Iran, Nukes, Diplomacy and other options (catch all thread 2007-2010)

[Sean Osborne]

The 3000 centerfuge cascade, working properly with no downtime, would at best create enough HEU in one year for ONE nuclear warhead.

Given the nature of the Shi'a Twelver regime in Iran, that's one nuclear weapon too many for a regime which has declared its intent to wipe another sovereign state off of the face of the earth.

Nevertheless, I don't know of any credible experts who claim that Iran has anything other than ancient centerfuges which might be able to generate enough HEU in 18 months to produce one nuclear warhead - and that's a big "if".

Graham Allison had a good article in the YaleGlobal back in June 2006.

He wrote:

The dog that hasn’t barked is Iran’s covert programs for acquiring nuclear weapons. Four huge “known unknowns” lie at the heart of judgments about the threat posed by Iran.

But on the specifics about Iranian centrifuges Allison wrote:

...the father of the Pakistani nuclear program, Dr. A.Q. Khan, sold Iran advanced P2 centrifuge designs that are still unaccounted for.

[bourbon]

Given the nature of the Shi'a Twelver regime in Iran, that's one nuclear weapon too many for a regime which has declared its intent to wipe another sovereign state off of the face of the earth.

What is the expression "to wipe [something] off the map” in Persian? I have been told that they do not even have such an idiom. There are some SWC members with significant Iran experience, hopefully they can help here.

Where in the history this “Shi'a Twelver regime in Iran” have they acted not in their interest, and acted irrationally? I am not speaking of rhetoric, but of behavior.

[Sean Osborne]

What is the expression "to wipe [something] off the map” in Persian? I have been told that they do not even have such an idiom. There are some SWC members with significant Iran experience, hopefully they can help here.

Okay, would the Farsi translation of the following suffice instead?

"They are angry with our nation. But we tell them 'so be it and die from this anger'. Rest assured that if you do not respond to the divine call, you will die soon and vanish from the face of the earth," he said.

Where in the history this “Shi'a Twelver regime in Iran” have they acted not in their interest, and acted irrationally? I am not speaking of rhetoric, but of behavior.

US Embassy, Tehran. USMC Barracks and US Embassy, Beirut, Lebanon. Khobar Towers, Dahran, Saudi Arabia. Or how about the cross-border crap the Qods Force of the IRGC has executed in iraq against US and British troops? There are other examples of irrational Shi'a Twelver behaior, but this will suffice for now.

[Rex Brynen]

US Embassy, Tehran. USMC Barracks and US Embassy, Beirut, Lebanon. Khobar Towers, Dahran, Saudi Arabia. Or how about the cross-border crap the Qods Force of the IRGC has executed in iraq against US and British troops? There are other examples of irrational Shi'a Twelver behaior, but this will suffice for now.

I'm not sure I would put many, if any, of those in the "irrational" column. Certainly no more irrational that the "topple Saddam Hussein's regime with grandiose ideas of establishing a stable, pro-Western free-market democratic ally in its place" (accompanied by "shift focus away from Afghanistan," "dissolve the Iraqi army," and "initially propose a bizarre system of Iraqi caucuses instead of elections"). Indeed, when in Tehran during the summer I was struck by how often I was asked to explain "irrational" American policy, which many interlocutors seem to have understood as reflecting a mix of Bush's personal views, Israeli influence, a cabal of neocon advisors, and Christian fundamentalism.

One of the most interesting thrusts of the declassified judgements of the NIE is the assessment that Tehran generally does weigh cost and benefit, and thereby acts in a strategic manner. Establishing a potential weapons capability, without actual weaponization, may well be quite rational from their perspective, given both perceived threats and the neighbourhood they live in.

[Jedburgh]

LA Times, 9 Dec 07: CIA Has Recruited Iranians to Defect

The CIA launched a secret program in 2005 designed to degrade Iran's nuclear weapons program by persuading key officials to defect, an effort that has prompted a "handful" of significant departures, current and former U.S. intelligence officials familiar with the operation say.....

.....Intelligence gathered as part of that campaign provided much of the basis for a U.S. report released last week that concluded the Islamic Republic had halted its nuclear weapons work in 2003. Officials declined to say how much of that intelligence could be attributed to the CIA program to recruit defectors.

Although the CIA effort on defections has been aimed in part at gaining information about Tehran's nuclear capabilities, its goal has been to undermine Iran's emerging capabilities by plucking key scientists, military officers and other personnel from its nuclear roster......

.....The program has had limited success. Officials said that fewer than six well-placed Iranians have defected, and that none has been in a position to provide comprehensive information on Tehran's nuclear program.....

[Sean Osborne]

LA Times, 9 Dec 07: CIA Has Recruited Iranians to Defect

.....The program has had limited success. Officials said that fewer than six well-placed Iranians have defected, and that none has been in a position to provide comprehensive information on Tehran's nuclear program.....

Dang... there goes my coveted HUMINT. POOF!

[Jedburgh]

As has been noted by others, this thread began to go in circles while taking a nosedive a little while ago. In an attempt to clean things up, I've removed the last few posts and changed it up. None of the deletions are targeted at the posters invidiually - just trying to get this rebooted in a more substantive manner.

This is an important subject, but I will lock the thread if it goes off-kilter or becomes stridently partisan.

Thanks

[Galrahn]

I'm not an expert on negotiations, but I've been largely unimpressed with the US approach of unconditional terms with Iran. It seems counter intuitive to me that the US should expect any results other than failure with the “unconditional terms” approach.

I'd negotiate with Iran, and bring to the table every issue, even the most complicated or controversial. I'd also put the media microphone in front of the Iranian negotiators every day for as long as I could in the process. My observation on Iran is their government has a very difficult time articulating their message in person without advertising an obvious disconnect with the west that is very difficult to conceal in media spin. The thing about Iran’s message is, their talking points work for either an audience in the Middle East or the West, but almost never does the same hard line message work for both audiences at the same time.

The region in general is less open to the hardliner message than in the past, too many economic interests counter to the hard line old school message Iran touts, so I'd let them talk. Their rhetoric adds little to their position in the region today, how would it be any different at the negotiating table.

The examples are the UN over the last few years (which largely goes uncovered by the media), but an even better example was Columbia University earlier this year. I get the impression that negotiations and plenty of public attention would strengthen the west’s position more than it would hurt it, because while Iran's message is appealing to hard liners, the hard line message is losing its steam regionally among the major players.

If it really is about talking, then let Iran speak. They really aren't very good at talking when they have to improvise, they are only good at it when they can package the message. That is my observation anyway.

[bourbon]

Post

Very well said.

Agree 100% about the Columbia University event. That worked out very bad for Iran. The only people who came away looking more of a buffoon then Ahmadinejad, were Bollinger and the people who complained so much about having him speak. Ahmadinejad came off more like a clown then a pariah, and I imagine his performance and how he was essentially laughed at in the west hurt his domestic standing.

PS: The "I-Ran" song parody about Ahmadinejad in NYC this fall was probably the best sketch Saturday Night Live has done in a few years.

[Rex Brynen]

Agree 100% about the Columbia University event. That worked out very bad for Iran. The only people who came away looking more of a buffoon then Ahmadinejad, were Bollinger and the people who complained so much about having him speak. Ahmadinejad came off more like a clown then a pariah, and I imagine his performance and how he was essentially laughed at in the west hurt his domestic standing.

I heard the opposite from many Iranians (including opponents of Ahmadinejad)--the open hostility of Bollinger was seen as so rude and contrary to the norms of hospitality that it overshadowed the content of Ahmadinejad's speech. As a result, he came off (remarkably!) looking like the statesman to domestic mass audiences...

While many in the Iranian foreign policy elite cringe at the President's antics and declarations, don't underestimate the way it plays with both hardliners and his broader voter base, among whom tweaking the US can score domestic points.

[JeffWolf]

Hi,



1) It's unclear to me whether the drafters of the NIE had any political motivation one way or the other. I can think of many, all plausible, but in the absence of additional information, it seems to me impossible to infer the drafters' intentions from the finished product. Additionally, people might not be angels, but they also often take pride in their work and their identity as "professionals." Maybe this betrays incredible naivete, but it does not seem beyond the realm of the possible that the drafters assessed the best available evidence, and made their conclusions accordingly. I recognize this may well not be the case, but I do think, as with all these hypotheses, it is probably difficult to rebut absent additional information.

2) I think the NIE does a reasonably good of acknowledging it is assessing issues that are uncertain - that is, cannot be quantified with any degree of precision. Moreover, I think the NIE does a reasonably good job of acknowledging, and trying to overcome, the difficulty of trying to convey that uncertainty via inevitably imprecise language. I think Sherman Kent once wanted percentages placed on intelligence estimates. I'm not sure about the practicality of that, but again, I think the scope conditions at the beginning of the NIE move in that direction.

3) Because of 2) I think to a certain extent, it is probably not particularly useful to parse particular word choices too much, and even less useful to do so without reference back to the scope conditions outlined at the beginning of the documents.

4) To use the same reasoning as to 1), I'd be wary of inferring a state's motives from its actions, just as I'd be wary of inferring drafters' intentions from the final product. Aggregates can produce different outcomes than individuals simply acting together. (Put more simply, the sum can be different than the whole of the parts.) A state's motives may not be transparent. Moreover, "states" consist of suborganizations, and their interplay (e.g., bargaining, conflict) may result in actions neither suborganization (or only just one suborganization) intended. (See Graham Allison, Essence of Decision, for the classic cite on this.) To me, it's actually easier to find a rational explanation for every state's behavior, than it is to determine every (or any) action taken by a state is "irrational." And I can think of lots of rational reasons why people within a state, rather than the state per se - say, Ahmadinejab - might display given behavior. And finally, my suspicion is that since I know little about Iran or Ahmadinejab, and have never been Ahmadinejam, most of those rational reasons would probably be wrong.

My $.02.

Regards
Jeff

[Galrahn]

While many in the Iranian foreign policy elite cringe at the President's antics and declarations, don't underestimate the way it plays with both hardliners and his broader voter base, among whom tweaking the US can score domestic points.

I agree. In negotiation this is part of the give though. I'm not sure I believe this hurts those in opposition though. I do not see building domestic support for the civilian nuclear program within Iran as zero sum against a coalition opposition to a nuclear weapons program, because to sell domestic support for peaceful civilian nuclear eneergy, Iran is selling the absence of a nuclear weapons program.

That makes any future IAEA discovery of a weapons program in Iran a silver bullet for both internal and external supporters and critics. Too bad the track record for uncovering silver bullets is checkered, at best.

Iran has played their cards very smart. They have in effect been mostly legal in their process, which will allow them to achieve nuclear energy without a nuclear weapons program even under sanctions, and leave them in a position where a nuclear weapons program would only require a few months to convert into should they so desire in the future.

[Stan]

Iran has played their cards very smart. They have in effect been mostly legal in their process, which will allow them to achieve nuclear energy without a nuclear weapons program even under sanctions, and leave them in a position where a nuclear weapons program would only require a few months to convert into should they so desire in the future.

Hey Galrahn !
How exactly will they achieve a weapons program in only a few months when the site and Russian-provided fuel are estimated as 'in-place and ready' in 2009?

Regards, Stan

[Steve Blair]

Stan,

I think he means "a few months" from when the reactor is completed...but I could be mistaken (happens all the time).

[Galrahn]

Hey Galrahn !
How exactly will they achieve a weapons program in only a few months when the site and Russian-provided fuel are estimated as 'in-place and ready' in 2009?

Regards, Stan

I'm sorry, was written a bit confusing. I'm not talking a few months from now; I'm talking about a few months from a point in the future when they have their civilian nuclear program up and running.

Probably about 5-8 years from now, but what I was thinking when I wrote it is basically Iran putting them in the same position nations like Japan and Brazil are in today, except Iran is much further along on some of the missile side aspects of nuclear tech than say a nation like Brazil.