New Rules of War

[zenpundit]

Wilf wrote:

"Certainly not confused. The attack on the Embassy had no element of so-called "swarming" what so ever. Many hundreds of decisions and actions taken after 1968 had significantly more effect on the outcome of the Vietnam war than some news footage. Wars are won and lost because of really decisive events. Not pictures of irrelevant events.'

Most historians of the Vietnam War would strenuously disagree with your interpretation Wilf.

Sure, there are downstream decisions of greater importance but they would have been different decisions - sometimes in response to different questions -had Tet been considered a victory.

Westmoreland, of course asserted Tet was a victory for the US in military terms and technically, he was correct. It also did not matter. After being told of progress for years by high civilian and military officials, Americans watched towns, bases and the embassy in South Vietnam being overrun on television. The effect of irrelevant pictures can be profound

Point being, if War today is really "more fast moving and unbelievably complicated," why should modern War not cost more than old simple WW2?

Scale comes to mind.

Also, why would "fast" always mean more expensive than "slow"? Moreover, situations might be complex or complicated but proposed solutions might be simple. And whether the solutions are simple or complex does not automatically correlate with cost by itself.

Using large units against small, irregular, networked opponents has been very expensive. Stupidity surely adds costs but the base cost of moving large military forces around the globe ain't cheap.

[William F. Owen]

Most historians of the Vietnam War would strenuously disagree with your interpretation Wilf.

Maybe, but as most write drivel, I disregard them.

Sure, there are downstream decisions of greater importance but they would have been different decisions - sometimes in response to different questions -had Tet been considered a victory.

Evidence? Tet did not break the American will to fight. It's a myth. US troop levels went on rising until Jan 69 and did not begin decreasing till August 69. Nixon invaded Cambodia in March 1970! The 1973 oil crisis doomed the South far more than Tet.

Westmoreland, of course asserted Tet was a victory for the US in military terms and technically, he was correct. It also did not matter. After being told of progress for years by high civilian and military officials, Americans watched towns, bases and the embassy in South Vietnam being overrun on television. The effect of irrelevant pictures can be profound

What was the effect? Please tell me how TV pictures in Jan 1968 effected the decisions taken by Nixon in 1973.

Also, why would "fast" always mean more expensive than "slow"? Moreover, situations might be complex or complicated but proposed solutions might be simple. And whether the solutions are simple or complex does not automatically correlate with cost by itself.

I never said fast. Arquilla did. Meaningless to me. I agree the solutions should be simple. All mine are. Simple works. Unfortunately we have a military academic community focussed on masturbating over the imagined problems, and coming up with things like "swarming."

Using large units against small, irregular, networked opponents has been very expensive. Stupidity surely adds costs but the base cost of moving large military forces around the globe ain't cheap.

I happy with expensive, as long as its effective. You cannot use business words and norms to try and understand military power.
What is a "networked opponent?" Please tell me. How is some bunch of Taliban speaking on ICOMS we are listening to "networked?" Using a cell-phone?

[zenpundit]

Would LBJ have lost the presidential primary in New Hampshire without the effects of Tet? His poll numbers dropped steeply

Would LBJ have withdrawn from the race for the presidency on March 1st or called a halt to bombing the enemy in order to seek a negotiated settlement? Johnson had called for a military victory in Vietnam, officially, only two and half years earlier.

Nixon entered office in January 1969 and started withdrawing troops by late summer. Richard Nixon never had any intention of winning the Vietnam War, though he'd liked to have seen GVN scrape by with some kind of independence, it was not a vital US national interest to him if it did (even less to Kissinger). Invading Cambodia or bombing North Vietnam was never used by Nixon to pursue a military victory but in context of gaining the upper hand in a negotiated settlement with Hanoi and triangulating secret diplomacy with Moscow and opening relations with Peking.,

Looks like the will to to continue fighting took a severe dent at least

[William F. Owen]

Hi Zen "Panther 35 in on the guns"

You can only fight to the degree and for so long as you can afford to pay for the kind of fighting that you are doing. Different kinds of fighting incurs different sets of costs. Paying enormous costs for marginal strategic results is not "winning". Ignoring fundamental economic trade-offs in selecting military tactics and operational approaches is simply stupid. This is not an argument for doing nothing, but to do it with eyes open and with a long-term perspective.

So spend blood and treasure for little effect makes no sense? I agree. That's why I want effect over efficiency and not "cheap stuff" or "cost saving." The debate is what serves the purpose. Not what it costs.

Would LBJ have withdrawn from the race for the presidency on March 1st or called a halt to bombing the enemy in order to seek a negotiated settlement? Johnson had called for a military victory in Vietnam, officially, only two and half years earlier.

Tet was significant. It did not loose the war, or even represent a turning point. It wasn't Kursk or Stalingrad. - and was the North better of with Nixon than LBJ?

Nixon entered office in January 1969 and started withdrawing troops by late summer. Richard Nixon never had any intention of winning the Vietnam War, though he'd liked to have seen GVN scrape by with some kind of independence, it was not a vital US national interest to him if it did (even less to Kissinger).

Nixon had a strategy, unlike LBJ. He was no less determined to "win."

Invading Cambodia or bombing North Vietnam was never used by Nixon to pursue a military victory but in context of gaining the upper hand in a negotiated settlement with Hanoi and triangulating secret diplomacy with Moscow and opening relations with Peking.,

Sorry but it was. It was instrumental in the coup in Cambodia and it knocked out all the major NVA base areas for two years. No single action did more military damage to the NVA than the Cambodian invasion. It was military action focussed on military forces, and yes it had strategic effect.

Watergate and the 73 Oil crisis doomed SVN greatly more than the very minor reversals of Tet five years before. - and ultimately, too many Americans died for no strategic goal the US was prepared to risk against China and the USSR.
Wars are not won and lost on CNN, or the front page of the New York Times.

[shloky]

Wilf,

After reviewing your posts in this thread, it's clear you don't seem to understand how information drives decision making, and, in a broader sense, how the evolution of the information environment would affect that process.

In short, you are essentially blind to an entire feature of the modern terrain. In classic terms, it is like being unaware of the existence of cliffs.

[William F. Owen]

After reviewing your posts in this thread, it's clear you don't seem to understand how information drives decision making, and, in a broader sense, how the evolution of the information environment would affect that process.

OK. So I don't under how "information drives decision making." So I do not understand the planning process, or command?
That you merely assert it, does not make it so. Kindly provide evidence as to why you think that.

You then state I do not understand "how the evolution of the information environment would affect that process." - So basically, again, I do not understand how the some aspects of information technology effect the planning process and command? Do I understand you correctly?

[Fuchs]

That's why I want effect over efficiency and not "cheap stuff" or "cost saving." The debate is what serves the purpose. Not what it costs.

Look up the definition of efficiency.
It's effect per cost.

There's no way how a look at effect only (ignoring cost) could be superior to a look at efficiency.
The word has been mis-used by unintelligent parrots a lot, but that doesn't change its definition.

[Ken White]

is he saying that flawed perceptions from erroneous or politically skewed information should not drive decisions?

I suspect he like I knows that happens but bitterly regrets that it does. It isn't a question of wishful thinking, simply stating the fact that it happens, should not -- and need not. As he said, a lot of 'historians' write drivel -- and a lot of decision makers do not allow themselves to be swayed by 'information' (see Bush, G.W. for a recent example).

Take the Saigon Embassy and Tet, both discussed above but in the terms of the historian's views on them . Some of us who were around back then have a totally different take on the actions and reactions to them. While it is true that perception is reality, it is not quite true that Politician's perceptions are deliberately attuned to what they THINK their voters want, they are attuned to what the Politician personally wants and attributes to what his or her voters should want in his or her view.

I believe that and a few other aberrations are the issues Wilf alludes and object to...

Fuchs:

There's no way how a look at effect only (ignoring cost) could be superior to a look at efficiency.

Depends on your viewpoint or emphasis. Militarily to look at effectiveness is the only sensible option.

However, holistically and politically for the majority of circumstances you're certainly correct. Cost is, of course, always a factor and in times of peace or near peace it dominates. Frequently in times of minor war it is an inconsequential issue; it literally becomes a non-issue in total existential war or anything near it (like WW II) when military effectiveness and/or combat effectiveness (not the same thing) take precedence, occasionally totally.

The military professional should look solely at effectiveness for his plan and recommendation, the Politicians will then tell him what they will support and he must retool his plans accordingly. In many cases, there will be minimal constraint imposed by 'cost efficient' models and the effectiveness can and will rule what happens. If, however, one plans with an eye on efficiency (which entails giving costs undue emphasis), then one is likely to produce a flawed plan that will not be effective. I emphasize that in this respect, I'm speaking of financial costs only; impacts such as economy of force or effort, casualties, terrain or initiative lost or gained are in reality more an effectiveness issue, current and future, than one of efficiency.

[Fuchs]

Fuchs:Depends on your viewpoint or emphasis. Militarily to look at effectiveness is the only sensible option.

You can maximize effect at given cost or minimize costs at given effect.

There's absolutely no point in preferring effectiveness over efficiency because efficiency in achieving a desired effect (= at minimum cost) is simply unbeatable.
Effectiveness is only about one variable while efficiency considers two important variables - it's a much richer term.

No one with a functioning brain will ever strive for the best ratio of effect and cost and willfully fail to achieve the desired level of effect by doing so.

A military that looks only at effectiveness is bound to waste resources and fail its master, the people, by performing poorly.
Look at the LCS, F-35 or the fuel cost in AFG, Puma for examples. In fact, every Western military force is extremely wasteful because they don't strive for efficiency.
I won't accept any excuse like "militarily only effectiveness counts" because the latter is ethically the same as to send a troop of soldiers every hour to rob a bank.
The damage that wasteful behaviour in the military does to the welfare of the nation is extreme.

Many "victories" were more damaging (net) to the "victorious" nation than staying at peace would have been. The costs of military & war suck and threaten to badly impair the Western nations in their ability to reform themselves for the future.

[William F. Owen]

I suspect he like I knows that happens but bitterly regrets that it does. It isn't a question of wishful thinking, simply stating the fact that it happens, should not -- and need not. As he said, a lot of 'historians' write drivel -- and a lot of decision makers do not allow themselves to be swayed by 'information' (see Bush, G.W. for a recent example).

Thanks Ken. Gold standard as ever.

Information is not understanding and everyone has three versions of history and ten versions of every new story.

[William F. Owen]

Look up the definition of efficiency.
It's effect per cost.

Well aware. I was using the term within the strict confines of military performance and capability. I am also well aware its an issue of balance and high degrees of efficiency have huge pays-offs in effectiveness, and vice versa.
My point is that I want to bias end-states and not process.

[Ken White]

But I can't see most western politicians accepting that; the need for 'control' drives their thinking...

Zenpundit:

What I found to be very odd, on a board where strategic thinking is highly valued, that no one addressed Arquilla's introduction where he raised the critical variable of cost-effectiveness of large unit operations against smaller, irregular and networked opponents. Maybe Arquilla was not explicit enough. Let me try.

Perhaps because cost effectiveness in this context is either a red straw or a herring man. As is your example. WW II expense are largely irrelevant to fighting today. A WWII Infantryman carried on his person or had usually readily available about $500.00 worth of clothing and equipment in 1944. That's roughly $5,620.00 in 2006 dollars.

His 2006 counterpart will have had about $25,000.00 in clothing and equipment in that year dollars. The majority of that difference is for materiel that did not exist in 1944. The NVG alone can run from 2 to 10K type dependent. Optical sights on all weapons...

Then consider UAVs and other factors.

That's merely one small point, a far larger issue is what capability those dollars bought and what combat effectiveness was or is produced. Cost effectiveness is too easily skewed to prove that money is being 'wasted.' What should be purchased for the spending is combat effectiveness. I have no doubt what so ever that the average Infantryman in Viet Nam was more capable than his WW II counterpart probably by a factor of two-- and I have no doubt that my serving Son and his contemporaries are miles ahead of us old guys, probably by another factor of at least two and quite possibly up to four. So yes, we're spending more but we're buying far more capability with fewer but considerably more expensive people.

As an aside, comparing wars is rarely wise, all are different and each must be taken on its own merits. My favorite is to point out that we usually fight as Brigades or RCTs and only in two recent wars did we really fight Divisions, so compare WW II to Desert Storm...

Further on Viet Nam. You may be correct in your statement of the Historians perception of the embassy seizure in Saigon and I'm old and thus have a suspect memory but my recollection that the embassy seizure was a quite minor blip except for the political wonks who made a big deal out of nothing. Most American pretty much ignored except for being hacked at the politicians US who allowed,even encouraged it to happen. I have to agree with Wilf, most of the Historians have made a hash of Viet Nam -- way too much politics involved in the 'scholarship.'

Shloky:

Which brings us to Ken's point, on which he's absolutely right. It does take a different kind of culture, particularly in regards to training. (Don Vandergriff's leading the way on that front. I'd recommend his books on the topic. )

True on the cultural change and there's another point. First the culture change; Not going to happen. Two reasons, the desire for control by Politicians and senior people who do not trust subordinates because they know that our training is weak. Add a refusal to provide the training really required in a Democracy where Mommas get upset at a 1 to 2 percent KIA rate in training -- and that's what effective training will cost. We've only been able to really do that in major wars (Civil, WW I and WW II). We could not or did not do it during Korea, during Viet Nam and we are not doing it now. We train better than we ever have but we are still a long way from training competent soldiers and Marines, Officer or Enlisted right out of initial entry.

Another factor is recruiting people who can and will do the things Argquila and you suggest. I strongly doubt the numbers are there. They could possibly be but you would then create a culture that would make Congress very, very uncomfortable. There are many there who think the Armed forces are already a little to competent...

I agree that Vandergriff's proposals are an improvement but even though only go part way -- and do recall he's been pushing that for over 10 years...