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  1. #22
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    Posted by Dayuhan

    I personally suspect that AQ and similar groups maintain a quite substantial urban apparatus... of course they would be trying very hard not to draw attention to themselves, and you'd expect them to have little or no contact with local militant groups other than with a few trusted individuals.
    Re-read my comments, I said as much and agree, but these are not strong holds where they live in the open and control the area. The urban area is generally hostile territory to overt (even clandestine) terrorists.

    I suspect part of the reason their activity is limited in the larger urban areas is due to security concerns.
    That comment was not intended to mean AQ is not active in the urban area, heck the urban areas are their targets. I suspect there are tens of AQ cells in London, New York, Paris, and elsewhere throughout the world, and they are very dangerous. However, this doesn't require the deployment of general purpose forces (like it did in Iraq, Algeria, etc.).

    Which is why I wrote:

    and if the scale of the AQ presence and activity in an urban areas is (dropped my thought, so completing it here in bold) relatively small and clandestine, then the appropriate response is generally small scale security assistance composed mainly of personnel from intelligence, special operations, and contractors with speciality skills. This is often enough to enable the affected state to defeat/suppress this threat.
    In sum I agree with you. What I am not getting is why it would be that much tougher for us to assist a partner with an Urban insurgency versus rural insurgencies (though in reality most are blended)? Urban areas are a tough battlefield, but so are the mountains and jungles, so regardless you have to adapt.

    If we occupy (not do FID) a country and try to control the populace ourselves then I agree that "may" (still situationally dependent, wasn't exceptionally tough in Germany or Japan) be brutal.

    My fault for failing to better clarify my intent.
    Last edited by Bill Moore; 07-23-2012 at 02:08 AM. Reason: grammar

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