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Thread: The Roles and Weapons with the Squad

  1. #81
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by COMMAR View Post

    W. F. Owens, fr/ the little I know about Brit formations the Squads are design to operate pretty tightly together, under the control of the PLT CO.

    Marine Squads operate much differently, much looser, the control of a Sqd fr/a SqLdr a Plt Cdr less of a direct control & is designed to be more fluid, more independent over a much larger area.


    So W.F.O, its my take that when you visualize RJ explain to you about a separated SqLdr your visualizing a Brit Manuever w/ the Plt Cmdr exhibiting tight control over the Squads in his Plt.

    Your not visualizing a USMC style Manuever, w/more men & more dispersion, covering much more ground where the SqdLdr is acting more like a Plt Cmdr throughout the Manuever.
    Interesting. Obviously the level of fluidity or control is product of training, experience and even personality. UK Platoons also operate as Multiples, of 12-20 men in fire teams, either under a Sgt or Plt Cmd so are near identical to USMC 3 x 4 squads.

    Point being, the organisation is subservient to the training and leadership. So my start point is how do you organised ANY given number of men, with any mix of weapons, to gain the levels of control you require to perform your mission. - and not many folk ponder than question.
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Interesting. Obviously the level of fluidity or control is product of training, experience and even personality. UK Platoons also operate as Multiples, of 12-20 men in fire teams, either under a Sgt or Plt Cmd so are near identical to USMC 3 x 4 squads.

    Point being, the organisation is subservient to the training and leadership. So my start point is how do you organised ANY given number of men, with any mix of weapons, to gain the levels of control you require to perform your mission. - and not many folk ponder than question.

    I don't see organization being subservient to training & leadership, but to Usage & Intent.

    Again, it comes down to how you (whoever is creating said squad) visualizes its squad's usage & visualizes it in action.

    And yes fluidity is the product of training, etc. But if you have a system that is designed for the Plt Cmd to exhibit tight control over the squads so "he" can keep the Plt's formation tight & concise during manuever then their make-up will reflect that, being tight & concise, streamline in its makeup. You will have fluidity, but fluidity relative to the concise design of how your Plt Manuevers.

    --In a system like that, a 44 man Plt of 3x 13man squads w/ independently moving & directing SqLdrs would be far too large & unwieldly. In that kind of system the SL's independent movements & direction would seem redundant to that of the PC.



    But when the USMC visualizes a Plt manuever they don't evision a concise tightly moving Plt based on the direction of a Central figure.

    They envision using alot of Space & alot of Firepower coming fr/ multiple sides & angles over an area of dispersion that is too large for one man to -directly- control.

    In that type of system you need independently operating SqdLdrs who can control & direct all of that FP, while controlling the spacing, & act in the sted of the Plt Cmdr, moving by the feel of the PC's overall intention & not his by direction.

    Not saying this doesn't happen in concise more centralized Plt's but do to design its to a much different degree.

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    Council Member Kiwigrunt's Avatar
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    Interesting to see the different angle of approach by Wilf and Commar.
    Wonder how the new Aus. 2012 platoon will fit in this picture. 40 man with 3 x 8 man sections of 2 'standard' fire teams and 1 x 12 man section with 3 x 4 man teams each based around a GPMG or potentially an HE projector. I imagine that the plt com will still be the central figure here.
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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Kiwigrunt View Post
    Interesting to see the different angle of approach by Wilf and Commar.
    Wonder how the new Aus. 2012 platoon will fit in this picture. 40 man with 3 x 8 man sections of 2 'standard' fire teams and 1 x 12 man section with 3 x 4 man teams each based around a GPMG or potentially an HE projector. I imagine that the plt com will still be the central figure here.
    The Aussie 2012 Platoon is very good, and has some real evidential substance to it. Dave Kilcullen and I talked it through at some length, when he was in London. Personally I think it's too big, and has a superfluous layer of command, but that's just knit picking.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

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    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by COMMAR View Post
    I don't see organization being subservient to training & leadership, but to Usage & Intent.
    Ahhh... American English

    But when the USMC visualizes a Plt manuever they don't evision a concise tightly moving Plt based on the direction of a Central figure.
    I don't think the UK does either. UK Platoon doctrine is pretty flexible, with Section Commanders given pretty broad scope. The Plt Commander or the Platoon Sergeant can command the platoon, and both usually play to their strengths. Section commanders are certainly expected to be able to Command a platoon as a last resort - and train to do so.

    If you're suggesting the UK screwed up by buying into "Section Tactics", then I'd agree, but that was the fault of the training, and not the doctrine.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Now that the USMC is apparently doing away with the SAW in the line platoons, I'd like to ask how this affects what people think as far as how squads should be set up?

    To me, I think this is taking 'maneuver warfare' a bit too far. Losing the suppressive capabilities of the SAW for an IAR that only takes 30-round mags?

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default You asked...

    We beat this up before while you were in transit, I guess. Don't have time now but will see if I can link to the thread later tonight. In the interim, let me give you two heresies to contemplate.

    Suppressive fire is vastly overrated and is not nearly as effective as some seem to think. Accurate fire, OTOH, is effective and few doubt that.

    Belt fed weapons have a place. Many believe -- and I am one of them -- that they do not have a place in the Rifle Squad. They are too fragile, they require too much maintenance, they require extra training, they add to the log burden, they are unwieldy --even with assault or otherwise short barrels (which harm accuracy and effectiveness) and they're heavy. Recall also that the Corps got through WW II and Korea with the BAR and its 20 round magazine as the Squad AR (some had the Johnson LMG with a 30 rd mag -- but very few had it. It also had problems of its own).

    More later.

    Stay alert.

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    Quote Originally Posted by tequila View Post
    Now that the USMC is apparently doing away with the SAW in the line platoons, I'd like to ask how this affects what people think as far as how squads should be set up?

    To me, I think this is taking 'maneuver warfare' a bit too far. Losing the suppressive capabilities of the SAW for an IAR that only takes 30-round mags?

    The call for an IAR goes back to at least 2001, pre 9/11, when 7th Marines out in MCAGCC performed a battery of tests in different scenario and found the SAW was only better than a smaller, lighter, more accurate Mag-fed LMG in about half the scenarios that would confront the Squad.

    Not enough to end the SAW but enough to warrant the need for another OPTION in the tool bag. 9/11 saw the push back of this program but it seems to be back on track.

    The SAW isn't going anywhere, a Squad will just have another option before leaving the wire.

    The report fr/ 7th Marines in 2001 should be online, also a recent IAR story fr/ The Marine Corps Times gives some info on it.

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Follow up

    If you haven't already discovered it, one earlier conversation was on this Thread; go back to Post 7 (LINK) and read down to Post 24 when the thread re-concentrates on squad organization. However, if you skip forward to post 72 on page 4 of this thread, there's one more comment.

    IIRC there was another discussion earlier but I'm having trouble finding it. Will keep looking.

    Two things I would add, you'll note the Army is keeping the M249. FWIW some of the Army folks are not great M249 fans citing heavy maintenance and still frequent failures.

    There are efforts to reduce the weight and improve the reliability. In my experience, those two efforts counteract each other. For example, the SEALs use the Mk 46, a lightened SAW and the 82d and some units have some modified SAWS. Both are okay for short term SEAL like missions but cannot take the day to day beating an infantry weapon has to live with, they're too fragile. Same is true for the Mk 48, a 249 on steroids for the 7.62 NATO cartridge; it's a lot lighter than the 240 -- and a lot less durable.

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    Default Tequilla, Its not the report but the reference of it in the MC Times

    Quote Originally Posted by COMMAR View Post
    The SAW isn't going anywhere, a Squad will just have another option before leaving the wire. The report fr/ 7th Marines in 2001 should be online, also a recent IAR story fr/ The Marine Corps Times gives some info on it.



    Marines to Test, Evaluate 4 Auto-Rifle Models: http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news...ewsaw_020109w/ ....A Change in Mindset (Note view entire article on link, text removed due to copyright issues)
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 02-27-2009 at 10:24 AM. Reason: Copyright issues and link added.

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Good informative post, thanks.

    However, in the future you might consider that to avoid copyright issues, this site encourages the posting of just an excerpt and a link instead of posting an entire -- or most of -- an article. The various service Times and Gannet in general are one crowd that occasionally get sticky about it. May not be a problem but it just keeps the board from getting in trouble with someone who's picky.
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 02-27-2009 at 10:25 AM. Reason: Text referred to replaced with link. Tks.

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    Default Madsen Gun

    For what it's worth, Bruce Gudmundsson had a short article looking at the historical evolution of the fire team around the automatic rifle, dating back to the Danish Army at the turn of the century. It's in Military History Quarterly, the Autumn 2008 issue, if you have a subscription or a good library, doesn't look to be available online.

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    Default SQD Leader

    So what sized SQD (and PLT?) did you come up with? How was it armed?

    Also:

    How long does it take to train a SQD?
    What would the "personnel cycle"/rotation policy be like?
    And most importantly - how would you build the NCO leadership cadre?

    We all do the #s of widgets pretty well, but the purpose of the SQD is to enable decentralized NCO leaders to conduct fire and mnvr. So "how do you build a NCO" should be part of the equation.

    Thanks.

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    1258 Dave - How long to train a Squad?

    Well, if the troops were trained in Boot camp and then the Marine version of AIT (Advanced Infantry Training) in my day ITR (Infantry Training Regt.) and then fed into a regular Marine Infantry Line Battalion as parts of a Squad - I'd guesstimate they would be functioning as a well oiled Marine infantry squad in 4 to 6 months, after being introduced tothe Infantry Battalion.

    The Squad leaders and most fire team leaders would have at least one to two cycles of leadership exposure before the "new guys" were intergrated into the system.

    Leadership exposure being trained up to the level of fireteam leader or Squad leader in previous cycles.

    It has been working since the eary 1940's for the US Marines.

    There have been very few instances in the history of the Marine Corps that a speeded up "shake and bake" system was used to create leadership for Marine Rifle Squads.

    What type of time line has the history of the US Army 9 man Squad system been exposed to. Has there been a conserted effort to train young privates and PFC's to the responsibilities of Fire Team Leader?

    Very few, Marine Squad Leaders become SL's unless they have passed thru the crucible of running a Fire Team under a Squad Leader who had paid his dues in that slot for a sufficient amount of time to be evaluated by his Squad Leader and his Platoon Sgt. They inturn pass on their opinions to the Platoon Cmdr and then up the line to the Co. Commander.

    Time in grade does not a Squad Leader make. They are evaluated at many levels before being given the responsibility of running a squad. It is not a matter of being there, but it is a matter of measuring up. Marine Rifle Squads are made by proven building blocks.

    I hope that helps understand the system the Marine Big Squad evolves from.
    Last edited by RJ; 03-04-2009 at 02:34 AM.

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    There are efforts to reduce the weight and improve the reliability. In my experience, those two efforts counteract each other. For example, the SEALs use the Mk 46, a lightened SAW and the 82d and some units have some modified SAWS. Both are okay for short term SEAL like missions but cannot take the day to day beating an infantry weapon has to live with, they're too fragile. Same is true for the Mk 48, a 249 on steroids for the 7.62 NATO cartridge; it's a lot lighter than the 240 -- and a lot less durable.
    Ken makes a good point, but there are some additional factors in play.

    The Mk48 is/was not an act of war. As Ken points out, indications are that it simply won't cut it on extended ops.

    However FN's "Minimi 7.62" is as robust as an M249, but not as robust as an M240. Point being the Minimi 7.62 was designed for dismounted operation.

    The M240 is a US built FN-MAG 58 which was designed as a multi-role MG for infantry, AFV's and even aircraft, so it weighs more than it should. It took it's cue from the MG-34/42/3 - also a beast!

    However, both the UK and US have never really had any really good idea of the why and how of MGs in the platoon. It certainly does not seem to be based on evidence.

    Another very good 7.62mm MG is the HK 21E / HK-11 modular design. Not much seen, but pretty good, all the same.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Council Member Kiwigrunt's Avatar
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    The Mk48 is/was not an act of war. As Ken points out, indications are that it simply won't cut it on extended ops.
    However FN's "Minimi 7.62" is as robust as an M249, but not as robust as an M240. Point being the Minimi 7.62 was designed for dismounted operations.
    I'm not sure there is actually much difference between the two Wilf. The 48 is made in the US, the standard in Belgium, both by FN. They weigh the same. The 48 has a different gasplug and (sturdier) bipod. Other than that they appear to be pretty much identical.

    Your point on lighter weight guns for section/platoon level is well made I think. Keep the MAG 58 at coy.level or above, close to their SF kits with spare barrels etc. (and from there they can of course still be used in the light role when required.) For as far as weight is any indication of robustness, the 7.62 Mimini is not much lighter than the old L4 (agreed, mag fed). I don't think the L4 had any durability issues.
    Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)

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    Two questions:

    #1 -- Why the IAR not in 7.62 mm? Does using 5.56 mm for the IAR not just reinstate the lost full-auto option on the M16/M4 without really adding firepower?

    #2 -- 30 rounds of 5.56 mm might in some situations be a little ... tight. What's the opinion here about using an adapted Beta C-mag for the IAR? Or a belt-drum?

  18. #98
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Not so on one, true on the other

    Quote Originally Posted by Kiwigrunt View Post
    I'm not sure there is actually much difference between the two Wilf. The 48 is made in the US, the standard in Belgium, both by FN. They weigh the same. The 48 has a different gasplug and (sturdier) bipod. Other than that they appear to be pretty much identical.
    Not sure from whence that statement is derived. They are two very different weapons and concepts.

    The Mk 48 weighs 18 pounds LINK, the M240 weighs 27 pounds LINK -- plus. Folks using it today tell me that those carried in theater today easily weigh over 30 pounds.

    Note that FN brags about the light weight of of the Mk 48 and provides that weight -- but for the M240 series ground guns does not provide the weight LINK simply because it is the troops greatest complaint about an otherwise excellent weapon. Note also the FN is working on several mods to reduce that weight.

    The Mk 48 is not robust enough to take the pounding an Infantry unit would give it; OTOH, it's okay to take out of a stock of weapons on a raid of relatively short duration and possible high intensity followed by return to an armorer to get ready for the next operation. It does not need to be excessively rugged.
    For as far as weight is any indication of robustness, the 7.62 Mimini is not much lighter than the old L4 (agreed, mag fed). I don't think the L4 had any durability issues.
    No, the L4 was one of the most reliable guns of its type -- and that operating system is the basis of the M240 system. The Minimi / M249 / Mk 46 / Mk 48 operating system is different, based on but not as robust as the Kalishnikov system and it is not nearly as reliable. Weight is not an indicator of robustness, the type of construction and materials used plus the operating system are.

    The MAG 58 / M 240 was designed at a time when those factors were dominant and the gun used heavy, thick plates and a strong riveted construction (The L4 from even earlier was even more so -- the receiver was milled fro one block of steel). The Minimi series OTOH was designed to be cheap to produce -- that was the dominant feature, so the construction is much more flimsy all round.

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Logistics, Distiller...

    #1 -- Complicates ammo resupply. The Newer M4s have full auto capability, the 3 round burst feature was as predicted a failure.

    Firepower is a vastly over stated and over rated issue. Volume of fire decides nothing, accuracy of fire is the determinant. Only very raw and inexperienced fighters are even remotely affected by the volume of fire. Everybody, no matter how experienced is affected by accurate fire...

    #2 -- Aside from the lack of robustness in most belt fed weapons -- the PKM being one notable and great exception (If we had any sense, we'd just buy it and convert it to a good 6mm or so caliber...) the need for a whole lot of ammo is also questionable. C-Mags have reliability problems as do belt drums. This LINK would be a better idea for someone who just had to have more capacity -- particularly if the magazine were inserted in the weapon horizontally instead of from below. Or one could just build these LINK.

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    Ken, your point on on construction is well taken. A friend of mine tells me that the Mk 48 is a reliable weapon until exactly 1100 rounds are fired, at which point the gas system freezes solid and a Small Arms Repairer is required.

    The PKM has had a long and successful run, and it has been designed to use both 7.62N and a 6MM caliber. Versions using rimless calibers are actually much simpler.

    I'm convinced that the IAR will work, and one of the reasons I'm so sure is because the USMC is also soliciting magazines that hold more ammunition. Information is publicly available about a 55 round magazine in development.

    The PKM uses a stamped action, and VLTOR here in the states is making an action that is actually stronger than the original. I'm told that the originals used to crack on occasion.

    As for alternate cartridges, there are many designs extant, all of which would outperform 7.62N on soft targets and some of which would outperform it on harder targets.

    KAC makes a ten pound LMG that is an improvement on the Stoner 63.

    The USMC is soliciting a thermally stable machinegun barrel that will extend barrel life and obviate the requirement for a quick change barrel. There is only one company, that I know of, that has a viable product. It is an SBIR set aside, if that matters.

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