BG McMaster on the Army Capstone Concept (Quicklook Notes)

[SWJED]

Brigadier General H.R. McMaster on Setting Conditions and The Army Capstone Concept

Certainty vs. Uncertainty / Theory vs. Recent and Ongoing Conflicts (Then and Now)

• Knowledge centric vs. fighting and politics centric.
  
• Planning process vs. design and education.
  
• Synchronization vs. initiative.
  
• Centralization vs. decentralization.
  
• Risk avoidance vs. risk mitigation.
  
• Efficiency vs. effectiveness.
  
• Fires vs. combined arms fire and maneuver.
  
• See / quality of firsts vs. find and understand.
  
• Rapid, Decisive Operations vs. sustained campaigns.
  
• ISR vs. recon and security.
  
• Command from the FOB vs. command from the front.
  
• Systems approach (EBO) vs. complexity (design).
  
• Dominance vs. strategy and continuous interaction.
  
• MCO focus vs. spectrum of conflict.
  
• Capabilities Based Assessment vs. Threat Based Assessment.
  
• Vagueness vs. transparency.
  
• Linear progression (leap ahead) vs. interaction with adversaries - continuous innovation.

Implications for the Army Capstone Concept

• Conducting operations under the condition of transparency.
  
• Conducting operations with partners and amongst diverse populations.
  
• Overcoming anti-access in the context of a joint operation.
  
• Conducting and sustaining operations from and across extended distances.
  
• Fighting for information (physical reconnaissance and human intelligence).
  
• Employing the manpower, mobility, firepower, and protection to close with the enemy.
  
• Conducting area security operations over large areas (including population security; precision fires to limit collateral damage).
  
• Developing partner capabilities (e.g. Security Force Assistance).
  
• Protecting the network and routinely fighting in degraded mode.
  
• Overcoming hybrid threats / complex terrain and overcoming enemy count-mobility efforts.
  
• Reshaping logistics and the demand side of sustainment to ensure operations without pause and freedom of movement in non-contiguous area of operations.

[SWJED]

Conference comment - What we lost in the 90's was the understanding that land warfare is fundamentally different from aerospace and maritime warfare because of the presence of a population and the complexity of geography. We have to capture that again...

[SWJED]

Conference comment - In consideration of the Capstone Concept and the implications and solutions it suggests we have to be careful that we do not overcorrect...

[SWJED]

Conference comment - The 2009 Army Capstone Concept fits nicely with US Joint Forces Command's Capstone Concept for Joint Operations.

[Mark O'Neill]

lack context in the 'vs' , Can you elaborate?

Thanks

Mark

[SWJED]

Mark - context was in previous theory (90's) vs. the reality we eventually encountered.

[Westhawk]

BG McMaster delivered a broad attack on the DoD’s transformation plans from the 1990s. He asserted that the technological focus of that time neglected the human, social, cultural, and political factors necessary to prevail on the modern battlefield. According to McMaster, events of this decade have shown how adversaries have adapted to previous U.S. methods thus negating them.

McMaster’s capstone concept seeks to reverse many of the precepts and assumptions of the 1990s defense transformation program. Under McMaster’s vision, in order to prevail in ground combat U.S. forces will need to “go local,” by getting very close to the enemy and sustaining long-term operations deep into a variety of indigenous population.

During yesterday’s staff ride of the Gettysburg battlefield, we discussed how any army is the product and reflection of the society from which it comes. The nature of U.S. Southern culture favored the Confederacy early on, but the more industrial and commercial nature of the North later asserted its dominance.

The question for today is whether U.S. society can produce the kind of soldiers and the Army necessary to implement the capstone concept McMaster described. And whether U.S. society can support the operational concept McMaster believes is required to prevail.

-Robert Haddick

[Mark O'Neill]

Originally Posted by SWJED

Mark - context was in previous theory (90's) vs. the reality we eventually encountered.

thanks for the clarification for a remote Aussie.

[marct]

There is an interesting dynamic at work in this presentation - it is a paradigm shift in the classic, Kuhnian sense. My immediate perception of most of the concern and debate is that it not involve a total paradigm shift, aka a Revolution but, rather, a modification and adaptation of the basic epistemology to bring it more in line with lived reality.

[SWJED]

Originally Posted by marct

There is an interesting dynamic at work in this presentation - it is a paradigm shift in the classic, Kuhnian sense. My immediate perception of most of the concern and debate is that it not involve a total paradigm shift, aka a Revolution but, rather, a modification and adaptation of the basic epistemology to bring it more in line with lived reality.

I will also point to the conference comment above concerning overcorrecting - that is probably the tough part here concernng adapting for the future - what's too little and what's too much. Hopefully there will be some drilling down on this...

Next brief and discussion is just starting - it's on the Army Campaign Plan...

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by SWJED

Mark - context was in previous theory (90's) vs. the reality we eventually encountered.

Well that does beg the question as to how the "theory" of the 90's became accepted in the face of no evidence and a body of historically informed "best practice" which has remained largely the same since 1918.

The only reason I point this out, is that an organisation that is prone to making poor decisions, usually avoids finding out why the bad decisions get made.

EG: On what planet was "Command from the FOB vs. command from the front" ever a good idea, and how is video feeds from UAVs helping solve this problem?

[Fuchs]

"Brigadier General H.R. McMaster on Setting Conditions and The Army Capstone Concept"

Where's the primary source?

[marct]

Originally Posted by Fuchs

"Brigadier General H.R. McMaster on Setting Conditions and The Army Capstone Concept"

Where's the primary source?

Currently, from what I understand, it is in draft format for internal discussion.

[Anlaochfhile]

Originally Posted by Westhawk

BG McMaster delivered a broad attack on the DoD’s transformation plans from the 1990s. He asserted that the technological focus of that time neglected the human, social, cultural, and political factors necessary to prevail on the modern battlefield. According to McMaster, events of this decade have shown how adversaries have adapted to previous U.S. methods thus negating them.

McMaster’s capstone concept seeks to reverse many of the precepts and assumptions of the 1990s defense transformation program. Under McMaster’s vision, in order to prevail in ground combat U.S. forces will need to “go local,” by getting very close to the enemy and sustaining long-term operations deep into a variety of indigenous population.

During yesterday’s staff ride of the Gettysburg battlefield, we discussed how any army is the product and reflection of the society from which it comes. The nature of U.S. Southern culture favored the Confederacy early on, but the more industrial and commercial nature of the North later asserted its dominance.

The question for today is whether U.S. society can produce the kind of soldiers and the Army necessary to implement the capstone concept McMaster described. And whether U.S. society can support the operational concept McMaster believes is required to prevail.

-Robert Haddick

Excellent point. We live in a society that is overall much more enamored with technology and hard sciences than with the humanities. How can a nation that routinely lags behind much of the world in social studies, geography, language arts, and other liberal arts studies hope to field armies that are culturally adept enough for the small wars that are likely to be a significant part of our future? The services are certainly making an effort, but without a solid grounding in our own culture, these efforts seem unlikely to ‘stick’.

I highly recommend Dr. Adrian Lewis’ book The American Culture of War: the History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom, which focuses on the role that American culture plays in how our forces organize, equip, and fight. It has some keen insights in this regard.

[Brasidas]

A quick point. The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations is a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff document of his vision on how joint forces would operate 2016-28 in the face of assorted challenges. CCJO incorporates USJFCOM's work in the document: Joint Operating Environment, threats and trends that could face the future force. The JOE is a companion document to CCJO.

[SWJED]

Thanks Brasidas, you are very correct that the CCJO is a CJCS document.

On the draft Army Capstone Concept - this document is the product of a writing team of 20 personnel...

[SWJED]

I highly recommend Dr. Adrian Lewis’ book The American Culture of War: the History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom, which focuses on the role that American culture plays in how our forces organize, equip, and fight. It has some keen insights in this regard.

Thanks Anlaochfhile...

The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom

The American Culture of War is a comprehensive and authoritative survey of American conduct in war from World War II to the present, including both Iraq wars. It traces the evolution of American strategic, operational, and tactical doctrine, including the national command structure, civil-military relations, the role of the media, military technology, the military personnel system, airpower doctrine, the role of Congress, and numerous related aspects of national defence. The American Culture of War will be an indispensable text for upper-division undergradudate courses on the history of war as well as history courses on the Vietnam War and the 1960s.

[SWJED]

Capstone Concept will change Army doctrine
By Robert Haddick

At last week’s TRADOC Senior Leaders Conference, I heard BG H.R. McMaster deliver a presentation on the U.S. Army’s forthcoming Capstone Concept. Here is a news article from TRADOC and the U.S. Army that describes what the Army’s Capstone Concept is and what it will mean to the Army in the years ahead. A few excerpts from the article:

The new Capstone Concept, McMaster said, examines how the Army operates under conditions of complexity and uncertainty in an era of persistent conflict. The concept's purpose is to put into operational terms Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Casey's vision of balancing the Army to win today's wars while describing how the future Army will fight the wars of tomorrow...

The primary purpose of the capstone concept is to lead force development and employment by establishing a common framework to think about future Army operations; place modernization decisions in a broader context of future armed conflict; establish a conceptual foundation for subordinate concepts; guide experimentation in Army operations and capabilities; and guide capability development.

"We looked at how the Army intends to operate and face the challenges in the future operating environment against what we're calling hybrid threats," said McMaster. "By looking at the current operating environment and the hybrid threats we face and could face in the future, this helps the Army make a grounded projection into the near future and understand what challenges our Army will face as part of a Joint, interdepartmental and multinational force, and then develop the capability our Army will need to fight the future battle."

BG McMaster is leading a team that will complete work on the Capstone Concept by the end of this year. The new Capstone Concept is then supposed to guide the development of subordinate Army doctrine. The Capstone Concept effort thus represents important guidance for Army training, leader development, and combat unit organization.

During his presentation last week, BG McMaster emphasized the differences between the doctrine his team is completing and the doctrine the Army operated under a decade ago. Small Wars Journal hopes to provide further discussion of the Army Capstone Concept as it nears completion. For now, I recommend reading the article linked to above.

[marct]

I'll admit that this jumped out at me:

In the new edition of the Army Capstone Concept, understanding the situation will be better defined and what the Army learns about the ethnic and cultural aspects of a situation will be factored into whatever threat the Army will face in the future.
{emphasis added}

I've been concerned for some time now about how "culture", broadly speaking, is understood and operationalized in US Army doctrine. There are serious implications for both policy, strategy and operations regardless of how the concept is constructed, but they vary by the construction. I'll be interested to see what final form they take.

[davidbfpo]

'HR' spoke yesterday at IISS, London to a nearly full conference room on the project, with a small number of slides; in a nice touch he had to operate the PPT control himself and sometimes forgot. Very clever delivery and some wicked humour: UK Ministry of Defence (Strategy) questioner poses question and 'HR' responds did I hear you right Tragedy?

A lot to absorb and many points that could be applied to law enforcement.

IISS I think will add a video to their website soon: http://www.iiss.org/ .

Later 'HR' added his praise for the contribution of SWJ / SWC.

More another day.

davidbfpo