Why democracies don't lose insurgencies

[Rank amateur]

I think it may well produce some insights.

I kind of hope they may support the bones of my basic thesis that Insurgencies are merely a style of warfare and subscribe to all the Clausewitian doctrines.

OK, then to completely disagree with Wilf, my concern would be that if everything depends on how you define things, it might be hard to gain a lot of insight.

To me, Democracy is a lot like sex. Its great if everyone involved wants it, but if forced upon you it is rape. To carry that analogy probably one step too far: If the Uncle Sam would improve his message and delivery, he'd probably find a lot more willing takers...

To carry it further, if you're carrying an assault rifle, no matter what happens, some people will never believe it was voluntary.

[Cavguy]

Good input all, these are the kinds of holes/skepticism I want to hear before I head too far down my research path.

RA, understand your point about democracy change, but the dataset allows for regime change during the insurgency (Indonesia is a key case - autocracy to democracy)

To Bob's World, I would definitely opine that the focus of my paper would not be to justify forceable democratic change, but to determine why, out of 89 insurgencies (as classified by RAND) observed since 1945, there are 25 insurgent "wins" against autocracies, anocracies, monarchial, and colonial governments, but none against democracies.

Like the "democratic peace" question - I am curious as to the reason - is it a facet of democracy that prevents insurgent victory, or some other reason?

Again, my initial findings indicate that not only are democracies resistant to insurgent victory, they actually directly politcially settle LESS than other forms of goverment.

[Gian P Gentile]

why do you confine yourself to the post world war II period? Is there something special about that period that interests you or do you see it as more relevant to the present day than other previous periods? Perhaps instead of taking 15 or so cases from that period you should expand your historical horizon and move farther back into time.

[Cavguy]

why do you confine yourself to the post world war II period? Is there something special about that period that interests you or do you see it as more relevant to the present day than other previous periods? Perhaps instead of taking 15 or so cases from that periods you should expand your historical horizon and move farther back into time.

Sir,

I just have problems with the inclusion of "democracies" prior to 1945 because (a) there are so few, and (b) even fewer experienced insurgency outside of a colonial context. Anti-colonial insurgencies posess a different dynamic. Secondly, it would require coding a completely new dataset than the very robust post-1945 RAND one I have now, which may be beyond my current capabilities. If I pursue my PhD route I probably will re-do and expand the dataset. Kinda hard to do all that research while holding my day job and soon to be in CGSC. The Correlates of War dataset doesn't have sufficient rigor for intra-state war to be useful. There is another finnish dataset but I found multiple errors in coding that would be painful to fix.

Now if you can convince the army to give me two years off after S3/XO time to get a PhD that isn't tied to teaching at West Point, I'm game. Because I was YG 97 and exited my BCT as a MAJ they wouldn't give me advanced civil schooling because I was too senior, hence night classes for me.


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I am hard pressed to think of many democracies that experienced indigenous insurgency outside of the USA and UK prior to 1945 (Brits all over - won every one, and the US vs. Native Americans, again, victory.) I am open to any examples of indigenous insurgent victory against democracy (loosely defined) that cross your mind. And no, I don't count our revolution because I don't think the UK meets the PolSci definition of a democracy until the early 1800's.

I am interested if you can think of any exceptions to my thesis prior to 1945, it would help.
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My alternate topic (potential for MMAS, if I do SAMS) is evaluating whether the historical approach/basis for FM 3-24 (very heavy Philippines, Algeria, Vietnam (x2), and Malaya) and approach to COIN by external counter insurgents holds true across other similar cases, especially those where insurgent possesses external sanctuary. Greece 1945-1950 is the best example, where it was heavily lethal in nature and won when Yugoslavia cut of support for the communist insurgents, as I understand.

Thoughts?

[Ron Humphrey]

OK, then to completely disagree with Wilf, my concern would be that if everything depends on how you define things, it might be hard to gain a lot of insight..

Whenever approaching any study such as this definitions do tend to effect what you see, that however doesn't represent the truth of what they are.

Given that one approaches the subject in such a manner as to tracing the roots and from there following up the tree this could turn out to be very insightful

To carry it further, if you're carrying an assault rifle, no matter what happens, some people will never believe it was voluntary.

While perhaps true that nonetheless fails to prove that it wasn't voluntary.

Lots and lots of "some people" out there. Never gonna please em all

[Rank amateur]

Lots and lots of "some people" out there. Never gonna please em all

And every one of them is a potential insurgent.



Neil, another factor to consider is that in a democracy, the environment isn't binary. In other words, if people hate the government the insurgents aren't their only alternative. (I believe you have a wee bit of experience in what happens when you give people a third option. )

[jmm99]

The conclusion of UM's link (p.24) is interesting:

While better measures of democracy may lead to a reassessment, it appears that regime type has little analytical utility for explaining COIN war outcomes and duration. Instead, emphasizing battlefield dynamics (the “how” of fighting) may prove a better theoretical bet than focusing on regime-specific variables (the “who” of fighting). Indeed, the degree of a military’s mechanization, its status as an external occupier, and the level of material support for insurgents all proved more consequential for explaining outcomes and duration. In short, democracies do struggle to defeat insurgents — but not because they are democracies.

Wilf, is this your position - more or less ?

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Some more articles by the same author are here.

[William F. Owen]

The conclusion of UM's link (p.24) is interesting:



Wilf, is this your position - more or less ?

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Some more articles by the same author are here.

Close but not exactly. My contention is that "Insurgency" is a style of warfare, or type of warfare, (and not a distinct one) but that it is generally applied to fulfilling political aims that are not possible with so-called conventional means. - though they may create the conditions for the use of conventional means.

Basically, insurgency is warfare. It is not something "other than war." Many different people may use an insurgency to get what they want, for many different reasons. - Just like War.