membership - that equates to a good deal of rank and experience in this case - we were augmented from other units to fill us out, and had some real talent that had come from supporting units - one of them (a ARNG medic E4 was on the ground when we got there - this guy was as much a pro as any - and as such we gave him a lot of responsibility and authority with how he did his job). We also lived outside the FOB on an IA COP - we got regular visits from the BCT CoC, and saw our own MiTT CoC pretty regularly, but everyone realized we had special conditions and as such needed to retain the authority commensurate with our responsibility to make decisions. We also demonstrated the professional maturity and judgment to counter any bad ideas issued in cookie cutter fashion.

Regarding modular armor. To talk about personal body armor is one thing, to consider it in terms of vehicle packages is another. Currently, adding or subtracting armor involves facilities, personnel, material handling equipment, etc. Protection measure in armor is heavy for the most part, or cost prohibitive. The process to upgrade 1114s and 1151s requires disassembly and reassembly to get it right - which is why MAREZ for example had a centralized AoA (Add on Armor) site - combined with the other things that make a vehicle a useful tool - its mobility, its ability to carry heavier weapons, more people and more powerful comms - getting the survivability enhancements right in a process that you can do a large amount of vehicles in an efficient and effective manner requires a professional process.

The only way I could see out of that for the current time would be to issue units a suite of vehicles to choose IAW the METT-TC conditions - depending on the scope, that could get cost prohibitive pretty fast (in more ways then just $$$ - such as logistics, maintenance, sustainment, training, etc.) - some units are justifiably equipped with enough capabilities to do so, some just can't be.

Best, Rob

[Cavguy]

The one issue not mentioned is the CYA factor.

Kind of goes with Hackworth's "Bayonet" analogy in "About Face".

Johnny is an infantryman, and spends most of his time on dismounted patrols while his leadership engages the locals. He's a well trained, disciplined infantryman.

Johnny doesn't wear his side SAPI (for example), it's too heavy and he wants to chase insurgents, and he can't climb or move quickly enough to dodge incoming fire. His PSG and CO allow their soldiers to tailor his load, knowing he understands the risk.

Johnny gets shot (of course) right where the side SAPI would have been, and is killed.

Every death in Iraq requires a 15-6 (formal inquiry). The 15-6 reveals that if Johnny had been wearing side SAPI, he would be alive, but notes the policy of the chain of command. Per Army SOP, the report is revealed and briefed to Johnny's mom and dad, a hardworking, patriotic couple. They are outraged that their son would be alive if his leaders had ensure he wore the "best available" protection. They go to the media and congress, demanding answers as to why Johnny wasn't wearing his side SAPI, accusing his chain of command of blatant disregard for Johnny's life by not ensuring he was well protected.

The New York Times picks it up, and congressmen send numerous inquires to the Army about why individuals are not wearing body armor that could save their lives. The Army Chief of Staff, wanting to avoid such arguments and end the bad publicity, mandates that Side SAPI be worn by all soldiers in theater, regardless of the weight issues.

Now Joe is wearing his side SAPI, deltoid protectors, neck protectors, and groin protector. His orginal SAPI plates have been replaced by an enhanced SAPI plate, weighing an additional two pounds. Six months later, Joe is killed in the streets of Samarra, when in an ambush he was unable to move quickly enough to escape the kill zone. The 15-6 investigation concludes that Johnny's death was regrettable and due to enemy action, and Johnny had all the protective equipment the Army could provide, and was wearing it properly. The family accepts the sad news, and holds a distinguished burial, and speak to the press about what a good son he was.

======

That's the issue with much of SAPI, HMMWV Frag Kit 5, etc. You hear the politicians constantly harping on "not enough" or the "not the best"for the troops. Witness the DragonSkin controversy, which I understand is even heavier than the IOTV. At one point, they developed (no kidding) an armored spacesuit (air conditioned) for HMMWV gunners on long convoys.

We have become so casualty adverse that we are pushing our equipment decisions beyond common sense, and are unwilling to explain the trade-offs to the public, and the soldiers get treated like "boys" or "kids" and not the adults they are.

[Ken White]

It's a sad indictment of the nation and our political and chattering classes which have forced that attitude on the Armed Forces. There are some -- probably most -- families who would not rail about the issue; regrettably there are a few that will and they are allowed to drive the train due to political and media ignorance and pandering.

Shame there's not a way to obtain the counterpoint figures to show how much practical and tactical damage overemphasis on force protection has caused...

I will forego commenting on the foolishness of a 15-6 for each death, a precedent unlikely to be able to be followed in a more intense combat environment -- and a fallacious effort also forced on the services by the same elements of misplaced pressure.

[J Wolfsberger]

The only way I could see out of that for the current time would be to issue units a suite of vehicles to choose IAW the METT-TC conditions - depending on the scope, that could get cost prohibitive pretty fast (in more ways then just $$$ - such as logistics, maintenance, sustainment, training, etc.) - some units are justifiably equipped with enough capabilities to do so, some just can't be.

The other approach is to design the vehicles for inherent modularity. Think of it as a "plug and play" approach. The vehicle arrives in theater with the basic suite plus whatever add-ons reflect the best estimate of needs. As the operation/mission proceeds, capabilities are added or removed to reflect experience. In some cases (armor being an excellent example) that might require substantial support, but that would be available from both organic units and contractors.

[Rob Thornton]

The other approach is to design the vehicles for inherent modularity.

That is kind of where the future is going. It was (and may still be) a key component of the FCS MGVs (manned ground vehicles). I think given the threats, future vehicles will probably be considered that way. However, there are some issues with it - anything modular implies it can be adjusted, or tailored - and provide flexibility - and this is good, but while a multi-tool, or even a crescent wrench is good - it may not be optimal - meaning a socket wrench might be the optimal tool.

This could get to some interesting (and tough) choices - you maybe can improve the "modular" choice to make it better at some or all of the jobs you might give it, but the cost to do so might be disproportional in the short run to just buying multiple vehicles - where you get a return on your investment is not having to sustain a larger inventory vs. the "one". This is still a tough call, because we've often dealt with over-engineered "things" that were so designed to everything equally well, that they wound up not anyone thing (including the original impetus for the thing) very well at all.

In some cases (armor being an excellent example) that might require substantial support, but that would be available from both organic units and contractors.

I think this part may be unavoidable. I'm not exactly set on how I feel about this one. On the one hand the contractors I've seen in steady state operations have flat out provided incredible support (to our unit), on the other the risk of relying on contractors too much makes my gut hurt. They are fine folks, and certainly pulling their weight, and I believe will be a feature on the future battlefield - but we always need to acknowledge the risk of relying on them (or not)
Best, Rob