New Guidance on Counter-Insurgency

[max161]

warfare within a state is unique and must be handled differently than by the rules derived from Napoleonic warfare; is dangerously off track when discussing insurgency.

Though I disagree with the backhanded slap at Clausewitz, Bob because passion, reason, and chance and the fact that war [all war] is a true chameleon is still applicable - he was not advocating how to fight using Napolenic warfare but like Sun Tzu (and I am convinced he read the 1789 French translation of the the great Master Sun) he admonishes us to understand the nature and character of the war, but I digress).


The problem with the American Way of COIN (as adapted from the American Way of War) is that the way we fight a war within a state presupposes US forces being in charge. We want to take the lead and we rationalize this in all kinds of ways as in when they stand up we will stand down, they are not ready, we have to provide security until they can get on their own two feet. With us in charge we undercut the very legitimacy that we seek to provide to the state. Now of course we have gotten to where we are today because we deposed two totalitarian regimes (that needed deposing) and now we have to come in and conduct armed social work.

Just for a minute if we think about what if we had used those dreaded Napoleonic rules of war and looked to take the surrender of the those regimes (a success to those criminals who were in charge) and instead of destroying the government and all its institutions (Sun Tzu: it is better to take a country in tact that to destroy it, it is better to take an Army in tact than to destroy it) we took the surrender akin to Germany and Japan and then embarked on a Marshall plan type effort to support the successor regime and allowed that successor government to develop in accordance with its own customs, traditions, and political processes rather than impose our own way on them.

To be successful in supporting a host nation in its war within in a state we must support the host nation. They must be in charge as the COIN equation is that there are only 3 main elements:

1. the insurgents
2. the population (battlefield of human terrain)
3. the counter-insurgent (and this includes as a sub-element external support to the nation conducting COIN).

Unfortunately we do not like being the sub-element and only in a support role. It is our nature to be in charge and build all institutions in our image (including the host nation security forces and their ways of governance).

We are on the right track with our emphasis on cultural awareness in today's situation. It is the new buzzword phrase (along with cultural agility and other similar catch phrases). We want cultural awareness so we can derive solutions that we think will work within that culture and also because we think it will win us the hearts and minds of the people (again, us as in the U.S., winning the hearts and minds which is the wrong construct - we should not be worrying about us winning hearts and minds but support the host nation in ensuring they have the hearts and minds of their population, but I digress again) Unfortunately we use cultural awareness as a means to an end and do not strive for the two things that are really necessary - cultural understanding (e.g., the reality of that culture as it really is, was, and likely always will be) and cutlural respect (and the understanding that we cannot and should not try to change it, nor their political systems, legal systems, etc -change can only come from within and while we can nurture and support that change it is of course generational and we cannot and should not try to force that change).

Now to my bottom line. (Sorry I did not put it up front). I am afraid that the American Way of COIN presupposes future OIF and OEFs. Although it does not explicitly say it, our doctrine combined with OUR strategic culture also presupposes us being in charge always (just look at the hot debates we have had had in the past about US forces under command of a foreign commander - something many Americans will never stand for, but I continue to digress and I apologive for the rambling). We pay lip service to FID and the new fashionable term Security Force Assistance but as we look at how we are going to employ forces it is all about "shaping" the environment and this in turn can undercut our legitamacy. FID is still the best construct for what we need to do because the very nature of its definition is that it supports the host nation in its programs for internal defense and development which is critical for war within a state (FID: "Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.")

So in closing, I would say that war within a state has to be conducted by he state, it can have external support but that external support cannot supplant that legitmate and sovereign nation-state. If it does it is defacto an occupying power and of course one of types of traditional insurgencies is to rid a country of an occupying power. And if we would kep in mind those Napoleonic principles in the future and ensure that our military operations against a nation state result in a formal surrender we might not have to be forced back into a "you break it you buy it" situaiton.

And lastly, we must purge ourselves of the romanticization of COIN. It is this idea that we can come in and save the people by us being in charge that gets us into trouble. We need to figure out how to best help a soveriegn nation state (when it is of course in our strategic, national interest). Yes, I am a student (just a student, not a self-described expert) of TE Lawrence and all the other great COIN theorists but I do not think that we should try to fancy ourselves as Lawrences as it is so fashionable to say today. The romanticization of COIN today is going to hurt us in the long run and we need to ensure our future doctrine development understands that. Yes we are going to be faced with a myriad of threats around the world from irregular forces with hybrid capabilities. But underforunately it will be the rare case in the future when we can take them on directly and we must realize that we have to support soveriegn nations in their quest to bring security and stability to their under-governed, perhaps improperly governed and ungoverned spaces that provide sanctuary for insurgents and terrorists.

Finally, I wholeheartedly agee with Bob that war within a state requires a different way of operating. We know how to do that. We have had doctrine for it. Now we need to build strategies and campaign plans that will correctly implement that doctrine to acheive our national security objectives.

Dave

[William F. Owen]

Though I disagree with the backhanded slap at Clausewitz, Bob because passion, reason, and chance and the fact that war [all war] is a true chameleon is still applicable - he was not advocating how to fight using Napolenic warfare but like Sun Tzu (and I am convinced he read the 1789 French translation of the the great Master Sun) he admonishes us to understand the nature and character of the war, but I digress).

Can't argue with any of that, but Carl read Sun? Really? Any proof, or just a hunch. Sun-Tzu wrote about Strategy rather than just War. CvC only wrote about the use of armed force.

[max161]

Can't argue with any of that, but Carl read Sun? Really? Any proof, or just a hunch. Sun-Tzu wrote about Strategy rather than just War. CvC only wrote about the use of armed force.

It is only my hunch but we know there was a 1789 French translation of the Sun Tzu and Clausewitz read French. But the best "evidence" I have to support my hunch is Michael Handel's work Masters of War in which he compares the major points of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu (and Jomini too). The similarities are striking when you read Handel's work and either the theories that Clausewitz wrote are timeless and self-evident or he was infleunced by the Sun Tzu.

Dave

[PhilR]

While it’s always a possibility, I’d offer that Clausewitz’s writings were more drawn from his interpretation of his experiences and history as he understood it. Peter Paret’s Clausewitz and the State (1976) is a useful biography that highlights this point. This is only foremost in my mind, because I only recently read the book. In looking not only at On War, but many of his other writings, Paret really reveals how Clausewitz zero’d in on the political underpinnings of every war. This is not simply in terms of policy, but that how any entity (usually as state, but not necessarily) goes to war and conducts war is a fundamental reflection of how their society is politically and culturally organized. Clausewitz’s thoughts and experiences are broader than just the phrase “Napoleonic Wars.” He realized that the true power of the French at that time was not in tactics or organization, but in how the fundamental changing of France to a nation that could tap the energies of the whole populace enabled it to wage total war against other European monarchies who still thought in terms of the limited wars.

Clausewitz could very well recognize the wisdom of Sun Tzu, but in all likelihood (and I can’t really speak for him), he’d assert that Sun Tzu’s tenets were applicable to the social and political makeup of China at the time he wrote it. Sun Tzu’s idea of avoiding bloody war, to win without fighting, reflected the tenuous hold Chinese kings/emperors had on their kingdoms. They could not bleed their kingdom dry, nor risk all on a long war. In this way, they were similar to the European wars of the 18th century before the French Revolution came on the scene.

Clausewitz actually focused much of his writings on politics. He understood that the concept of a nation in arms could express itself through a government and army, or through guerilla war without much account to an effective government or army (like Spain). In fact, as he became frustrated with the lack of reform in Prussia, he advocated the idea of the nation resisting through guerilla warfare.

All of this comes back around to the current discussion, because I believe it highlights how our own doctrine and “way of war” must be a reflection of our own political constitution and beliefs. In this light, population-centric COIN ala FM 3-24 is appropriate. However, FM 3-24 may not be the appropriate COIN strategy for the “host” governments and societies that we are aiding. By implementing 3-24 in a FID or SFA manner, its required that we and the host government have the same concept of what a legitimate and effective government is and that it will be the ultimate goal of the conflict.

s/f
Phil Ridderhof USMC

[slapout9]

Phil Ridderhof USMC

Are you the same Phil R. that wrote this paper?
Sorta fits New Guidance if it is the first time you have read it
http://capmarine.com/cap/thesis.htm

[PhilR]

Are you the same Phil R. that wrote this paper?
Sorta fits New Guidance if it is the first time you have read it
http://capmarine.com/cap/thesis.htm

I wrote that as an undergraduate thesis in 1986. I gave a copy to a CAP vet in 1997 and he later uploaded it to the internet.
Its been some time ago, but I don't think I'm far off my present point, in one of the paper's concluding paragraphs, however:

"Combined Action worked at providing area security. It excelled at this. It did work at pacification and Vietnamization. Pacification could only occur if the population felt that the GVN was stronger and preferable than the VC. Successful Vietnamization of the war was the only way this shift of thought could happen. No matter how effective at combating the VC the CAPs were, the CAPs were still US run units and represented foreigners who would someday leave. Unless the GVN was able to survive without US troops, it would lose the war. Combined Action could have been a positive step towards preparing the GVN to survive alone, but the effort in that direction was not there. There is also evidence that with the GVN, all the effort in the world would not have worked."

s/f
Phil Ridderhof USMC

[slapout9]

I wrote that as an undergraduate thesis in 1986. I gave a copy to a CAP vet in 1997 and he later uploaded it to the internet.
Its been some time ago, but I don't think I'm far off my present point, in one of the paper's concluding paragraphs, however:

"Combined Action worked at providing area security. It excelled at this. It did work at pacification and Vietnamization. Pacification could only occur if the population felt that the GVN was stronger and preferable than the VC. Successful Vietnamization of the war was the only way this shift of thought could happen. No matter how effective at combating the VC the CAPs were, the CAPs were still US run units and represented foreigners who would someday leave. Unless the GVN was able to survive without US troops, it would lose the war. Combined Action could have been a positive step towards preparing the GVN to survive alone, but the effort in that direction was not there. There is also evidence that with the GVN, all the effort in the world would not have worked."

s/f
Phil Ridderhof USMC

It is an excellant paper and you make an excellant point.

[William F. Owen]

All of this comes back around to the current discussion, because I believe it highlights how our own doctrine and “way of war” must be a reflection of our own political constitution and beliefs. In this light, population-centric COIN ala FM 3-24 is appropriate. However, FM 3-24 may not be the appropriate COIN strategy for the “host” governments and societies that we are aiding. By implementing 3-24 in a FID or SFA manner, its required that we and the host government have the same concept of what a legitimate and effective government is and that it will be the ultimate goal of the conflict.

My emphasis added.

Thank you! Excellent observation. I would also submit that FM3-24 is a reflection of the political and social beliefs of it's writers, based on a flawed understanding of the problem. - Thus the title "COIN."