Security and Stability in Afghanistan

[Jedburgh]

10 Dec 07 testimony before the Canadian Senate National Security and Defence Committee:

The State of the Afghan Insurgency

Afghanistan is not hopeless. To be fair, NATO operations have had mixed success thus far. But the insurgency will ultimately be won or lost in the rural areas of Afghanistan, not in the cities. Success in ending the insurgency will take time and sufficient resources. It would be a tragedy if the naysayers in Canada succeeded in reducing their country’s commitment. The challenge for the Afghan government and its NATO allies is not an easy one. It involves providing security to local villages, especially in strategically important areas of the south and east. It also includes getting a handle on the corruption that is gnawing away at the government and its fragile support base. Most Afghans are not asking for much. They want security and hope, and perhaps something to make their difficult lives a bit better. After 30 years of near-constant war, they certainly deserve it.

Brigadier-General P.J. Atkinson, Director General of Ops at the Strategic Joint Staff, also testified, but I can't find a transcript.

[TheCurmudgeon]

A lot of good information in http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/...fghanchall.pdf.

Spent time building roads in the Tarin Khot and Khost areas. I remember working with the provinicial Governor north-east of Khost on the border with Pakistan. The US (or someone) came in and built his a nice building with a generator but he had no fuel to run it. He had no tax base to get money for the fuel. He got support for ANA and ANP from the central government, but he did not have fuel for thier trucks either. Building a complete government there in "our" image is going to take a long time.

I think we need to learn to find a way to build a stabile, functioning government and slowly work towards democracy rather than try to change thousands of years of history.

[Beelzebubalicious]

online version of recent article in print version. Interesting overview of non-kinetic operations, including a tip to the HTT.

Policing a whirlwind
Dec 13th 2007 | KHOST AND LASHKAR GAR
From The Economist print edition

As foreign troops become more efficient, government is still the problem

http://www.economist.com/displaystor...ry_id=10286219

[JeffC]

John McCreary just published a detailed analysis of casualtiy statistics and the state of the war in Afghanistan - the Taliban are making gains and are on the brink of retaking Kandahar, and this against a force ratio of 18-25:1.

From McCreary's report:

The ratios
The loss ratios show the Afghan Army is not doing well and the police remain in a crisis. The overall casualty ratio rebounded in favor of the Allies for the first time this year. The overall ratios of Taliban killed and wounded to Allied
killed and wounded was 3 : 1. In September and October, the ratio fell to 2 : 1. During the summer offensive the ratio was 4 : 1.

The kill ratios once again showed another drop in favor of the Taliban. In November the ratio dropped to 3 : 1, the lowest ratio since the fight began. In early summer the Allies killed Taliban at the rate of 7 : 1. In August the rate dropped to 5 : 1. In September it was 4 :1 in favor of the government. In October the ratio was 3.5 : 1. This is an alarming trend.

I have more on this at my site, along with a .pdf of the NightWatch report.

[Ken White]

Concentrating on such figures as he provides in his "report" give you a trees instead of forests perspective.

In any irregular war a force ratio of 18-25:1 is virtually meaningless. Big bureaucratic western Armies -- and , in this case, their Native allies who are trying to fight the same way -- will never be as flexible as the irregulars. Casualties on both sides will fluctuate and a lot of things -- with some real research instead of just looking at figures -- will tell you why they fluctuate.

Such things as operational tempos impacted by political events, unit rotations (putting new instead of experienced troops in play) and a host of other factors intrude.

To balance that excessive negativity induced by almost meaningless numbers, here's an equally excessively positive number; (LINK). Neither set of numbers means much.

Before you rush to point out that good numbers cited by a General are offset by the tone of the rest of the article, true -- but it's from the AP, not an unbiased source. My point is that the numbers don't mean much no matter how much the punditocracy, talking head and Generals like them.

[JeffC]

Concentrating on such figures as he provides in his "report" give you a trees instead of forests perspective.

McCreary recently retired a senior analyst with J2 after 38 years. You might want to read his entire report before dismissing it as "meaningless numbers". I made a .pdf available at IntelFusion.

[Ken White]

McCreary recently retired a senior analyst with J2 after 38 years. You might want to read his entire report before dismissing it as "meaningless numbers". I made a .pdf available at IntelFusion.

Not impressed. The NYT came out with an article couple of days ago that said much the same thing. So have several other outlets.

Look deeper. The system likes metrics, they're something to show -- usually, they prove little but they satisfy those with an itch for 'meaningful data on which to base decisions.' Or for analysts who want more than well honed instincts...

That .pdf reminded me of a page in a math text book rather than any intel estimate of value I've ever read. Sorry. The net content was summed up in this; "Taliban can hold terrain for limited periods; Allies cannot prevent Taliban attacks." which doesn't pass the "so what" test. It does not because in a nation that size with terrain like that where shifting loyalties are a national sport it is simply logical that should be so. It would not change if there were ten times as many Allied troops there.

Consider the fact that the Joint Staff and CentCom are -- properly -- concerned about the health of the US Defense establishment and their entire AO respectively; they'd both be quite happy to see Afghanistan and Iraq just go away. Based on prior experience, I have no doubt that some in both places are actively fomenting to make that happen (Note that is not an accusation of treason, merely of being over zealous in pursuing their Bosses stated -- or assumed -- goals). So CentCom leaks to the NYT the fact they're 'reviewing' the mission. Given the paper's tilt that immediately is cast as the sky is falling...

At the same time, Gates is pushing NATO for a bigger commitment -- not just more troops but the things like Choppers and support elements that they promised and haven't delivered. So he doesn't object at all to the Times saying things are going downhill -- perhaps that'll tweak NATO a bit. Could even be that the J staff leaked instead of CentCom.

I noted in the Times article a 'military official' spouting gloom is quoted. His location is not stated (deliberately, I'm sure, so we'll asume he's in the 'stan) but I'll bet big bucks he's here in the States and his 'professional' opinion is swayed by a whole lot of factors of which current on the ground knowledge is not one.

Wheels inside of wheels and nothing in war is simple -- nothing in the bureaucracy that is the US DoD is even merely comples -- its generally a bucket of worms. I assure you there's no intent to denigrate you or McCreary, I'm just highly skeptical of a numbers approach in a COIN effort. I thought we'd learned better than that from Viet Nam -- apparently not. Sad.

[JeffC]

Wheels inside of wheels and nothing in war is simple -- nothing in the bureaucracy that is the US DoD is even merely comples -- its generally a bucket of worms. I assure you there's no intent to denigrate you or McCreary, I'm just highly skeptical of a numbers approach in a COIN effort. I thought we'd learned better than that from Viet Nam -- apparently not. Sad.

Well, I reject your inference that McCreary built his case solely on statistics. Clearly there's a problem and casualty rates, force ratios, etc., are a part of the picture. Not the whole picture, but no one is claiming that it is, either. It's just a straw man to claim otherwise.

What, in your opinion, are the factors contributing to the fact that the Taliban have encircled Kandahar and may retake it before the Spring? How do you think this has happened?

[tequila]

Whoa ... retake Kandahar? One has to remember that they don't actually hold any major towns at all and cannot defend even Musa Qala against a thrust by the Afghan Army.

Now what they can obviously do is spread insecurity and fear, and dominate areas at night. They have reestablished their ability to do so in many areas throughout the south and the problem is growing worse. Things are not on an upward path, they are trending downwards, and we had better do something about it. But they are not the VC in 1968, ready to storm Hue City, and probably never will be.

[Jedburgh]

The Economist, 17 Dec 07: Afghanistan: A Victory, But Little to Cheer

The recapture of a town that was previously controlled by Western troops is welcome, but it represents a limited triumph for the outsiders as winter freezes much of the country quiet. The year has seen neither the Taliban nor outside troops gain telling advantage. NATO has won all the battles and has managed to preserve the support of most Afghans: if opinion polls can be believed Afghans still support an international military presence in their country (one published by the BBC this month suggested that 71% of Afghans want American forces to stay). Yet overall levels of Taliban violence continue to rise across southern and eastern Afghanistan. Worse, they have spread significantly into the border areas of Pakistan.....

....The winter is at least a moment to pause and reflect on strategy for next year. At Musa Qala, NATO and Afghan forces easily defeated the Taliban but as diplomats in Kabul, the capital, concede, a far greater challenge is then defending against reinfiltration. Securing territory means getting the support of local people. In Helmand, for example, this requires teams of anthropologists and political officers to deal with a mosaic of tribal interest groups, an approach used by American forces elsewhere in the country. That means a greater emphasis on reconciliation and negotiation with local Taliban leaders, as well as training Afghan forces so they are able to take the lead in military operations.

Politically the challenges are no easier.....

[tequila]

Hotel Serena bombed and attacked.

Taliban threatens to attack Western restaurants in Kabul.

Dr. Barnett Rubin on possible implications. The picture he paints of the current Western "reconstruction" effort in Kabul is quietly devastating - frankly it points out that our civilian efforts are adrift and are just as likely to be alienating and unpopular in Kabul.

The Taliban just won a major IO victory. More such attacks could succeed in crippling an already-sagging international relief and reconstruction effort in Afghanistan, just as they did in Iraq --- and I think we all know that without a much better such effort, there really is no hope of a decent outcome in that country.

Dr. Rubin:

... Most of the aid was not delivered by UN agencies. It was delivered by an army of foreign contractors, consultants, and NGOs working for bilateral donors (that's aid-speak for "countries," like the US). And all those foreigners need security that NATO, the Coalition, and the Afghan government cannot provide: hence the proliferation of foreign owned-private security contractors -- and the Afghan private security contractors that they have spawned as their subcontractors, many of which are composed of supposedly demobilized militias.

I'm not attacking all those aid workers. I'm one of them. The point is not about our individual merits -- there are saints and sinners among us. God knows, I am probably a more legitimate target for the Taliban than that Filippina woman they killed in the gym. But collectively we have generated an infrastructure serving only our needs that dwarfs the infrastructure provided for Afghans. This infrastructure -- of which the Serena Hotel is the flagship -- is the most visible part of the aid system to Afghans. Projects may mature in a few (or many) years, but right now Afghans see the guest houses, bars, restaurants, armored cars, checkpoints, hotels, hostile unaccountable gunmen, brothels, videos, CDs, cable television, Internet cafes with access to pornography, ethnic Russian waitresses from Kyrgyzstan in Italian restaurants owned by members of the former royal family and patronized by U.S. private security guards with their Chinese girlfriends and Afghan TV moguls, and skyrocketing prices for real estate, food, and fuel, traffic jams caused by the proliferation of vehicles and exacerbated by "security measures" every time a foreign or Afghan official leaves the office -- I could go on, but the Serena is a symbol of all that ...

[Ken White]

...
The picture he paints of the current Western "reconstruction" effort in Kabul is quietly devastating - frankly it points out that our civilian efforts are adrift and are just as likely to be alienating and unpopular in Kabul.

Western thought applied in south Asia has typically done that...

The Taliban just won a major IO victory...

They did? I missed that, where was it? What did they do that comprised this major victory?

...More such attacks could succeed in crippling an already-sagging international relief and reconstruction effort in Afghanistan, just as they did in Iraq --- and I think we all know that without a much better such effort, there really is no hope of a decent outcome in that country.

"We" do? That was never likely to work in any event; the key is to get the Afghans to take responsibility for their own nation. That will not be easy; it entails turning around over a century of unhelpful western, Pakistani and Russian meddling and developing a sense of nationhood and getting the pride to transcend the individual and tribal level; that and 3,000 years of history. I figure about two generations and all the virtually fruitless NGO and western government 'help' in town won't speed that up by very much.

[tequila]

I am optimistic about Afghanistan. We've been there longer than in Iraq, yet the large majority of Afghans still welcome Western troops. Despite the ugly picture presented, Afghan life expectancy has increased since 2002 (in marked contrast to Iraq), Afghan refugees have returned to the country as opposed to being generated, and more Afghans have access to medical care and education than before 2002, again all in marked contrast to Iraq.

We can still turn this around. Afghanistan now is like Iraq in 2003, before we locked ourselves into the Green Zone. But first we must recognize that a turnaround is necessary.

[tequila]

They did? I missed that, where was it? What did they do that comprised this major victory?

They successfully infiltrated and attacked Westerners in one of their most secure environs. Canadian PM Harper has stayed in that hotel. The Tailban infiltrated several attackers who shot and blew up Western expats.

The IO victory is not so much in the broader Western public, which no longer appears to care much about the wars in Iraq or Afghanistan, but rather in the Western NGO and aid community as detailed in the Rubin post. If they can pull off follow-on attacks on Western establishments and run the NGO community into Green Zone-style compounds or out of the country, they will have gone a long way towards successfully alienating the Afghan people from the Western mission there.

"We" do? That was never likely to work in any event; the key is to get the Afghans to take responsibility for their own nation. That will not be easy; it entails turning around over a century of unhelpful western, Pakistani and Russian meddling and developing a sense of nationhood and getting the pride to transcend the individual and tribal level; that and 3,000 years of history. I figure about two generations and all the virtually fruitless NGO and western government 'help' in town won't speed that up by very much.

NGO and Western gov help has not been utterly fruitless - it has already vastly expanded the Afghan central government's ability to provide services to the Afghan people. The only way to build a sense of nationhood and loyalty towards a central government is to establish a national infrastructure and a government which can actually provide security, law, and services instead of another layer of predatory authority. Without Western capital and technical assistance, there is no way that the Afghan central government can do this on its own especially in a neighborhood with fierce competitors like Iran, Pakistan, and India.

Of course the Afghans will have to do most of the work and the whole point of Rubin's post which I endorsed is that Western governments must be willing to surrender much of the responsibility and power to the Afghans in terms of the reconstruction effort. But without the capital and security umbrella provided by the West, a truly independent Afghanistan will be strangled in its cradle.

[Ron Humphrey]

in large part about the Afghans themselves being the necessary actors in creating success. There is still a very important part however in being the Big cousin who's standing there to help just in case you start really getting the $#@ kicked out of you.

In order to stand they have to not only feel like it's plausible to do so but must be able to feel that any given failure isn't necessarily the end all be all.

That where we come in and thats where NATO really needs to get its priorities straight.

Right now it's way to easy for the bad guys to sell locals on NATO not really caring in the larger sense.

[Ken White]

They successfully infiltrated and attacked Westerners in one of their most secure environs. Canadian PM Harper has stayed in that hotel. The Tailban infiltrated several attackers who shot and blew up Western expats.

Not at all difficult to do; quite easy, in fact. The Hotel was and is an icon target; resonates far more with the media and the intelligentsia than it has actual effect on the ground. To say it's an IO oriented strike is correct, to say it's a 'victory' is, IMO, an massive overstatement.

The IO victory is not so much in the broader Western public, which no longer appears to care much about the wars in Iraq or Afghanistan, but rather in the Western NGO and aid community as detailed in the Rubin post. If they can pull off follow-on attacks on Western establishments and run the NGO community into Green Zone-style compounds or out of the country, they will have gone a long way towards successfully alienating the Afghan people from the Western mission there.

The broader western public never cared much about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Still don't and are unlikely to ever do so -- they, mostly, just want them to go away.

My experience with the NGO community is, over all, far from positive and my experience with western government aid in the ME and Asia isn't a whole lot better. YMMV.

While there is some merit to your suggestion that a lack of such involvement from the west will have an adverse effect on the Afghans, I believe "a long way" is an overstatement of some magnitude. NATO armed forces will pick up the effort as they really pretty much already have.

NGO and Western gov help has not been utterly fruitless - it has already vastly expanded the Afghan central government's ability to provide services to the Afghan people...

True -- and most of that support has been from various armed forces.

...The only way to build a sense of nationhood and loyalty towards a central government is to establish a national infrastructure and a government which can actually provide security, law, and services instead of another layer of predatory authority. Without Western capital and technical assistance, there is no way that the Afghan central government can do this on its own especially in a neighborhood with fierce competitors like Iran, Pakistan, and India.

It will still take at least a couple of generations; the capital is far, far more important than is the governmental 'assistance' but the west is wedded to building dependency in return for that assistance (the socialist mantra of 'we know what is best for you' is alive and well...) -- I don't think the Afghans will play that game, they're a lot more independent than are Arabs...

Of course the Afghans will have to do most of the work and the whole point of Rubin's post which I endorsed is that Western governments must be willing to surrender much of the responsibility and power to the Afghans in terms of the reconstruction effort. But without the capital and security umbrella provided by the West, a truly independent Afghanistan will be strangled in its cradle.

We can agree on all that while disagreeing, apparently on the provision of capital (by whom and with what strings) or that the NGO will have much effect one way or another -- and we can agree they need the security assistance for a while longer.

[Stan]

Roots of Peace Builds School on Former Afghan Battlefield.

The U.S. Department of State salutes Roots of Peace, a non-governmental organization that turns minefields into productive farmland, for building a new school on a former battlefield near the Bagram air base in Afghanistan. The project was funded by 1 million pennies ($10,000) raised by American students through the "Roots of Peace Penny Campaign"

The school originally consisted of a few tents serving just 50 pupils after fighting between the Taliban and Northern Alliance destroyed the original building. Today, a new, sturdy 10-room school, certified by Afghanistan's Ministry of Education, accommodates over 260 boys and girls. Prior to construction, landmines and explosive remnants of war were cleared by The HALO Trust

More at the links...

[davidbfpo]

THis article appeared in The Spectator (UK) last week, by Adam Holloway and is to the say the least challenging, notably for the UK: http://www.spectator.co.uk/the-magaz...-taleban.thtml

Oddly the article does not say who Adam Holloway is, but a quick Google strongly suggests he is a Conservative MP, who has recently visited Helmand Province and there is a shorter piece on his website: http://www.adamholloway.co.uk/Afgan.htm

davidbfpo

[Jedburgh]

RAND, 9 Jun 08: Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan

This book examines counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan following the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001. It is based on repeated trips to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India in 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008. It focuses on the early stages of the insurgency—from 2002 until 2008—and examines why and how the insurgency began. It also draws lessons from the broader literature on counterinsurgency warfare and provides recommendations to help the United States develop capabilities and improve performance in future counterinsurgency operations. The focus of this research is on the U.S. military. However, since the actions of other U.S. government agencies, countries, international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are obviously important, they are discussed where appropriate. The results should be of interest to a broad audience of policymakers and academics concerned with counterinsurgency and the related issues of state-building, nation-building, and stability operations.....

NPR interview (audio) with the author of the study

[davidbfpo]

Found via another thread a Canadian think tank's publication, which has sveral articles on Afghanistan, on a quick read worth a look, especially the book review by a lady living in Kandahar: http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/1153.pdf

davidbfpo