Son Tay raid: stop or go? Vietnam

[jcustis]

The decision to proceed with the Son Tay raid despite confirmation that the camp was empty was gross incompetence.

You contiinue to post in this thread, over and over, that there was confirmation the prisoners were moved.

A single source report from a HUMINT asset is not confirmation of anything, yet you continue to toss your hand in with the conspiracy theorist lot who believe that report sealed the deal.

Do you understand that your argument hinges on that weakness right now?

[JMA]

You contiinue to post in this thread, over and over, that there was confirmation the prisoners were moved.

A single source report from a HUMINT asset is not confirmation of anything, yet you continue to toss your hand in with the conspiracy theorist lot who believe that report sealed the deal.

Do you understand that your argument hinges on that weakness right now?

I nearly missed this.

Major, let me help you with a simple timeline:

* Air photography in May 1970 identified the presence of US POWs in Son Tay on the following basis:

At Son Tay, 23 miles from Hanoi, one photograph identified a large "K" - a code for "come get us" - drawn in the dirt.

* To study the feasibility of a raid, CJCS Wheeler authorized a 15-member planning group under the codename Polar Circle that convened on June 10. The study group, after a review of all available intelligence, concluded that Son Tay contained 61 POWs.

* July 14 POWs moved from Son Tay

* Finally, in late July 1970, a Joint Contingency Task Group was formed and the operation received the code name Ivory Coast. Moorer briefed Laird on Ivory Coast and Laird immediately approved formation, training, and support of the rescue group.

* 21 November 1970 the Raid on an 'empty' POW camp went ahead.

So what does that tell you?

It tells you that all of the 'stack' of evidence indicating that the POWs were at Son Tay they had dated after 14 July was nothing but dead wrong... or as they say in the classics, nothing but hot steaming horsesh*t.

Not only that, Adm Train is on record as follows:

In a 1993 book, Admiral Train admitted: “Twelve hours before the raid we had fairly high confidence that [Son Tay] was empty. The photography showed the grass had not been walked on in ten days. On the basis of the photographic evidence alone we knew that it was empty.”

(my emphasis)

So I suggest major instead of getting picky with me over the available intel why not question how the charade was able to continue after the camp emptied on 14 July up until the actual raid on 21 November.

Little wonder the following:

The intensity of the criticism, and leaks of information including reports of the operation, caused the Nixon Administration to reorganize both the military communications network and the government's intelligence apparatus.

I hope you are now able to see where the real weakness lies.