New Rules for New Enemies

[Rob Thornton]

From the Discussion Post on Morals and Ethics


"You will find that many opportunities will arise for you to discuss ethics and morals with your Iraqi counterparts. These will be among some of the most challenging and rewarding conversations you will have. These conversations will require you to examine your own beliefs in the context of how and why Iraqis see the world differently. You will need to consider why they see the world the way they do (such as understanding the long term effects of having brutal, totalitarian dictator for a leadership model has on the cultural and national psyche). You will need to frame your (our) ethical and moral beliefs in a manner that resonates with them. Here are some vignette topics you can use to discuss morals and ethics with your counter parts:

Corruption – pick one from the recent news (its all over both the Iraqi news and our own since the media is pretty much universal in their coverage). Shape it into a vignette that has a personal impact so it becomes more relevant. Discuss at length its consequences at every level so they understand the harm it does. Do not expect to come to a real concurrence on beliefs with the first conversation, instead focus on planting the seed. You have also established your views on the subject, empathized with them by trying to understand the environment in which their views have grown, and you have set the stage for future discussions.

The Army as a guarantor of human rights – this is a delicate subject, but one you will need to discuss and understand. Remember you are not advising the US Army (or for that matter any western army). These men will be fighting this insurgency and potentially others within their own country day on end, for an indeterminate period. They may be targets of revenge for their actions even after the insurgency is over. They have seen neighbors, friends, family and innocent women and children killed for no other reason then because someone in their family served. When they see a terrorist, they realize that the next time they see this man it may be in an ambush, or fleeing from a crime where one of their family was murdered. For many their frame of reference of a time when security was guaranteed was when Sadam held absolute power (they tend to gloss over some of the more thorny details). They are disheartened by the seemingly (perspective is 9/10’s of reality here) apathetic criminal justice system which seems to value the rights of the criminal above those of society or the safety of society’s defenders and their families. They understand their average insurgent better then we do. They know his background and what he has endured before he ever gets to them. They know that the insurgent is a hard man who will use every advantage such as claiming to only target Americans, to claiming abuse, to using connections to regain his freedom so he can conduct his terrorist activities again.

Within the context of the above you are going to have to make a case for the problems with a rigid, cookie cutter Iraqi ROE. I’ve heard Iraqis become so frustrated with the system that they proclaim the next time they will not risk capturing the terrorist, but instead will kill them. I’ve heard them discuss the need for stronger techniques during the questioning of detainees. You have to argue for the problems with such a cookie cutter, rigid application of force. You have to point out the short and long term problems with such solutions. Explain the consequences of a climate where everyone (or at least every soldier) is free to use violence because it is the most expedient and most convenient. Point out that while Sadam’s regime may have preserved order, the price paid was heavy, and that many innocent people died as a result. Point out that the what they are fighting for is not to set the conditions for another Sadam to come to power. Point out that such conditions allow for abuse of power under the guise of public good. Again, you are going to have to frame your arguments within the context of the environment you are in. You are not trying to castrate them, ultimately (and I mean down the road when the MiTT training wheels come off and we are no longer embedded) their solution may be something we would have trouble accepting in our society. Consider the diplomat’s son in the 1990s who received a “cane” whipping from Singapore authorities for vandalism (I think he had spray painted a car), we considered it barbaric given the type of crime, the age of the boy, that he was an American, and that it was a beating. However, it was not our rules. We often have debates in our own societies about capital punishment, prisoner rights, etc. Be careful about viewing a foreign state’s practices (particularly on where we are trying to develop to be able to stand on its own two feet and make decisions concerning its own interests) through a US centric lens, you may find yourself defending your own point of view and being labeled a hypocrite.

My point in this thread is that no one told me I’d be mentoring on ethics. The “advisory pitch” made things seem much cleaner, discuss a little MDMP, work some effects, and conduct a few AARs. This is not a CTC, and you are not an OC. Advisory work is more like developing a team from the inside out then the outside in. I’d recommend you familiarize yourself with a few other texts besides FMs. You might bring along a little Jonathan Hume, some Plato, some Shakespeare, and the Federalist Papers for a start (actually the list could be very broad, and there are lots of places to ref. good discussions on morals and ethics). You are more then just a military advisor, you are something of a mentor too. Your day to day interactions and conversations over the year your are an advisor will do more to develop and influence your counterparts then any class or block of instruction you give. The former is a cumulative picture about who you are, and what a US Soldier believes in, the latter is a stand alone class that is delivered and received as such." - end of thread post

So what are the thoughts about emotional and character development as a requirment to implementing a strategy for New Enemie and New Rules

[Steve Blair]

I think we need to be very careful about how much ethics mentoring we do when we go into advisory efforts. The ethics sources you mention are Western in origin, and may have little or no bearing on the environment an advisor finds himself working in. It gets very difficult when dealing with things like this, and there's always the major concern of not wanting to look like we're imposing our belief systems on another culture (which typically opens us up to attacks from just about everyone in the IO arena).

Good points, though. This is a very convoluted area.

[Rob Thornton]

Steve,
You're right, but "thorny" may be a word to be used in conjunction with convoluted. In truth I have been hip deep in all kinds of issues out of necessity. Since we are balancing our goals with their goals, its bound to happen.
You are right, all of the sources I mentioned are western, but you have to start somewhere. I think it may be beneficial to understand yourself and the foundations of your beliefs, before trying to understand the beliefs of others.
So far I'd have to say I've benefited as much from their perspective as I have from mine. My counterparts have been as eager to understand me as much as I am to understand them. We've created an atmosphere where open dialogue is encouraged, and it has really paid off. We've had some very frank discussions on topics that I thought were once taboo. We have had disagreements that became animated, and did not end with either side conceding their position, but ones that did enhance respect for on another. We've also had disagreements that did end with both of us seeing the problem from another perspective and modifying our views some.
This has been one of the most challenging and rewarding assignments I have ever had. However, I know other teams and advisors who are having a range of difficulties adapting to their role as an advisor (not that I hadn't had my share of problems). I think it has something to do with applying too much of the things that make us successful in traditional operational roles. We breed A type personalities that desire to be in leadership positions, and we are very good at it. Some of the jobs the military is and will be doing will require not only that skill set, but others as well, and the ability to transition quickly.
To be honest, I'm still learning every day.
Regards, Rob

[Steve Blair]

Glad to hear it's working out for you, Rob! It sounds like you've hit a good balance, which sadly doesn't always happen with assignments like this.

One reason I pointed out the thorniness of the ethics question is that we will have some advisors who don't have the maturity or personality to deal with the more complex areas and simply try to put their view forward as the correct one.

[Jimbo]

When we were advising the Iarqis' early on you don't get wrapped up in ethics. You focus on military professionalism in the sense of servic eto country and not arbitrarily killing people. corruption, you have to accept that their is a 10 to 15 percent cost of doing business in that region. It has been that way longer than we have been a country. We don't have the time or resources to fix that. We focused on the responsibility of rank. the Iraqis had respect down, we had to gte them to undertsnad how to care for soldiers. Literacy was another problem we had as well. The key thing was teach them Infantry tactics and get them success on the ground. AAR it, and build from there.

[Rob Thornton]

Jimbo,
The IA have progressed quite a bit (it may be different down South) up here. We still have CF platoons conducting the occasional combined patrol, but tactically the IA here are capable of conducting independent ops (and they do a pretty good job of it). Yes literacy amongst the Jundi is still a problem, but getting better. Tribal segregation is still a problem, but shows signs of getting better as competence is starting to be regarded as desirable over who lives in what town. While CF units run basic soldier and leader skills training programs, and units such as the scouts work with CF scouts on things like CTR and sniper skills, the MiTTs these days focus on developing the staff and the BN CDR. That is just our charter, and its also what we are resourced to do. Your talking about BN TTs where out of the 11 guys 4 are majors one is a CPT, and the rest are SNCOs. It is not about MDMP though. It is about helping them build solutions to their problems that are executable and sustainable by them - read Iraqi solutions to Iraqi problems.
Yes there is a certain amount of corruption. We joke and say its part of the culture - we'll call it cultural economics with a subset of local best business practices . However when your soldiers are quitting because out of the $13 a day for life support you only see a fraction, then you have to explain how it jeopardizes the mission - i.e. poor food in quantity and quality, poor living conditions, etc = attrition of your best soldiers who will find other opportunities. That's an example, but the point is that a lack of ethics in morals in some areas puts the mission at risk. They will have to find a balance. But if they abandon all morals and ethics then they cease to be soldiers and the mission fails. Its important they understand that leadership means accepting and fulfilling your responsibility, and that while you need to be able to execute your combat tasks, these guys are going to have to sustain this army they have built at the current OPTEMPO for some time to come.
They are making progress. Our BN has come a long way in the last 8 months. We go out on the Operations and walk with them. They are working well by themselves, with CF partners and with the IP. I have seen officers here that would do well in any army. In many ways they have advantages that they are using in COIN that we do not possess. They are even adapting the conventional force structure we initially stood up for them to mirror the enemy (one of the biggest things I think an Army can do is recognize its shortfalls and adjust their resources to compensate in order to build the organizational structure they need to be successful.) he TTs are finally getting the resources to do more. It is the main effort (at least where we are at) because we have transitioned to a point here where the ISF have equity (if not the majority) of the fight. We live with these guys - we are own their schedule - eat with them, etc. I'd guess within the next year within this Division, they will be good enough at the BN level that they will not need a TT with them, and efforts will focus at the BDE and DIV levels.
Regards, Rob

[Rob Thornton]

I thought Recommendation #2 fit pretty well in this thread, but as stated it ain't cheap!

Second, we must develop a new class of statesmen, civilian and military, to be holistic thinkers, capable of managing the integration of the many implements in the toolbox of American power - diplomacy, economics, law-enforcement, intelligence, information, as well as the military. They should have a deep understanding of modern conflict in all its manifestations, from narcotics and international crime, to terrorism, insurgency, ethnic and civil wars, conventional war, as well as the ecological basis of national security

Any body hear the relevant joke about the Lexus? Woman goes into a Lexus dealership and peaks into the cabin of a top end model, as she does so she experiences a minor case of gas. Embarrased, she looks around to see if anybody heard her. Sure enough the floor sales man is standing behind her. To recover she asks, "How much for this one?". The salesman replies, " I don't know, if you farted just touching it, you'll #### when you hear the price!"

Full context below. regards, Rob

Philadelphia Inquirer
December 12, 2006

Winning Battles, Losing Wars

Once again, the United States has failed to grasp that war is more than just weapons.

By Gabriel Marcella and Fred Woerner

On April 25, 1975, U.S. Army Col. Harry Summers, author of On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context, said to a North Vietnamese colonel in Hanoi: "You know, you never defeated us on the battlefield." To which the North Vietnamese replied: "That may be so, but it is also irrelevant."

Both men were right. In Vietnam, the United States scored all kinds of tactical victories but lost the war. Today there is no military peer that can compete with the global reach, speed, precision, and lethality of our armed forces. And few nations can be as proud of their soldiers and officers; they represent the finest values of American democracy.

Yet Iraq demonstrates that, despite all the power, resources and technology, we are strategically impaired. We continue to win most of the battles, but not the wars.

War is a transformative political process intended to lead to a better peace, not a mere sequence of battles. In Iraq, our soldiers fight splendidly, performing Herculean feats to make the investment in blood, treasure, and honor work. But strategic success, a better peace than what preceded, may be beyond their grasp because of flaws in strategic design made by superiors.

Why are we strategically impaired? Rather than seeing continuity, Americans tend to separate peace from the aberration called war, whereas the opponents we face do the opposite. Our strategic planning tends to reflect that bifurcation and causes untold distempers and recriminations among civilians and military in government.

In foreign affairs, we rely too much on military might, allowing the velvet glove of diplomacy and information to wither in comparison, thereby weakening the world's understanding of what we stand for, and breeding misperceptions that lead to hostility.

We have unbounded confidence in technology to solve the complex social, economic, and political problems of millennial civilizations.

We go to war without mobilizing the support of the American people, knowing full well their impatience for quick results and intolerance for ambiguity. We have a quasimissionary zeal to "democratize" societies that we barely understand, and we fathom the intellectual requirements for such ambitious tasks even less.

Moreover, we give the military missions that are best performed by civilian agencies like the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, and then we don't empower the military.

Finally, going it alone internationally loses friends who want to help and burns bridges that must be rebuilt.

What can be done? First, our political leaders must respect the complexities, limits, paradoxes, and unintended consequences of war. They must understand the utility of the military, neither expecting it to perform the impossible nor underestimating its enormous capabilities for doing good.

Second, we must develop a new class of statesmen, civilian and military, to be holistic thinkers, capable of managing the integration of the many implements in the toolbox of American power - diplomacy, economics, law-enforcement, intelligence, information, as well as the military. They should have a deep understanding of modern conflict in all its manifestations, from narcotics and international crime, to terrorism, insurgency, ethnic and civil wars, conventional war, as well as the ecological basis of national security.

Third, they should be thoroughly schooled in the language, culture, history, economics, and politics of foreign cultures.

Fourth, we should strengthen our diplomatic and informational capabilities. The United States is likely to need these tools for a long time in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, where we have deployed power since America inherited global responsibilities in 1945, but still the areas we understand the least.

Democracy is a process of mutual learning. Our founding fathers understood this and the seriousness of war very well. Thus they wrote into the Constitution that the responsibility for taking the nation's armed forces to war be shared by the people and the government. If we are wise, we will learn from the Iraq experience, make corrections, and approach future war better prepared to build the better peace.

Gabriel Marcella teaches strategy at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pa. Fred Woerner is a retired general and professor emeritus of international relations at Boston University.

[Tom Odom]

And that is why unless things have changed dramatically (and I do not believe they have) Foreign Area Officer attendance (as a FAO not as a secondary FAO) at the War College is non-existent.

At best we can hope to make the correspondence course list as I did where our real world experiences have no effect on our fellow students.

Right

Tom

[Shek]

I thought Recommendation #2 fit pretty well in this thread, but as stated it ain't cheap!

Rob,

It may look expensive, but all that money we saved in the 90s by not actively pursuing #2 has cost us in Iraq. The money spent sending Petraues, Chiarelli, and McMaster to grad school was an investment well worth it.

Just think how many more Mattis' are out there wanting to self-educate themselves by reading voraciously, but we don't have a program to provide books from professional reading lists for free, and so they don't have the institutional push to make them take the plunge. Heck, I'm sure that we spend more money funding knife purchases through the supply system for soldiers in Iraq that could easily be better spent on stocking several thousands libraries with Galula, Nagl, Horne, Krepinevich, Linn, etc.

[Rob Thornton]

Shek,
You are spot on. I've always thought the problem was convincing the hands that control the wallet that investing in people is just as important in investing in hardware. So its not a question of "means" but of "will". Retired General Scales has written allot on it as well. Somewhere along the line we developed a cultural aversion to developing intellect as a priority. We talk a good game, put out some good periodicals and pubs, but we don't like to resource the types of programs that allow for building intellectual width (scale that exposes many), and depth (makes them in to "Olympic Class Pentahletes able to handle the diverse challenges of the COE/FOE). When we do, culturally we subconciously tell others the path to higher command is to push for certain jobs that keep you in the operations jet stream (ex. I heard once from an 06 in my SR counseling, "Don't spend time doing SAMS, that requires a commitment that puts you behind the competition! Go for the "king Maker" job - the BDE 3!"). This leaves those who really value knowledge, and that want command to self-educate (a bonus for the military which now gets a few smart guys on the cheap), or willing to let the chips fall where they may.

When I made the decison to leave Operations for the 59 field (a very tough decision on my part), I had plenty of reasons - family, age, desire for something different, etc. I also knew that IN Branch would not say, "Hey wait a second?" - because I was swimming out of the jet stream; so by Darwinian standards there must be a reason .

So while it would be an easy thing to fund in someways, we'd have to place cultural emphasis on it for it to be more then an anomaly. What a paradox in that we often know what is most healthy for us, but choose not to do so, even when we have most of the resources available.

By the way, I got your nephew's letter. I mean to write them back and thank them soon. It really brightened my day.

Best regards, Rob

[marct]

Hi Rob,

I've always thought the problem was convincing the hands that control the wallet that investing in people is just as important in investing in hardware. So its not a question of "means" but of "will". Retired General Scales has written allot on it as well. Somewhere along the line we developed a cultural aversion to developing intellect as a priority. We talk a good game, put out some good periodicals and pubs, but we don't like to resource the types of programs that allow for building intellectual width (scale that exposes many), and depth (makes them in to "Olympic Class Pentahletes able to handle the diverse challenges of the COE/FOE). When we do, culturally we subconciously tell others the path to higher command is to push for certain jobs that keep you in the operations jet stream... This leaves those who really value knowledge, and that want command to self-educate (a bonus for the military which now gets a few smart guys on the cheap), or willing to let the chips fall where they may.

I hate to say it, but there is a reason for that <wry grin>. It's actually a process you see in most organizations based on an Authority Ranking system (ref to Alan Fiske's Relational Models). Basically, operations inside such an organization require the assumption of greater knowledge the higher up the chain of command you go - the knowledge is the ideological basis (not symbolic) of authority that serves as one justification for invocing that relational model.

The ideological model is supported and mediated by a symbolic system that reinforces it at an emotional level. Most modern, bureaucratic organizations use "knowledge" as the basis of the ideological claim but others have been used: blood lines (aristocracy, tribal lineage), rhetorical skills (politics in a democracy), closeness to "God" (the Cathars, al-Queda), etc.

The internal selection method may be Darwinian (straight selection pressures with no teleological value), but it is justified using a Spencerian "survival of the fittest" model with a specific teleology. Organizations also "protect" their teleological vectors and resist changes to them in the long run, even though there may be short run changes (this is a principle called "organizational hysteresis"). If you want to change the valuation of knowledge inside the military, then you have to think like an organizational genetic engineer .

I don't know the cultures well enough to offer specific suggestions on doing this type of organizational genetic engineering but one observation that may help is that every successfull organizational re-engineering has several characteristics:

1. an executive level "champion";
2. constant communications to all levels of the organization;
3. a clear statement of vision, values and ethics;
4. a well laid out system of rewards and punishments to reinforce those values;
5. a group with power whose sole responsability is to enforce that code; and
6. an agreement that the core power brokers in the organization don't have to meet the most onerous requirements that they impose on the rest of the organization.

So while it would be an easy thing to fund in someways, we'd have to place cultural emphasis on it for it to be more then an anomaly. What a paradox in that we often know what is most healthy for us, but choose not to do so, even when we have most of the resources available.

Personally, I always thought that the paradox went deeper than that, for the military at least. For me, it centers on the concept of "civilian control" and how that is interpreted. Basically, the paradox I see is the question of "who has the right to establish and change the social focus of the military?" As long as the ultimate power is vested in an abstract symbol, the Crown, the Constitution, etc., then there is a "touchstone" for all orders and cultural changes. If this power is, however, invested in individual people, however, then that person becomes the touchstone - a dangerous situation when combined with a polarized democratic process.

Marc

[Rob Thornton]

Marc, killer reply & a great read on organizational theory.

Organizations also "protect" their teleological vectors and resist changes to them in the long run, even though there may be short run changes (this is a principle called "organizational hysteresis"). If you want to change the valuation of knowledge inside the military, then you have to think like an organizational genetic engineer .

I don't know the cultures well enough to offer specific suggestions on doing this type of organizational genetic engineering but one observation that may help is that every successful organizational re-engineering has several characteristics:
1. an executive level "champion";
2. constant communications to all levels of the organization;
3. a clear statement of vision, values and ethics;
4. a well laid out system of rewards and punishments to reinforce those values;
5. a group with power whose sole responsibility is to enforce that code; and
6. an agreement that the core power brokers in the organization don't have to meet the most onerous requirements that they impose on the rest of the organization.

Can you subconsciously be bound to "organizational hysteresis", or is it more of a matter of being ignorant of the organizational inertia which inhibits change? To me, the first in my mind implies a fear of change; the latter more of an inability to consider problems which require change?
• an executive level "champion"; - A CSA with a SecDef mandate?
• constant communications to all levels of the organization;- we are getting better about this through Communities of practice, Blogs, circulation of emails and ideas
• a clear statement of vision, values and ethics; - we kind of have that with the OERs where we lay out attributes, values, ethics, but I don’t think we’ve done a good job emphasizing where those come into play. Many company grade officers & arguably junior field grades don’t think understand the organizational and individual values of “emotional strength, conceptual, and the ilk” . We beat a pretty good drum though on “adaptive, innovative and agile”
• a well laid out system of rewards and punishments to reinforce those values; - Hmmmm???
• a group with power whose sole responsibility is to enforce that code; - For the military I’d prefer that it be more of a shared group responsibility
• an agreement that the core power brokers in the organization don't have to meet the most onerous requirements that they impose on the rest of the organization. – I don’t understand. If the core power brokers don’t share it, then they don’t understand it, and we’re back to square pegs in round holes.

As for me, I'm waiting for the Matrix theory - where I get a USB port behind my ear

Thanks, Rob

[marct]

Hi Rob,

Marc, killer reply & a great read on organizational theory.

Thanks .

Can you subconsciously be bound to "organizational hysteresis", or is it more of a matter of being ignorant of the organizational inertia which inhibits change? To me, the first in my mind implies a fear of change; the latter more of an inability to consider problems which require change?

Get to the heart of things why don't you?

That's a really tricky question and to do justice to it, I'm going to have to give you a rather long and complex answer. The (very) short answer is "both".

Let me start by saying that institutions and organizaions do not "exist" in any absolute sense of the word - they are "illusions" held in the minds of individuals. These "illusions" are reified (turned into objective things by cultural convention) and, as a result, take on the attributes of things that exist. It is "easier" (actually, it's part of our evolutionary heritage) for us to ascribe characteristics to a shared illusion than it is to deal with its reality.

Having said that, "organizational hysteresis" really refers to what might be called a "self-protection mechanism" in the brain that allows individuals to operate within an organizational environment. All organizations have both ideological (rational, communicated reasons) and symbolic (significatory and emotional) systems. Organizational hysteresis operates using the symbolic system and is usually expressed via the ideological system.

"fear of change"? Sure, that's some of it, although fear, at an unconscious level, of "meaninglessness" would probably be a better description. I usually use Yates' Second Coming as a way of communicating what I mean by this:

TURNING and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.

"Organizational inertia"? Sure, there's some of that too. One of the key problems for any organization is to figure out at any given time what its rate of adaptation needs to be. If you look at private industry, for example, the past 40 years has seen a massive shift in the rate of change in employment practices, technology adaptation, etc.

I'm pretty certain that most people in any organization have a fairly good idea of the inertia of that organization <wry grin>. The question is how this is handled in the ideological and symbolic systems of the organization. Organizations based on Authority Ranking systems have a tendency to disapprove of change both ideologically and symbolically, so if you really want to overcome organizational inertia, you need a strong, institutionalized component of the organization whose job it is to push for situational change.

BTW, this doesn't actually have to be a person it can be a process. Let me give you an example: Take the "lessons learned" documents coming out of Iraq. If the process required policy revisions based on these documents with a regular review for compliance every, say, 6 months, then you would actually have a form of adaptability that takes advantage of organizational inertia.

• an executive level "champion"; - A CSA with a SecDef mandate?

Possibly, although it could be an outsider who is brought in at the JC level.

• constant communications to all levels of the organization;- we are getting better about this through Communities of practice, Blogs, circulation of emails and ideas

I agree on that . In many ways, the communications structures that have worked in private industry tend to be a combination of "official" and unofficial. Think of it as an "organizational lessons learned" campaign <evil grin>. BTW, it is also crucial that negative lessons learned are included with no backlash IFF their was no fault.

• a clear statement of vision, values and ethics; - we kind of have that with the OERs where we lay out attributes, values, ethics, but I don’t think we’ve done a good job emphasizing where those come into play. Many company grade officers & arguably junior field grades don’t think understand the organizational and individual values of “emotional strength, conceptual, and the ilk” . We beat a pretty good drum though on “adaptive, innovative and agile”

I suspect that that is a reaction to the current operational environment - "adaptive, innovative and agile" are much more usefil in the field. The actual "vision statement" has to be an offical construct, while the applications of an ethics code need to be continually debated. Proctor and Gamble is a good example of what I am thinking of now. On the training side, Heinlein's idea of a class in History and Moral Philosophy is a good example (Book not movie!).

• a well laid out system of rewards and punishments to reinforce those values; - Hmmmm???

Pretty simple, really. You already have the Joint Code of Military Justice for most operations. In the case of implementing changes, you need to tweak the current system such that each desireable value is reinforced, while non-desired values are punished. For example, let's supppose that a company commander drags his heels on implementing a particular initiative. This is pretty much already covered under the JCMJ and it's just a matter of applying it.

• a group with power whose sole responsibility is to enforce that code; - For the military I’d prefer that it be more of a shared group responsibility

I can understand that, but there is always the problem of an old boys network disrupting the change process. Think of what I am proposing as a combination of an Inspector General and an Auditor General. I'm not sure about the US, but in Canada, the Auditor General has the right to examine any government organization and the legal responsibility to point out its flaws. As an anti-old boys network component, the Auditor General is appointed for a specific time period and given a golden parachute. They are never expected to work for the government again.

• an agreement that the core power brokers in the organization don't have to meet the most onerous requirements that they impose on the rest of the organization. – I don’t understand. If the core power brokers don’t share it, then they don’t understand it, and we’re back to square pegs in round holes.

Not quite - this is more of a "reality of situations" than an ideal. The core power brokers are required to appear to support it, but are not required to meet all of the "new" requirements. For example, let's suppose that one "requirement" was for a mandatory sabbatical after 10 years of service. The main power brokers are likely to be older and closer to retirement, so they could be exempted from this requirement on the understanding that they would retire within 10 years. Or how about mandatory psychological testing every six months for all active duty personelle?

Basically, it is a way of sugar coating something that they can't stomach.

As for me, I'm waiting for the Matrix theory - where I get a USB port behind my ear

It's coming!!!!!

Marc

[Shek]

Rob,
I'm sure that you've already read this op-ed piece from Parameters, but if not, it gets very much at the heart of our conversation:

"Fashion Tips for Field Grades"
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute...les/PUB731.pdf

What a great metaphor, and all too sad.

[120mm]

On superiors exempting themselves from onerous requirements:

As a Reservist, I have time and time again been forced to attend mandatory training designed to "accept change", yet I have never seen a person in actual authority attend. The result? The organization in question doesn't actually change, as the important people didn't have to attend the class, or buy into change, at all.

On a contrarian note: I had the honor of speaking at last year's Combat Studies Institute Symposium. LTG Petraeus was the keynote speaker on the first day. He got up, said his spiel, and then, shockingly to me, sat back down in the first row. And attended all three days of the conference.

I have never, ever seen such behavior in a senior officer. It was the first time, in over 24 years of service, that I saw a senior officer actually attend something. LTG Petraeus not only attended, but he took notes, and asked a question or two of every single presenter.

I always just assumed that once you hit O-6, that you became a "Spot-Check Charlie" who had to be acquainted with your organizations through briefing slides. The 5 GOs that I've worked directly for, wouldn't have recognized their respective units without a 2 hour PowerPoint briefing.

I've been both a unit commander and an SGS. I am not overwhelmed with our current crop of O-6s and above. And the Field Grades I work with every day appear to be largely anti-intellectual, as well.

[Tom Odom]

True enough...but

The really good officers AND NCOS read. The steadty stream of visitors through my office dirung rotations or LTP classes indicates the appetite is there if we cook the meal.

The most sought after item aside from Lessons Learned materials? The military history DVD I assembled with 3 CDRom equivalents of military history from CSI, CMH, and MHI.

I have hopes for a new rennaissance in the Army as we had in the early 80s.

I have nothing but respect for David Kilcullen the Aussie who is the latest fad in COIN theory. The Army had Kilcullens before 9-11 as did the Marine Corps as did State, CIA, and AID. But as indicated in the fashion piece from SSI above, we were not fashionable.

Even Colin Powell in his "rules" offers a distinct anti-intellectual bent:

1. It ain't as bad as you think. It will look better in the morning.

2. Get mad, then get over it.

3. Avoid having your ego so close to your position that when your position falls, your ego goes with it.

4. It can be done!

5. Be careful what you choose. You may get it.

6. Don't let adverse facts stand in the way of a good decision.

7. You can't make someone else's choices. You shouldn't let someone else make yours.

8. Check small things.

9. Share credit.

10. Remain calm. Be kind.

11. Have a vision. Be demanding.

12. Don't take counsel of your fears or naysayers.

13. Perpetual optimism is a force multiplier.

Meanwhile the challenge to all of us on here is to:

1. Keep reading and learning

2. Keep encouraging others to do the same

3. Reward those who do, if only with simple praise

4. Maintain the intellectual integrity and bravery to challenge ignorance

5. And remember that stupidity cannot be fixed with knowledge: to reverse Forrest Gump's Mama: "Stupid does because Stupid is."

Best

Tom

[marct]

Hi 120mm,

As a Reservist, I have time and time again been forced to attend mandatory training designed to "accept change", yet I have never seen a person in actual authority attend. The result? The organization in question doesn't actually change, as the important people didn't have to attend the class, or buy into change, at all.

You know, I hesitated before listing that particular point <wry grin>. Historically, it has tended to be the result of backroom political deals inside organizations with divided power structures. It is a face saving option that allows the cynics who run many organizations to appear to support a position, but then not actually do anything other than make their underlings do the work <sigh>.

On the effects of it, you are quite right. It doesn't necessarily stop change, but it does inevitably slow it down.

On a contrarian note: I had the honor of speaking at last year's Combat Studies Institute Symposium. LTG Petraeus was the keynote speaker on the first day. He got up, said his spiel, and then, shockingly to me, sat back down in the first row. And attended all three days of the conference.

I have never, ever seen such behavior in a senior officer. It was the first time, in over 24 years of service, that I saw a senior officer actually attend something. LTG Petraeus not only attended, but he took notes, and asked a question or two of every single presenter.

Remember that point I made about establishing a "Champion"? That is exactly what he was acting as. If his actions shocked you, how do you think that they have affected your long-term view of what a senior officer should do? My gut guess is that you, and a bunch of other people attending, started to rethink your views. His actions of attending, paying attention, asking questions, etc. has, probably, shifted your emotional responses to the symbol of a "good senior officer".

This is culture change in action. Now, to back it up and reinforce it, the trick will be to start getting more and more senior officers to attend this type of event, making it a "tradition" for fast-track promotions. If that happens, then the inverse will happen as well - "Jim, oh, he said he can't be bothered with coming. Yeah, I guess he will get that posting to the Dew line. See you there...". It's a silly script, but it is also the basis of what cultural change / engineering in organizations is all about - redefining the emotional valuation of symbols (including events).

I always just assumed that once you hit O-6, that you became a "Spot-Check Charlie" who had to be acquainted with your organizations through briefing slides. The 5 GOs that I've worked directly for, wouldn't have recognized their respective units without a 2 hour PowerPoint briefing.

<wry grin>You know, somehow that doesn't make me feel very sanguine. I hope that they didn't need a 20 slide PowerPoint presentation to show them how to get under cover? Hmmm, maybe I should rethink that - there is something to be said for Darwinian selection .

On a more serious note, this is a classic problem that has developed time and time again in many organizations between those who "do" and those who "support the doing" - think of it as the difference between warriors or soldiers and bureaucrats. Inevitably, when the "doers" are not needed for the survival of the society, the bureaucrats take over the institutions. The Byzantine Empire in the 11th century provides one of the most horrific examples of this in terms of the military, but their are other good examples as well - the Roman Catholic Church in the 14th century and the British Colonial Office in the 20th century come to mind.

I've been both a unit commander and an SGS. I am not overwhelmed with our current crop of O-6s and above. And the Field Grades I work with every day appear to be largely anti-intellectual, as well.

So are many of the academics I've come in contact with . I think it's important to point out that being overly intellectual is equally dangerous. To my (biased) opinion, the best situation is someone who can combine expertise in the immediate "now" when neccessary and, at the same time, has the ability (and knowledge) to sit back and think when time is available.

Intellectualizing, over-thinking as it were, is actually something that has been bred out of our species for most of our history, and for good reason. When I talk about this in my Intro to Anthropology classes, I use the example of Australopithicenes after they developed Oldowan tool technology. Picture this scene:

(Setting - the savanah grasslands in Africa. A small troop of 3 foot tall Australopithecines gather around to hear their troop leader talk)
Leader: Alright, listen up! This is it! This is what we have been waiting for! WE've got the tools! We've got the technology! Let's conquer the world! (sound of raucus cheering)
(pan shot showing the troop moving out into the tall grass. Sequence of shots showing time movement of several hours, ending with the troop in a skirmish line moving towards a watering hole)
Lucy: Um, guys, do you see that patch of grass up ahead? The one that's moving against the wind?
Everyone: Yeah Sure Got it, etc.
Lucy: Do you see that tuft of grass that looks a bit burnt at the end?
Everyone: Yeah Sure Got it, etc.
Lucy: Well, I don't know about you guys, but I'm getting out of here!
Leader: What!?! Deserting your post? Get back here and use logic, damnit!
(shot of Lucy running of into a stand of trees 200 meteers away)
Leader: Damn coward! Okay, boys, let's look at this logically. A tuft of grass going against the wind. Hmm. it's tawny, and now, hey, that's odd - it seems to be moving towards us.
(shot of other members of the troopp running for the trees)
Leader: Hey, wait a minute! Don't forget, we've got the technology here - we can take on anything! Now, hey, it's getting closer isn't it? Wow, only about 15 feet away and...
CRUNCH as a lion jumps on the leader and proceeds to have lunch while thinking that his current meal tastes a bit "airy".

I'd hate to think what would have happened if Australopithecines had had PowerPoint presentations

Marc

[Steve Blair]

I've seen the same interest from some of our AFROTC cadets, Tom. I'm something of the office history specialist, and many of them drop by with questions or just to talk and get book recommendations. But they get little encouragement aside from these talks. Our course materials are geared toward turning out little Curtis LeMays who can spout AF "core values" until the cows come home but have no real grasp of reality outside the little blue ball. And it's a shame.

[Rob Thornton]

I read recently where the 3 GOs in the running to take over from GEN Casey are: LTG Petraeus, LTG Dempsey and LTG Chirelli. One of them will implement (and are probably influencing its design) whatever new strategy comes out with the New Year. Their policies and execution of the strategy will influence every officer here in some fashion who will take back with them what they have learned to the various school houses, follow on assignments, etc.

I was talking with our team 1SG last night about if we thought the American public had the stomach for a "generational war"? What I mean for example, if say in 2008 -2010, we transitioned from a major investment in Iraq to say a major investment in the Horn of Africa, would the public have the stomach for it? Even though the public suffers very little - not many serve, the % of the GDP spent on Military Spending is actually very low (almost commensurate with the % who serve) - would we have the politcal will for it? Are we willing to allocate the resources for it?

There was an article which quoted an AF strategist the other day that said (I paraphrase), "Radical Islam is willing to fight for 50 -100 years to establish an Islamic State" and that this was somewhat akin to the "Cold War" in terms of it being an ideological struggle on a global scale.

Now maybe through limited, "early intervention", etc. the world can help to deny the conditions in failing states from being ripe for picking by radical Islamic opportunists. However, its going to take leaders with vision on how not only to employ all the instruments available to them, but the leadership skills to build teams of diverse groups (Combined, Inter-Agency, Joint) with mixed chains of command together to achieve a purpose.

Maybe, these early intervention efforts can go under the public radar enough not to drag in the media'a propensity to spin it; maybe it won't spook the politicians, or be used by the other party as a "catalyst" for change, maybe...., but even relatively small deployments (in comparrison to OIF & OEF) can go supernova quickly.

Keeping the "Long War" acceptable to a public majority who does not seem interested in sacrifice in almost any sense of the word will be difficult. Our national short term memory and attention span may create something more along the lines of a "knee jerk", reactionary strategy that allows only for intervention after the conditions are such that the contest is already decided, but still demand action because now a political response to media spun public outcries require it. However, failure will now be the fault of .....

I know its dark and pessimistic, and hopefully its not so bad as all that. My point is to discuss some of the conditions that leaders will have to operate in. Which brings me back to Marc's Executive champion & the other motivators for genetic re-engineering. One of the challenges is going to be engineering the all volunteer military for another long struggle - our metaphor of the background of Marathon in which the pentathletes compete.

[120mm]

Marc, you got my sarcastic point about Petraeus, entirely. What also interests me about the guy, is that we had a couple of discussions during the conference and he seemed genuine and smart.

My point about anti-intellectuals, is that they tend to have good coping skills for one set of familiar situations. Unfortunately, they lack the imagination and desire to prepare themselves for a different set of unfamiliar situations.

In other words, being anti-intellectual discards the baby with the bath-water. While one can be overly-intellectual, and embrace new things without healthy skepticism like your Australopithecenes, most people I label as "anti-intellectual" were saying things like "They're just truck drivers, they'll never have to use their rifles" in early 2003 in Kuwait.

It is not easy to be well-read in the military, and it is not easy to have worked with your hands in academia, from what I've seen and experienced.