What will our expedition to Afghanistan teach us?

[Bob's World]

David,

I would add a few points a bit more fundamental and strategic in nature:

1. The form of legitimacy necessery for natural stability cannot be created or bestowed by foreign power, but rather must be bestowed by culturally accepted ways across the populace.

2. To maximize foreign influence one must first minimize foreign control.

3. Winning is not preserving some government in power or destroying some threat to the same. Winning is when the % of the population who perceive themselves as stakeholders in the solution of governance grows.

[jcustis]

In most ways, I suspect we actually won't learn much from the Afghanistan experience. We have no real strategy now, so there will be no way to assess any lessons learned from that; our metrics are all tactical in nature, so all of our lessons learned are about how to optimize those metrics, while at the same time slipping farther and farther behind in regards to the larger strategic picture.

And this is the reason why someone needs to continue the sincere, transparent assessment, across the tactical to strategic.

Chandresekaran has laid the first stone on the path.

[Dayuhan]

Winning is not preserving some government in power or destroying some threat to the same. Winning is when the % of the population who perceive themselves as stakeholders in the solution of governance grows.

With this I must disagree. Winning is achieving the goals you set out to achieve. Period, end of story. The percentage of Afghans who perceive themselves as stakeholders in the solution of governance doesn't have to be our problem or our business, and inherently is not our problem or our business.

I think Jon had it right from the start:

1) The national policy goals should be clear and concise, and the integrated plan to achieve them must be properly resourced. Make sure everyone understands the goals and the plan.

Winning is achieving your goals, and the first step toward winning is to start with a clear, practical, and limited set of goals. A second step would be to stick with those goals and not go looking for new ones.

As far as lessons go, I think Jon had the first one right. Keep the goals clear, practical, and limited, and make sure everybody involved knows what they are and how they are to be achieved.

Lesson 2, for me, can be summarized as "know when to go". There is nothing to gain by getting bogged down in occupation and nation-building. When you occupy you become a static target that invites insurgency. When you embrace the chimera of "nation-building" you inevitably end up harnessed to a government that cannot stand, but that you cannot allow to fall. It doesn't work. It's not necessary. Better to leave while you're still scary, while you still have the initiative, before anybody can claim to have chased you out. That might not have been best for Afghanistan, but "fixing" Afghanistan was never our problem. Convincing whoever ends up running the place that provoking us is a bad idea was our problem.

If we're ever in an analogous situation again, I hope we can compel ourselves to go there with clear, practical, limited goals. I hope we can achieve those goals and leave. Faint hope, I know, but we all have dreams.

[jcustis]

You're touching on something that gets stuck in my craw consistently these days.

The notion that we must stay the course with disaster, so that allies believe we will follow through on a commitment/promise/partnership, tends to blind us to the truth that the disaster is overwhelming us.

That may have worked with Cold War containment strategies, but I do not believe it is valid for the small wars we have faced recently. Time to set that model aside.

[Dayuhan]

The notion that we must stay the course with disaster, so that allies believe we will follow through on a commitment/promise/partnership, tends to blind us to the truth that the disaster is overwhelming us.

I think before we talk about staying the course we have to talk about defining the course, and that brings us back to the goals. I have no objection to "staying the course" if the course is defined by a set of clear, practical, and limited objectives. If "the course" is defined as transforming Afghanistan into a western-style market economy democracy, we shouldn't even be starting on it, let alone staying on it... IMO of course.

[Bob's World]

As I stated in an earlier post, "punitive expeditions work."

But even if that achieves ones narrowly tailored goal of punishing for past acts and deterring future ones, that is not "winning."

The win I describe is not for the interloper, it is for those they would interlope upon. Not our job to create or even fund such a victory - but is good to understand what a true victory is.

[Dayuhan]

But even if that achieves ones narrowly tailored goal of punishing for past acts and deterring future ones, that is not "winning."

It is for us, and that's what we need to worry about.

The win I describe is not for the interloper, it is for those they would interlope upon. Not our job to create or even fund such a victory - but is good to understand what a true victory is.

Neither you nor I nor any combination of Americans can determine what "winning" is for anyone else. Like us, they "win" when they achieve their goals, and their goals are something they have to define. We can't do it for them. If we're talking about Afghans (or many others), the chances are that some of them will have goals that are not compatible with the goals of others. Those discrepancies are something they will have to sort out in their own way. That may or may not involve violence; either way it is not our business unless they ask us to mediate (fat chance) and we think it's in our interest to do so.

We need to focus on what we need to achieve, not what we want to achieve, and on ways to achieve those needs that are consistent with the time and resources we are willing to apply. Trying to define other people's goals is just going to create more trouble, and it's not going to make us any friends.

[Bill Moore]

As I stated in an earlier post, "punitive expeditions work."

But even if that achieves ones narrowly tailored goal of punishing for past acts and deterring future ones, that is not "winning."

The win I describe is not for the interloper, it is for those they would interlope upon. Not our job to create or even fund such a victory - but is good to understand what a true victory is.

Gradually we're returning to the Powell Doctrine, which was a doctrine born out history and non-emotional examination of our past adventures where we attempted to impose our way of life on others through various forms of coercion. The Powell Doctrine was intended scope expectations of policy makers, but unfortunately arrogance triumphed over reasoned decision making where we recognized our limitations.

COINistas like Nagl who are partly responsible for the U.S. wasting billions of dollars on these unreasonable expeditions without end continue to push for the implementation of failed approach and are apparently incapable of learning from our reason expeditions. Funny and sad in the same way because this is what Nagl accused the military of during Vietnam. Maybe the next best seller that influences military doctrine will be "Eating Soup with a Spoon."

The lessons I believe we need to take to heart are:

- Punitive operations work, even if their effects are transitory. They are often the best option unless it is feasible (not simply desirable) to address underlying issues.

- Before heading off to occupy a country and transform a foreign culture more to our liking we must do a cost benefits analysis. Transforming societies in small pockets like Iraq and Afghanistan does not address existential threats to our nation, in fact these expensive (financially and morally) expeditions distract us from what is important, and divert resources from the important to the unimportant.

- In rare cases where we need to oust an existing government and then occupy and transition to a new government we need to gain much better understanding of what is desirable and workable by the population instead of blindly barging in with an American vision of their future. Nations will evolve at their own rate when "they" are allowed to evolve.

Let's face if a nation like America existed before our own Revolution they would have been highly critical of our slow political development when it came to human rights (slavery), the right for women to vote, discrimination, etc. It takes both political space and time to evolve, and while you can impose with bayonets and leveraging financial tools, what you impose won't last.

[jcustis]

Maybe the next best seller that influences military doctrine will be "Eating Soup with a Spoon."

Post of the year Bill...post of the year!

As for the cost-benefit analysis, the problem we seem to have stems from the limited scope of people conducting the analysis.

When it is accomplished by people you brought into your administration, and doesn't have the sense to cast the net of assessment far enough, it's screwed from the beginning. I think it's double screwed if those people have never carried a weapon before in the service of their nation, because that tends to balance out the booksmart theory, in my opinion.

[AmericanPride]

1. The form of legitimacy necessery for natural stability cannot be created or bestowed by foreign power, but rather must be bestowed by culturally accepted ways across the populace.

I think this lesson is conditional and unique to specific circumstances. What is "natural stability"? History is replete with examples of military occupations imposing culturally unacceptable systems of power without any kind of legitimacy (legal, political, cultural, or other); some episodes with less conflict than others. The Soviet Union managed to do so in a dozen countries at the end of World War II with limited resistance - why did partisans fight the Nazis but not the Soviets? Why are there no partisans in North Korea? I doubt it has to do with legitimacy. Ultimately, power (re: coercion), not legitimacy, determines outcomes in environments with little or not political constraints. The problem we have in Afghanistan is not that the US, West, or Karzai administration is illegitimate but that their opponents have the power to resist (that in turn fuels perceptions of illegtimacy). The basic power of the state is its monopoly on violence, which obviously is in serious contention by vying political factions. So we have run into the basic problem that we have neither destroyed the enemy's will or capabilities, while watching our own will erode, and thus the basis of state legitimacy - the monopoly on violence - remains in contention.

Legitimacy as you seem to articulate it is relevant in framed political environments in which cultural and legal norms establish acceptable ends, ways, and means for action. This is where the political object constrains the military act (i.e. rules of engagement), even if not always perfectly rational, it in some way seeks to mitigate the problems you cite with legitimacy. But at the end of the day, the only thing that matters is mission achievement (addressed later in this post); how missions are selected, executed, and relate to one another and broader policy is another issue altogether.

2. To maximize foreign influence one must first minimize foreign control.

I don't think this is a lesson that can be extracted from the experience of Afghanistan -- at least not to the extent that it can be used as a hard and fast rule for future conflicts. In one sense you are correct -- committing to one course of action, in this case military intervention comes at the cost of all the other actions that could have been taken at that moment. Is influence any more desirable than control? Since ultimately we are more concerned with the ends than the means then the answer is "it depends". For Afghanistan specifically, I would argue that mission achievement cannot be attained without foreign control; the central Afghan government is virtually powerless without either support from abroad or from the regional political factions of the country. This is probably the central lesson about Afghanistan specifically. And if our interest is in imposing globalized political norms and reducing freedom of action of terrorist organization, then we must to some degree do it ourselves.

3. Winning is not preserving some government in power or destroying some threat to the same. Winning is when the % of the population who perceive themselves as stakeholders in the solution of governance grows.

"Winning" is achieving our established objectives, however defined. But this occurs on multiple levels - the selection of poor tactical objectives can lead to tactical victories and operational failures, and so on up the chain to the national level. At the end of the day, when it comes down to measuring competing interests, everyone else and everything else is expendable.

[Bob's World]

We'll just have to disagree.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I think this lesson is conditional and unique to specific circumstances. What is "natural stability"? History is replete with examples of military occupations imposing culturally unacceptable systems of power without any kind of legitimacy (legal, political, cultural, or other); some episodes with less conflict than others. The Soviet Union managed to do so in a dozen countries at the end of World War II with limited resistance - why did partisans fight the Nazis but not the Soviets? Why are there no partisans in North Korea? I doubt it has to do with legitimacy.

I am going to respectfully disagree with you. Even thought you state that human nature is conditional, you seem to think that legitimacy is unconditionally monolithic. It is not. Leadership at any level, with or without a political entity, can be viewed as legitimate or illegitimate, by the population it attempts to sway. The concept of legitimacy is ubiquitous - it is not restricted to the realm of politics. A religious leader can be seen as legitimate; a professor can be seen as a legitimate authority, the actions of a judge can be seen as legitimate if she follows the proper procedure. Political legitimacy is only a small part of what legitimacy is. Legitimacy is adherence to the values of the population.

I am pretty sure that most North Korean's see Kim as the legitimate leader in the same way as most surfs saw their King as the legitimate leader. His legitimacy is based in a different set of values, values tied to in-group survival similar to those of any clan or tribal group. Do you think the people of Kenya really wanted a War Criminal as their president over other, more liberal leaders, or do you think that the Uhuru Kenyatta's methods of suppressing outsiders fit more with the population's views on how different groups should be treated. Don't think it is all that unusual. George Wallace was elected governor on a segregationist platform in a first world country. in-group/out-group dynamics are very powerful under the right conditions.

Ultimately, power (re: coercion), not legitimacy, determines outcomes in environments with little or not political constraints. The problem we have in Afghanistan is not that the US, West, or Karzai administration is illegitimate but that their opponents have the power to resist (that in turn fuels perceptions of illegtimacy).

Not true. It is this misunderstanding that has caused us to believe that legitimacy can be imposed. Control can be imposed on the people - Legitimacy is granted by the people.

The basic power of the state is its monopoly on violence, which obviously is in serious contention by vying political factions. So we have run into the basic problem that we have neither destroyed the enemy's will or capabilities, while watching our own will erode, and thus the basis of state legitimacy - the monopoly on violence - remains in contention.

Again, I disagree. The monopoly on violence is a benefit of legitimacy. Violence can be legitimate, as when a police officer uses necessary force to apprehend a murder and the state, after all proper procedures are followed, execute that murderer. The people see that act as legitimate. The original act of the murder is not seen as legitimate. The murder can intimidate the population into refusing to testify, but that does not make the act legitimate (or make him the legitimate authority in the community, although it may make him the unopposed power in the community).

Likewise, when a political entity continually acts in a manner that part of the population views as illegitimate that part of the population may no longer feel compelled to obey the political entity and may take up arms to enforce what it sees as legitimate authority - as in the case of religious fighters taking up arms to defend a religious state against a secular invader. In their minds they are committing no crime - they are not acting illegitimately. They are acting as a legitimate authority should act. You can suppress this urge with force or bribery, but it is still there, just below the surface.

Think of legitimacy as a weak force, like gravity. It is always there, but it can be overcome by a stronger force, like the lift produced by the wings of an airplane. Think of coercion as the lift. With enough propulsion the plane can ascend into the air but it requires constant thrust to maintain speed and overcome gravity. If that thrust is lost gravity will pull it back to the ground. Coercion can overcome legitimacy, but it requires a constant effort to continually suppress it.

Legitimacy as you seem to articulate it is relevant in framed political environments in which cultural and legal norms establish acceptable ends, ways, and means for action. This is where the political object constrains the military act (i.e. rules of engagement), even if not always perfectly rational, it in some way seeks to mitigate the problems you cite with legitimacy. But at the end of the day, the only thing that matters is mission achievement (addressed later in this post); how missions are selected, executed, and relate to one another and broader policy is another issue altogether.

The problem in Afghanistan and Iraq is that mission objectives were tied to political results. The mission was not complete when we took control of the country. The mission was complete when we created a democratic state. Our mistake was to define a military objective in terms of a political result. I don't think that is a mistake that we can avoid. If one assumes that war is the extension of policy, and our policy is to spread democracy, then it is a mistake we are bound to continue to make.

[AmericanPride]

The problem in Afghanistan and Iraq is that mission objectives were tied to political results. The mission was not complete when we took control of the country. The mission was complete when we created a democratic state. Our mistake was to define a military objective in terms of a political result. I don't think that is a mistake that we can avoid. If one assumes that war is the extension of policy, and our policy is to spread democracy, then it is a mistake we are bound to continue to make.

I partially agree. I agree that specifically it was a mistake top define "our policy... to spread democracy" insofar there are numerous conditional variables which make such an ambitious project mostly unreachable and it's questionable whether it is in our material interest to do so. However I disagree that it is a mistake to "define a military objective in terms of a political result." Ultimately, the desired "political results" should determine the shape of the military operations, even if not perfectly rationalized or connected, and the military objectives must eventually produce favorable political results to be justified. Now of course there any number of reasons why the selection or execution of political and military objectives may not pan out in the desired way.

As for the discussion on legitimacy, I think we are speaking past one another to some extent. I think that legitimacy is conditional and thus not always relevant (this depends on the selection of the desired political results and the chosen military objectives). My point is that I do not think legitimacy is a fundamental component of our problems in Afghanistan -- it's a second-order effect from our desired political results and selected military objectives. Legitimacy is conditionallly based upon the frame we have constructed around the conflict and our approach to it. This plays out on multiple levels (faction infighting, media satuation, cultural norms, etc); and its importance is not because it is inherently valuable but because these things have been made important by actors with the ability to make them important. What x% of the population thinks is legitimate vis-a-vis military operations in Afghanistan is not inherently relevant to our conduct and our performance unless; there must be a material consequence for their views one way or another and to the extent that it affects our performance.

EDIT: Political actors can act with or without legitimacy, however defined. The monopoly of violence originates from an asymmetric material advantage in capabilities and organization over potential competitors. Legitimacy is not necessary for it to exist or to function. The apperance of legitimacy can emerge under any circumstance; it can be as much a function of support as well as of hopelessness. When that monopoly fails, it invites contention -- weakness begets weakness.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I partially agree. I agree that specifically it was a mistake top define "our policy... to spread democracy" insofar there are numerous conditional variables which make such an ambitious project mostly unreachable and it's questionable whether it is in our material interest to do so. However I disagree that it is a mistake to "define a military objective in terms of a political result." Ultimately, the desired "political results" should determine the shape of the military operations, even if not perfectly rationalized or connected, and the military objectives must eventually produce favorable political results to be justified.

I agree with you that the military objectives must produce the conditions favorable for the political result, but military objectives can only go so far to do that. The Army is fantastic at defeating any other comperable ground force. Less good at acting as a occupying force. Horrible as acting as a police force, particularly with the language and cultural barriers. And woefully unprepared to act as a democratic civilian governing agency. Unfortunately, that is what they have been asked to do, with some notible successes. Force only gets you so close to a political objective like a stable, democratic Afghanistan.

As for the discussion on legitimacy, I think we are speaking past one another to some extent. I think that legitimacy is conditional and thus not always relevant (this depends on the selection of the desired political results and the chosen military objectives)..

I agree. For most of history legitimacy on the level I am refering to rarely mattered. A king replaced another king, and the local lord was either killed or he pledged allegance to the new king. In this case there is no question of legitimacy. But when you are replacing traditional legitimacy with democratic legitimacy it is a different story. This has really only become an issue in the last hundred years or so.

My point is that I do not think legitimacy is a fundamental component of our problems in Afghanistan .

Here I disagree. If the political objective is a stable, democratic Afghanistan, legitimacy is the only issue. It does not matter how many Taliban you kill, or how many roads you build, or schools, or hospitals -- if the people still want an autocratic state built on patron-client (warloard) relationships, then you have failed.

And if you are simply replacing one coercive power with a more effective coercive power, you have still failed, even if you are the undisputed power in the country. That is not democracy, that is a military state.

[AmericanPride]

Here I disagree. If the political objective is a stable, democratic Afghanistan, legitimacy is the only issue. It does not matter how many Taliban you kill, or how many roads you build, or schools, or hospitals -- if the people still want an autocratic state built on patron-client (warloard) relationships, then you have failed.

And if you are simply replacing one coercive power with a more effective coercive power, you have still failed, even if you are the undisputed power in the country. That is not democracy, that is a military state.

So, we have two questions: (1) is "the political objective a stable, democratic Afghanistan" and (2) if so, is "legitimacy the only issue" (emphasis added)?

The first question has a number of related questions: is it the only objective? Is it the most important objective? Does it contradict other objectives?

In 2003, the objectives in Afghanistan were stated as the following:

1.Eliminate the Al Qaeda network in Afghanistan.
2.Convince or compel the Afghan Taliban to end its support for Al Qaeda.
3.Demonstrate that the United States is not at war with the Afghan people or Islam.
4.Demonstrate U. S. resolve in the war on terrorism.
5.Build international support for the war in Afghanistan.
6.Stabilize Afghanistan following the fighting.

None of these explicitly mention democratic government. Of course, there is significant domestic and international pressure for democratization through politics, think tanks, media, legal systems, and political expectations and norms. The narrative that eventually emerged could be summed up in the democratic peace theory: democracies don't war with one another, therefore, if Afghanistan was a democracy, it would not sponsor terrorism against the United States. A component of this argument included the line of thought that freedom would diminish radicalization.

What does this have to do with legitimacy? And what kind of legitimacy is necessary? In entering Afghanistan, the US had legal, political, and moral legitimacy, at least according to the norms of the globalized West, in retailation for terrorist attacks on its soil. And if the principles behind the maxims of "you break it, you own it" and "to the victor goes the spoils" is not any US action "legitimate" in some regard? My point is that defining legitimacy is nebulous, and achieving it is impossible; nor do I think from any material perspective, does it enable, justify, or complete the exercise of power. It's certainly a component of politics because legitimacy becomes an aspect of influence in the absence of power (e.g. one's inability to compel another to do one's will).

This is especially more difficult in the context of conflict, given that trust is notably absent and that numerous actors have sufficient power to act independently; why would anyone obey if they didn't have to? So what comes first, power or legitimacy?

State cohesion relies on coercive power (military capabilities, law enforcement, etc) to compel citizens and/or subjects to comply with desired practices; this is true regardless of the type of government in place. Even citizen participation in government (i.e. democracy) can also be compelled, and this is true for countries with weak and strong democratic institutions. This is the case because power is ultimately expressed materially.

There is no inherent contradiction between achieving all of the objectives highlighted above in addition to having a "democratic" Afghanistan, while simultaeneously not having "legitimacy".

[TheCurmudgeon]

So, we have two questions: (1) is "the political objective a stable, democratic Afghanistan" and (2) if so, is "legitimacy the only issue" (emphasis added)?".

I agree with your questions. I also agree with the first part of your argument in regards to the original objectives as well as your basic arguments regarding why, from a foriegn policy perspective, the US would be interested in exporting democracy (the democratic peace theory). Where you and I fundamentally disagree is what you might call a "the Chicken and the Egg" argument, and I would call an "Apples and Oranges" argument.

This is especially more difficult in the context of conflict, given that trust is notably absent and that numerous actors have sufficient power to act independently; why would anyone obey if they didn't have to? So what comes first, power or legitimacy?

Your Chicken and Egg argument: which comes first power or legitimacy. You say power, with legitimacy following at some later date as the population comes to accept their submissive roles.

State cohesion relies on coercive power (military capabilities, law enforcement, etc) to compel citizens and/or subjects to comply with desired practices; this is true regardless of the type of government in place.

I would argue that these are apples and oranges. Coercion and Legitimacy are two completely separate things: one is not derived from the other.

Coercion, which I would define as including both force and bribery, is based on an external pressure. Legitimacy, founded in the values a person holds true, is in internal motivator. The external pressure of fear (force) or the desire for goodies (bribery) can overcome what a person holds as right and true, but it does not change what they believe it right and true. It can only suppress it.

The use of force and coercion are not the same thing. The use of force by any entity can be either coercive or legitimate depending on how the population percieve the act. You and I disagree on this fundimental point as well.

There is no inherent contradiction between achieving all of the objectives highlighted above in addition to having a "democratic" Afghanistan, while simultaneously not having "legitimacy".

Here I think you are confusing the US military's legitimacy to act, the Karzai government's legitimacy to rule the country, and the distinction between systematic political legitimacy at the national level. I am referring to systematic legitimacy - what is the source of political entities legitimacy. In a theocracy it is God; Monarchy is the King (usually via a grant from God); Democracy it is the individual citizen (We the People,...). You would argue that if we could just gain total control of the country we could impose the type of systematic legitimacy we desire (When you've got them by the balls, their hearts and minds will follow). I believe that our experiences in both Iraq and Afghanistan prove that this is not possible.

As long as we maintain pressure and offer material support the Afghan government will maintain the illusion of democracy. Once that pressure is gone it will return to what others have called "natural stability" - a homeostasis where the legitimacy the people prefer and the legitimacy of the government will more closely align.

As for how we moved from stability to democracy, I will refer you to an article from the Military Review, Policy, COIN Doctrine, and Political Legitimacy , for a more complete description of that process.

I don't believe that you and I are going to agree, but we don't have to.