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Thread: Wargaming Small Wars (merged thread)

  1. #181
    Council Member BayonetBrant's Avatar
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    First things first, go find Dr James Sterrett on the sims team down in the basement of the L&C bldg, and have a long conversation with him. He's the wargaming guru down there, and has a great wealth of experience that can (at least) help point you toward some great resources. While you're there, ask him what the difference is between a "game" and a "sim" and see how long it takes him to ask "did Brant put you up to this?"

    Second, and more to you direct area of interest - you need to ask what the point of the wargame is within the context you're observing. Part of what comes out of the MDMP wargame is the identification of key decision points, and the CCIRs that drive those DPs. Regardless of "linear" or not, that output is still relevant, significant, and useful.

    MDMP wargaming for COIN is still branches, sequels, and FRAGOs, just much more divergent than before, and may require more nebulous descriptors than we've had in the past - especially at higher echelons where you increase the involvement of participants not under military control (DoS, USAID, etc). You're branches and sequels are no longer "what if they attack the flank" but now "what if they start bombing day-care centers".


    However, let me also say that you can NOT throw out the 'conventional' type of MCMP wargaming any more than you can throw out the 'conventional' maneuver plan or 'conventional' combat doctrine of the US military. No other gov't agency in the US 'owns' warfare the way DoD does. Lots of people have a stake in COIN/nation-building, like DoS, DoJ, USDA, CIA, USAID, etc. Only one owns conventional warfighting, and if we don't do it, there's no backup plan.
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  2. #182
    Council Member Surferbeetle's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by John View Post
    I am currently in CGSC and a SAMS selectee. Deployment experience and now the word of academics has led me to believe the Army no longer has a viable model for wargaming for stabilization / counter-insurgent operations. The linear process is no longer feasible given the number of variables, threats, competitors, etc. (i.e. action, reaction, counteraction is a thing of the past).

    I am beginning my thesis research in this area of wargaming. Specifically looking at a model that provides an idea of what questions should be looked at. Honestly, I am not convinced that wargaming is feasible given the complexity of influences along a given LOE.

    Thoughts and perspective would be appreciated.
    Hi John,

    Simulations and models are pretty powerful tools as long as we keep in mind that they are simplifying and incomplete representations of reality (perhaps comparable to Bertrand Russell's table).

    SWC threads How to Win and Mathematics of War have some interesting points on the why's and how's of simulations. These post's (here and here) on concepts examined by others have sparked some thoughts.

    I enjoy making simple models in excel (on occasion I also use mathcad & mathematica but it's rare) for engineering work and financial modeling. I enjoyed using the commercial simulations offered to us in mba school, and sometimes work with HEC-RAS while dabbling with HEC-HMS, Arcview and AutoCAD Civil 3D.

    This is a thesis that I am exploring here at SWC. (Since that post I am presently defining War as being composed of various TTP, or warfare types, i.e. Conventional warfare, COIN warfare, etc. and have not changed my views that the nature of war is constant throughout these TTP).

    The Jan/Feb 2010 edition of the Atlantic discusses military simulations in the article SimCity Baghdad by Brian Mockenhaupt.

    Lieutenant Colonels Matthew Moore and Kevin Mindak repaired the airport, the bus terminal, and the water-treatment plant. They silenced three insurgent groups and won the support of many in Al-Hamra’. But the mayor, Anwar Sadiq, still spoke out against the U.S. Army battalion stationed in his town.
    Steve
    Last edited by Surferbeetle; 01-18-2010 at 04:32 PM.
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  3. #183
    Council Member Wargames Mark's Avatar
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    These might be of interest:

    UrbanSim

    Deep Green

    I have been thinking about doing something very similar to the UrbanSim concept, but as a commercial product, and reflecting my own particular view of network defeat.

    With regard to the Deep Green concept, anyone interested in it might also be interested in the subject of genetic algorithms (also, see the Robby the Robot examples on the net, such as this one. Read about GAs recently in Complexity: A Guided Tour).
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    Quote Originally Posted by Wargames Mark View Post
    These might be of interest:

    UrbanSim
    You'll also find some discussion of UrbanSim, as well as links to some additional material on it, here.
    They mostly come at night. Mostly.


  5. #185
    Council Member Wargames Mark's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Rex Brynen View Post
    You'll also find some discussion of UrbanSim, as well as links to some additional material on it, here.
    Good site you have!
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    Default Refinement of the Question

    All -

    Thank you for the comments thus far. I am looking at the tactical level wargame, not unlike the MDMP that we currently use. My questioning is not based on a "game" or "sim", but the thought process required to understand competitors, tribes, etc. Further, I am not convinced, based on personal experience, that one can completely understand every effect on the battlefield. Nor am I attempting to develop a product to predict the future. However, I do propose that TTPs, good practices, in conjunction with current business models can provide an estimate of actions, reactions and counteractions.

    I envision input from HTTs, PRTs, and others that provide insight and perspective to a unit's battlespace.

    I understand John Nagle's comments that humans are involved and we cannot completely predict their actions. I concur, but submit we can do a better job of understanding trends, causes, and effects.

    Regards

    John

  7. #187
    Council Member Stan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by John View Post
    My questioning is not based on a "game" or "sim", but the thought process required to understand competitors, tribes, etc. Further, I am not convinced, based on personal experience, that one can completely understand every effect on the battlefield.

    I envision input from HTTs, PRTs, and others that provide insight and perspective to a unit's battlespace.

    Regards

    John
    John,
    Just my blind 2 cents, but a simulator or game cannot replicate the thought process of life on the ground. Only experience will provide the upper hand and even that's not a guarantee I'm willing to bet on.

    You're on the right track in my opinion - There are many other players out there that we tend to ignore when it comes to fully understanding the playing field. I learned more from a bunch of mixed up expats in the bush than any other pre-deployment training program.

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  8. #188
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    Quote Originally Posted by John View Post
    My questioning is not based on a "game" or "sim", but the thought process required to understand competitors, tribes, etc. Further, I am not convinced, based on personal experience, that one can completely understand every effect on the battlefield. Nor am I attempting to develop a product to predict the future. However, I do propose that TTPs, good practices, in conjunction with current business models can provide an estimate of actions, reactions and counteractions.
    I think this is the right approach to take. I would, however, be wary of excessively privileging the notion of "best practices" (which may be highly contextually dependent)--indeed, this is one of my concerns about UrbanSim, in that it potentially generalizes from one set of COIN experiences that may not travel well to other environments. (Then again, I haven't seen the actual simulator, only read the literature on it.)

    Key, I think, is encouraging people to think about what questions they need to ask, what kind of dynamics they need to be alert for, and what kind of operational/economic/political/normative trade-offs they are likely to face.

    Finally, we need to prewarn people in a sophisticated way about "worst practices"--that is, situations where well-intentioned actors make mistakes due to organizational pathologies, cultural baggage, inappropriate or unresponsive SOPs, etc. I've often found that my own students end up repeating many of the mistakes they've already read about--which provides a valuable opportunity to discuss how and why they did so.
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    Quote Originally Posted by John View Post
    All -

    Thank you for the comments thus far. I am looking at the tactical level wargame, not unlike the MDMP that we currently use. My questioning is not based on a "game" or "sim", but the thought process required to understand competitors, tribes, etc. Further, I am not convinced, based on personal experience, that one can completely understand every effect on the battlefield. Nor am I attempting to develop a product to predict the future. However, I do propose that TTPs, good practices, in conjunction with current business models can provide an estimate of actions, reactions and counteractions.
    As someone who went through this process as a planner bound for Afghanistan in 2006, I can give you some insights - mostly negative 'cause I screwed up, but leavened a little in hindsight. I understand you are talking wargame not in the sense most of the posters in this thread have taken it, but in the Army planning sense of marathon sessions with some poor unfortunate posted at a matrix chart to fill out tiny boxes. The only good thing about them is that they were too boring for the generals to attend, so actual work does get done.

    First, you can't expect the same level of fidelity you learn to strive for when planning a river crossing on the north German plains - you won't come away with "TF 1-23 LD 210330 at PP 1 & 2" or "Activate Branch Plan B if 3rd TA retains 75% of combat power". Second, it is much easier to talk yourself into things when wargaming counterinsurgency or nation-building, either out of ignorance or wishful thinking - or most likely both. "Yeah, if we kill or capture Mullah Omar the local elders will agree to promote recruitment for the ANSF" may sound reasonable, but it reflects an inappropriately linear faith in cause-and-effect that just doesn't hold when dealing with human hearts in a hideously complex operating environment.

    You can't really wargame operations because in this environment they are spread out over months, not days, and because they are subject to incredible ethical, social, political, economic, and, yes, military stresses. They can also be radically affected by things that would normally be insignificant in a conventional setting: the death of a particular individual, the crash of a helicopter, an enterprising reporter, a phone call from a politician (or his brother-in-law), a case of collateral damage or fratricide.

    You can and should wargame concepts of operations. Say you want to stop infiltration over the international border. You can wargame the concept fairly easily, along with the bad guys' likely reaction, possible counter-reactions, counter-counter-reactions, etc. You won't come away with details that will help in the day-to-day grind, but you can emerge with the following:

    A rough idea of the problems that will crop up
    A vague notion of the resources required for various levels of success
    A primitive understanding of the political, social, and economic influences at work
    A draft list of possible indicators and barely adequate measures of effectiveness/progress
    A lot of blank spaces in your understanding and situational awareness that various staff weenies can go away to try to fill in

    In other words, it is a brainstorming session with a modicum of discipline applied through adherence to normal wargaming procedures. Helpful, but not a silver bullet. It is really easy to allow it to focus directly on staff processes; try to avoid that as it will give the illusion of solutions without preparing you to face the messy realities on the ground.

    One last word - get some real experts to role play during the wargame. Best solution would be to get guys currently on the ground, but that won't happen. Indigenous personnel, guys with past experience, academics, State guys, NGO reps, smart-ass captains who think they are smarter than every field-grade they ever met - these are the guys you want in the room, particularly on the 'red' team.

  10. #190
    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    All really excellent points, Eden. I'd like to elaborate on your last one:

    Quote Originally Posted by Eden View Post
    One last word - get some real experts to role play during the wargame. Best solution would be to get guys currently on the ground, but that won't happen. Indigenous personnel, guys with past experience, academics, State guys, NGO reps, smart-ass captains who think they are smarter than every field-grade they ever met - these are the guys you want in the room, particularly on the 'red' team.
    There's two extrapolations that should be made here. First off, don't stick with Red and Blue teams; add in multiple additional teams, at a minimum add in one "team" for each lineage operating in the area, one for NGO's in the area, and one for the "press". On this "press" point, set up your game rules such that the press team gets points for "sensational" stories that make the administration and/or the military look "bad". That's not always the case by any means, but it's a factor to consider.

    Second point, in addition to the types of people Eden suggested, get some precocious 12 year olds (a younger, more smart ass version of the CPTs Eden suggested), plus some old style, RPG gamers (preferably old DMs of the frakin' sneaky variety) who know a bit about current operations.

    One final point, make sure that you have an umpire / ref who is not military. This is, actually, crucial - you want someone who can think totally outside of the doctrinal box. Personally, I'd suggest Rex !
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  11. #191
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Pay attention to Eden. He's got it right

    Also add a couple of sharp SFC/MSG types to your Red Team -- go for SFCs at a minimum because most have no problem speaking truth to power. Stop at MSG because they have not yet learned to make all their answers politically palatable. The NCOs will play dirty, even most CPTs will not.

  12. #192
    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    And be sure to get outsiders to play press and local interest groups. They're going to give you the most innovative and/or irritating performances, which is just what you need in that role. They'll be best able to shake up your regular participants and give them situations that won't be "in the book." Marc's comments are especially valid here.
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  13. #193
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    Default Adding to Eden

    Thanks for writing what I was supposing I was going to have to (until of course I read your post)...

    Rule one of MDMP: Understand the problem, if you don't, don't worry you will continue to return to Mission Analysis until you do...

    Rule two of MDMP: If you come away with a shared understanding of the problem, the process largely served its purpose... because you can then develop...

    (head node to Eden)

    A rough idea of the problems that will crop up
    A vague notion of the resources required for various levels of success
    A primitive understanding of the political, social, and economic influences at work
    A draft list of possible indicators and barely adequate measures of effectiveness/progress
    A lot of blank spaces in your understanding and situational awareness that various staff weenies can go away to try to fill in

    I think the intellectual discord John senses is that we have plenty of senior officers who just want a series of decision points and 3 x 5 cards handed to them at the end of the process as opposed to being an active participant at specific points in the process...

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  14. #194
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    Default Another Two Cents from Another Person

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Warfare has never been linear, and the number of variable is quantifiable. This is just irregular warfare as opposed to regular warfare. You merely have to replicate the Ends, Ways and Means in a form that delivers the product you want. FIGHTING Irregulars is not very different from Fighting Regulars. War gaming really only works at the tactical level, so I suggest that is the limit of your enquiry.

    Do you mean "gaming" or simulation? What is the exam question? ( see REX ) Warfare today is no more complex than it was 3,000 years ago. If you assume it is, you've just backed yourself into a corner. Killing bad folks = gets points. Killing civilians = loosing points.
    Irregular warfare generally requires greater discrimination in order to support the Policy = do not kill civilians.

    I admit that I am new to this blog; however, I would like to respectfully disagree with Mr. Owen. I will start by saying that I am a current Army field-grade officer and CGSC student. Also, I have read many posts by Mr. Owen, and I find his comments to be largely lucid, intelligent, and well-said. Nonetheless, I feel obligated to disagree on many points in his post.

    At first glance, there is nothing shocking (or shockingly wrong) with Mr. Owen's comments. However, as I read them more deeply, I think those comments are made without an appreciation for the complexity of a counter-insurgency.

    First of all, he contends that
    Warfare has never been linear.
    Many historians argue that linear warfare was the norm until 1939, when the German blitzkrieg defeated Poland and essentially altered the nature of combat. This strategy (coined "third generation warfare" by the United States in 1989) focused on maneuver, speed, surprise, and synchronization to overwhelm the enemy. So, historically speaking, warfare was ENTIRELY linear before 1939.

    When Mr. Owen states that
    "Killing bad folks = gets points. Killing civilians = lossing [sic] points
    I can't help but cringe a little. Clearly, killing civilians on a regular basis is not going to win any friends among the local population. However, "killing bad folks" is an oversimplification that borders on intellectual arrogance. First of all, how does one define "bad?" While this seems like an absurd question, there are countless levels of "bad," and not all of them should be solved with lethal fire. In many cases, it is actually preferrable to leverage lower-level criminals, insurgents, etc., as a way to glean more information about the higher-tier individuals. This is a fairly common practice in poorly-acted crime shows, but the fact is that it works on the ground in places like Vietnam, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. So, no..."killing bad folks" does not necessarily get points. In some cases, the losses grotesquely outweigh the gains.

    Finally, I take issue with the claim that
    Warfare today is no more complex than it was 3,000 years ago. If you assume it is, you've just backed yourself into a corner.
    I'm certain that every generation of veterans believe -and justifiably so, in my opinion- that they are fighting a different kind of war. But at no other time in history have the lines between tactical, operational, and strategic warfare been so blurred. The actions of a few Soldiers on the ground can produce second and third-order effects that immediately impact upon national strategy. A good, albeit overused example, is the Abu Graib scandal. The level of complexity that young men and women deal with while deployed is significant, as are the repurcussions of their actions. The slightest mistake is leveraged in the information age by insugents looking to capitalize from the fog of war. As the first conflict since the explosion of the Internet, the War on Terror makes headlines, across the globe, within minutes. That burden is heaped on the shoulders of young officers, NCOs, and enlisted personel. I think, in response to Mr. Owen's claims, that if you assume warfare today is the same as it was for the Doughboys of WWI, then you have, in fact, backed yourself into a corner.

    I apologize for rambling. Again, I respect 99% of what Mr. Owen says. However, I did feel the need to voice a different opinion on this one post. Thank you for listening.
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 01-20-2010 at 10:43 PM. Reason: Add quote marks and PM to author

  15. #195
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Duckhunter View Post
    Nonetheless, I feel obligated to disagree on many points in his post.
    ...and you are obligated. T'is why you are here!
    First of all, he contends that Many historians argue that linear warfare was the norm until 1939, when the German blitzkrieg defeated Poland and essentially altered the nature of combat. This strategy (coined "third generation warfare" by the United States in 1989) focused on maneuver, speed, surprise, and synchronization to overwhelm the enemy. So, historically speaking, warfare was ENTIRELY linear before 1939.
    Which historians? So the Greek Persian Wars were linear? Hannibal's campaign against Rome was linear? Wellington's campaign in Spain? The Spanish conquest of South America? The English Civil War? The US Civil War? ...and what does "linear" mean anyway? The first common and enduring use of the phrase "Front lines" - in Theatre terms - appears in WW1. It was never used in the same context before that.
    There never was anything called "Blitzkrieg". It's baby talk, and the Germans never used the word. German operations in 1939 were based on tactical doctrine written in 1922/3 and that in turn developed from the Artillery Tactics of WW1 - often wrongly coined "Stormtrooper."
    However, "killing bad folks" is an oversimplification that borders on intellectual arrogance. First of all, how does one define "bad?" While this seems like an absurd question, there are countless levels of "bad," and not all of them should be solved with lethal fire.
    Killing the folks who oppose your policy is why you fight. "Bad" means exactly that. Warfare is about the breaking of will, via violence. All else is diplomacy.
    Warfare requires killing. Killing is instrumental, so must be applied against the right people for the right reasons. Who you need to kill is why you have intelligence. FIND, FIX, STRIKE, and EXPLOIT works in all warfare, regardless of the enemy or the policy - and even Galula could not avoid that fact - he just couldn't admit it!
    But at no other time in history have the lines between tactical, operational, and strategic warfare been so blurred.
    Why are they blurred? What do you not understand?
    a.) There is not an "operational level of war." There is tactics and strategy.
    b.) Operations are those things an army does to ensure tactical action occurs in the time and place best suited to the political aims required.
    The actions of a few Soldiers on the ground can produce second and third-order effects that immediately impact upon national strategy.
    I submit winning the Battle of Waterloo (tactical action of a "few soldiers") had strategic effect!
    300 Spartans did the same (in myth anyway).
    5-10 Bombs dropped by 5-10 men, won the Battle of Midway.
    One U-boat captain sinking the Lusitania provided the US with a pretext for War.
    A good, albeit overused example, is the Abu Graib scandal.
    Explain the actual strategic out come of Abu Graib? Give me facts. What did it actually change?
    The level of complexity that young men and women deal with while deployed is significant, as are the repurcussions of their actions. The slightest mistake is leveraged in the information age by insugents looking to capitalize from the fog of war.
    How is this new? WW1 was started by one assassination. What about a mistake by Nuke Boat driver in the Cold War?
    As the first conflict since the explosion of the Internet, the War on Terror makes headlines, across the globe, within minutes. That burden is heaped on the shoulders of young officers, NCOs, and enlisted personel.
    No it isn't. This is a myth. - and the internet and conflict existed well before 2001! War on terror? War on an abstract noun? It may be more complicated because Presidents do no understand the instrumental nature of strategy.
    I apologize for rambling. Again, I respect 99% of what Mr. Owen says. However, I did feel the need to voice a different opinion on this one post. Thank you for listening.
    No apology required. First call me Wilf and second, voice away.
    -Point is, you seem to have brought into all the comforting myths of modern warfare that forgives folks not studying military history both in breadth and in depth. It is incredibly arrogant of the modern generation to assume they have it tougher or more complex.
    It is simply without evidence. Confusion born of ignorance (no offence intended) does not mean "complex." Warfare has always been about the most complex human affair on the planet.
    Loosing on Iwo Jima or Okinawa would almost certainly have had far greater strategic consequences than defeat/withdrawal in both Iraq or Afghanistan.
    Washington loosing his entire Army in one administrative river crossing at Trenton would have had similar effect.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Default wargaming

    I'm new here, and will apologize in advance for any faux pas I might commit. After reading John's post, I got to thinking about models generated by the nature of stability and conflict, and was just wondering what everyone thought about the possibility of changing the "rules" of wargaming by changing (expanding) some of the underlying assumptions. For instance, what if stability happens on a spectrum, with the US on one end of that spectrum and a destabilized county-in-conflict on the other.

    There have to be factors responsible for the stability of this country (although they may be hard for us to spot because we live here), that the other country is lacking. What if conflict itself were not the driver here, but was a symptom of the underlying issue. That is, what if lack of conflict is not evidence of stability.

    Could a wargame in which conflict is one outcome/phenomenon (one that requires a response) include non-military variables, such as economic factors, governance factors,etc (I have a few ideas on this but will withhold them for the sake of brevity).

    Could such a wargame create a more meaningful and holistic set of variables and shorten or make more effective any military solution?

    Is it still a wargame if war isn't the reason for conducting the game?

    Scott
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    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Hi Scott,

    Welcome aboard. If you can, could you toss up a bit of a "Hi, this is me" post over on this thread? Knowing some of people's backgrounds makes things much easier in an online forum ?

    Quote Originally Posted by ScottDC View Post
    I'm new here, and will apologize in advance for any faux pas I might commit. After reading John's post, I got to thinking about models generated by the nature of stability and conflict, and was just wondering what everyone thought about the possibility of changing the "rules" of wargaming by changing (expanding) some of the underlying assumptions. For instance, what if stability happens on a spectrum, with the US on one end of that spectrum and a destabilized county-in-conflict on the other.
    Well, I would argue that "stability" is actually a collection of different factors that are all along continua. For example, resource distribution is one factor that can be looked at as a key component of what we broadly call "stability", but that system has several parts or sub-systems - cultural (how it SHOULD be done), social (how it IS done), and infrastructural (how do they do that?). No individual nation state is perfect by any stretch of the imagination (consider health care in the US as an example....).

    Quote Originally Posted by ScottDC View Post
    There have to be factors responsible for the stability of this country (although they may be hard for us to spot because we live here), that the other country is lacking. What if conflict itself were not the driver here, but was a symptom of the underlying issue. That is, what if lack of conflict is not evidence of stability.
    This is going to sound a bit harsh, but the idea that stability = -conflict is, IMHO, a ridiculous ideologically driven illusion that comes from a completely insane (in the technical sense of privileging ideas over reality) view of the world in general and the concept of "stability" in particular. First off, none of the G20 are "stable" countries; we are all in moderately stable vectors of socio-cultural change, but we are not "stable". The associated idea that "stable" just means "no conflict" is also silly, since all G20 countries, which are supposedly "stable", have conflict both internally and externally. This conflict may, or may not, be what most people would call warfare, but it is there.

    Quote Originally Posted by ScottDC View Post
    Could a wargame in which conflict is one outcome/phenomenon (one that requires a response) include non-military variables, such as economic factors, governance factors,etc (I have a few ideas on this but will withhold them for the sake of brevity).

    Could such a wargame create a more meaningful and holistic set of variables and shorten or make more effective any military solution?

    Is it still a wargame if war isn't the reason for conducting the game?
    The short answer, at least IMO, is Yes to all. Most of the older wargames, both board and RPG, included so-called "non-military" factors, usually via something related to production systems. I used to spend a lot of time playing (and running and designing) these types of games, and most were not solely "military".

    Were a lot of the current games fall apart is, IMHO, they rely on sets of assumptions that are just wonky. I remember sitting in a session talking about designing a COIN game where the designers admitted that their game could not allow tactics that have been around for 30 years. Most of the modern games I have seen suffer from serious cases of what Freud called "projection"; the designers, or the organizations they worked for, projected their assumptions about "reality" into the operational rules of the game. Reminded me of stories my godfather used to tell me about the British generals he had to deal with at the start of WW I who kept pushing for more cavalry!
    Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
    Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
    Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
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    http://marctyrrell.com/

  18. #198
    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Hi Duckhunter,

    Welcome aboard. If you get a chance, you should intrioduce yourself a bit more over here.

    Quote Originally Posted by Duckhunter View Post
    At first glance, there is nothing shocking (or shockingly wrong) with Mr. Owen's comments. However, as I read them more deeply, I think those comments are made without an appreciation for the complexity of a counter-insurgency.

    First of all, he contends that Many historians argue that linear warfare was the norm until 1939, when the German blitzkrieg defeated Poland and essentially altered the nature of combat. This strategy (coined "third generation warfare" by the United States in 1989) focused on maneuver, speed, surprise, and synchronization to overwhelm the enemy. So, historically speaking, warfare was ENTIRELY linear before 1939.
    Well, Wilf and I have had our go arounds, but I have to agree with him on this point. Let me just raise three examples that demolish the silly idea that maneuver warfare is something "new":

    • the M'aryanni explosion in ~1850 bce
    • the Barracks Emperors period (3rd century) in Rome
    • the Mongol wars of Gengis

    In the first example, we have a volkeswanderung that started around 2100 bce or so, went over the caucuses and resettled in the lake Van area. After a couple of hundred years of hiring out as mercenaries ("sutu" in the terms of the time), they decided to take over pretty much everything from what is now Iraq to Egypt - and succeeded. Why? Simple; six spoked, light chariots with bow and spear. They could, and did, annihilate every "conventional" military they went up against.

    In the second example, a lot of the "revolts" were semi-spontaneous expressions of what we would now (inaccurately) call "nationalism" (e.g. Palmyra under Zenobia). What we actually have, at least from what we can get out of the archaeology and the records, is an ongoing, multi-sided civil war with spontaneous tribal insurgencies breaking out for about 80 years. Totally freakin' messy, and driven, in part, by the development of some fairly sophisticated cultural engineering technology in the 1st century ce which made it easier for local generals and leaders to revolt. All in all, and incredibly "fluid" situation which makes Iraq and Afghanistan look like a model of "stability" and predictability.

    The third example, the Mongols under Gengis, is pretty well know. I would have to say that, given the technology available in the 12th century, being able to co-ordinate the movements of 100k+ men over a 200+ mile front, moving upwards of 60 miles a day over a wide variety of terrain just isn't "linear warfare".

    Quote Originally Posted by Duckhunter View Post
    When Mr. Owen states that I can't help but cringe a little. Clearly, killing civilians on a regular basis is not going to win any friends among the local population. However, "killing bad folks" is an oversimplification that borders on intellectual arrogance. First of all, how does one define "bad?" While this seems like an absurd question, there are countless levels of "bad," and not all of them should be solved with lethal fire. In many cases, it is actually preferrable to leverage lower-level criminals, insurgents, etc., as a way to glean more information about the higher-tier individuals. This is a fairly common practice in poorly-acted crime shows, but the fact is that it works on the ground in places like Vietnam, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. So, no..."killing bad folks" does not necessarily get points. In some cases, the losses grotesquely outweigh the gains.
    That is a point, but it also highlights one of the problems with ongoing discussions. Everyone, and this does seem to be a species "habit", tends to create verbal shorthands, and Wilfs "bad folks" is one such.

    Quote Originally Posted by Duckhunter View Post
    Finally, I take issue with the claim that I'm certain that every generation of veterans believe -and justifiably so, in my opinion- that they are fighting a different kind of war.
    Different in specifics, maybe, but hardly different in its nature. I don't know if you ever talked with anyone who fought in both WW I and WW II, but the ones I have talked with would talk about both the similarities and the differences.

    Quote Originally Posted by Duckhunter View Post
    But at no other time in history have the lines between tactical, operational, and strategic warfare been so blurred. The actions of a few Soldiers on the ground can produce second and third-order effects that immediately impact upon national strategy.
    Exactly the same thing happened, albeit with a lower speed of propagation, in the Barracks Emperors period, in the 5th century resettlement of the Goths (which lead to Adrianople; another great maneuver warfare example), and in the Wars of the Roses in England.

    Quote Originally Posted by Duckhunter View Post
    A good, albeit overused example, is the Abu Graib scandal. The level of complexity that young men and women deal with while deployed is significant, as are the repurcussions of their actions. The slightest mistake is leveraged in the information age by insugents looking to capitalize from the fog of war. As the first conflict since the explosion of the Internet, the War on Terror makes headlines, across the globe, within minutes. That burden is heaped on the shoulders of young officers, NCOs, and enlisted personel.
    What the 'net changed was the velocity and volume of information that can be spread. It also shifted the dominant mode of communications from a centralized, state-supporting, broadcast technology model to an interactive analog technology model (cf, by way of example, The Soft Edge by Paul Levinson). This was a change in "rate", not "kind" similar to the shift brought about by moving from an 8 spoked chariot to a 6 spoked chariot. What is "different" about the spread of the 'net is that the information war, as an area of operations, is now highly interactive and capable of supporting major combat operations without relying on a major infrastructural investment. This change is piggy-backed on to the previous state from Vietnam where you still have a fairly widespread, broadcast capability that can be manipulated. If you want some of the precursors to this, look at the Great Bauermkrieg in the 16th century with the spread of inexpensive printing presses coupled with the development of the Thurn und Taxis mail system (originally Imperial couriers, then a post system).

    Quote Originally Posted by Duckhunter View Post
    I think, in response to Mr. Owen's claims, that if you assume warfare today is the same as it was for the Doughboys of WWI, then you have, in fact, backed yourself into a corner.
    Well, I've never talked with any of the Doughboys, just some of the folks who were in it from the start (and do you know why they were called Doughboys ?).

    Leaving that aside, you could, and I have, talked with people who were in WW I from different regiments, and the war wasn't "the same" for them. You are getting caught up in a logical fallacy that says if the experience was different then the "nature" of the event must be different. The problem with that, however, is that experience is individual while "nature" is a group property surround an entire event-space. this means that in order to get a better handle on the "nature" of an event-space interaction, you need to look at the structural factors that limit and condition that event-space.

    Certainly there will be differences, and a lot of those differences are "caused" (don't get me started on why that is in quotes ) by changes in the socio-cultural technology available and in use.

    Quote Originally Posted by Duckhunter View Post
    I apologize for rambling. Again, I respect 99% of what Mr. Owen says. However, I did feel the need to voice a different opinion on this one post. Thank you for listening.
    No need to apologize !

    There are a couple of rather neat cultural memes that operates here: "attack the message, not the messenger" and "agree to disagree". This can definitely lead to "lively" discussions!

    Cheers,

    Marc

    ps. apologies for the tight focus on changing technology; I'm in the process of prepping a course on the interaction of technology and warfare, so my brain is more than a little focused that way at the moment.
    Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
    Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
    Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
    Senior Research Fellow,
    The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
    Carleton University
    http://marctyrrell.com/

  19. #199
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    We've started adding a series of reviews of insurgency/counterinsurgency/contemporary civil war boardgames at PaxSims. You'll find the first two here:

    Liberia: Descent into Hell (2008)
    Battle For Baghdad (2009)

    While you can typically find many more reviews in places like BoardGameGeek, we focus on the potential usefulness of such games in education and professional training settings. Comments welcomed!
    They mostly come at night. Mostly.


  20. #200
    Council Member AdamG's Avatar
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    I searched the thread to find any prior reference, but it's with a certain sense of irony that I find no mention of H.G. Wells' LITTLE WARS.

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Little_Wars

    Little Wars is a set of rules for playing with toy soldiers, written by H. G. Wells in 1913. Its full title is Little Wars: a game for boys from twelve years of age to one hundred and fifty and for that more intelligent sort of girl who likes boys' games and books.
    See also
    http://books.google.com/books?id=M9d...page&q&f=false

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