Toward Sustainable Security in Iraq and the Endgame

[wm]

Rob,
Thanks for your thoughtful replies. I agree with your point about other nations respecting versus liking the US--lazy use of language on my part. However, gaining respect is not enough. Even though other nations may respect the USA, they still may not do the things which we Americans believe are the right things to do. America needs to be prepared for those eventualities--which was an underlying concern in my point about Iraq becoming a regional hegemon--and decide how it will respond to them. Sort of like having a plan to deal with one's kids that are having temper tantrums (or coping with one's teenaged offspring in general ).

I still think our own foreing policy goals are better preserved and advanced by assiting Iraq in its recovery and integrating it into the region. I think key to this is Iraq's achieving sustainable secuirty.

On this point, I would like to agree. However, I have concerns that America has some foreign policy goals that may well be contradictory or at least contrary to each other. This makes it hard to see any one course of action (COA) (such as ensuring that Iraq achieve self-sustainable security) as being a better way to achieve this goal than other posible COA.

BTW, I presume you noticed that I modified your position from sustainable security to self-sustainable security. These are two very different policy goals. Which one does America really want for Iraq (or any other nation it helps out with SFA)? Is there a "one-size-fits-all" answer to this ?

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Wayne,

BTW, I presume you noticed that I modified your position from sustainable security to self-sustainable security. These are two very different policy goals.

I think you have the right of it with "self-sustaining". This gets after the need to go beyond train and equip and assist in the development of the systems which make self sustaining security possible. It requires a holistic look by both the "assister" and the "assistee" Both words may not fully show the relationship though because its context driven. Much as U.S. policy realizes the need for partners and allies in its foreign affairs, so too do other states to varying degrees based on their security concerns and FP goals. The level of cooperation and participation varies over time and circumstance I think.

Which one does America really want for Iraq (or any other nation it helps out with SFA)?

I beleive self sustaining security is the goal. But that goal is relative to Iraq's capability and capacity when measured against its security environment - so we need to manage our expectations with regard to our level of assistance lest we unduly risk other FP interests. Assisting Iraq to get itself to a point where it can self sustain more, frees up more of our own means, and promotes Iraq's own self-image and interests as a sovereign state - which in my opinion also advances some of our interests.

Is there a "one-size-fits-all" answer to this ?

I don't think there is, I'm don't believe there should be. Each situation must be considered of its own merit. I think some of the questions I put into the ODP for SFA piece should be asked up front. The geopolitical environment is dynamic, so a state's interaction with others needs to account for that both in terms of what is important in the now/short term and what better serves its long term interests. This is one of the sources of friction you mentioned in reconciling FP objectives - often the actions we take to address a short term need don't serve us well in the long term, and often those that better suit our long term objectives don't address the pressures or sense of immediacy of the moment.

There are many reasons this is so I think - our form of government, our election cycles, our value of of free press, our strategic culture, etc . - however its not a uniquely American issue - from polis to politic its been a feature. It is something we must recognize though and muddle through as best we can. While a state with sufficient means can legitimately have more room between "either" and "or" to make decisions, the argument will not be based on means alone, but will be influenced by politics which often only appear rational to the person, party or constituents who base their position off of their own goals, vision and perception of what is best for them, their constituents and their view of what the state should be. That changes over time through new events, changes in culture, changes in power (ours and others), etc. so too will some of our policies - not necessarily all at the same time, or in congruence with one another.

Well - need to go - talk to you later, Best, Rob

[Steve Blair]

On this point, I would like to agree. However, I have concerns that America has some foreign policy goals that may well be contradictory or at least contrary to each other. This makes it hard to see any one course of action (COA) (such as ensuring that Iraq achieve self-sustainable security) as being a better way to achieve this goal than other posible COA.

BTW, I presume you noticed that I modified your position from sustainable security to self-sustainable security. These are two very different policy goals. Which one does America really want for Iraq (or any other nation it helps out with SFA)? Is there a "one-size-fits-all" answer to this ?

Sorry to cut in on the conversation....

I think that, given the nature of our system, it's almost inevitable that we will have contradictory foreign policy goals. Each administration (and for that matter each iteration of the Senate and House Foreign Policy Committees) will have its own agenda (or agendas), and often bits of a previous agenda linger on in the minds of a group of staffers or others...and get slipped into current (or new) policy. Or, out of respect for a previous administration, a policy that has already started may be left in place...running almost on autopilot (Vietnam is to my mind a classic example of this...both with Kennedy and Johnson).

Like Rob, I don't think there's a "one-size-fits-all" answer for this stuff, because each situation is going to be unique in some aspects. We need to be able to tailor our goals and expectations and not try to fit a single template over each circumstance.

[wm]

Like Rob, I don't think there's a "one-size-fits-all" answer for this stuff, because each situation is going to be unique in some aspects. We need to be able to tailor our goals and expectations and not try to fit a single template over each circumstance.

I concur. I am just a Cassandra or "voice crying in the wilderness," trying to remind folks that the quest for a silver bullet solution to foreign policy problems is very much like the quest for the Holy Grail. Seems to me American policy wonks and/or implementers of policy initiatives forget that too often.

[Ken White]

sure do forget it. Worse, there are millions out there (many of whom like to comment volubly on both sides of the political weblogs) who have never learned

"...the quest for a silver bullet solution to foreign policy problems is very much like the quest for the Holy Grail."

Too much effort is expended in attempting to achieve the impossible...

[Rob Thornton]

Steve - glad to have you and Ken on the thread

Steve said:

I think that, given the nature of our system, it's almost inevitable that we will have contradictory foreign policy goals. Each administration (and for that matter each iteration of the Senate and House Foreign Policy Committees) will have its own agenda (or agendas), and often bits of a previous agenda linger on in the minds of a group of staffers or others...and get slipped into current (or new) policy. Or, out of respect for a previous administration, a policy that has already started may be left in place...running almost on autopilot (Vietnam is to my mind a classic example of this...both with Kennedy and Johnson).

made all the more complex given the nature of political interaction in our domestic and foreign policies. Its not just our policy which is subject to change, but the policies of all the participants. This is the interactive nature of politics and people. This is why policy objectives require continued engagement - the interaction does not stop just because we say it does - or as Clausewitz remarked "In war the result is never final, the outcome is merely a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at a later date."

Wayne said:

trying to remind folks that the quest for a silver bullet solution to foreign policy problems is very much like the quest for the Holy Grail.

made yet more fun by our constant reinterpretation of what is "holy" and our redefining of what a "grail" is. As such getting consistency in our means and ways by which go pursue any policy objective is made all the more difficult. It is the policy equivalent of a self-inflicted GSW to the foot. The value each element (or party) places on its own political philosophies and and the way they devalue the other elements creates a self constraining bias. It creates conditions where policy objectives may be forfeited either because those policies or objectives do not fit their specific view, or because their bias and loyalties prevent them from realizing the significance. This seems to be true even when the goals are actually the same - but because the other party put it in motion it must be renamed, restaffed, redefined, etc. to put their brand name on it. Doing so takes time and interrupts funding and resourcing and generates undue fog and friction. We are powerful enough that our biggest impediment to achieving our policy goals is often ourselves. No good deed will go unpunished.

Best, Rob

[Steve Blair]

made all the more complex given the nature of political interaction in our domestic and foreign policies. Its not just our policy which is subject to change, but the policies of all the participants. This is the interactive nature of politics and people. This is why policy objectives require continued engagement - the interaction does not stop just because we say it does - or as Clausewitz remarked "In war the result is never final, the outcome is merely a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at a later date."

Quite so. I was focusing more on the internal considerations because I think there are too many "ghosts in the machine" within our system to allow it to quickly adjust to its own changes, let alone the outside factors. That and there is a tendency (aided by the addition to polls) on the part of some policy makers to focus on internal factors to the virtual exclusion of the other parties involved.

In keeping with Wayne's comment, I don't think there's a silver bullet for this problem. Far from it. Our system is somewhat tailored to respond quickly (or fairly quickly) to internal problems and doesn't focus much on what goes on outside the borders. As parties rotate through power, our policies become circular in a way...providing a sort of continuity provided one is patient enough to wait for the pendulum to swing back to his favorite corner. Sometimes those swings are radical, but I think that has more to do with the entrenched power structures in Congress than anything else.

Part of the key may lie in the Department of State, but I'm not sure if their infrastructure is sound enough to carry consistent policy evaluation these days. If current events are any clue, I would say that it is not...

[Ken White]

... but I think that has more to do with the entrenched power structures in Congress than anything else.

Part of the key may lie in the Department of State, but I'm not sure if their infrastructure is sound enough to carry consistent policy evaluation these days. If current events are any clue, I would say that it is not...

Me, too...