Current Combat/Tactical Tracking Operations

[TYR]

Historically and currently by doctrine, Infantry Units from LRS down to an infantry squad are supposed to be capable of conducting Tracking Patrols as part of a larger operation. The thing I don't understand is why the Combat Arms folks haven't attempted to use that skill on a wider scale. I believe the problem was that the program was in the wrong place and didn't get the visibility by the rest of the Army.

[jmm99]

from T275
Just like dealing with a crime scene in the United States, tracking in urban areas in Iraq are not much different. However, I have found far more evidence that has been able to be identified in Iraq than anything I have done in law enforcement here in the United States.

Your thoughts on why this is so ? US has more careful perps ?; levels of violence are different ?, come to mind as possible explanations.

Regards (from the son of a hunter and trapper who knew his "spoor")

Mike

[Tracker275]

Your thoughts on why this is so ? US has more careful perps ?; levels of violence are different ?, come to mind as possible explanations.

Regards (from the son of a hunter and trapper who knew his "spoor")

Mike

Mike,

Please refer to the paragraph previous to what you quoted from me, it will answer the questions you inquired about. I will include a few of those answers from what I have already stated though.

Typically, in the urban environments in either Iraq or Afghanistan, most of the streets are either dirt, or have a concrete/asphalt base that is covered in dirt. Due to the dust storms, and the basic lacking of keeping anything picked up or clean over there, track traps are everywhere.

It is far easier to perform tracking in urban areas in Iraq than it is in the United States, as most of the alleys area dirt, and not paved. Additionally, our peak times in urban areas were between 2100hrs to 0100hrs, which there was limited activity in the towns we were working in. Most of the spoor was also identified going through alleys and not along the main streets. Typically, the point of setting up an IED in those areas was to eliminate either a specific person, or a group of individuals near buildings they felt safe at.

I can elaborate in more depth if you like, however I think the answers you seek have already been stated.

[Boris]

Historically and currently by doctrine, Infantry Units from LRS down to an infantry squad are supposed to be capable of conducting Tracking Patrols as part of a larger operation.

I fully agree! But the present mind of the chain of command does not agree. I stated in the other thread on this topic that as a LRS PSG I pushed hard to have at least some guys to be sent the the Army tracking school during our units MOB up. The would have nothing to do with it. It was more importain for them to check the box on the BS traing we were having to attend. Many of the trainers during out MOB were less than qualified to teach. I had E4's that could of done a better job. The point I'm trying to make is that commanders dont have any confidence in tracking. The same issues that snipers face in their units. Commanders dont know how to use them, because they dont learn how to in OCS.

[Boris]

SOF guys come from a different mind set than the rest of the BIG army on tactical/combat tracking. They use their brain to think past the next OER. There are thoes out there in the Military that can think outside the box. But they seem to be the exception rather than the rule. You talk to the E7 and below in the big Army, they want to close and kill the bad guys. And use all the tools in their tool box to do so. I would love to see tracking take off in the military. But as can be seen by the closing of the tracking school, There are thoes that make to decisions for use all that dont see it fitting in to how they want to fight.

[qp4]

I didn't even know we had a school at Ft. H. But that was part of the problem and lent to it being closed, don't you agree?

Sometimes these things come to a cost and utilisation issue. Spend thousands of dollars TDY on a S2 guy who never leaves his building once he's in theater to track? I mean really. Ft. H is about analysts (the computer using type) and signals; much like the geographical isolation it has from the rest of the Army the things taught there are isolated from the maneuver community.

Then Boris gets it right too, because there are other issues. We have shortened time at home station, take the 18 month timeline-- two months of leave, two months of guys going; ARFORGEN says this is the individual training time. But who is there to train? Not to mention you have all the "BS" taskings that float down from on high that you have to keep throwing the diminishing manpower at.

Then when you start collective it's all about the gunnery gunnery gunnery, and getting out in the field. By now the DIV focus is on the BDE behind you to get those individual slots, but of course it's too late for them too, because they had the same problem you just did. The taskings are still coming too, and now you have to send a joe to this three day, and another to this four day, and one of your E5s to another week long thing of some sort of theater specific equipment you may or may not ever see.

And suddenly you're on the plane. It's very easy to blame our system.

This stuff is basic fieldcraft, but unfortunately that is now tribal knowledge held at about the O4/E7 level because of the Army's OPTEMPO. I think the challenge that we as Leaders have is how to we train things like tracking within our own? Identifying who has the talent for it, and helping them pass on that knowledge to the left and right. This is especially crucial within maneuver units.

[TYR]

Boris and QP4,

You are both correct. Ft. H was an improper place to teach tracking. However the Army could host the school at Ft. Polk. Units going to JRTC could send soldiers though the course prior to their JRTC rotation. When the unit deploys to JRTC for their exercise their trackers would have an opportunity to track an unpredictable OPFOR, which could validate the relevance of tracking in a training environment. Commanders from brigade down to company level would be able to observe firsthand the validity of tracking as its being employed by their soldiers conducting operations. Let’s face it if the Army didn’t think tracking was a necessary skill then why would it be written in Army Doctrinal publications spouting its benefits.

When I was at the Special Warfare Center the SWC CSM had everyone in the auditorium and he said that SF was going to reinstate Hand to Hand combat within the Q-Course. His reason was that in the “Ballad of the Green Berets" it said we were “trained in combat, hand to hand” and if we didn’t, we would have to change the song and that wasn’t going to happen. Now, of course he was joking, but his point was if you say you are supposed to be capable of performing a certain type of skill then you should be able to do it and doctrinally the Infantry say they do tracking.

[Rifleman]

I believe the problem was that the program was in the wrong place and didn't get the visibility by the rest of the Army.

Interesting that you say that. I thought Ft. Huachuca seemed like a good choice in light of current operational invironments.

So, in light of current ops, should it be like Ranger School in that it is headquartered at Ft. Benning but has phases that rotate between different areas? Perhaps a basic phase at Benning plus urban and desert phases elsewhere?

I think I asked a training question but it was related to ops. Now I'm not sure where to post it.

I'm so confused.