I posit this situation: a fictional country in which I am an indigenous national; and, for sake of play acting, a district civil affairs officer. The DCAO has direct control over police, including "Special Branch"; over other civil administration components; and also over mobile military forces who operate in the district. Basically, the Malaya triangular pattern of executive committee co-ordination, including but not limited to intelligence co-ordination.

My district is a contested district, with insurgent main forces neutralized (killed, captured or converted) or split into smaller size groups which can be handled by paramilitary police units. The district would be under "martial" or "emergency law" until restoration to what is considered by the natiional command authority to be an "acceptable civil environment".

The incumbant government, whose national command policy I represent, has an insurgency considered of existential importance to the incumbant government (my government). My choices are four: (1) stick with the government; (2) join the insurgency; (3) start a "third way" movement; or (4) leave the country. I posit that I stick with choice 1.

Among the many things I'd want to do in the district would be a census and dossier on each household, which would include, as only a part of the whole, a registry of all items that could be used as weapons against me and mine (e.g., firearms), or manufactured into weapons against me and mine (e.g., nitrogen compounds - e.g., fertilizer - easily converted to explosives and with some other simple household items and homemade components - e.g., into remote-controlled IEDs).

To do all that, I have to have the horses (personnel) in close proximity to the grassroots (villages and hamlets; or urban block by block). In Malaya (in the mature stage of the anti-terr effort), Special Branch (operating on a fairly limited budget) had accurate individual dossiers on about 50% of the insurgents.

Since I have posited that the insurgency is existential, the cost and number of personnel is limited only by what's in the national treasury and manpower pool. Obviously, my dream model has little to do with US involvement in Iraq and Astan.

The bottom line (in response to your post) is that the police and political measures required to defeat an existential insurgency may be needed there, but would be very inefficient (and probably not needed or tolerated) in a normal civil environment.

As to the Canadian link, there is also a pro-gun registry side of the argument (although I appreciate personally the anti-gun registry arguments linked ). As I understand the political situation, the Candaian Senate (as presently constituted) is pro-gun registry. In any event, what may be ineffective and/or inefficient in a normal, civil environment, may be necessary in an existential, contested paramilitary environment.

Regards

Mike