The US Military and COIN Doctrine, 1960-1970 and 2003-2006

[Jedburgh]

The whole COIN curriculum was rebuilt at CGSC then.

Steve, being just an old NCO and thus ignorant of CGSC curricula then or now, I have to ask the follow-up question. Was the rebuilding of the COIN curriculum at CGSC in the '80s linked to any substantive change in published COIN doctrine (mentioned above) or rather was it rebuilt to reflect the doctrinal changes brought about by AirLand Battle in the revised '82 FM 100-5 Operations?

[SteveMetz]

Steve, being just an old NCO and thus ignorant of CGSC curricula then or now, I have to ask the follow-up question. Was the rebuilding of the COIN curriculum at CGSC in the '80s linked to any substantive change in published COIN doctrine (mentioned above) or rather was it rebuilt to reflect the doctrinal changes brought about by AirLand Battle in the revised '82 FM 100-5 Operations?

It was linked to 100-20. My department (Joint and Combined Operations) was responsible for both.

[Ken White]

seen some good studies -- merely was pointing out that studies are like a lot of things; some good, some less so -- and few offer the holy grail.

I read the linked study; not that bad. I agree with their conclusion that in Viet Nam we talked well and did not do exactly what we said we were doing (noting in passing that they apply some revisionist history to Viet Nam ); that much of the US military does prefer HIC (Obviously -- COIN is messy, tedious, expensive and destructive of HIC capability and unit pizazz) and that to adapt to a COIN dominated future, a massive reorientation of thinking would be required. Basically, they got their history and scholarship right. I think.

However, I disagree with them on the ability of the Army to adapt elements of the force and structure training in such a way as to provide full spectrum capability. The Study suggests it probably cannot be done -- like most studies, it offers no firm, planted guidon recommendations and it maintains waffle room.

While I agree that few units can be full spectrum, I'm quite convinced that most can specialize in one mode and if required switch to another with minimal retraining -- and the few that can do (and need to be able to do) the full spectrum bit know who they are and know they can do it.

[Gian P Gentile]

(noting in passing that they apply some revisionist history to Viet Nam

Just to point out that history by nature, in theory and in practice, is always revisionist; how could it not be? If it were not with regard to military history we would have never gotten past Thucydides.

[Ken White]

Just to point out that history by nature, in theory and in practice, is always revisionist; how could it not be? If it were not with regard to military history we would have never gotten past Thucydides.

in the popular sense (as opposed to the academic quest for ever more accuracy) of the study authors subscribing to a very few questionable and essentially post hoc views of what theoretically transpired on the ground. I also agree that most of their assessments were valid as I recall events. My apologies for my lack of accuracy and clarity and thus sowing confusion.

That does bring up the question; after untold translations and transliterations and academically skewed interpretations, if he appeared today would Thucydides recognize his writing...

[selil]

I have a pretty extensive (to me) library of the RAND and other studies done for the Airforce in the 1980s responding to the LIC directives. I think this was a result of the different laws signed at the time. It is interesting reading as they had some really good ideas. I'm not sure why they never got any traction.

[SteveMetz]

I have a pretty extensive (to me) library of the RAND and other studies done for the Airforce in the 1980s responding to the LIC directives. I think this was a result of the different laws signed at the time. It is interesting reading as they had some really good ideas. I'm not sure why they never got any traction.

Well, there was the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict at Langley AFB which also published a few things. As the first and, as far as I can tell, only Professor of Low Intensity Conflict at the Air War College, I can tell you there wasn't a huge amount of interest. I ended up teaching Latin American regional studies.

[selil]

Well, there was the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict at Langley AFB which also published a few things. As the first and, as far as I can tell, only Professor of Low Intensity Conflict at the Air War College, I can tell you there wasn't a huge amount of interest. I ended up teaching Latin American regional studies.

Most of the books I have were published at Maxwell. That may just the publishing location though. Any idea why there was no interest? There really did seem like some good ideas.