Quote Originally Posted by marct View Post
Well, populations are not singular; even in families !
That's exactly what I'm driving at. Obviously each population considers its own grievances to be legitimate, but addressing those grievances can cause another population to turn to violence. For example, consider the institution of slavery in the US from before Civil War and through the Civil Rights Act. Was there, for example, some kind of "good governance" which we might have instituted sometime before the Civil War that would have avoided that conflict? Was there any possible kind of "good governance" that could have brought us to where we are today in the 19th century? Was rebellion in the south a failure of governance? I don't think so. In fact, I suspect that had the feds tried to impose something like the CRA immediately following the Civil War, then we likely would have faced a post-war insurgency. So the question is, what can governance do when populations have irreconcilable differences?

Applying this to Afghanistan, I really need to be convinced that good central governance in Afghanistan is even possible, much less the highly centralized government that currently exists. The best that could be hoped for, in my estimation, is something along the lines of how Pakistan is currently organized, but that isn't working out all that well either. The alternative is the devolution of central power altogether - if centralized good governance isn't possible, then perhaps a highly decentralized state is. Certainly there is precedence for that in Afghanistan, but we are limited by the political reality and the conditions today, which is a highly centralized Afghan government wholly dependent on foreign powers.

In short, I question that there is any kind of "good governance" under the existing system which can satisfy all the competing factions.

The alternative is for the populations to change. Such change occurs very slowly. This is, I think, what happened here in the US with slavery. Good governance did not solve the irreconcilable differences between the North and South, even after the Civil War. Ultimately, and over a long period of time, the populace changed. In Afghanistan I fear trying to bring misplaced notions of good governance through a highly centralized government will set the stage for more violence in Afghanistan and not less.

In the end what we think is "good governance" may, in reality, turn into quite the opposite. Jcustis' comments highlight our continuing collective ignorance on Afghanistan which impedes our ability to understand what good governance is in Afghanistan, much less our ability to foster it.

No state actually has a monopoly on violence. In the US, for example, each individual state has its own armed forces, as do many municipalities (aka police). Private corporations also have the capability of violence, either from their own security forces or by hiring them or by manipulating local politicians to use theirs. The idea that the "state", which is an illusion anyway, has a monopoly on violence is just one of those myths that have been propagated since the development of modern states.
That's true and I do understand there are various levels of government and/or authority depending on circumstances. "Monopoly" is the wrong word and I didn't mean a monolithic "state" so sorry for the confusion.

Let me put it this way - what is it that prevents me from taking justice into my own hands? In large part it is because I'm deterred from doing so because the "state" (ie. some authority with coercive power over me) will visit negative repercussions upon me that I cannot avoid. In short, one can't have a governmental authority without credible coercive power to include violence. If I tried to set up my own independent system of justice here in my neighborhood it wouldn't last long because the government has the coercive power to prevent it, even if my system of justice is superior and more legitimate in the eyes of my "population" (ie. my neighborhood). I would still fail because the government has the coercive power to prevent my system from being used.

Now suppose that the government had limited (or no) means to prevent me from forming my own independent system of justice. In that case my system has the chance to win based on its merits vs what the government can offer. I have the opportunity to supplant the government in delivering justice for my population. More likely, though, the government would have some coercive power and so would I. We are both, then, in the position of competing over the population as well as trying to reduce the other's coercive power. It may be the case that our justice systems are not that different, or are not sufficiently different that the population would not live under one or the other. In that case, legitimacy is not derived from who can provide the best system of justice, but who can exclusively provide any system of justice - in other words, competing over the justice system becomes a power struggle. This analogy isn't far removed from what's happening in parts of Afghanistan where people DO need a justice system to resolve disputes.

So legitimacy isn't just the ability to deliver a government service - it's the ability to deliver a service and prevent competitors from offering alternatives and that requires the credible ability to bring violence or coercion on those who would buck your system.

For years and years now we've read stories and reports where Afghan government and coalition efforts in any number of areas are stymied because once the government authority leaves, or the project is built, or whatever, a new authority moves in and either fills the vacuum or displaces what government authority there is. The population isn't going to accept your authority unless it is both perceived as legitimate and you posses the credible capability to enforce it. Afghans are notorious fence-sitters because they are so often caught in the middle of power struggles. So for any Afghan government or coalition project to succeed, it must have the durable and credible ability to keep the insurgent governance structure out. The ability to do that successfully is what will give you true legitimacy.

As I said, I think Col. Jone's model is useful and easy to understand, but I would like to know how his model accounts for these factors.