Generation Kill

[MikeF]

Thanks for the update VMI_Marine.

Initially, after bypassing the main town and seizing W Nassiriyah (11th ID HQ, Talil airfield, and the bridge), we were told that Marines would relieve us in place. On the 20 or 21st, we were told to push west to As Samawa without a relief. I always wondered what happened to the Marines when they eventually pushed through.

Like you, I was a simple platoon leader looking 100-200m out.

Obviously, our units had some breakdown over secure and bypass. Unfortunately, this miscommunication cost us Marines.

v/r

Mike

[120mm]

As I sat and watched this on BLUFOR tracker, back in the V Corps Rear TOC, it became obvious that the Marines and 3ID had two completely different understandings of their mission. Other than the "Operational Pause", 3ID appeared to be moving faster than V Corps expected, and TF TARAWA was moving slower than V Corps expected.

From reading the rough draft of the V Corps history, I'm not aware if anyone is actually studying why this was.

Is someone writing/has written something on this out there? I admit that I've not kept up on the details since 2004.

[VMI_Marine]

Thanks for the update VMI_Marine.

Initially, after bypassing the main town and seizing W Nassiriyah (11th ID HQ, Talil airfield, and the bridge), we were told that Marines would relieve us in place. On the 20 or 21st, we were told to push west to As Samawa without a relief. I always wondered what happened to the Marines when they eventually pushed through.

I reread some excerpts from Marines in the Garden of Eden this morning. TF TARAWA was briefed by COL Allen before the war that his brigade was going to secure the Hwy 1 bridge and etablish a blocking position on Hwy 7 south of An Nasiriyah. Somehow this got translated down to my level that you guys would clear the city ahead of us. According to the book, 3ID never set up the blocking positions on Hwy 7, but told the TF TARAWA staff when they conducted final coordination at Talil on the night of the 22nd.

120mm, TF TARAWA may have been moving slower because 2 out of the 3 battalions in the TF Ground Combat Element were mounted in trucks, not AAVs. In addition, our entire move from Kuwait to Hwy 7 near Talil was cross-country, which slowed us considerably.

I watched Episode 2 last night - it was about as close a depiction of An Nasiriyah as I think you're going to get. It was interesting that they showed Hwy 7 through Ambush Alley being a narrow 2-lane road, when in fact it was a 4-lane divided highway. It was nowhere near as tight through Ambush Alley as the show depicted. In addition, there were no destroyed AAVs on the bridge itself, they were all north of the Euphrates bridge. Marines were not clearing houses as RCT-1 pushed through the city - 3/1 was strong-pointing the major intersections in the city to allow the rest of the RCT to pass through.

Richard Lowry posted some criticism of the episode on OPFOR that, while I agree with on a factual basis, I think misses that the show wanted to portray the "grunt's eye" view of the war. Yes, the show has many factual inconsistencies about Nasiriyah, but I think it accurately portrays what the Marines of 1st Recon Bn believed about the battle at the time depicted in the show.

[selil]

Richard Lowry posted some criticism of the episode on OPFOR that, while I agree with on a factual basis, I think misses that the show wanted to portray the "grunt's eye" view of the war. Yes, the show has many factual inconsistencies about Nasiriyah, but I think it accurately portrays what the Marines of 1st Recon Bn believed about the battle at the time depicted in the show.

Generation Kill is a dramatization it is NOT a documentary. It is a story written from the perspective of the participants and the writer was in the truck. The writer is involved and creating an account that is first person and from his perspective. The levels of bias rise as the directors and creators of the show each add to the dramatization.

Taking the sanitized knowledge of today (also based on accounts) and glaring through that lens at the tumultuous story of the writer does no good for anybody. It is the act of a concrete thinker and inflexibility to look at a show and apply a factual lens to what is attempting to give an emotional view. I really doubt that the driver gave such a philosophical meandering debate without using the "F" word as punctation for hours on end.

I will read the histories when they are written through a lens of factual obligation and enjoy the show for the personal first person account the writer and creators have attempted to give. I will listen with interest as people who were there tell me that things happened differently. But, like with the movie Black Hawk Down I'm not looking for abysmal detail in the facts of the account. I am looking for the emotional and personal stories from their perspective.

[Wildcat]

Richard Lowry posted some criticism of the episode on OPFOR that, while I agree with on a factual basis, I think misses that the show wanted to portray the "grunt's eye" view of the war. Yes, the show has many factual inconsistencies about Nasiriyah, but I think it accurately portrays what the Marines of 1st Recon Bn believed about the battle at the time depicted in the show.

Precisely. One needs to remember that "Generation Kill" is not a documentary. It's not fiction, either, but it is a boots-on-the-ground, pointy end of the spear perspective on real events through the eyes of men, including their officers, who didn't have the luxury of seeing the broader operational picture. I think the "artistic license" that some people might accuse the series of having is little more than the filmmakers' subtle portrayal of that phenomenon known most commonly as the fog of war. Apparently some historians might not pick up on this immediately, but veterans of Nasiriyah like VMI_Marine and MikeF do.

Other things like the streets being too narrow are probably the unintended consequences of the filming locations. With the level of realism that the show has displayed so far, I don't think that's something the filmmakers would knowingly distort unless they simply couldn't find another place with streets similar to those in Nasiriyah.

[Rank amateur]

I just saw episode 2. I was wondering who would man up to the tank thing. Congrats to Selil for having the cajones. (I'm going to assume that you've all done it.)

I was a little surprised that there weren't more IEDS in the early days. I'm going to assume that Saddam was too paranoid to release the ordinanace when he was driving around the streets. (If you're ever wargaming Iran, it'd probably be a good idea to assume they aren't so paranoid.)

The filmmakers probably made a good choice. Making the guys take a "false" route, just so they could see some of the stuff that was going on would've been worse. So would have been leaving stuff like the destroyed AAV out, because that would've painted a false picture too. (Though even I could figure out that the Iraqis probably couldn't have effectively engaged the AAV at that range.)

I don't know a lot of 4 lane highways that go straight towards a tall building. (I'm referring to the building that collapsed in the episode.) Was the geography of that building accurate, or was it the best that the directors could find? Just curious.

Question. I know it was an economy of force mission, but if we'd had double the troops, and giving everything we know now about COIN and population control, would anyone recommend cleaning out towns more thoroughly, instead of bypassing or pushing through them?

[Tom Odom]

I watched the 3rd episode last evening.

Pros:

a. The 2nd platoon leadership (the LT and Gunny) and then the Squad leader shine. The LT questioning the company commander's insistence in calling for a 200 meter fire mission took back bone. Realizing that the Company CO was using the wrong grid zone designator for the mission: priceless.

b. Again leadership but leadership in pushing the issue of doing something for the Iraqi boy shot during the airfield seizure.

Cons:

a. Use of the thrid person to refer to yourself. I got a real problem with the habit of using third person to speak of yourself.

B. Bravo Co Commander

C. Captain America

Tom

[Cavguy]

I watched the 3rd episode last evening.

Pros:

a. The 2nd platoon leadership (the LT and Gunny) and then the Squad leader shine. The LT questioning the company commander's insistence in calling for a 200 meter fire mission took back bone. Realizing that the Company CO was using the wrong grid zone designator for the mission: priceless.

b. Again leadership but leadership in pushing the issue of doing something for the Iraqi boy shot during the airfield seizure.

Cons:

a. Use of the thrid person to refer to yourself. I got a real problem with the habit of using third person to speak of yourself.

B. Bravo Co Commander

C. Captain America

Tom

I read the book on a plane ride last week. I was actually pretty impressed with the writing. The series is probably the most accurate representation of the "environment" of Iraq I have seen yet.

The two episodes I caught in the Hotel I was staying in (free HBO!) seemed accurate enough given the constraints of where they had to film - buildings were too nice and too high but that is entirely execusable.
I read the OPFOR criticism - Fick and Wright both claim a short arty round, the blogger denies - I tend to trust the guys who were there. I know from experience (Ken Ballard case) units tend not to highlight when friendly fire kills their own.

RE: civilian casualties - I take issue with those that claim that that would never happen - I've seen it, so has most everyone who have served in OIF (and other wars). They happen, it's tragic, but part of the friction of combat through urban areas in that context. I've seen more than a few civilians injured/killed by "collateral damage". Unless it was done maliciously, it's an inevitable and unfortunate byproduct of combat on all but the most rural battlefields.

For an "elite" unit, I was struck throughout the book at the poor quality of officership and also senior NCO leadership. Part I am willing to write off to the author's bias and lack of perspective. Maybe it was only that company. But the fact that "Encino Man" was allowed to command a company shocked me. In the book later one of his NCO's tells him he's a nice guy but just not competent enough to command a company. Encino Man doesn't dispute his assertion, according to Wright.

Captain America shocks me more, and you will see what Wright claims he did later on. (spoiler) He does get relieved briefly near the end. In the end of the book he apparently moves onward with good reports, as did Encino man.

Having been there, I am very hesitant to judge leadership based on a few accounts who haven't had to deal with the challenges of leading in combat. However, I wondered why the "Godfather" didn't take stronger action when the stakes were so high. Or if he knew at all what was going on.

Will be a good question for me to ask the Marines at Quantico tomorrow at the get together!

[Tom Odom]

Cav,

Agree with your comments and your concerns. For my part, my pros and cons are strictly based on what the film shows. Again I have not read the book and lack even that yardstick. Like you, I have been surprised at the leadership issues. Frankly it reminds me more of my Army of 1976-1979 or so rather than a Marine Recon battalion. Again it is a series and as such I look at it more of a series of leader laboratory events than a depiction of "fact," which in any case relies heavily on who is doing the depicting.

best

Tom

[Connable]

I have been watching the docu-drama with mixed feelings. I was with the Div Fwd COC during the invasion; I met Evan Wright during Phase IV in Diwaniyah; I know Craig Schwetje (Encino Man) and have spoken with him at length about Evan's story.

THE SERIES: The HBO series almost perfectly captures the feel of the March Up. The first thing that struck me was the little pack of Skittles sitting on the dashboard of one of the HMMWVs - I think I rested about 30 packs of Skittles in exactly that same position over the course of the invasion. The detail, and the willingness of the producers to accurately re-create impenetrable Marine-specific dialogue, is both incredible and incredibly daring. Spending five minutes on the lack of LSAT for the Mk-19... less dedicated producers would have dropped that to the cutting room floor without a second thought. We've all seen enough lame Dale Dye creations to make us cringe. Whatever else one might think of HBOs Generation Kill, the Marines should at least be appreciative of this risky effort to show the little things as they really were. Evan Wright and the Marines who worked on the series also deserve kudos.

THE DIALOGUE: The dialogue between the troops is dead-on, even the bitching about the officers. I was an enlisted machinegunner in the Gulf War and I listened to plenty of "private" troop bull#### sessions during my three tours as an officer in Iraq. It all rings true and it's obvious that Evan took good notes.

Officers often address their enlisted Marines by their first names, especially in recon units. For better or worse, that's the way it is. Troops often believe that officers are stupid and/or don't deserve their position and they often state their case. This is not a uniquely military phenomenon; leaders are often the subject of warranted and unwarranted derision. As a fellow Marine once told me, "The higher the monkey climbs up the pole, the more you can see of his a**hole."

THE CHARACTERS: This is definitely a point-of-view story. From a character perspective, this is an embellished work of fiction. There are no Manichean opposites like the fictionalized Nate Fick or Craig Schwetje. Nobody is that competent, moral, brilliant, or insightful day on, stay on during extended combat. Conversely, nobody could possibly be as stupid and utterly, consistently incompetent as Evan Wright’s/HBO’s Encino Man.

I have known and worked with Craig on and off for about 14 years. We went to Basic Officer's Course (BOC/TBS) together, I served with him during one of my Iraq tours, and we ran into each other at Camp Pendleton from time to time. During one of the inter-deployment Pendleton meetings we talked about the book. He told me that Evan latched on to the biggest dirt-bags in the company and took everything they said as verbatim truth. He gave me a different version of Nate Frick, one that is inconsistent with Nate's and Evan's first person accounts.

I can't speak accurately to either point of view - bottom line, I wasn't there with that platoon. However, I can affirm that Craig is not a dumb guy. He's had at least one successful follow-on tour in Iraq as an intelligence officer. In all the time I've known him I've never seen him walking around with a gape-mouthed grin on his face. Yes, he looks like Encino Man; we're not all pretty boys.

As an intelligence officer leading an infantry recon company for his first go-round in combat, Craig probably made some mistakes. He may have made an ass out of himself from time to time. So have I, so has General Mattis, so has LtCol Ferrando, so has Nate Fick, and so has every other officer I have ever met.

Whatever Craig's mistakes he probably didn't deserve the blasting he got in either the book or the series. This is not a work of distant history or fiction. Craig is still around, still serving. This will impact his personal life and his career. If he screwed up, fine, tell the story. But tell the balanced story. I'm curious to know if the HBO team interviewed Craig or tried to get his input. I can clearly state that Craig is not a moron and at least one other Marine from the unit has published a different account of the portrayed events: http://coinside.blogspot.com/2006/05...-rebuttal.html.

I don't know "Captain America" but so far the HBO series has implicated him in at least one war crime (shooting an unarmed man in the back). Has anyone brought charges against him? If not this is a pretty nonchalant way of portraying what should be an investigated criminal act.

I don't know Nate Fick but I've read his work and respect his intellect, writing talent, and passion. I want to hear his point of view on the series.

EVAN WRIGHT: Evan approached me at the Division COC in Diwaniyah about a week after the end of major combat operations (mid-late April). He told me that he was trying to track a Syrian foreign fighter who had been wounded during an ambush against Fick's platoon. The Syrian was purportedly aboard one of our hospital ships. He asked me to try to get him an interview so he could tell the other side of the ambush story. I thought it sounded like a great idea and told him I'd do what I could but that he had placed a very tall order.

I went back to work. Needless to say we were busy setting up the COC and trying to figure out our next mission. Evan barged into a clearly marked secure area of the COC and asked what progress I had made. I gently took him back outside and told him he needed to be patient. I warned him about entering a secure area. A few hours later he came back in to the same secure area. This time I yanked him outside and chewed his ass. As I was yelling at him (he could have been detained at this point - I figured a stern warning would suffice) he said, "You can't talk to an enlisted Marine that way."

For a second I was taken aback. Was Evan a Marine? He had on Marine cammie bottoms and a green t-shirt but wore what looked like a puka shell string around his neck. "Are you an enlisted Marine, Evan?" He looked down at the ground. "Well, no." I ripped him again and sent him packing.

I think this interaction gives some insight into depths of "embeddedness" to which Evan had sunk. Part of him actually thought that he had become a Marine. Only Evan and the guys he wrote about will ever know how much of his story is weighted towards his "fellow Marines" at the expense of objective truth.

INACCURACIES: Portraying a story from one point of view means getting things wrong from time to time. It also means that just about everything is out of context and often more broadly inaccurate.

For example: In the series the Marines complain that they are dropped to eating only one MRE a day because LtCol Ferrando abandoned a supply truck that carried some of their food. Anyone who was with the Division during the invasion knows that we were all down to one MRE a day because we were out-running our logistics convoys. We fell victim to an inter-war program called "Logistics Pull." Essentially, you carry what you need for a very brief period of combat and request the remainder to arrive at your position "just in time." This bean-counter program completely failed to take into account combat friction, fog of war, or high-tempo operations. Since 2003 this problem has been rectified. However, anyone watching the series who is unaware of these larger issues will come away thinking that LtCol Ferrando made a mistake that wound up starving his Marines.

I think there are repeated instances in which this first-person perspective leaves viewers with the wrong impression. This method is authentic in that it portrays the junior Marines' point of view. It's dangerously misleading as a story-telling or historic device in that it leaves an international viewing audience with the impression that our officers are generally incompetent and that the invasion was a near fiasco.

At the end of the day we demolished or caused the collapse of an entire national Army with what really amounted to two divisions of fast-moving troops. As General Mattis and many historians have pointed out, tempo was the key to our success. Embracing the fog of war and moving quickly meant operating in very uncertain environments. From a troop perspective this came across as "stupid," "incompetent," or "foolish." At the end of the day, however, the First Marine Division was immensely successful, achieving all objectives while suffering very few casualties. We'll see how HBO finished out the series.

FINAL: Whatever its faults, Generation Kill is certainly generating some good discussion. I'm looking forward to hearing some feedback.

- Ben Connable