Sanctuary (or perhaps just area) denial operations at the Afghanistan village level

[Surferbeetle]

Good start to an important issue folks. Here is what I am hearing. Some material has indeed come from previous bits and pieces in other threads.

Like the list, they look so deceptively simple to make don't they?

Our SWJ community has been happily bashing powerpoint the last week... so how do we transform the resulting information into knowledge? Back in the day we did acetate overlays on maps for the Army side of my life. I guess that's part of why I enjoy Arcview so much on the civilian engineering side. Here is a typical algorithm:

1. Take geotechnical samples at set intervals, depths, and locations.
2. Use the resulting information to paint a picture of the existing underground stratigraphy.
3. Match engineering properties to each layer - ie the ability to carry a set load (ie ~2,000 pounds/sf for sand, much more for rock depending upon type), exhibit permeability (I worry about waterflow - clay cores vs. sand cores), etc.
4. Analyze data via finite element modeling to identify weak and strong areas
5. Develop a statement of work or design, cost estimate, and project schedule.
6. Get a construction specialist to build the sucker and inspect the heck out of them for QA/QC

Beyond all of the calculations paper/calculator/excel/mathcad/proprietary calculation programs we capture and share the geo-referenced knowledge using AutoCad Civil 3D (not applicable for our SWJ project) and Arcview before, during and after the project. We also use powerpoint

While developing/evaluating a business plan for a small group of investors we use excel, google earth, typical business metrics for our reference industries, capital budgeting techniques, marketing, and lots of shoe leather.

It may be just me but I see many parallels between the civilian side and the military side when we wisely decide to address the non-kinetic part of life in our solutions. Governance, economics, and security covers alot of ground...

[Cavguy]

Amazing no one is talking forced population controls for hostile areas including:

- Barriers/walls to village to restrict entry/exit
- Biometrics and photo ID cards for entire population
- Census and registration of all personal property (vehicles, houses, carts, animals)
- Designation/appointment of local responsible leader for each sub-area, held accountable
- "Gated communities", if necessary
- Curfews and movement restrictions
- Infiltration of villages by "turned" detainees
etc. etc. etc.


Harsh, yes, but needed in the worst areas. Population control is extensively advocated by almost all the major COIN theorists for hostile areas. Recommend reading Sir Frank Kitson for a good treatment of how to do this. Trinquier discusses in detail, see chapters 6-7,9, and 10. Galula, Chapter 7. McCuen, all of Part 2.

One of the areas of broad agreement in almost all the theorists I have read for dealing with hostile areas. Influence ops and CA projects are useless in areas under insurgent control. As one of the above said, "without security, there is nothing".

[Schmedlap]

I've always thought that it would be an interesting topic to compare the use of barriers in Sadr City in 2007 and the use of berms to surround cities, as was attempted in 2005/6.

[jcustis]

Amazing no one is talking forced population controls for hostile areas including:

- Barriers/walls to village to restrict entry/exit
- Biometrics and photo ID cards for entire population
- Census and registration of all personal property (vehicles, houses, carts, animals)
- Designation/appointment of local responsible leader for each sub-area, held accountable
- "Gated communities", if necessary
- Curfews and movement restrictions
- Infiltration of villages by "turned" detainees
etc. etc. etc.


Harsh, yes, but needed in the worst areas. Population control is extensively advocated by almost all the major COIN theorists for hostile areas. Recommend reading Sir Frank Kitson for a good treatment of how to do this. Trinquier discusses in detail, see chapters 6-7,9, and 10. Galula, Chapter 7. McCuen, all of Part 2.

One of the areas of broad agreement in almost all the theorists I have read for dealing with hostile areas. Influence ops and CA projects are useless in areas under insurgent control. As one of the above said, "without security, there is nothing".

My research does not lead me to believe that those measures are part of any ISAF campaign plan at the moment.

I sat back last night and though about the Sexton article, and how close it rang to accounts of what the VC would often do when trying to establish control of an area. That in turn made me think about the strategic hamlet project effort. Then I had to ponder how that fits into the current fight in AFG.

Quite a few not-so-small towns in Iraq have substantial berms around them now, and they facilitated control of traffic flow to a great degree. Are we exploring and/or utilizing this at all in Afghanistan?

[Bob's World]

I am currently stationed in Iraq where I am advising the Iraq Department of Border Enforcement. Among my peers we have had numerous discussions in regards to denial/interdiction operations. Obviously we want to stop the flow of foreign fighters and outside influences into the country. One of the questions we posed was what; is our current doctrine in regards denial/interdiction operations. After much time researching this topic very little doctrine exists; David Galula states in his book, Counterinsurgency and Doctrine,
“Every country is divided for administrative and military purposes into provinces, counties, districts, zones, etc. The border areas are a permanent source of weakness for the counterinsurgent whatever his administrative structures, and his advantage is usually exploited by the insurgent, especially in the initial violent stages of the insurgency. By moving from one side of the border to the other, the insurgent is often able to escape pressure or, at least, to complicate operations for his opponent.”
The only doctrine I have been able to find is FM 31-55 Border Security and Anti-Infiltration Operations written in 1968. It is currently out of print and I ordered it through Amazon.com. Since then new doctrine has been written. But very little has been written on border and anti-infiltration operations. In the early 1980 the Low Intensity Conflict FM came out, I am not sure of its number. In 1986 Counter-Guerrilla Operations FM 90-8 dedicated about four paragraphs to the topic of securing the borders. FM s 3-24 and 3-24.2 discuss very little about border operations. They state the obvious that securing the borders is important. FM 3-07 Stability Operations makes reference to securing borers, but does not provide a guide to developing a plan to secure the borders. So the point of my post is where is the doctrine and why have we allowed ourselves to become so far behind in this topic.

Any law that constrains that actions of those enforcing the law, but enables the actions of those violating the law is clearly a problem. This is exactly what borders are.

In Vietnam we hand built an insurgent sanctuary by creating the state of North Vietnam; let alone allowing the use of Cambodia and Laos relatively free from attack.

Similarly the Durand line is a matter that must be effectively dealt with between the governments of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the West if there is to be any hope in working toward an enduring solution. It means nothing to the Pashtun people; it is a constant source of irritation to Afghanistan; and a critical national interest to sustain for Pakistan; and the primary sources of legal status sancuary for Taliban insurgents and AQ UW operators. This can only be settled at a conference table by senior diplomats and leaders, and due to the many divergent interests will require some very creative statecraft. Someone order up some creative senior people for State.

[Schmedlap]

This can only be settled at a conference table by senior diplomats and leaders, and due to the many divergent interests will require some very creative statecraft. Someone order up some creative senior people for State.

While that is probably how it will need to be resolved, I don't think it will ever get to the table due to the efforts of those people. An issue this thorny will be kept under the rug unless a lot of large NGOs rally a lot of public concern in many countries and make a loud clamor for the self-determination of the ethnic groups in that area - not just the Pashtun, but the Baloch, too.

I often wonder if Pakistan exists for any reason other than the benefit of its ruling class. The instability in Kashmir, NWFP, Afghanistan, and Baluchistan seem to be justified only so that the Pakistani government will not fall, because they need to remain in control, because they have nukes. If they didn't have nukes, what would be the point? Propping up a government that requires a large region of instability to remain in power - what a way to run a planet.

[jcustis]

Attacking Insurgent Space: Sanctuary Denial and Border Interdiction

This drifts a bit off topic for what my aim is, but this I found this Army professional Writing Collection article when running a Google string for "sanctuary denial".

[MikeF]

Quite a few not-so-small towns in Iraq have substantial berms around them now, and they facilitated control of traffic flow to a great degree. Are we exploring and/or utilizing this at all in Afghanistan?

I think it may be a bit tough to do this on a large scale in A'stan for two reasons: 1. Feasibility 2. Manpower requirements.

1. Feasibility- 30,000(?) villages, extended sparsely populated rural areas and mountainous terrain. That's just tough to attempt control.

2. Manpower requirements. Each village would take at least a platoon plus to seize.

I suppose it could be done on very small targeted areas for a short period of time, but the commander would have to choose wisely and determine if the potential pay-offs outweighted the cost. Some primer questions I'd ask would deal with purpose and intent

For instance, in Baghdad, the barriers were used to seperate the populace from the ethnic-sectarian fighting. In Ramadi and Zaganiyah, the control measures were used to convince/coerce the populace that the US forces were the biggest tribe. In Tal Afar, the berms were used to separate and protect the populace from the insurgency. So, population control measures can be used, but you gotta figure out purpose and intent.

Cavguy said:

One of the areas of broad agreement in almost all the theorists I have read for dealing with hostile areas. Influence ops and CA projects are useless in areas under insurgent control.

True, but your actions can be your influence operation. Depends on what you want to achieve.

One final point. I can't overstate the importance of good reconnaisance and surveillance prior to execution into denied areas. The confirm/deny of your initial hypothesis based off incoming information may drastically change what you thought you were getting into OR you may find decisive point that you could have missed (ex. location and massing of guerillas in a training camp).

[slapout9]

JC, did you see this when I posted it awhile back?
Identifying Insurgent Infrastructure by Major James A. Harris
This guy was SF during the late 80's and he was so frustrated that know one ever showed him how to Identify the hidden insurgents that he turned to LE techniques so he could figure out how to do it. Good stuff in there I can testify to Link is below.

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...c=GetTRDoc.pdf

[Surferbeetle]

Slap, thanks for the link to the paper by Maj Horris, I am currently working my through it.

Jon, thanks for the link to the paper Attacking Insurgent Space: Sanctuary Denial and Border Interdiction...it's a thought provoking piece.

Firn, help us out and give us some examples of how to apply CvC to this exercise. As an applied science guy I certainly can use the assistance.

Bob's World; in the west our system of living (a system of systems) ensures that we have to pay attention to right-of-ways and other borders during construction projects or things can get very expensive very quickly. As you often state and are no doubt intimately familiar from both your barrister time and military time however many problems are not necessarily constrained to artificial boundaries delineated by right of ways and treaties. To me the term Sanctuary implies definitive borders and that those receiving Sanctuary have the mandate of heaven...thus the negative visceral reaction to it's use with respect to our enemy. As an up front stated assumption I also believe that it skews the follow-on analysis.

Schmedlap, would you agree that at the end of all conflicts some sort of mediation or negotiation occurs? If so, would we not want the most experienced negotiators representing our interests when this time comes? I would also posit that we need these negotiators to help shape the situation along the way towards resolution.

MikeF; I paraphrase..."don't forget METT-TC dumbass" I was very lucky to have had an airborne/air assault/ranger Cpt out of Alaska as an instructor for those first key years...so, yea verily you are right.

Cavguy; security is very important and desired but believe it or not 'low level' local efforts persist even in high threat environments. I use the heuristic life threatening, life sustaining, and life enhancing for a rapid assessment/solution tool.

B.E.A.; thanks for the references.

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So, given that we have a rough first draft in place regarding some of the issues of concern how do we involve all of the force (our respective units plus the units we will be working with) in gaining understanding and ownership of our situation both kinetic and non-kinetic?

Sandtables are a integral piece of kinetic training. Recently me and mine were able to learn from a nearly 7 foot Marine who used small team training techniques supported by sandtables and applied video games...the event ranks among the top ten of my kinetic training experiences with my CTC rotations still in the lead.

For stateside non-kinetic training I have had mine tour water treatment plants, wastewater treatment plants, landfills, and city councils. I have also had the troops break up into teams lead by our civilian experts who serve in the reserves (irrespective of rank) and use google earth and the 'interweb' to put together open source assessments of state owned enterprises. Currently some of mine are studying a value chain analysis example .... quiz to follow

So what are the suggested fusion methods to bring it together with the units we support? Do our mobilization centers address the realities of integration of active and reserve and if not how do we improve our stateside training given limited time and resources?

I am using my Christmas iPod touch to review short instruction blocks (free) on materials engineering...

[jcustis]

Slap, that's a unique and valuable piece of work. As I got to page 43, it jarred me to the notion that I needed to modify the bulletized list...one of the most critical things is to force the intelligence side to produce a relevant and accurate situational template. Any information gaps that prevent that template from connecting the dots need to be published and incorporated into the ISR collection matrix, plain and simple.

I admit that with all this COIN jazz, it's easy to let things go a little amok and forget to employ basic tools of the MCPP/MDMP system.

[Cavguy]

I think it may be a bit tough to do this on a large scale in A'stan for two reasons: 1. Feasibility 2. Manpower requirements.

1. Feasibility- 30,000(?) villages, extended sparsely populated rural areas and mountainous terrain. That's just tough to attempt control.

2. Manpower requirements. Each village would take at least a platoon plus to seize.

I suppose it could be done on very small targeted areas for a short period of time, but the commander would have to choose wisely and determine if the potential pay-offs outweighted the cost. Some primer questions I'd ask would deal with purpose and intent

For instance, in Baghdad, the barriers were used to seperate the populace from the ethnic-sectarian fighting. In Ramadi and Zaganiyah, the control measures were used to convince/coerce the populace that the US forces were the biggest tribe. In Tal Afar, the berms were used to separate and protect the populace from the insurgency. So, population control measures can be used, but you gotta figure out purpose and intent.

Obviously you can't do it EVERYWHERE, but you don't have to. Isolate the worst areas, take a census, institute controls, and counter-mobilize the people. Again, this is medicine for the worst insurgent areas, not the best. I'm assuming that these villages described in Hemland are key terrain for some reason, influencing a route or a population group. Otherwise we wouldn't be operating there. METT-TC rules as always.

One of the things that continues to baffle me in Iraq and Afghanistan is why we didn't start licensing/registering cars and issue difficult to forge IDs to the people. With today's computers and printers it is easier than ever before. We have BATS/HIDE down to unit level now anyway.

If the Romans could do a census c. 2000 years ago, we can do one now. Biometrics, etc.

True, but your actions can be your influence operation. Depends on what you want to achieve.
.

Agree. Your operations are your influence ops, I was talking more about the common naive belief that you can shape some message to a foreign audience that will magically cause them to switch sides without a whole lot else.

[jcustis]

So, given that we have a rough first draft in place regarding some of the issues of concern how do we involve all of the force (our respective units plus the units we will be working with) in gaining understanding and ownership of our situation both kinetic and non-kinetic.

So what are the suggested fusion methods to bring it together with the units we support? Do our mobilization centers address the realities of integration of active and reserve and if not how do we improve our stateside training given limited time and resources?

There is certainly very little training for the battalion task force-level training audience (at the Marine Corps' Exercise MOJAVE VIPER) in integrating OGAs into the mix. We figure it out as we go along, but for the most part it's self-study and experiential learning that allows the green side to function best amidst these supporting elements.

Just as we are pushing civil affairs down to the battalion level, and pushing intel cells down even further to the company, there needs to be a component for CMOC training, even if it were just one or two modules for select personnel. We don't have that resource at this moment though, and yet COMISAF's campaign plan would lead most to believe that cracking that nut is the most important task we must master.

[MikeF]

Great links from JCustus and Slap. This thread is turning into a "power" thread of good ideas. Here's another consideration. Neil touched on it yesterday.

Surveys and Census.

1. Surveys. A well structured survey prior to infiltration or post-clearance can be a powerful tool to gather relevant information for the commander to add to MDMP, civil affairs considerations, and future psyops info ops. This is one tool that I think we've underappreciated in Iraq/A'stan. However, in a hostile area, should we trust the results? It seems like many locals that are distrustful of the HN gov't would not answer truthfully.

2. Census. This is a bread and butter task, and I have no idea why we've don't use it. Yes, some units have conducted mini-census in Iraq (ID cards and biometrics on the neighborhood/village level), but a nation-wide census would provide the building blocks for many tactical and operational decisions.

From Cavguy

Obviously you can't do it EVERYWHERE, but you don't have to. Isolate the worst areas, take a census, institute controls, and counter-mobilize the people. Again, this is medicine for the worst insurgent areas, not the best. I'm assuming that these villages described in Hemland are key terrain for some reason, influencing a route or a population group. Otherwise we wouldn't be operating there. METT-TC rules as always.

Your operations are your influence ops, I was talking more about the common naive belief that you can shape some message to a foreign audience that will magically cause them to switch sides without a whole lot else.

Agreed.

From Surferbeetle:

"don't forget METT-TC dumbass"

METT-TC means different things to different people. I was considering how my views changed over time (from cadet through major) b/c of experience, maturity, common sense, intuition, whatever. Nothing on this thread is new, but it drives your earlier question- how do we capture and institutionalize this stuff? And that's a million dollar question.

[MikeF]

Attacking Insurgent Space: Sanctuary Denial and Border Interdiction

I tend to agree with much of what the author wrote. I posted these two paragraphs b/c I think they help highlight how to consider sanctuaries.

If the advantages of sanctuary and access to border transit are critical to the insurgency, then the sanctuary becomes a center of gravity to be attacked. Insurgents in sanctuary are inherently vulnerable because the government they establish within the sanctuary will automatically threaten their host's sovereignty. Other vulnerabilities include the support they need from the local populace, their sources of supply, and their base defense systems. Insurgents must conduct a fine balancing act to protect all of these vulnerabilities, but their challenge to the host government's authority could be their biggest problem.

In a sense, insurgents hand us a gift when they establish sanctuaries and base camps. Most insurgencies are fought on "human terrain," offering few instances when the counterinsurgent can actually find, fix, and fight the enemy. But when the enemy seeks sanctuary, engagement becomes possible. Once we have located and defined the sanctuary area, we can focus our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets on it and then, in at least some instances, our combat power. We would be negligent if we didn't force insurgents to earn their pay when they congregated and surfaced. Of course, attacking them in their host-nation sanctuary will require synchronization of military and other government agencies' capabilities at the operational level and higher, to ensure that kinetic actions do not result in defeats in the international court of public opinion.

[Bob's World]

I tend to agree with much of what the author wrote. I posted these two paragraphs b/c I think they help highlight how to consider sanctuaries.

But if your goal is counterinsurgency (defeating the reasons the government is being challenged and not just those individuals or organizations who currently dare to operationalize that challenge); then this is a pretty limited view IMO.

There is far more dangerous sanctuary to Great Britain among the disaffected Pakistanis heritage British Citizens living in Great Britain than than there is in either the countries of Afghanistan or Pakistan. Thus the importance of understanding and addressing the sanctuary within poorly governed populaces over that of undergoverned spaces. As this author states, dirt can be surrounded, searched, and cleared of insurgents. But while that may be a critical supporting effort to a larger COIN operation, I would caution strongly against considering it decisive, or a COG to ones larger campaign.

The irony is, the harder one works to defeat the physical sancutaries in the lands of others; may very well be intensifying the sanctuaries among your disaffected popualces at home with ties to the issues and people of those regions. Win the battle, lose the war. When people talk about COIN being PhD warfare, this the type of second/third order effect consideration and understanding that they are referring to. Not that it is somehow vastly more difficult to take down an insurgent safehouse than it is a squad position.

[Ken White]

When people talk about COIN being PhD warfare, this the type of second/third order effect consideration and understanding that they are referring to. Not that it is somehow vastly more difficult to take down an insurgent safehouse than it is a squad position.

in everything we do. Taking out an enemy Squad may be simple but what that Squad was doing at that location may have several orders of effect and it may have been better to have bypassed them.

Warfare is not at all complex -- policy pertaining to warfare is quite complicated. That is true of MCO and COIN -- and all other variants...

[Bob's World]

in everything we do. Taking out an enemy Squad may be simple but what that Squad was doing at that location may have several orders of effect and it may have been better to have bypassed them.

Warfare is not at all complex -- policy pertaining to warfare is quite complicated. That is true of MCO and COIN -- and all other variants...

violence is pretty fundamental; and warfare is violence for the sake of politics. Warfare between to separate parties is a clash of separate politics for separate populaces, a resoloving of conflicting interests that could not be resolved by other means. CvC spoke to this, and most thought on warfare is on this dynamic.

insurgency is all about internal politic (discounting the external politics and interests that are often engaged by FID and UW forces that show up at various insurgencies around the world to wage pawn warfare at the expense of that troubled host). More like an election gone bad, when the votes don't count, when the supreme court can't resolve it, when the populace rejects what the government is dishing out. Still politically driven violence, but to very different terms. Is this more complex? Perhaps not, but it is definitely much harder to grasp as the inclination of politics is to blame the other guy and refuse responsibility for ones shortcomings; and effective COIN requires that hard look in the mirror first.

So effective COIN goes against our human nature. Effective conventional warfare is at the essence of our human nature.

[Ken White]

So effective COIN goes against our human nature. Effective conventional warfare is at the essence of our human nature.

Highly disputable. Machiavelli and John of Islay among others plus the survival of Byzantium for Centuries would seem to be but three examples refuting your first assertion. Your case for it assumes a degree of selfishness that is not universal and is peculiarly western in large quantities. You also excluded third party interventions which are, as 'humanely' practiced in a 'limited' war, a western proclivity and which muddle your position...

As for your summation, I suspect the survivors of the conventional battles at Peleliu and the Hurtgen Forest might strongly disagree. In fact, given the overall history of US Arms for the past 264 years, it seems our net effectiveness at it is at best questionable. As Jon Custis once noted, we have been fortunate that our opponents have been more screwed up than we have...

[Surferbeetle]

Sun Tzu says it well when he states: ‘And as water has no constant form, there are in war no constant conditions.’

It would then seem to follow that COIN operations, although chameleon like, are no freer from the presence of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity than are Conventional operations nor are the associated efforts of either type of warfare isolated from the people, the commander/army, and government.