PMC in COIN (general theme)

[cobot]

Wow-all I am getting is the common perspective that contractors have failed and the request that I prove otherwise. In spite of the fact that day after day, week after week and month after month, supplies are delivered, personnel are trained and security is provided. In short, in spite of the fact that contrators have largely succeeded, I'm being informed that they have failed. Again, a few highly publicized accounts of problems don't translate to a failure.

If you are able, illuminate the specific positive impacts (beyond simple mission execution) that contractors have had in current COIN ops.

You don't hear about all the successes (which in terms of quantity absolutely dwarf the failures) precisely because they aren't high profile missions. "Low level" missions like delivery of supplies, training and security all are important parts of COIN. Without "simple mission execution" COIN ops would be greatly handicapped.

In fact, Bill is the only one who mentioned "failure", and it was certainly not in the form of an assumption. He stated clearly that the contractors have largely failed (meaning they have created more harm than good) in Iraq and Afghanistan, while going on to positive reflections of PMC impacts in other arenas.

And again, my request is for some substantiation as to why he thinks the contractors' efforts could aptly be construed as "largely" a failure. Yes, there have been some sporatic problems but these haven't, to my knowledge, tainted the overall effort. If I'm missing something please enlighten me.

you are the one making a huge assumption. If you believe the members of this board - especially individuals like Bill Moore and SWJED - are less than enthusiastic about the overall impact of contractors on ops in Iraq due to a few media stories, you are sorely mistaken.

Hmmm, enlighten me again-where did I ever write this or even insinuate this?

As for myself, I am pretty much in line with the others that have responded. Not just the guns for hire, but the loggie guys, drivers, mechanics, tech geeks and other contractors in theater are there simply because we don't have the bodies in uniform to execute every necessary supporting mission in the larger op. Having people that can ably (more or less) fill those roles is a good thing - in the short term. However, the use of contractors in several of those roles raises many troubling operational issues; i.e. from my perspective, the over-reliance on contractors in many intelligence roles is doing long-term damage to the MI field, from which it will take a tremendous effort to recover. This is a significant negative impact that ripples well beyond Iraq and Afghanistan.

Now we're getting somewhere-this is the level of analysis I was looking for-thank you.

And don't assume that the members of this board develop their perspectives from media feeds. Even in the best of interpretations, that is insulting.

Well if somebody has spent time there, they'd have seen the number of times things were done properly-the everyday mission successes which directly feed into the possibility of overall operational success. Again, if I'm missing something please enlighten me.

[marct]

However, the use of contractors in several of those roles raises many troubling operational issues; i.e. from my perspective, the over-reliance on contractors in many intelligence roles is doing long-term damage to the MI field, from which it will take a tremendous effort to recover. This is a significant negative impact that ripples well beyond Iraq and Afghanistan.

Now we're getting somewhere-this is the level of analysis I was looking for-thank you.

I would have to add to this that using contractors for MI is not only damaging to the field itself, but is also damaging to the reputation of the US forces globally. Many people can understand why contractors would be hred for specific support services (e.g. driving, tech support, etc.), but for something as crucial as MI and interogations? Surely this is sending a message that the administration wishes to bypass all intenational conventions surrounding prisoners - regardless of the "truth" of such a message.

Marc

[Jimbo]

There are many problems with the use of PMC's in COIN. The first thing to consider is their motivation. They are a for profit company. Therefore, what is their motivation to see a solution? That being said soem things to be said. The PMC's are not the resurrection of Hoare and No 5 Commando in the Congo or Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone. The one attempt at contractor direct involvement, MPRI running basic training at Kirkush for the new Iraqi Army did not work. If the mission needs to change, even slightly, that involves a new contract. Therefore the PMC's lack flexibility. The PMC's do good at fixed sight security, but at a certain point you have to have the locals do this, once again we are back to making money. The use of PMC's to escort convoy's works, but they really aren't integrated into military C2. This leads to them being very heavy-handed on the local population, hence a liability in COIN. Finally, the over reliance of PMC's for technological and labor support leads to an overall eroding of a military's capabilities. The PMC's provide a valuable resource for security, but there is no transition plan for them, and due to them being outside the military there are C2 issues and "butter-fly effect" issues that manifest into large problems. So in very limited roles, PMCs are great, but they are not what was and has been done in Africa in the mercenary tales of lore. Many of the PMC folks are great guys with impressive skills and resumes, but they are not the answer in any way shape or mean to COIN, and at worst, contribute to the problem.

[marct]

Hi Jimbo,

There are many problems with the use of PMC's in COIN. The first thing to consider is their motivation. They are a for profit company. Therefore, what is their motivation to see a solution?

I certainly have to agree with you on this. As one of my favorite armchair theoreticians said:

I say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his state are either his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed. Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for they are disunited, ambitious, and without discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have neither the fear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is deferred only so long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed by them, and in war by the enemy. The fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which is not sufficient to make them willing to die for you.

Nicolo Machiavelli, The Prince

The one attempt at contractor direct involvement, MPRI running basic training at Kirkush for the new Iraqi Army did not work. If the mission needs to change, even slightly, that involves a new contract. Therefore the PMC's lack flexibility.

This might be handleable via a flexible contract such as that of the Landsknecht in the 15th and 16th centuries, but it wouldn't deal with the political problem of hiring mercenaries.

The use of PMC's to escort convoy's works, but they really aren't integrated into military C2. This leads to them being very heavy-handed on the local population, hence a liability in COIN.

Absolutely! And, just to add to the problem, there is an insidious symbolic problem as well - "obviously the 'infidel' has no principles or strong beliefs except trying to grab all the money they can; after all, they don't even have enough volunteers to guard their trucks!". Using PMCs in field support roles may create a situation where there is a perception that the Coalition's national wills are much lower than they actually are, embolding the various insurgent groups and militias to act.

Finally, the over reliance of PMC's for technological and labor support leads to an overall eroding of a military's capabilities. The PMC's provide a valuable resource for security, but there is no transition plan for them, and due to them being outside the military there are C2 issues and "butter-fly effect" issues that manifest into large problems. So in very limited roles, PMCs are great, but they are not what was and has been done in Africa in the mercenary tales of lore. Many of the PMC folks are great guys with impressive skills and resumes, but they are not the answer in any way shape or mean to COIN, and at worst, contribute to the problem.

Honestly, I'm not quite sure if I would agree that "they are not the answer in any way shape or mean to COIN" - there are some possibilities, but I certainly haven't seen them take place. I certainly agree that a reliance on mercenaries, and I'm using that term rather than PMCs to highlight the propaganda problem with PMCs, would be disasterous. I also agree that the "the over reliance of PMC's for technological and labor support leads to an overall eroding of a military's capabilities"; but there is a problem here. In a number of cases, the regular forces just cannot get or hold onto the right type of technological skills (in the broad sense of technology).

At least in the case of technological mercenaries, it may be a good idea to modify their contracts such that they are also responsible for field training members of the regular forces as well as fulfilling their general contract objectives. Another problem, at least in the technology area, is that the world views of the mercenaries may be so different from the regular forces that they spend all of their time fighting each other. This was certainly the case with most Anthropologists working in WW II in the US (yes, symbolic manipulation is a technology).

Marc

[Tom Odom]

A relevant article in the Wash Post today:

There are about 100,000 government contractors operating in Iraq, not counting subcontractors, a total that is approaching the size of the U.S. military force there, according to the military's first census of the growing population of civilians operating in the battlefield.

The survey finding, which includes Americans, Iraqis and third-party nationals hired by companies operating under U.S. government contracts, is significantly higher and wider in scope than the Pentagon's only previous estimate, which said there were 25,000 security contractors in the country.

It is also 10 times the estimated number of contractors that deployed during the Persian Gulf War in 1991, reflecting the Pentagon's growing post-Cold War reliance on contractors for such jobs as providing security, interrogating prisoners, cooking meals, fixing equipment and constructing bases that were once reserved for soldiers.

Official numbers are difficult to find, said Deborah D. Avant, author of the 2005 book "The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security," but an estimated 9,200 contractors deployed during the Gulf War, a far shorter conflict without reconstruction projects. "This is the largest deployment of U.S. contractors in a military operation," said Avant, an associate professor at George Washington University.

Best

Tom