Page 15 of 47 FirstFirst ... 5131415161725 ... LastLast
Results 281 to 300 of 934

Thread: The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

  1. #281
    Council Member MattC86's Avatar
    Join Date
    Aug 2007
    Location
    REMFing it up in DC
    Posts
    250

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    Grant will likely always be my favorite US General. One of his greatest accomplishments that he receives little credit for is the strategy to target the will of the Southern populace as his main effort (to which he tasked Sherman in Georgia and the Carolinas; and ultimately Sheridan in the Shenandoah to execute), while he supervised Meade in the supporting, but critical effort of defeating Lee's Army and taking Richmond (in that order).

    He, IMO, was the first leader to not only understand that merely killing soldiers or capturing capitals was enough in wars between nations, as it had been in the West for generations in wars between Kingdoms.
    Pardon my interjection, but I was under the impression that this was not correct - Grant's initial attitude towards Sherman after the latter proposed the March to the Sea was one of trepidation; that Sherman should first destroy Johnston/Hood's army before heading on his swath of destruction, or even head for Mobile. Sherman gradually convinced Grant he could not only pull this off, but the objective Grant really wanted - destruction of the Confederate Army in the West - could be done by Gen. George Thomas' Army of the Cumberland at Chattanooga (as indeed happened).

    I was similarly under the impression that Grant saw the destruction of Confederate armies as his goal, but that he came to see what Sherman was doing as the flip side of the same coin - that grinding Confederate armies to powder reinforced the helplessness civilians felt in the path of Sherman, and vice versa.

    Aside from the torturous history lesson (my apologies if I am wrong), can I ask what is NOT Clausewitzian about Sherman's actions? Just as the Confederates targeted the Union will to continue, Sherman realized he had a golden opportunity to return the favor. His writing is littered with references to destroying the will of the enemy to resist. I feel like the calculated brutality this guy promotes is just another way of achieving victory in the competition of wills. . .he's being Clausewitzian without even realizing it.

    Not to mention Sherman's March didn't kill 8-10% or whatever of the population - it burned and stole but did not often rape and murder. That was the intent. Sherman was also not one for pitched battles of annihilation as Grant was. So I don't know where this guy is getting his ideas or his facts, but the whole premise as Cavguy describes it seems absurd.

    Matt
    "Give a good leader very little and he will succeed. Give a mediocrity a great deal and he will fail." - General George C. Marshall

  2. #282
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2005
    Posts
    4,818

    Default

    Matt86, you ain't wrong....you be jamming

  3. #283
    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
    Join Date
    Aug 2007
    Location
    Chapel Hill, NC
    Posts
    1,177

    Default Shame as a combat multiplier

    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    Also Sherman had an IED problem to, you know how he solved it? He had the civilians who would not tell him where the torpedo's(that is what they called land mines in the Civil War) were march down the road in front of his columns! The IED problem was solved real quick. Put that in an IO campaign for A'stan......I know we can't do that but we should......tie rich folks to the of front Humvee"s and search for IED's.....hey that sorta rhymes.

    Also the first thing Sherman did was prepare a SPECIAL TAX MAP and his march to sea went right through the richest parts of Georgia where he collected his food and supplies and burned bridges,tore up rail roads and knocked down telegraphs. In short he made the rich folks poor and feel pain, he did not target civilians directly he targeted their support system more than anything. Victory because he new how to make a good Systems Map
    One of the quickest things you learn in a combat zone is how much emotions effect actions. War is personal, and it cannot be reduced to a simple mathematical equation or engineering problem.

    Two examples.

    1. The scene in Band of Brothers the day after Echo Company discovered the concentration camp. They declare martial law and force the adjacent neighbors to clean the camp and bury the bodies. Echo Company used shame as an instrument of resolve. The other option would be to kill ever person in that town as punishment. I'm sure it crossed their minds.

    2. In May 2007, after a raid, we discovered the videos of public beheadings in our town. Not knowing exactly how to react, I decided to force all the village elders to watch the video with me standing over telling them how utterly wrong and inhumane it was. I chose to use shame. In that instance, it worked. There was a lot of crying sheiks that day.

    v/r

    Mike

  4. #284
    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Location
    Montana
    Posts
    3,195

    Default

    Granted Civil War history isn't my main field, but the answer isn't as simple as "Sherman had the idea and Grant resisted." And likewise the reverse isn't completely true.

    Grant had learned the value, and practicality, of moving through the Southern countryside during the Vicksburg campaign. He also began to understand at that time that the Southern popular will would need to be defeated along with the field armies. But he also understood that Lee's ANV was a physical representation of that will, and that the Army of the Potomac would not likely close with and destroy that army without his physical presence. Actually, both Sherman and Grant were wary of the possibility of moving an entire army through the deep south, but over time both began to see the possibilities of that movement. Grant seems to have grasped the need to carry the war to the deep south first, but Sherman certainly came around quick enough. He was the one who was wary during the Vicksburg campaign of cutting loose from the supply lines and living off the county, but had clearly changed his tune when the Army of Tennessee cut loose through the deep south.

    Both Sherman and Grant (and by extension Sheridan and many other senior Union leaders from the Western Theater) grasped the need to shatter Southern popular will and support for the cause. Such a realization seems to have come with slower speed and clarity to those Union commanders who spent most of their time fighting in Virginia.

    Sherman's campaign certainly changed to a tune of punishment when they left Georgia and entered South Carolina.
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
    T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War

  5. #285
    Council Member Firn's Avatar
    Join Date
    Sep 2009
    Posts
    1,297

    Default

    It is pretty hard to create only through Cavguy's post an sensible image of the critic of CvC offered by the lector.

    His approval of Sherman and the description of his book seem to indicate that he is somehow irritated by the importance of the foreigner CvC in the military of the USA. The preview on Amazon really sounds like a personal rant, doesn't it?

    In the aftermath of defeat in Vietnam, the American military cast about for answers--and, bizarrely, settled upon a view of warfare promulgated by a Prussian general in the 1830s, Carl von Clausewitz. This doctrine was utterly inappropriate to the wars the U.S. faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. It led the U.S. Army to abandon its time-honored methods of offensive war--which had guided America to success from the early Indian campaigns all the way through the Second World War--in favor of a military philosophy derived from the dynastic campaigns of Napoleon and Frederick the Great. It should come as no surprise, then, that the military's conceptualization of modern offensive war, as well as its execution, has failed in every real-life test of our day.



    This book reveals the failings of the U.S. Army in its adoption of a postmodern “Full Spectrum Operations" doctrine, which codifies Clauswitzian thinking. Such an approach, the author contends, leaves the military without the doctrine, training base, or force structure necessary to win offensive wars in our time. Instead, the author suggests, the army should adopt a new doctrinal framework based on an analysis of the historical record and previously successful American methods of war. A clear and persuasive critique of current operative ideas about warfare, The Clausewitz Delusion lays out a new explanation of victory in war, based on an analysis of wartime casualties and post-conflict governance. It is a book of critical importance to policymakers, statesmen, and military strategists at every level.
    Perhaps the digital ink is spent better elsewhere...


    Firn

  6. #286
    Council Member MattC86's Avatar
    Join Date
    Aug 2007
    Location
    REMFing it up in DC
    Posts
    250

    Default Going waaaaay off topic, perhaps. . .

    Quote Originally Posted by Steve Blair View Post
    Granted Civil War history isn't my main field, but the answer isn't as simple as "Sherman had the idea and Grant resisted." And likewise the reverse isn't completely true.

    Grant had learned the value, and practicality, of moving through the Southern countryside during the Vicksburg campaign. He also began to understand at that time that the Southern popular will would need to be defeated along with the field armies. But he also understood that Lee's ANV was a physical representation of that will, and that the Army of the Potomac would not likely close with and destroy that army without his physical presence. Actually, both Sherman and Grant were wary of the possibility of moving an entire army through the deep south, but over time both began to see the possibilities of that movement. Grant seems to have grasped the need to carry the war to the deep south first, but Sherman certainly came around quick enough. He was the one who was wary during the Vicksburg campaign of cutting loose from the supply lines and living off the county, but had clearly changed his tune when the Army of Tennessee cut loose through the deep south.

    Both Sherman and Grant (and by extension Sheridan and many other senior Union leaders from the Western Theater) grasped the need to shatter Southern popular will and support for the cause. Such a realization seems to have come with slower speed and clarity to those Union commanders who spent most of their time fighting in Virginia.

    Sherman's campaign certainly changed to a tune of punishment when they left Georgia and entered South Carolina.
    I don't think I suggested (at least I hope I didn't) that Grant opposed it and Sherman won him over - only that he showed some resistance to the grand scale of what Sherman was planning. He worried if it was feasible with Hood maneuvering in Sherman's rear - remember, during the Siege of Vicksburg, he sent Sherman to Jackson to guard against Johnston's possible relief expedition.

    No argument with any of what you said, though. I wonder if the phenomenon you notice is the result of minimal contact with the Southern population by officers and men fighting with the Army of the Potomac?

    Getting back to the topic at hand, Firn is probably right, it seems a bit premature to judge the entire book and argument based on these snippets, but coming from Cavguy and the publisher's own description at Amazon, it does seem highly suspect.

    Matt
    "Give a good leader very little and he will succeed. Give a mediocrity a great deal and he will fail." - General George C. Marshall

  7. #287
    Council Member Cavguy's Avatar
    Join Date
    Jun 2007
    Location
    Honolulu, Hawaii
    Posts
    1,127

    Default

    Apologize I couldn't sketch the arguments in more detail. The presentation lasted an hour and I wasn't taking notes as I was processing what was being said. Some of it may or may not be in his forthcoming book.

    I don't think the author is insincere or anyhow prejudiced, he sincerely believes the influence of CvC and the way it was implemented has reduced the effectiveness of the US Army. I am not enough of a CvC/Jomini student yet to really rule on what CvC meant or didn't mean and whether he adequately accounts for CvC's "intent".

    My issue was the 5-18% number and the logical implication that successful pacification requires mass murder. Even if effective, it's not a COA that should be considered by the USA.

    Niel
    "A Sherman can give you a very nice... edge."- Oddball, Kelly's Heroes
    Who is Cavguy?

  8. #288
    Council Member Firn's Avatar
    Join Date
    Sep 2009
    Posts
    1,297

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Cavguy View Post

    My issue was the 5-18% number and the logical implication that successful pacification requires mass murder. Even if effective, it's not a COA that should be considered by the USA.

    Niel
    You have my respect for stressing that point during the lecture. Such a number may sound pretty understandable and agreeable on paper but as you said it will in practice be very bloody. Killing in the process of the pacification of Afghanistan up to 18% of the population or 8.600.000 humans doesn't seem to fit the purpose of the current mission.

    Leaving that aside I guess we will have to wait for that book to see if it provides something useful. The perception so far is not a good one, but it might be overridden by the qualities of the book.


    Firn
    Last edited by Firn; 10-12-2009 at 08:59 PM.

  9. #289
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2007
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    8,060

    Default True.

    Quote Originally Posted by Steve Blair View Post
    Granted Civil War history isn't my main field, but the answer isn't as simple as "Sherman had the idea and Grant resisted." And likewise the reverse isn't completely true.
    It was a growing pain sort of thing. Both were fair Generals, neither was great. Thomas and Buford were both better, just not in the right place at the right time.

    Any General that says as Grant did "I propose to fight it out on this line if it take all summer" has some problems as a tactician, particularly considering it was said immediately after he got a really bloody nose with 17,000 casualties in The Wilderness and was in process of getting zapped again at Spotsylvania with another 18,000 casualties. His claim to fame is actually that he had more troops to throw away than did his opponents-- and he surely did that.

    A strategist he was not. Good writer, though...

  10. #290
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Oct 2007
    Posts
    1,444

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Cavguy View Post
    My issue was the 5-18% number and the logical implication that successful pacification requires mass murder. Even if effective, it's not a COA that should be considered by the USA.
    Are you sure that is the logical implication? If it was, then okay, maybe he's crazy.

    I suspect that he was looking at cases where that much of the population was killed - in large part because it was a total war - and he then drew a link between that beat down and the willingness to submit. If that was his thought process, then I don't think that the logical implication is a mass murder COA.

  11. #291
    Council Member Umar Al-Mokhtār's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Location
    Cirenaica
    Posts
    374

    Default One of my rare disagreements with Ken...

    Seems you've been living in the deep South too long and have drank up all the Kool Aide.

    Grant knew that he had to hit Lee again and again since the ANV was the CoG, not so much Richmond. So he hit him hard at the Wilderness. When the Federals broke off the attack Lee (and many Federal officers) was sure Grant would withdraw. He didn't, he moved to his left. This threw Lee off his game a bit but he rallied well to block Grant at Spotsylvania. So it went until U.S. stole a march on Bobby and crossed the James, but his Corps were slow in taking Petersburg and so the siege began. Grant lost about 55,000 (which were fewer men than the Federals had lost in the three previous years trying to do the same thing) to Lee's 33,000, the key being the Union casualties were a smaller % of overall forces. Since Sherman at the same time was “making Georgia howl” there could be no shifting of Confederate forces between the theaters. Also, when Early threatened Washington Grant failed to react as previous commanders had; which was to withdraw and rush north. He kept focused on Lee.

    Grant formulated his strategy based on his greater manpower to make his flanking movements and keeping his supply lines secure. Lee was able to counter since he had the advantage of interior lines, but only because he was obliged to defend Richmond and his supply line to the southwest. Grant had considered going west of Richmond with the same strategy but it would have unacceptably lengthen his supply line. He also factored in the desire that one of his attacks might break through to Richmond. Both Grant and Lee knew that a prolonged siege (whether around Richmond or Petersburg) would end the war in favor of the North.

    Agree that neither Grant nor Sherman was a “great captain” per say, but neither was Lee (he was too Virginia centric and at times overly aggressive for the resources available to the CSA). In the aggregate, when one totals Grant's losses from Beaumont to Appomattox he lost fewer men numerically (and effectively won the war in the western theater in 1863) than Lee incurred from Seven Pines to Appomattox. Grant used his obvious superiority in manpower and resources to defeat Lee, like that's a bad thing. Was he supposed to just sit back like all the other AotP commanders before him?
    "What is best in life?" "To crush your enemies, see them driven before you, and to hear the lamentation of the women."

  12. #292
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2007
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    8,060

    Question I'm not sure we're disagreeing but we can if you insist...

    Quote Originally Posted by Umar Al-Mokhtār View Post
    Seems you've been living in the deep South too long and have drank up all the Kool Aide.
    Nah, your aim's off -- if you aimed...

    I probably woulda fit for the Union. However, I don't drink Kool Aid; that's sugary stuff for all you kids...
    Grant formulated his strategy based on his greater manpower to make his flanking movements and keeping his supply lines secure. Lee was able to counter since he had the advantage of interior lines, but only because he was obliged to defend Richmond and his supply line to the southwest...
    True -- Grant wasted him away and continually slipped to the SE. No great strategy but an admittedly effective one.
    neither was Lee
    Nor did I say he was -- I cited Thomas and Buford, both Union. Only Jackson whom I did not mention comes close to being great for the South. He was better than any of the others save possibly Buford and both of them died too young. John Gordon and Forrest may have become great with more experience; they didn't get it so they don't make it to greatness (whatever that is)...
    Grant used his obvious superiority in manpower and resources to defeat Lee, like that's a bad thing.
    I hope not, that's the American way; has been in every war we've won and the two we lost (both due to really bad Generals; one northerner, one southerner). In any event, I didn't say it was bad, just that it was what he did -- which you corroborate.
    Was he supposed to just sit back like all the other AotP commanders before him?
    No, nor did I say he should have -- I just said he wasn't a particularly great General and named two northerners (one from Kentucky, one from Virgina )who were better. I think you're picking a fight where none need exist -- that ain't good Generalship.

  13. #293
    Council Member Umar Al-Mokhtār's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Location
    Cirenaica
    Posts
    374

    Default Ken, I know better...

    than to pick a fight with you...didn't you actually serve in the late unpleasantness?

    Buford probably would have proven to be great, he was far and away the best cavalry commander on either side. Thomas was solid, and shrewd since he deftly avoided taking a major command. It would have been interesting how things would have played out if the roles of Thomas and Sherman had been reversed.

    Other picks would be Reynolds and Cleburne who, like Buford, were also cut down before their time.

    My aim is poor, at least that's what my wife says when she's cleaning up the head.

    I too gave up Kool Aid quite some time ago having acquired a taste for Glenmorangie and Dalwhinnie.
    "What is best in life?" "To crush your enemies, see them driven before you, and to hear the lamentation of the women."

  14. #294
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2007
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    8,060

    Default No fight, to my mind.

    Quote Originally Posted by Umar Al-Mokhtār View Post
    than to pick a fight with you...didn't you actually serve in the late unpleasantness?
    Alas no, then in my 61st reincarnation, I was advising Wu Wen Chen, late Warlord and ruler of Guiyang at the time. Pity, I could've had fun ragging G.A. Custer...
    My aim is poor, at least that's what my wife says when she's cleaning up the head.
    Hmm. Sounds like yours and mine been communicatin' somehow...
    I too gave up Kool Aid quite some time ago having acquired a taste for Glenmorangie and Dalwhinnie.
    Good stuff, I'm told, can't do Scotch. Results of a weekend foray in Oceanside in 1951 which entailed quantities of White Horse (I know, I know - but on a Corporal's pay back then, choice was limited... ) and did not end well; there was minor illness involved. Haven't much desire for it since.

    Fortunately, there is bourbon.

  15. #295
    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Location
    DeRidder LA
    Posts
    3,949

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Steve the Planner View Post
    Ron:

    Right.

    In dumb-ass civilian terms, it might be termed a "gap" in the title chain.

    Something about 'you can't convey what you don't own."

    Steve
    Except in the case of con men.

    Elected or appointed, matters not a whit

    Them that are transferred and them that accept

    Are both screwed in equal parts

    By the con men arranging the transfer

    Tom

  16. #296
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Sep 2006
    Posts
    499

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Steve Blair View Post
    One of my side projects (that I might actually finish someday...) is an examination of officers who served successfully in the Civil War and then transitioned to fighting Indians. It's an interesting adaptation to look at.
    As you work on that project don't forget that the plains tribes were largely subjugated because the buffalo were eliminated. The buffalo gave them everything they needed: food, shelter, clothing, even a theology. When the buffalo was gone they got in line fast for blankets and beef.

    It's enough to make a body think that the buffalo was one of them there Clauswitzian centers of gravity that I keep hearing about.
    "Pick up a rifle and you change instantly from a subject to a citizen." - Jeff Cooper

  17. #297
    Council Member M-A Lagrange's Avatar
    Join Date
    Aug 2009
    Location
    In Barsoom, as a fact!
    Posts
    976

    Default

    Clausewitz did not say talk about THE decisive battle. He talked about the need for Decisive battles that gained you benefit in terms of strategy.
    Well, here we have a dialectic/translation problem. I was not talking about THE decisive battle but using the as in French where “the” would mean “a”.
    Also, I believe this could be debated but I did not read CvC in German.
    But I have to admit that benefits from Waterloo were longer term than Austerlitz on the political side. But the benefits from Austerlitz were larger at its time. (more countries involved, larger impact in European powers…).

    Just to add some spices to the discussion. Definition of a decisive battle is quite loose with time. I’ll take the example of La Marne in 1914. It was merely a strategic decisive battle but was a tactical decisive battle as it was more a smart use of modern logistic technology and more or less did fix the front. But this was not the attempt or aim. (The objective was to protect Paris so the old dogma I have your capital = I won, would not happen).
    But still it was a decisive battle.

    Closer from us, I can see where such statement that “mass killings benefits” could come from.
    I will take the example of last Israel operations. (No critics, no offense, no judgment, please. Take it as an intellectual exercise).
    The 2006 summer war was a defeat and Israel needed to reaffirm its military supremacy. So they did conduct Castle Lead.
    I have no idea of the ratio of population killed among Palestinian. But IDF maintained a 1/10 ratio if you melt civilian+armed population for the Palestinian. (Roughly 1 IDF for 10 Palestinian). And, as you said, Israel gained some time.

    Was it a decisive battle? Personally I would not go that way. The Rand studies about Israel cycle of violence have shown that basically Israel is buying 11 month of peace between each round of terror/war.
    On a regional scale? Well, that can be debate also since Iran has shown capacity to produce continental range weapons.
    On the hostage scene? Yes most probably.

    But does that really balance the bad image that Israel did built during the operation? Did that worst the lost of credit among the international opinion (even in West)? That is not that clear. Just for this I would say that the statement of killing plenty, even combatants, would be somehow fault. It just shows a theoretical understanding of war. Also, CvC did not write about stabilization and stabilization was much easier at his time. Well may be not in Spain.

    In war among the people and with the increase of education of the population (civilian + military + international opinion) such assumption based on terror is almost an immediate political loss. So the benefits from an operation or war that kills many civilian (the figure should not be count in %) has more disadvantages than advantages.

    Or the guy is just crazy.

  18. #298
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Location
    The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
    Posts
    3,947

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by M-A Lagrange View Post
    Definition of a decisive battle is quite loose with time. I’ll take the example of La Marne in 1914. It was merely a strategic decisive battle but was a tactical decisive battle as it was more a smart use of modern logistic technology and more or less did fix the front. But this was not the attempt or aim. (The objective was to protect Paris so the old dogma I have your capital = I won, would not happen).
    But still it was a decisive battle.
    ...so you might want to point that out on this thread here, because this is very relevant! - http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=8647

    I will take the example of last Israel operations. (No critics, no offense, no judgment, please. Take it as an intellectual exercise).
    Good luck with that. Ever met an Israeli?

    Joking aside, Israel has a very simple view of strategy. It is the use of force to maintain the state, at all and any cost. It does not have to be perfect or even good. It just has to work, and it does. No one expects "Peace" anytime soon. Relative security is good enough.
    Economy growing, population growing, and 3 years since a serious war = all good.

    The Israeli population (as opposed to political elite) also cares very little for what others think. The only condemnation that had any impact at all during Cast Lead was that from the Turkish Islamist Party!
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  19. #299
    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Location
    Montana
    Posts
    3,195

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Rifleman View Post
    As you work on that project don't forget that the plains tribes were largely subjugated because the buffalo were eliminated. The buffalo gave them everything they needed: food, shelter, clothing, even a theology. When the buffalo was gone they got in line fast for blankets and beef.

    It's enough to make a body think that the buffalo was one of them there Clauswitzian centers of gravity that I keep hearing about.
    Granted we're diverting from topic here, but I do understand that. But it also varies from tribe to tribe. The groups most impacted by the demise of the buffalo were the Plains tribes...the loss of buffalo didn't do squat to the social support systems of the Southwestern tribes (Navajo, Apache, Yavapai, and so on). And some of the tribes had their resistance broken before the buffalo were removed from the equation (the Comanche are a good example, as are the Kiowa).

    I'll hush now....the Indian Wars are one of my main focal areas, so I could bore folks to death with tons of trivia.....
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
    T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War

  20. #300
    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2008
    Posts
    3,189

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by M-A Lagrange View Post
    Just to add some spices to the discussion. Definition of a decisive battle is quite loose with time. I’ll take the example of La Marne in 1914. It was merely a strategic decisive battle but was a tactical decisive battle as it was more a smart use of modern logistic technology and more or less did fix the front. But this was not the attempt or aim. (The objective was to protect Paris so the old dogma I have your capital = I won, would not happen).
    But still it was a decisive battle.
    Maybe it's been too many months that I read Clausewitz for the last time, but I'm sure that he wrote in German. So he wasn't using the word "decisive", and that eliminates my problems with the fuzzy definition.

    The German words "Entscheidung" (decision) and ("entscheidend" (supposedly "decisive") may have evolved over 170 years, adding another potential problem.

    Nevertheless, I can assure you that modern Germans would not use these words for battles like the Marne battle, except ex ante.
    So despite I didn't read his book recently I'm quite confident that he wouldn't have called the battle of the Marne a Entscheidungsschlacht (ex post) - except maybe ex ante (then still only being potentially entscheidend).

    The same applies to the Tannenberg battle (Eastern Prussia 1914), of course.

Similar Threads

  1. Assessing Al-Qaeda (merged thread)
    By SWJED in forum Global Issues & Threats
    Replies: 286
    Last Post: 08-04-2019, 09:54 AM
  2. OSINT: "Brown Moses" & Bellingcat (merged thread)
    By davidbfpo in forum Intelligence
    Replies: 34
    Last Post: 06-29-2019, 09:11 AM
  3. The David Kilcullen Collection (merged thread)
    By Fabius Maximus in forum Doctrine & TTPs
    Replies: 451
    Last Post: 03-31-2016, 03:23 PM
  4. The Warden Collection (merged thread)
    By slapout9 in forum Futurists & Theorists
    Replies: 317
    Last Post: 09-30-2015, 05:56 PM
  5. Gaza, Israel & Rockets (merged thread)
    By AdamG in forum Middle East
    Replies: 95
    Last Post: 08-29-2014, 03:12 PM

Bookmarks

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •