Son Tay raid: stop or go? Vietnam

[JMA]

But...Sort of -- but Moorer wasn't an imbecile. Does that negate your complaint?

May not negate it but it certainly calls your comment into question. The truth is that neither the Wiki, you or I know for sure the 'why' of that decision -- as I said, it'll be released about 2030. Stick around to find out...

I said Moorer was an imbecile? No I did not but he clearly made an imbecilic decision.

One must surely question how this man reached the pinnacle of the US military without it being established that he was unable to make (in this case) an intelligent decision under stress.

This links back to the post by Red Rat in the What Are You Reading Now thread about the book The Stress Effect: Why Smart Leaders Make Dumb Decisions

I would welcome a review from him on this book as to any insights he has gleaned from the book as to the military in this regard.

Ken, how did Moorer manage to get to CJCS when his was unable to make a simple decision a 15 year old could make and does this indicate the the joint chiefs are merely rubber stamp yes-men?

Yes and no. I suggest that it was a tactical raid that got -- wrongly IMO -- elevated to the Strategic plane by the US desire to make some things more important than they really are...Simons, not Simmons and having worked for him, he was okay, not the best...

For the OBL strike it was troops from stateside that were used and not those based then in theatre? A pattern here?

Aside note -- he also made the Cabanatuan Raid.

I'll look it up.

[Ken White]

I said Moorer was an imbecile? No I did not but he clearly made an imbecilic decision.

To you it is clear, others without your vast knowledge, experience and inside information do not know enough to make that call...

You may, however, make as many standing broad jumps at possibly wrong conclusions as you wish.

One must surely question how this man reached the pinnacle of the US military without it being established that he was unable to make (in this case) an intelligent decision under stress.

I suspect that he did it like countless others around the world before and since -- by making more, mostly intelligent decisions involving far more persons while under stress than you or I ever had to do. Note also that we do not know that the decision was not intelligent, we only have your assumption based on limited information that it was unitelligent.

Note also that you're basing your possibly fallacious assumption on one incident of which you are but partially aware and informed as opposed to possessing (or citing) more detailed knowledge of his over 40 years of service in which, among other things, he was both CinCPac and CinCLant, two major commands and something no one had ever done before (or since...).

Ken, how did Moorer manage to get to CJCS when his was unable to make a simple decision a 15 year old could make and does this indicate the the joint chiefs are merely rubber stamp yes-men?

The 'how' is discussed above. You do not know that it was a simple decision, it merely suits your purposes to so assume. Been my observation that 15 year olds make a lot of hasty --and bad -- decisions. Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs are like ordinary mortals, some are yes men, some are not. All have far more military experience than you, most good, in more areas of the world and more varied circumstances. Most also have more sense than to leap to judgement based on limited knowledge and most are concerned with far more than minor tactical problems. They can be legitimately accused of being excessively cautious but it must be recalled that they are dual hatted as both the military adviser to the President (not Commanders, they command nothing) AND as guardians of the institutions that are the entire US Armed Forces with worldwide and not just current Theater (or current political administration) concerns. Those are somewhat conflicting roles and the balance is always uneasy.

For the OBL strike it was troops from stateside that were used and not those based then in theatre? A pattern here?

That too is an assumption and not necessarily correct.

However, you raise a good point. The Cabanatuan raid was ordered by the local commander using in-theater troops. There were some unheralded but deep and successful raids in Korea that met those same parameters. Son Tay, OTH was the harbinger of excessive control from Washington and of the use of out of theater forces. That raised those efforts from a military operation to a political action (please note and consider that FACT). As was / is the OBL effort. The OBL thing was a mixed bag, theater wise but was emphatically a Washington orchestration. I suspect little good will come from that trend...

[JMA]

To you it is clear, others without your vast knowledge, experience and inside information do not know enough to make that call...

There are none so blind as those who will not see.

I say again Ken, explain the scenario to a random 15 year old and see what an epic fail the CJCS's action was. How he wasn't summarily dismissed (forced into retirement) remains totally amazing.

You may, however, make as many standing broad jumps at possibly wrong conclusions as you wish.

Ken, you can attempt to mock me as much as you like to entertain your like minded around here. (by now you should have realised that those tactics do not work on me)

I suspect that he did it like countless others around the world before and since -- by making more, mostly intelligent decisions involving far more persons while under stress than you or I ever had to do. Note also that we do not know that the decision was not intelligent, we only have your assumption based on limited information that it was unitelligent.

... but at the critical moment he failed. So (being thankful he killed no one in this case) you thank him for his service, give him a service medal and pack him off post haste into retirement.

Note also that you're basing your possibly fallacious assumption on one incident of which you are but partially aware and informed as opposed to possessing (or citing) more detailed knowledge of his over 40 years of service in which, among other things, he was both CinCPac and CinCLant, two major commands and something no one had ever done before (or since...).The 'how' is discussed above. You do not know that it was a simple decision, it merely suits your purposes to so assume.

... forget the history all it took was the man to fail at a critical moment... one mistake is all it takes. He failed. Probably a good case study for the Peter Principle.

Been my observation that 15 year olds make a lot of hasty --and bad -- decisions. Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs are like ordinary mortals, some are yes men, some are not.

I don't have anything to do with 15 year olds

The question is how they managed to claw their way up the promotion ladder. Officers of that rank (one would like to think) would be a cut above us mere mortals, yes?

All have far more military experience than you, most good, in more areas of the world and more varied circumstances.

So did Hannibal's elephants, but did that make them any more than mere elephants?

The simple difference Ken, is that I did not serve long enough to reach my own level of incompetence... obviously many of the guys you mention did.

Most also have more sense than to leap to judgement based on limited knowledge and most are concerned with far more than minor tactical problems.

Maybe most do. But then obviously some are so intellectually challenged that they allow an attack to go ahead on an empty camp 23 miles from Hanoi. The mind boggles.

Don't worry the Brit have there problems as well. Remember Arnhem?

On D-1 an Ultra decryption revealed the movement of 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions to Nijmegen and Arnhem. Also airphoto-reconnaissance and intel from the Dutch underground confirmed the panzer presence. Eisenhower was concerned, Montgomery laughed it off and Eisenhower did not have the balls to overrule Montgomery. (seems to be a problem at the top levels of the US military, yes?) The rest is history. Only 8,000 casualties, what the hell, hey Ken? (can't criticise the generals can we?).

They can be legitimately accused of being excessively cautious but it must be recalled that they are dual hatted as both the military adviser to the President (not Commanders, they command nothing) AND as guardians of the institutions that are the entire US Armed Forces with worldwide and not just current Theater (or current political administration) concerns. Those are somewhat conflicting roles and the balance is always uneasy.That too is an assumption and not necessarily correct.

Excuses, excuses Ken. This man blew it. He should have been fired if not worse.

However, you raise a good point. The Cabanatuan raid was ordered by the local commander using in-theater troops. There were some unheralded but deep and successful raids in Korea that met those same parameters. Son Tay, OTH was the harbinger of excessive control from Washington and of the use of out of theater forces. That raised those efforts from a military operation to a political action (please note and consider that FACT). As was / is the OBL effort. The OBL thing was a mixed bag, theater wise but was emphatically a Washington orchestration. I suspect little good will come from that trend...

Ken, with respect, you are now trying to pass the buck to Washington while there is growing evidence that after all is said and done maybe the US military does in fact need political micromanagement.

But the US did once have a man of honour. Remember Operation Eagle Claw? As a result of that cock-up Beckwith resigned.

[Ken White]

There are none so blind as those who will not see.

Ain't that the truth...

I say again Ken, explain the scenario to a random 15 year old and see what an epic fail the CJCS's action was. How he wasn't summarily dismissed (forced into retirement) remains totally amazing.

What is totally amazing is that a mature South African with considerable and successful military experience is making judgements like a 15 year old.

Ken, you can attempt to mock me as much as you like to entertain your like minded around here. (by now you should have realised that those tactics do not work on me)

Understand one thing -- I am not mocking you. I am stating that you espouse some bizarre theories. Nor am I attempting to entertain anyone -- I am trying to suggest to you that you, as the saying goes, should "engage brain before putting mouth in gear." You are smarter than some of the odd comments you make for whatever reason.

... but at the critical moment he failed. So (being thankful he killed no one in this case) you thank him for his service, give him a service medal and pack him off post haste into retirement.

That's just asinine. You apparently totally misunderstand the role of the CJCS. None of that was his call.

I don't have anything to do with 15 year olds.

Nor do I so stop suggesting we call on one for answers to questions about which most will know little. An attribute apparently widely shared.

The question is how they managed to claw their way up the promotion ladder. Officers of that rank (one would like to think) would be a cut above us mere mortals, yes?

Not at all. Pontificating, sycophantic, overly aggressive, less than thoughtful and other less than stellar types exist in all ranks, Private to General. If one thought as you say one should like to, then one would make some terribly flawed judgements about people. Obviously.

So did Hannibal's elephants, but did that make them any more than mere elephants?

Yep, they were combat experienced Elephants.

The simple difference Ken, is that I did not serve long enough to reach my own level of incompetence... obviously many of the guys you mention did.

Still groping, I see...

Yep, many of them did -- many of them also did not. Same applies in all fields of human endeavor. As you know...

Maybe most do. But then obviously some are so intellectually challenged that they allow an attack to go ahead on an empty camp 23 miles from Hanoi. The mind boggles.

Yes, the boggle is quite noticeable.

Don't worry the Brit have there problems as well. Remember Arnhem?

On D-1 an Ultra decryption revealed the movement of 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions to Nijmegen and Arnhem. Also airphoto-reconnaissance and intel from the Dutch underground confirmed the panzer presence. Eisenhower was concerned, Montgomery laughed it off and Eisenhower did not have the balls to overrule Montgomery. (seems to be a problem at the top levels of the US military, yes?) The rest is history. Only 8,000 casualties, what the hell, hey Ken? (can't criticise the generals can we?).

I was criticizing Generals before you were born. Generally, though, I tried to have some factual basis rather than my perceptions on which to base that criticism. It might be helpful if you tried that.

Re: the Arnhem effort -- and Son Tay for that matter --you forget or elide the political aspects and the stultifying effect of a large bureaucracy. You apparently never had to deal with that or have forgotten how perncious it can be. Some of us have dealt with it and know better than to discount it -- think of our conversation re: Libya when I suggested those factors would cause exactly what did happen...

Not all bad, I guess -- gave you something to rail about for a few weeks.

Excuses, excuses Ken. This man blew it. He should have been fired if not worse.

We can disagree on that. You're speaking through your hat...

That's no excuse, it's simply reality with which you have never had to work so you can be dismissive. Those who have to live with it do not have your luxury.

Ken, with respect, you are now trying to pass the buck to Washington while there is growing evidence that after all is said and done maybe the US military does in fact need political micromanagement.

Heh. I wouldn't deign to comment on that little gem...

But the US did once have a man of honour. Remember Operation Eagle Claw? As a result of that cock-up Beckwith resigned.

No. he did not. I knew Beckwith and while he was indeed generally honorable, he did not resign over the foul-ups (plural) that led to the failure of Eagle Claw -- which were many, multi-service and both bureaucracy and Washington jinxed from the start and a few of which he also contributed. Charlie didn't resign, he retired with credit for 30 years service and full Retired pay -- the norm for Colonels, then and now. He did that over a year after Eagle Claw. So, once again you make a fallacious comment based on poor knowledge and a lot of false presumption.

You really ought to work on that -- and that, BTW is not mockery or meant to entertain anyone, it is a suggestion for you to consider if you wish to be taken seriously.

[jmm99]

1. Lowered NV morale because it showed we could hit within 25 miles of Hanoi, with minimal losses to us.

2. Enhanced US PW morale because an effort had been made to free them.

One might also suggest that putting US boots on the ground that close to Hanoi opened up the US psyche to more aggressive actions within North Vietnam itself, culminating in the 1972 Operation Linebacker I and Operation Linebacker II.

One might also consider the effect in 1964 had Linebacker-type actions, as well as US raids, been employed against North Vietnam - rather than the "graduated response" employed by the Johnson Admin.

[JMA]

What is totally amazing is that ...

I will not continue the ###-for-tat response but rather restate my position.

The decision to proceed with the Son Tay raid despite confirmation that the camp was empty was gross incompetence. The fact that the CJCS failed to act sadly indicates that a person incapable of decision making at a critical moment had somehow managed to reach the pinnacle of the US military. If the decision to proceed was taken by or strongly recommended by the military the CJCS should have been dismissed (or worse). If, however, the decision to proceed was driven by the politicians then it exposed a lack of moral courage in the CJCS which again raises questions as to how he managed to reach that position. I say again any which way you try to spin it the man was worthy as a subject of a case study into the Peter Principle.

Fast forward to Operation Eagle Claw. Here we see more of the Keystone Cops incompetence at the highest level of the US military. I quote from Beckwith's book: - in conversation with Task Force Commander Major General James B. Vaught during the preliminary planning stage:

"What's the risk, Colonel Beckwith?"

"Oh, about 99.9 percent."

"What's the probability of success?"

"Zero."

"Well, we can't do it."

"You're right, Boss."

"I've got to buy time from the JCS."

Staggering isn't it?

A major-general and a colonel can't tell the JCS that the operation has a zero chance of success??????????????????????????????????

So what were the JCS thinking???????????????????????

Then from here:

The contradiction between the optimism of the flag-rank staff officers and the pessimism of field commanders like Beckwith indicates that the feedback of ground commanders had not been taken seriously by a civilian administration which was determined to execute what it perceived as a last resort.

It is simple.

Nobody (in their right mind) with question the physical courage of the US forces... but it is becoming increasingly clear that moral courage is in short supply in the upper echelons of the US military.

Sticks and stones and all that stuff Ken

[Fuchs]

(...)moral courage is in short supply in the upper echelons of the US military.

I see no good reason for spelling "US" here.
Moral courage in armed services is the exception, not the norm. Anecdotes.

That's the downside of the power that command authority bestows on superiors and the downside of having an organisation that demands obedience to the degree of overpowering survival instincts.

Military moral courage needs to be replaced by a careful selection of civilian leaders (and by civilian authority over the military). The civilians on top need to make sure that unpleasant news reach them by rewarding good reporting and punishing bad reporting (and non-reporting of important facts) whenever they can reveal it.

I don't think there's a reliable way how to make amilitary effective AND foster its moral courage at the same time.

[ganulv]

That's the downside of the power that command authority bestows on superiors and the downside of having an organisation that demands obedience to the degree of overpowering survival instincts.

It’s not limited to the military, that’s for sure.

The civilians on top need to make sure that unpleasant news reach them by rewarding good reporting and punishing bad reporting (and non-reporting of important facts) whenever they can reveal it.

[JMA]

I see no good reason for spelling "US" here.
Moral courage in armed services is the exception, not the norm. Anecdotes.

You are probably correct in that one hears of very few commanders who are willing to make that final and irrevocable protest and resign rather than follow insane orders or risk soldiers lives unnecessarily.

That's the downside of the power that command authority bestows on superiors and the downside of having an organisation that demands obedience to the degree of overpowering survival instincts.

Of course in a situation (like that Beckwith found himself) where the operational commander who himself will be in harms way to refuse would invite the response "well if you are not up for the task then we will find someone who is," (incorporating the innuendo of cowardice).

When it is a situation where it is someone who will not be at risk like the cocooned JCS it is all about their pensions - in that how many lives can be gambled with (not risked mind you) before he/they are prepared to risk their pensions.

Military moral courage needs to be replaced by a careful selection of civilian leaders (and by civilian authority over the military). The civilians on top need to make sure that unpleasant news reach them by rewarding good reporting and punishing bad reporting (and non-reporting of important facts) whenever they can reveal it.

In the case of Son Tay you may be correct but in the case of Eagle Claw (where a desperate unpopular President was prepared to risk the lives of military men to save his own political ass) it was up to the CJCS and the JCS to tell the politicians to go take a hike. They didn't have the balls (moral courage in this case) to do it.

I don't think there's a reliable way how to make a military effective AND foster its moral courage at the same time.

You may be correct... but a step in the right direction will be to court-marshall those who it is proven have failed in their duty of care to the men under their command.

In the case of Son Tay and Moorer if he had known that either way he was going to end his career and lose his pension he may just have done the right thing especially if that was the honourable course of action.

[Ken White]

I will not continue the ###-for-tat response but rather restate my position.

He said as he again laid out a ###.

As for this:

It is simple.

Nobody (in their right mind) with question the physical courage of the US forces... but it is becoming increasingly clear that moral courage is in short supply in the upper echelons of the US military.

That certainly applies to some, fortunately, not to all even though such blanket condemnation may be perceptively merited in your view. Fortunately, you are not the arbiter. Also fortunately, reality -- and most others -- differ.

Sticks and stones and all that stuff Ken

No sticks or stones, just another response to your apparent once a month or so relatively pointless excessive negativity cycle. It's yet another plea for you to think about what you're posting rather than occasionally dashing off ill considered and quite uninformed vituperation for no apparent reason other than that you can...

It's too early for the Grinch...