McKiernan replaced

[Ken White]

JMM: Unless you're going to play Genghis Khan, in any COIN situation, you either kill them all -- thus win a 'victory,' I guess -- or, if you aren't going to kill them all for whatever reason, you're going to come to a point of mutual agreement -- thus less than a 'victory.' You cannot win a COIN campaign, you can only achieve an acceptable outcome. Hopefully...

In the words of helogrunt, killing AQ and the Taliban leadeship will not accomplish the goal which is, as I understand it, to deny in some way future use of Afghanistan for the training or launching of terrorists. Even if you could do that -- which I doubt, the smart ones will just go to ground and wait until you leave -- you still wouldn't achieve a victory. They've got a personnel replacement system as good or better than ours. Probably better. So many are...

Schmedlap: Yeah, that's the theory but in practice, all those Generalists reveal their backgrounds. Heavy guys like mass, Artillery guys like precision and rapid response (accuracy comes in a distant third), Aviators like checklists, the Light guys tend to be dazzled by their own tactical prowess, SF guys will drink a lot of Chai, SOF-DA guys will kill you if you offer them tea and so on. There was also a major difference in approach and tolerance for error between Officers with the same generic background but assigned to what used to be Functional Areas 41 and 53 back in pre-historic times...

Problem is aside from the genes, we're all products of our environment and old habits die hard. Take Sanchez (please...). He was a tanker, an unusually cautious one with (bad IMO) experience in Bosnia -- this is the guy after all that took a week to get a bridge across a River; that appeared in Bosnia where the 82d had SSGs out playing Mayor and immediately upon arrival announced everyone would pull out of the villages and fortify in base camps (sound familiar...) and every patrol would have a Field Grade Officer accompany it. Sheer idiocy. If there was anyone who should not have been in charge in Baghdad, he was the poster boy.

Having been in Airborne units with Mech experienced Cdrs and in Mech units with Light or Airborne experienced Cdrs, they are definitely different skill sets. In all cases, the folks cited performed adequately but only one crossover performed well IMO. On a far lower but pertinent level, do9ing away with the 11M MOS was not smart.

The Generalist myth is caused by the harsh fact that our thoughtful Congress has decreed that we must be fair in promotions and assignments. Which means the Army has no choice but to assume that all folks of equal rank are equally qualified. They aren't and even if they were, personality and experience differences would still mean uneven performance. What that also means is that the Army is forced to place square pegs in round holes -- and as I've said before, you can do that -- but the peg is too small to fill the hole.

[Rob Thornton]

All I know about McKiernan is anecdotal, but none of it would indicate he is not a sharp leader - I would add he would seem to have spoken the truth on many occasions as to the conditions in Afghanistan and operational requirements to address those conditions. On other threads we've commented on the lack of clear ends est. in Afghanistan, but I can't help but wonder how much of what is possible there is as much a question of having the right capabilities available in the right quantities as it is having a vision to employ them.

How much of what was able to be accomplished in Iraq in 2007 and 2008 would have been possible without the amount of resources General Petraeus had to work with? What are the types of capabilities that McKiernan had to employ, and how much can those capabilities be adapted to meet the true operational needs?

Was the USG able to generate the right capabilities in the right amount for McKiernan? Will we be able to for McCrystal? If we are able - will we choose to? I don't see this as McKiernan's failure alone by any stretch, we don't need to look far for decent evidence that his options were few. It may a wonder the situation is not worse than it is.

I think it will take more than a change in commanders to achieve our objectives (what ever they are, or may become). It will take some national will, and it will take the USG providing its commander with the right capabilities and capacities based on the conditions and the objectives. Anything less and we'll be leaving it up to pluck and fortune. I hope this is not an issue lost in the QDR, at least as far as relates to those capabilities we believe will be required to support the operational commanders who employ forces to achieve an objective.

I don't know what sort of man General McKiernan is, if he will write a book like Sanchez, or just sort of fade away, but I suspect he has a side to tell. What I hope he will do is provide some thoughtful analysis on the war we can learn from. I suspect there is plenty of blame to go around, but we always seem to come up short on lessons which make us better - they get lost amongst the more controversial bits.

Mark O - your point was well taken about the composition of JCISFA - currently in our band of merry men (and a few women) we have an almost equal number of Marines to Army, two Navy and two Air Force, We have one SF SNCO (our only NCO) and one long tabbed 06 who wears multiple hats. I would say the composition probably accurately reflects the organizations and people we interact with, and the ratio of those in need and those supplying the resources. As busy as we are, I need look no further than Neil Smith's office (which has both the COIN center, and Army proponency for Stability Ops and Army SFA) to appreciate the relative larger numbers we have.

Best Regards, Rob

[John T. Fishel]

Ken, although we can't know for sure how well or badly done that relief was, we do have a few indicators. First, Sec Gates went to Afghanistan and personally delivered the bad news, very unlike the relief of GEN Fred Woerner in Panama in the summer of 1989. Second, Gates went out of his way to praise McKiernan for his service in public. Third, he took personal responsibility for it in public. So, all in all, it seems that it was as well done as it could have been in those circumstances.

From everything I've read,McKiernan simply was not the right guy to command in Afghanistan. That brings us to McChrystal. According to the reports I've read, he has a good relationship with Petraeus and is supportive of Petraeus' strategy. He is also part of the USMA class of 76 mafia that has done really well in the small wars world - includes David Rodriguez (to be #2), David Barno former commander there and now civilian head of the DOD NESA center, Rich Downie former commandant of WHINSEC and now civilian Director of the DOD Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies and intellectual mentor of John Nagl, and cAC Commander, Bill Caldwell.

Not entirely sure what this all means but it feels better to me than what we had going before.

Cheers

JohnT

[jmm99]

I do better in I Law and associated areas.

OK, I'll try again - with a diagram - and the question (which I didn't really ask in the prior post) is: does this make sense ?

What I'm suggesting is that DA is a very different thing from COIN-FID (no Genghis Khan suggested there; FM 3-24 and Niel's courses, etc.). In fact, DA may be contra-indicated in a COIN-FID situation; or maybe not.

In the case of DA, there are two preliminary issues: (1) defining the targets, in accord with US domestic law (including I Law accepted by the US) in such a way as to allow them to be hit by DA; and (2) gaining access rights in others' sovereign territories (or establishing a clear "white-space" doctrine) to allow DA to be executed. And other issues to derive ROEs.

We then move away from my little world to the world of intelligence and martial artistry to identify and destroy the targets. That seems to be a world in which McCrystal has walked well (even if with some controversy - it's a dirty world), based on other posts.

Basic question is whether I am nuts - as to this suggestion.

[Ken White]

about what you might be asking...

What I'm suggesting is that DA is a very different thing from COIN-FID (no Genghis Khan suggested there; FM 3-24 and Niel's courses, etc.). In fact, DA may be contra-indicated in a COIN-FID situation; or maybe not.

Yes.

Use of DA in going after High Value Targets may or may not be a viable option in COIN / FID. Personally, in both Afghanistan and Iraq, I thought it worthwhile -- but I also think we're close to overdoing it based on what I read in the funnypaper. That's just my take...

...And other issues to derive ROEs.

All true but even there ROEs rule (with the normal self defense latitude, enhanced).

That seems to be a world in which McCrystal has walked well (even if with some controversy - it's a dirty world), based on other posts.

True but he's also worked well with the GPF and has insisted that SOF elements coordinate with said GPF.

Basic question is whether I am nuts - as to this suggestion.

This is where I get lost -- not sure precisely what you're suggesting.

If it's "victory as to that list," well, yeah, I suppose so -- but I'm dubious that would accomplish much of anything in Afghanistan or the world. IOW, what would be the point?

[Ken White]

Ken, although we can't know for sure how well or badly done that relief was, we do have a few indicators... So, all in all, it seems that it was as well done as it could have been in those circumstances.

It could've been done with, as Gavin said, more class.

Gates went all the way over there to tell him face to face and good for Gates for doing so. My personal belief is that it was not done with more discretion -- or class -- so that the new President gets props for being decisive and forceful. If that's correct it's shoddy; even if not the relief could've been done with a bit of finesses; McKiernan I think deserved better. Any US ARmy General who has the testicular fortitude to approve Armored Brigade Thunder Runs through Baghdad is okay in my book.

No, we don't know and in any event, it's done.

I will point out though, that Woerner's case and this one are a couple of many that answer the question about why Generals stick together and don't criticize each other in public...

I agree McKiernan probably wasn't the right guy for the job; didn't think he should've gotten it in the first place. First he's a heavy guy; second he's probably too nice. My perception is that Afghanistan is run sort of loosely -- which is fine if you have a well trained and educated Army -- we don't. Mc Crystal may be better, he's sharp, no question and he's one senior SOF guy who's not opposed to the GPF on principle. We'll see.

Think it'll be Petreaus replaces Casey, McCrystal replaces first Olson and then Petreaus...

Ah, yes, the class of '76. Now what was it about them. Oh, no -- that was '77...

You left out Odierno, '76 -- and Petreaus, '74.

Barno, McCrystal and Rodriguez are all Ranger Regiment Mafiosos.

[Steve the Planner]

As a dumbass former tank commander (Anybody remember M60s?), I'll take some offense to that statement, but leave it to history.

The guy running the military side of the surge in the North was MG Hertling (1AD), and a real tanker to boot. I was in 3/64 Armor when he was in 2/64 Armor, so I know he has cherry juice in his veins.

History, I'm sure, will more clearly explain the role of SF in the North, and how it worked hand-in-hand with a tank general's efforts. All of it part of the "Big Game," and, at least one tank general was working just fine with SF.

Reconstruction stuff is nice, but it is that essential level of hard power (caught between the formal army and a sniper?) that has to happen before soft power becomes practical in a conflict zone.

Steve

PS- Yeah, I know. Tanks are dinosaurs NOW. But, back in the day....

[Ken White]

an M4A3E8 an M26 and an M-46...

Some Tankers are true heirs of John Buford. Some are heirs of McClellan. I've served under both kinds. I suspect the 20% rule applies.

Tanks aren't going away. I've heard that prediction on and off since the 50s, they're still here -- and still needed.

[Surferbeetle]

Yeah, that's the theory but in practice, all those Generalists reveal their backgrounds. Heavy guys like mass, Artillery guys like precision and rapid response (accuracy comes in a distant third), Aviators like checklists, the Light guys tend to be dazzled by their own tactical prowess, SF guys will drink a lot of Chai, SOF-DA guys will kill you if you offer them tea and so on. There was also a major difference in approach and tolerance for error between Officers with the same generic background but assigned to what used to be Functional Areas 41 and 53 back in pre-historic times...

Hmmm....so perhaps there is something to modeling human behavior after all?

Best,

Steve

[Ken White]

Hmmm....so perhaps there is something to modeling human behavior after all?

Best,

Steve

My 'evidence' is anecdotal, no data points, ergo it isn't modeling it's heresy. Oops, er, uh -- it's hearsay...

[Schmedlap]

Schmedlap: Yeah, that's the theory but in practice, all those Generalists reveal their backgrounds. Heavy guys like mass, Artillery guys like precision and rapid response (accuracy comes in a distant third), Aviators like checklists, the Light guys tend to be dazzled by their own tactical prowess, SF guys will drink a lot of Chai, SOF-DA guys will kill you if you offer them tea and so on...

I understand that concern, but I don't think it takes a lifetime of working with SOF to understand how to effectively employ it. The criticisms that you mentioned regarding Sanchez and the observations that Max Boot makes about McKiernan here have little, if anything, to do with the former specialty of the officers, but more to do with the type of leadership that was rewarded in our peacetime Army of the 1990s and got those guys promoted. That's not branch-specific. That is just the result of an era of foolishness in our Army that allowed transactional leaders to succeed beyond their abilities.

If there is anything special about SOF in that regard, it is simply that, as somewhat of a red-headed stepchild during that time period, SOF was not infected with the same institutional irrationality that so pervaded the rest of the force. I am willing to concede that it is less likely for a SOF General Officer to be some linear-thinking manager (I know a few SF field grades and SGM/CSMs who would laugh me out of the room I were to say that out loud - and they would name names - but I think it is generally true). But as for a SOF background giving someone some special skill in commanding a multinational force at the 4-star level - I just don't see it. A good leader will be effective in any setting within the bounds of his profession - and not all good leaders opted for the SFAS try-outs. Many stayed in their branch (Petraeus, Odierno, etc).

If McCrystal's background is so influential, then I hope that it doesn't carry over too much. I see in the Boot article mentioned above that he "spent an unusually long time (2003-2008) heading the Joint Special Operations Command, which is responsible for 'black' counter-terrorism operations using elite units." Let's hope he doesn't leverage them too much in Afghanistan. I laughed when I read your tongue-in-cheek comment that "SOF-DA guys will kill you if you offer them tea," because it was one of those "it's funny because it's true" statements. Many a mess has had to be "mitigated" due to SOF-DA killing people for less provocative reasons.

Just to be clear - I've got no issue with any of these personnel changes. I just don't like reasoning for why it makes sense. It's a great talking point for the masses (we're putting a SOF General in charge to clean up this mess!), but it just seems like too simplistic of an explanation for us.

[Spartan6]

"But as for a SOF background giving someone some special skill in commanding a multinational force at the 4-star level - I just don't see it. A good leader will be effective in any setting within the bounds of his profession - and not all good leaders opted for the SFAS try-outs. Many stayed in their branch (Petraeus, Odierno, etc)."

Brother I couldn't have said it better myself. As much as I love my SF brothers, I don't think they have the market cornered on leadership. When you're talking about a 4-star running operations in Afghanistan, he better not be thinking like a tanker, grunt, or snake eater. He has to put ALL the pieces together, including diplomacy to be effective. It takes a very special leader to do this. The great ones are rare and in my opinion are not concentrated in any one branch.

Having said that, I do think he'll do a great job, but time will tell.

[John T. Fishel]

Ken, I didn't look up Odierno.

Really, though, how much difference does background and training make? Although John Abizaid was a ME FAO Dave Petraeus had a better feel for the Iraqis than Abizaid. In eth absence of actually knowing the person we fall back on what we do know which is the background and experience that we know has some effect on shaping the person. How the new team will actually work in the environment of the Afghanistan war remains to be seen. But as I said in the previous post, this feels better.

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

Really, though, how much difference does background and training make?

In my observation it depends, some folks can put aside their past better than others, some can acquire new skills faster than others and, of course, specific situations can have an impact. Basically, the short answer to your question is 'probably some, probably not totally.' See my Post above on 20%.

How the new team will actually work in the environment of the Afghanistan war remains to be seen. But as I said in the previous post, this feels better.

Agreed. The key will be the amount of DA emphasis, I think. We'll see.

[jcustis]

What does DA mean to you guys in the Afghanistan context?

I get the piece about targeting HVIs, but beyond that, how pervasive could DA possibly be?

[Ken White]

What does DA mean to you guys in the Afghanistan context?

I get the piece about targeting HVIs, but beyond that, how pervasive could DA possibly be?

what little I do know from all I've heard and read, most of the DA there is HVI. The issues that I think arise are some small ones and these three biggies:

How sure are we that X is in fact (a) HVI; (b) actually located at the strike point?

Allied to that is how many bystanders are likley to get zapped -- and is that cost worth the price of that HVI?

Do we have people doing HVI strikes that could be more profitably employed in other things or other places?

I think all those are important because I know that pressure to identify HVTs, any HVTs; to DO something; to not scrub a laid on mission, to discount the 'collateral damage' problem and a few other not really war fighting considerations can intrude and skew what happens...

I know that most people most of the time don't fall prey to those traps and are busting their tails to do good and do it right -- and are doing just that.

I also know that some folks will fall into those traps if we aren't careful.

We have a bad tendency, as Armed Forces, to put constraints on processes (four hours to get approval for aircraft as a rule...) and not on the effects of what we do.

[Ken White]

When you're talking about a 4-star running operations in Afghanistan, he better not be thinking like a tanker, grunt, or snake eater. He has to put ALL the pieces together, including diplomacy to be effective. It takes a very special leader to do this. The great ones are rare and in my opinion are not concentrated in any one branch.

Bertrand Russell pointed out that 20% of the people do 80% of the world's work -- that applies to Generals as well as Privates.

Two out of ten that really have their acts together seems about right to me...

[Pragmatic Thinker]

Bertrand Russell pointed out that 20% of the people do 80% of the world's work -- that applies to Generals as well as Privates.

Two out of ten that really have their acts together seems about right to me...

Having worked for LTG McChrystal two things he has going for him that will be crucial in Afghanistan. 1) He truly gets small unit tactics (company and below), and he has a knack for team development. In his former capacity within JSOC he gets much credit for bringing interagency to the forefront of military doctrine today although he his somewhat humble and would probably give his staff more credit than himself. 2) He is all about "flattening" organizations with regards to C4I. He would often say "Centralized command with decentralized control", so I think you will see a paradigm shift in letting BCT/RCT and Bn commanders make strategic and operational decisions at their level vice waiting to push CONOPs up and down the reporting chain.... Again, I don't know LTG McChrystal is the purist in a COIN sense (SF versus Ranger arguments) but he will bring a new approach to the way the war is fought. I look forward to it...

PT SENDS

[Ken White]

Having worked for LTG McChrystal two things he has going for him that will be crucial in Afghanistan. 1) ... 2)...

I think you're correct on all points. I do know he pushed folks to work well with the GPF troops in the AO and that he used GPF elements widely and wisely.

Even better, he would have done more had the CentCom staff not flummoxed the troop allocation process as they're prone to do...

[Pragmatic Thinker]

I think you're correct on all points. I do know he pushed folks to work well with the GPF troops in the AO and that he used GPF elements widely and wisely.

Even better, he would have done more had the CentCom staff not flummoxed the troop allocation process as they're prone to do...

Michael Smith quotes LTG McChrystal in his book "Killer Elite" (pg. 276)...

Although Task Force 145 was under the control of the coalition commander, its operations were largely autonomous and heavily influenced by the JSOC Commander LTGEN Stanley McChrystal. His views were articulated in a memo sent to all JSOC operators at the same time as the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism was published. "This has been, and will be, a long and serious war," McChrystal told them. "Although initial structures and TTP's have evolved tremendously from where they were even two years ago, we are still operating within manning and operating processes that need to be improved to be more effective and professional. We must increasingly be a force of totally focused counterterrorists-that is what we do. This is a complex as developing Long Term Strategic Debriefing Facility that feeds our in-depth understanding of the enemy, and as simple as losing the casual, "I am off at my war adventure," manner of dress and grooming. In every case it will not be about what's easy, or even what we normally associate with conventional military standards. It will not even be about what is effective. It will be about what is the MOST effective way to operate- and we will do everything to increase the effectiveness in small ways. If anyone finds this inconvenient or onerous, there's no place in the force for you. This is about winning-and making as few trips to Arlington Cemetary en route to that objective."

I think this type of thinking and attitude are what SECDEF Gates was referring to when he spoke publically about LTG McChrystal replacing GEN McKiernan. There is no doubt that LTG McChrystal brings great management and leadership skills to the helm of this fight. He is also a huge proponent of SOF-GPF integration and isn't one to engage in who is better but rather how each compliments the other on the battlefield, but it has to start with getting over the egos and attitudes of "us versus them." He has on more than one occassion said that very thing... I think we will see some fresh ideas and some real shifts in doctrine for ALL forces in Afghanistan as he brings his unique leadership and management style to USFOR-A headquarters...

PT SENDS