Indirect and Direct components to strategy for the Long War

**Rob Thornton** · 03-13-2008

Hey Marc,
One more thought occurred as I was running - with regards to an indirect component, how do you better leverage existing, and naturally occurring "means" that result from some of the factors I mentioned in the post above? For example, if technology and interconnectedness are more frequent, is it possible to apply the same philosophical tenets of "by", "with", "through" to people engaged in inter-communications? I think one of the things we miss with regard to our conception of strategic communications is that somehow all you need is to do it once, put something out there, or post a single blog, make one public appearance, etc. I think the people who engage in this medium and increasingly others as a result of access to this medium and having been affected by it, are more sophisticated - they want interaction. Being engaged, does not mean firing a few shots across the bow, the guidance should be more akin to "gain and maintain contact", or inter-act. The other part I'd go back to is what Kilcullen pitched as "matching the narrative and the action". Which I think means you more often do what you say, vs. explain what you've done after the fact. Certainly there will be times when the latter has to occur, sometimes things go very different from the expectation, and as such must be explained, sometimes the opportunity presented may be of such value it seemingly contrary action must be held against the impact on public perception(s) - but by and large I think there is room to create a narrative or policy in which our actions fall within the narrative - we just need to be very clear about our narrative, and we need to be engaged in strategic (inter) communications.

In my view this can occur by more leaders (uniformed, government civilian, religious, academic and private sector) being more engaged with both each other, and the general public. Understanding and articulating where their interests coincide, and how there activities can be synchronized is important; convincing them that they have keen interests in promoting greater stability that coincide with their understanding of their existing interests would be a key enabler for leveraging their participation toward a level of "by, with , through" that rivals those promoting instability. Certainly there are also the more accepted and very important components of "by, with, through" as they relate to BPC, but to build capacity (and in some cases capability ) in our available means commensurate to the scale and scope of the "end", and means that help us put into action our desired, or optimal "ways", we need to explore how the enemy is leveraging existing means, and in some cases tempting us to use our own weight/strengths against ourselves (I've heard it described as "cultural judo"). Does that make sense?

Best, Rob

**Rob Thornton** · 03-13-2008

Hi Eden,

Secondly, in your slides you show SFA as nested within larger political and economic efforts. One could argue that it would, in many areas of the developing world, be working at cross-purposes rather than supporting the other elements of national power. In essence, as presented we would be strengthening security forces in societies that are otherwise undergoing radical political, cultural, and economic changes. It seems to be a Metternichian approach to preserving order

Quick post then I have to go to work. I think the challenge you outline is real, and one that must be considered - communication and coordination are key to est. unity of effort. Also, there is no set ratio - it must be "operationalized" in view of both the "end" not only as it applies to us, but what is sustainable with regard to conditions present in the HN, the long term health of the region, and the greater context of the International scene and our place within it. I think this is one reason why you can't rely wholly on an "Indirect" or "Direct" component of themselves - they both have applicability, and conditions may dictate that they shift or create preference of one over another - wholly or partially. I know I put the slides together, but I think it'd be wrong for me to lay claim to it as something original - its more about describing what we are already doing, and synthesizing it into something that might help synchronize or coordinate effort. Certainly in Iraq, Afghanistan and other places we are doing both and the weight of effort has shifted and continues to shift with the conditions - you could also take the perspective that this is occurring from one region to another.

There are certainly lots of points in your post that need to be discussed, which is the value of coming here. I promise I'll come back to it this evening, but hopefully others will also weigh in, lots of folks I'd hope to hear from who can bring up good points from the excellent things you raise.

Best, Rob

**marct** · 03-13-2008

Hi Rob,

Originally Posted by Rob Thornton

how do you better leverage existing, and naturally occurring "means" that result from some of the factors I mentioned in the post above? For example, if technology and interconnectedness are more frequent, is it possible to apply the same philosophical tenets of "by", "with", "through" to people engaged in inter-communications?

The short answer is yes and no, the long answer is much longer.

Basically, the form of the modern bureaucratic state is predicated on two things: control over access to scarce resources and control over information. Given the radical changes in productive and distributive technologies, the states have been loosing control over the access to resources part of their power base for years. The deployment of interactive communicative media exemplified by the 'Net, cell phones, IM systems, etc. has pretty much smashed their second power base.

This leaves them with a "brute force" approach to maintaining power, and that can be economic (e.g. government spending and manipulation of markets), ideological (i.e. trying to control the symbol system rather than the means of communication), or overt force. The problem is both perceptual and ideological. On the perceptual level, how many people actually "trust" politicians and bureaucrats to be working for them? On the ideological level, what individual "good" does the state provide to its citizens and how much actual power does it have to do so?

Let me toss some of his in an historical context. 100 years ago, most people in Canada and the US were pretty blase about their governments - they didn't "get in your face" too much and, I suspect, that Joe Public was quite happy with a minimalist government were most social services were provided by "intermediate organizations" (ref to Durkheim's Division of Labour in Society, 2nd edition in the preface). Governments were, on the whole, viewed as a necessary component of maintaining general order and keeping the social system running by making sure people "played by the rules" (hooray for the Scottish Enlightenment

).

After the Collapse in '29, the state moved more and more to replace these intermediate structures in the provision of social services - basically, they were "buying" public support while, at the same time, creating public dependencies (think Rome in the late Republic). Increasingly, the State in the West as a whole worked its way more and more into the lives of individuals gaining power and control by appearing to be a "fair broker" for scarce resources and, also, by indirectly (or directly) controlling information media. In part, actually a large part, this was because of a shift towards centralized broadcast media technologies (Paul Levinson's The Soft Edge does a great job of detailing this shift). And, as long as things were generally perceived as "okay", people accepted that.

Now, what does this have to do with "by", "with" and "through"? Simple, the modern bureaucratic state is based on a very specific form of social relation: it's a modification of the Authority Ranking form (cf Alap P. Fiske on Human Sociality). The "social contract" or, rather, the structure of the social contract for this social form is based on the right to "command" held by the State and the right to receive "benefits" held by the people - in its extreme form, we get the "Nanny State". Part of the effect of this is a sub-conscious assumption about technique - the "by", "with" and "through" that you talk about. In its simplest form, it frequently takes the expression of "The Government needs to DO something!" (often said in a whiny voice

). When enough people say things like that, politicians listen and the pressure to "DO" something is immense, even if what they do is idiotic.

The problem with "doing" something is that it's form is predicated on the assumed technique, so when a modern bureaucratic state "does" something, it is always in a manner that follows that technique. Before about 1985 or so, that technique mandated some new government regulation or agency, while after that it could be either an new regulation or agency or hiring private organizations to fulfill the perceived need (it was actually a rather slow shift in frequency distribution between the two options from about the end of 1968 when the bubble burst to today).

Now, both of these assumed techniques are "adaptive" for bureaucratic organizations: the first extends the bureaucracy, while the second extends their resource base while, at the same time, giving them a whipping boy if the effort fails. What is not adaptive for bureaucratic organizations is the technique that underlies and informs the primary social relationship inherent in highly interactive technologies: reciprocity.

Let me expand on this a bit. If we look at the job search situation in North America for the past 40 years, we can see that organizations used the techniques of bureaucracy to hire people (i.e. increasing regulation and standardization and outsourcing of hirings). There are very good reasons why this happened, but I won't get into them here (I've written them up elsewhere). What happened was that individuals got increasingly frustrated with these two techniques and learned how to bypass them using a third technique - "networking" (BTW, the same thing happened on the other side). As a technique, networking is based on information reciprocity and information sharing. "Power" in this technique derives from the provision of information and the provision of a community "space" for information exchange. You can imagine how this was speeded up with the deployment of the interactive 'Net technologies

.

Once we move into the current world of high interactivity, we have a real problem for many bureaucrats as bureaucrats (not as individuals): "power" as information, flows freely between members of the populace without bureaucratic control over any of it. Needless to say, this is not a technique that is adaptive for bureaucratic organizations. This tends to lead to an increasing perception that first, they are not as efficient as the networking system and, later, they are a parasitic drain on the social system. It's that "everyday life" effect - if the Government can only help me find a crap job and it takes them 50 weeks to do so, and I can get a good job in 5 weeks using my network contacts, which do you think I am going to use and what technique will I place my trust in?

This "everyday life" effect has a spreading effect out into their areas of lived experience as well. If, for example, I need ideas and information fast will I use the bureaucracy or will I use my network? The more I bypass bureaucratic technique, the more likely I am to bypass or discount things associated with it. Which brings me to your next comment...

Originally Posted by Rob Thornton

but by and large I think there is room to create a narrative or policy in which our actions fall within the narrative - we just need to be very clear about our narrative, and we need to be engaged in strategic (inter) communications.

In my view this can occur by more leaders (uniformed, government civilian, religious, academic and private sector) being more engaged with both each other, and the general public.

One of the properties of an information reciprocity system is "trust" in the validity of the information (and the person providing it), including statements about the limits of that information. Part of this is, as you note, combining action with story.

The question of "leaders" is an interesting one. At present, I would tend to agree with you about increased engagement. At the same time, many of these leaders are "leaders" solely by virtue of offices held within a bureaucratic system, so the level of "trust" in the individual and the information they provide is often related to the level of trust in the organization they represent. With the rise in interactivity, we are also seeing a concomitant rise in "information leaders" (for want of a better term) who operate outside of formal bureaucratic organizations. A really good example of this is in the open source software community. This means that, in the interactive environment, you have differing types of "leaders" operating based on differing assumptions of technique, which brings us to

Originally Posted by Rob Thornton

Certainly there are also the more accepted and very important components of "by, with, through" as they relate to BPC, but to build capacity (and in some cases capability ) in our available means commensurate to the scale and scope of the "end", and means that help us put into action our desired, or optimal "ways", we need to explore how the enemy is leveraging existing means, and in some cases tempting us to use our own weight/strengths against ourselves (I've heard it described as "cultural judo"). Does that make sense?

Yup, it does make sense. One of the key ways that our opponents are practicing cultural judo is by pointing to the problems in everyday lived experience as they are being articulated in our own societies. They are leveraging a reciprocity technique against us by supporting the many narratives that oppose the bureaucratic techniques (e.g. globalization = job loss, etc.), and there is not really much "trust" at home in the bureaucratic narratives.

Anyway, I did tell you it would be a long answer

.

Marc

**Hacksaw** · 03-13-2008

As usual Rob has posted another of his intellectual hairballs that generates so much intellectual activity that it is nearly impossible to keep up and still do your job

. A few thoughts that might already be accounted for above, but I don't have the time to digest...

Being on the strategic defense does not preclude offensive action. This is especially true if you consider STRATCOM/Info Engagement (IE) as part of the mix. Of course Clausewitz needs to be bent to fit generational changes, but he still fits in this era of fourth generation warfare.

All this gets a little hazy if you are like me and consider all actions/activities as having some IE component. I conduct a raid, I take physical action but I also convey a message to foes, friendlies, and neutrals alike based on how, when, etc...

However, if we bend our concepts of offense and defense so far that they no longer resemble their commonly understood definition (an example would be that Iraq was strategically a defensive action because it was pre-emptive of a presumed threat), then we probably just need to start over again.

As I continue on this stream of consciousness... I heard rumor (probably in this forum) that ADM Mullen proposed as food for thought that we ought to have an Info Order with an OPS Annex as opposed to the other way around. There is probably way too many cultural hurdles to scale with that idea, but that is the kind of big idea that I expect from a CJCS. If you get past your initial gut reaction, you can easily so why that is a far more useful mental construct. Unfortunately it took a squid... god help us if they are going to do all our thinking.

Live well and row

**Rank amateur** · 03-13-2008

Originally Posted by Hacksaw

As usual Rob has posted another of his intellectual hairballs that generates so much intellectual activity that it is nearly impossible to keep up and still do your job

.

Glad I'm not the only one.

1. I also have to jump on the stability doesn't automatically equal less terrorism bandwagon. Furthermore, I don't think our objective is stability. Iraq was stable before we invaded. If dividing Iraq into three countries were proven to make the situation more stable, this administration wouldn't do it. There is wide consensus that a Palestinian state would make the entire region more stable. We've had over 50 years to make one happen. We haven't done it.

2. I believe that the words/actions dynamic (which I've seen Rob mention a couple of times, so I'll address it even though it is a bit of topic) in the Middle East is very simple. We support Israel unconditionally: always have and probably always will. Anything we're in favor of will be perceived - correctly - as being good for Israel. Anyone who believes that whatever is good for Israel is bad for the Arabs - which probably includes most Arabs - is not only never going to believe that we want to help them, they'll always believe that we're going to hurt them. No matter what we do or say.

3. Which brings me to AQ. Their Achilles heel is recruiting. (Blowing up your own members is obviously unsustainable unless you can replace the old mules with fresh meat.) The Koran says that Muslims have a religious obligation to fight against anyone who attacks Islam. Anyone who takes that obligation seriously (fundamentalists) is going to become a terrorist if they think that we're at war with Islam. UBL really didn't care about the Palestinians, but photos from Gaza bring in fresh recruits better than just about anything. He repeatedly uses the term "Zionists and crusaders" to make our support of Israel like a war against Islam.)

4. A rule of advertising. You don't try to change people's beliefs, you leverage them. (If people believe that the planet getting warmer is bad, you don't try to change that. Instead you leverage their belief that change isn't bad. As a spin doctor you stop talking about climate warming and start talking about climate change.) As a spin doctor for the other side you realize that people believe that mankind shouldn't fool around with nature and you start talking about "man made climate change."

5. Therefore, indirect approaches that can work in the long war are:

a) convincing people that we only hate the Palestinians, but not Muslims. Although I don't think any president would ever be so blunt, and such a statement would undoubtedly cause many other problems.

b) convincing potential recruits that AQ is blowing up more Muslims than "zionists and crusaders." This one has the advantage of being true, so it's a relatively easy sell. On the other hand, it kind of forces UBL to respond by attacking the homeland, so it only works if we simultaneously kill everyone who is planning and leading the attacks.

6. Nothing personal Rob, because I know you've been tasked with BPC - and I know you'll do an excellent job - but BCP is highly likely to be viewed as building capacity to "wage war on Islam" by those who are most likely to blow themselves up, so there is at least a theoretical possibility it'll make the "long war" tougher not easier.

**Rob Thornton** · 03-13-2008

Hi RA,

Nothing personal Rob, because I know you've been tasked with BPC - and I know you'll do an excellent job - but BCP is highly likely to be viewed as building capacity to "wage war on Islam" by those who are most likely to blow themselves up, so there is at least a theoretical possibility it'll make the "long war" tougher not easier.

Absolutely nothing personal taken, and I appreciate your participation and opinion. And you make some good points to discuss. The point about how BPC is viewed is well worth considering. Many people view power and influence as a zero sum gain, so if somebody gets more of it, then somebody else gets less e.g. if I accept more states into NATO, then that encroaches upon the Vladmir Putin's idea of the status quo.

However, we need to decide if that is risk worth taking, and what are the consequences for, or for not doing so.

Then we have to decide how to mitigate the risk associated with that decision.

In the case of BPC, it may be that the capacity improved upon is not strictly military, although that is clearly a part of SFA (but the level of proportion allocated to military vs. other security areas is conditional). This is not to say either that BPC in other areas will not threaten others - improving economies, or changing the status quo in other areas will produce some kind of change in the region, depending upon what the other interests at stake are will expend upon the amount of resistance given to that change could be from internal or external actors. We have to address that as well by a comprehensive review of potential frictions and stakeholders in those areas, and where possible look for like and parallel interests, but where the effort is opposed, we must consider if the opposition is legitimate or illegitimate, constructive or destructive, benign or threatening - then we (the partnership) must act based on that. While some of this might be possible to anticipate, it must be understood as with any partnership there will be a great deal of the unseen and unforecasted that requires flexibility, tolerance in some areas and the willingness to accommodate on issues that can be reconciled.

I think its a going in position that some enemies cannot be accommodated. As such we are going to find some who are opposed because by the nature of our political and cultural beliefs we will be at cross purposes to them and their beliefs. This does not mean that are going in position should be unreasonable or antagonistic, or that we cannot be compromising on many things. This is where Diplomacy is key, the articulation and transparency combined with actions that match the narrative to build trust are key to building and maintaining relationships.

I do think we are interested in stability, and I believe its in our strategic interests to pursue it. Now, you can go down the road of ideologically defining stability.... If you don't think we are interested in stability, then what do you think the objective is or should be?

Best, Rob

**Rank amateur** · 03-14-2008

Originally Posted by Rob Thornton

If you don't think we are interested in stability, then what do you think the objective is or should be?

Best, Rob

I think we want more than just stability, we want a form of stability that works for us and that's often not the most naturally stable option.

Stability under Saddam was unacceptable and like I said, if someone could scientifically prove - and this is obviously hypothetical - that dividing Iraq into three countries would cause stability, we still wouldn't do it. Democracy in Iraq hasn't produced much stability. Obviously, an "iron fist" could produce stability faster, but we won't go down that road. (BTW I'm not saying we should, just that logically we should if stability was our only objective.)

I'm actually working on a theory about the behavior of "inkspots" but it is difficult to define the geopolitical limits of COIN in a thousand words or less - while working a full time job - so it's possible I might never succeed.

Basically, I think the idea that we can be part of the political foundation then replace one US "brick" at a time without making the foundation unstable can work in certain circumstances, but not all the time.

Assuming for the moment that the factors you discuss are necessary for stability, are they sufficient? Will they work every time, or are there other factors that could cause instability anyway? If so, what are they?

**Rob Thornton** · 03-14-2008

I'm actually working on a theory about the behavior of "inkspots" but it is difficult to define the geopolitical limits of COIN in a thousand words or less - while working a full time job - so it's possible I might never succeed.

I think that will make for an interesting and useful paper - I hope you can flesh it out. You might consider posting chunks of it on the SWC to help you write it as you go.

Stability under Saddam was unacceptable and like I said, if someone could scientifically prove - and this is obviously hypothetical - that dividing Iraq into three countries would cause stability, we still wouldn't do it. Democracy in Iraq hasn't produced much stability. Obviously, an "iron fist" could produce stability faster, but we won't go down that road. (BTW I'm not saying we should, just that logically we should if stability was our only objective.)

I'd agree, its not just stability - its got to be qualified by something like: Increased Stability in developing and politically volatile states that offer conditions our enemies can exploit to counter or harm U.S. interests at home or abroad; or to a greater extent, something like - The United States and its Interests are not threatened at home or abroad by State and Non-State actors using Violence, Coercion, Intimidation & messages of intolerance to promote extremist agendas to realize their political ends

I pulled those from the slides, but I'd say those represent acceptable endstates in terms of political objectives that justify the expenditure of means. The discussion Marc brought up is relevant here as there is a gap in terms of specific justification to settle domestic policy concerns and in terms broad enough to accommodate others in the International community. There is also the context in which a threat and an endstate are evaluated - regardless of what is known now, the Administration and all those in Congress who voted for war saw Saddam Hussein as a threat. They can bemoan the fact that they were not given the whole truth, but many did not even personally read the intelligence they were provided or conduct personal analysis that would define their vote. You could go back to Clausewitz's Trinity and contemplate the role of emotion over rational thought, but its still OBE. So context of evaluation matters.

There is also the analysis that must be conducted to determine which COA gets you closer to your broader objectives, and it gets real muddled there. Consider the potential consequences for a hard partition of Iraq? Other then saying we did our part to address Iraq's internal problem so we can exit, I find few good things in it for the future. I think the potential for greater regional and international instability would only multiply.

So - yes the word stability must be qualified. I think anything that is as complex and interactive as a human society is going to be inherently unstable - it almost has to be given the nature of its actions. To be completely stable would be no activity. So, the goal might be defined as "more" stable, or stable "enough" to run itself within the context of the endstate or political objective. As I'd mentioned early on, ideas like BPC have their warts, nobody should be under the illusion that you are going to make completely self sustaining states over night, or even over a decade - they are going to require continued inter-action - it may be on a military level, a diplomatic level, an informational level, or economic level - which we have (and others have with us) with almost every existing state.

Assuming for the moment that the factors you discuss are necessary for stability, are they sufficient? Will they work every time, or are there other factors that could cause instability anyway? If so, what are they?

Yes - I'd pointed to a few earlier in the thread - put a "trans" in front of almost anything and you have a potential enabler or accelerator for instability - this just means that if you add more of something - it creates more things the HN government must contend with. Refugees crossing the border, nomadic influences, crop infestations, cyber-hacking/crime/espionage, human migrations, climate changes, crime, terrorism, foreign investment that attracts more of something else or creates something new, the use of ungoverned spaces as safe havens, etc. - you could really go for awhile I think. However, if you increase a states ability to extend governance over its own territories and citizens, you mitigate (probably not eliminate - after all look at our own domestic issues) the effects of those destabilizing influences. The pay off for us goes back to the endstate. So if Columbia is able to extend governance and increase stability how does that effect destabilizing influences in our own country? If Latin America is more developed and offers more opportunity - how does that effect us - not just the things that come to mind, but the second and third order effects.

Not all of it is good - countries that are developing are by nature "unstable", but you have to weigh the good against the bad - and you must weigh the various potential outcomes as well given the nature of things today, and our best guess on the future - this gets into things like "conflict prevention vs. conflict termination" and the associated costs of doing either. That goes back to - how important is it to the role you see yourself playing in the world, it could be because nobody else can or will, and the effects of doing nothing are going to hurt you (or your friends, or your partners, or your outlook) enough to justify the effort, or because the benefits and prospects of doing something now are better then waiting, or because there is competition on the horizon that will accelerate it in the other direction because they view it as a zero sum game, etc.

It gets complicated fast, but that is the nature of it. Its messy, it requires sustained commitment or the means to go back and fix what you left unattended when you can no longer ignore it. Given the changes we've seen in the world, the latter may no longer be an option. Its not just a matter of "new", or "more" changes, its the degree of scale and the speed in which those changes now effect us, and our ability to compensate - it almost seems exponential.

Best, Rob

**selil** · 03-13-2008

Originally Posted by marct

The question of "leaders" is an interesting one. At present, I would tend to agree with you about increased engagement. At the same time, many of these leaders are "leaders" solely by virtue of offices held within a bureaucratic system, so the level of "trust" in the individual and the information they provide is often related to the level of trust in the organization they represent.

Currently on about Friday of next week I'll be reading "Leaderless Jihad", don't know much about the book, but the concept of leaderless organizations does intrigue me. The organizational structure has definite impacts on the ability to effect desired outcomes.

On the transnational level of crime and terrorism (which I disagree with Steve Blair it has been around a lot longer than the anti-Globalists e.g. Yakuza, Tongs, Mafia). I would suggest that there is an element to leadership and organization that is starting to emerge due to the hyper-connectivity of current communications/technology structures.

The use of technology in cyber-terrorism (sic) and trans-national crime has allowed for disparate groups to near instantly form and coalesce around a chosen target (for different reasons being targeted) engage in an attack and evaporate as an agency of action. All without clear thought or organizational leadership.

Tilly (<-- sociology classes are paying off to argue with MarcT) would argue that this is a form or resource mobilization in contrast to Durkheim and the break down theorists. I would suggest it is a wholly new form of organizational structure eclipsing earlier societal network structures and illuminating a neo-Marxism of the new hyper-connected/communication model.

Several authors and academics have looked at the "Copyright Wars", and digital copyright issues, the "Hacker Code" and other meritocracy type organizations of the hyper-connected and identified the forming and dissolving of these groups. This is truly more than the Internet as hyper-connected takes in ALL forms of communication's (cell phone, pda, instant messenger, etc.)

The question I can't answer is will society enforce the dictum of currency (perhaps convention as MarcT illustrated elsewhere), or will the evolving communication model (distributed, less ideology driven, loosely coupled or uncoupled) expand to effect and change the "whole" of society? If the expansion and assumption of normalcy occurs then it will have substantial and long lasting effects on conflict. If it doesn't occur and is relegated to a "phase" then it will be more a symptom rather than a disease.

Or, something like that.

**Steve Blair** · 03-13-2008