Patrol Base Density and Proximity - Too many and too close?

[PhilR]

I don't have first hand experience with Afghanistan, but I'd assert that just like there are calculations involved in employing combat power in a "conventional" sense, the same holds true in an irregular environment. The basic answer to your question are the fundamental planning factors on what is required to secure the force, whether it be in a small COP or a large FOB, or "going mobile" ouside of the wire.
There is an advantage to the large FOB in that for a set investment in FOB security and logistics, you may be able to generate much greater aggregate combat power outside of the wire at any one time. The obvious disadvantage, as you point out, is that fewer large FOBs means less density of presence and greater distance any force must travel outside of the FOB to cover an entire area. The lower density drives the greater travel distance and results in the "commuting to war" charge as forces spend as much time getting to/from all points of their operating area as they do actually operating in it.
I don't think there's a single answer to your question, but its METT-T dependent. However you highlight some real considerations when choosing a laydown. Yes, big FOBs can be bad, but there are advantages. You should probably consider a mix of solutions. Even though COIN may be all about being out with the population, there are hard calculations in how you can generate the necessary persistent (or episodic) presence.

Happy Birthday Marine!

Phil Ridderhof

[Tom Odom]

I don't have first hand experience with Afghanistan, but I'd assert that just like there are calculations involved in employing combat power in a "conventional" sense, the same holds true in an irregular environment. The basic answer to your question are the fundamental planning factors on what is required to secure the force, whether it be in a small COP or a large FOB, or "going mobile" ouside of the wire.
There is an advantage to the large FOB in that for a set investment in FOB security and logistics, you may be able to generate much greater aggregate combat power outside of the wire at any one time. The obvious disadvantage, as you point out, is that fewer large FOBs means less density of presence and greater distance any force must travel outside of the FOB to cover an entire area. The lower density drives the greater travel distance and results in the "commuting to war" charge as forces spend as much time getting to/from all points of their operating area as they do actually operating in it.
I don't think there's a single answer to your question, but its METT-T dependent. However you highlight some real considerations when choosing a laydown. Yes, big FOBs can be bad, but there are advantages. You should probably consider a mix of solutions. Even though COIN may be all about being out with the population, there are hard calculations in how you can generate the necessary persistent (or episodic) presence.

Happy Birthday Marine!

Phil Ridderhof

Agreed, Phil. Balance in all things remains fundamental. I would also add that in a Xenophobic society, flooding the zone with too many outposts, further adds to the distrust, and boosts the bad guys IO.

Best
Tom

[Ken White]

Happy Birthday, Marines!

Semper Fi.

On topic, agree with PhilR and Tom -- balance /common sense are key.

My personal belief is that the small outposts are very counterproductive. Too much effort goes into securing and resupplying them to really reap the benefit of being 'local.' Larger FOBs (Bde / Regt size, IMO; only rarely Bn (+) and almost never Co -- or ODA, that oughta rattle some cages... ).

PhilR is correct, that does cause commuting to the war -- and there's nothing wrong with that. There's no reason Platoons and Companies cannot go out and prowl the area for days, even weeks, at a time. Unless, of course, one is excessively risk averse...

I haven't been to Afghanistan in the current fight but I have been to a fight or two with opponents at least as good and probably more numerous and I have been in the neighborhood and in similar terrain. Everyone I've talked to who has been there recently or is there now essentially seems to agree that we are far more risk averse than necessary (one told me he's convinced the MRAP is the Devil's invention... ).

I suspect rather than "stretched too thin" number-wise that risk aversion is the real reason for the small outpost approach. It's a way to obtain 'presence' while minimizing risks (in the eyes of some). It is essentially the theory of 'limited war' which holds that one should use minimum force applied to a COIN fight where presence is important. The flaw in the approach is that there are not enough troops (there almost never will be) to really flood the zone.

Plus, minimum force is a good dictum for law enforcement but an extremely bad one for military forces. Trying to limit war only prolongs it and increases casualties and damage, better to slam in hard and fast and get it over with. More short term damage but far less long term pain.

And yes, that applies in FID / COIN as well.

And all of you "shoulda been in the Old Corps... "

[Eden]

We do tend to end up with too many bases, posts, OPS, etc, but this is partly a result of the type of thing I observed in the Korengal, Kunar, and Nuristan over the course of about a year.

Subordinate commanders, as they become more familiar with the terrain and enemy, identify more and more places that it would be beneficial to establish some presence on. You know the deal - OPs to watch areas from which the enemy habitually fires on our bases, an extra post to keep an IED-plagued stretch of road under observation, etc. All of these individually are justifiable, but they soak up more and more manpower and reduce the number of boots that can actually patrol out the front gate. Senior commanders need to do a better job of controlling this tendency of subordinates to circumvallate themselves, but that means accepting.

Because what we really need in these cases are not just extra posts, but more people, and that is the one resource that is extremely difficult to come by.

[slapout9]

The more guys you have running around in strange looking uniforms and strange looking vehicles the easier you are for the enemy to spot! That is a tremendous advantage for a small mobile Guerrilla force. LE has to deal with that everyday we just call them criminals.

[tequila]

I would disagree with this one on the LE front - the NYPD employs the "flood-the-zone" tactic regularly and adjusts its deployments on a precinct level with Compstat. Despite some obvious gaming that has to light, overall as a longtime resident of NYC I would argue that the NYPD's tactics are overall quite effective as a deterrent to street violence and open-air drug markets.

[slapout9]

I would disagree with this one on the LE front - the NYPD employs the "flood-the-zone" tactic regularly and adjusts its deployments on a precinct level with Compstat. Despite some obvious gaming that has to light, overall as a longtime resident of NYC I would argue that the NYPD's tactics are overall quite effective as a deterrent to street violence and open-air drug markets.

But that tactic is based on Intelligence ,that is what is what makes them effective. Not a magic force to space ratio.

[Pete]

Happy Birthday, Marines!And all of you "shoulda been in the Old Corps... "

Isn't that what Lt. Presley O'Bannon said to the guys who joined the Corps after him?

[Rifleman]

And all of you "shoulda been in the Old Corps...

Ken is waxing nostalgic about his first duty assignment again.

"Beat to Quarters! Private White! To the tops!"

I mean, I know Major Henderson was a great officer and the USS Constitution was a great ship but give it a break already.