Sanctuary (or perhaps just area) denial operations at the Afghanistan village level

[JMA]

A couple of recent threads detailing the Stryker Bde in the Arghandab area (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=8082) and how Taliban take over a village (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=9205) have caused me to rethink my attitude towards denial of insurgent freedom of maneuver.

Villages and other populated areas can be considered sanctuaries for insurgents until counter-insurgent forces wrest control away. As such, I'm curious what you all think are relevant factors when trying to deny access to an area, in both kinetic and non-kinetic forms. I think these sort of ops can be both enemy- and population-centric in a seamless way, and they need not be a black or white proposition that has been sensationalized in recent media offerings.

ETA: I guess it would be better to frame my question through the use of a hypothetical scenario (I'll call it a tactical decision game). Let's say we are dealing with Pashtun Taliban who have been slipping into a series of villages along the Helmand River at night, to conduct an intimidation effort against local civilians in order to secure poppy cultivation and onward shipment. They receive passive and active support in the process, ranging from areas to rest, cache supplies and arms/ammunition. When the feel secure enough, they remain in these areas and move amongst the people as they go about their daily routine, holding Sharia Law courts to keep the locals in line. Their endstate is to control a network of villages through subversion first, but intimidation if required. This network of villages, while producing funds via opium cultivation and other taxes, is also intended to serve as a footprint from which attacks against coalition forces can be conducted.

You need to start with who is in the pocket of the opium "big men". Clearly it has got to be understood that there is very senior Afghan government involvement in the opium trade or at least pay-offs at the highest level for poppy cultivation to be continuing with the positive acceptance of the US government and military. (maybe someone should turn over a few stones there as well)

Take a step back for a moment and look at the insanity of it all. Effectively the US and British militaries are allowing the poppy cultivation which in effect pays for the components for the IEDs which are killing the majority of US and British troops in the country... and in addition to which much of the resulting heroin ends up on the streets of the US.

No matter which way you look at it it is absolute insanity.

[davidbfpo]

JMA,

Partial quote:

Effectively the US and British militaries are allowing the poppy cultivation which in effect pays for the components for the IEDs which are killing the majority of US and British troops in the country... and in addition to which much of the resulting heroin ends up on the streets of the US.

No matter which way you look at it it is absolute insanity.

The plain crazy lack of a coherent drugs policy for the UK in Afghanistan has appeared before in different threads, notably this thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=1234; on US policy others can comment and we did have a regular poster who was "hands on" 120mm. Check his posts for his viewpoint.

In virtually all UK media reporting poppy cultivation rarely is mentioned, let alone footage of soldiers walking through fields of poppies. I knew there was an exception and hours later found it, Mark Urban from the BBC; a photo only of UK soldiers beside a poppy field:http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/newsnight...been_told.html

[Surferbeetle]

Leans more towards a thought piece than a how-to ttp but it's an interesting article nonetheless.

James E. Shircliffe, Jr. in Military Review: The Need for Intelligence Preparation for Economic Operations

It is often difficult for commanders to determine the best use for the development assets and resources at their disposal. Blindly throwing money and people at a problem is not a viable solution because the force rarely achieves the level of impact commanders seek, and in a world of scarce resources, more problems exist than there are assets to throw at them. Like battlefield operations, economic operations require the commander to develop and choose a course of action with its own unique requirements and risks. The Army needs to practice intelligence preparation for economic operations using “economic operations intelligence cells” that enjoy the level of dedicated support the Army gives to battlefield intelligence.

[JMA]

JMA,

Partial quote:

The plain crazy lack of a coherent drugs policy for the UK in Afghanistan has appeared before in different threads, notably this thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=1234; on US policy others can comment and we did have a regular poster who was "hands on" 120mm. Check his posts for his viewpoint.

In virtually all UK media reporting poppy cultivation rarely is mentioned, let alone footage of soldiers walking through fields of poppies. I knew there was an exception and hours later found it, Mark Urban from the BBC; a photo only of UK soldiers beside a poppy field:http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/newsnight...been_told.html

There is a need to put the finger on the button here.

It is common knowledge that drug money can corrupt anyone if the quantity is right. This surely applies to the US and British military as well? Is counter-intelligence keeping and eye on the generals?

[Bob's World]

JMA,

Partial quote:

The plain crazy lack of a coherent drugs policy for the UK in Afghanistan has appeared before in different threads, notably this thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=1234; on US policy others can comment and we did have a regular poster who was "hands on" 120mm. Check his posts for his viewpoint.

In virtually all UK media reporting poppy cultivation rarely is mentioned, let alone footage of soldiers walking through fields of poppies. I knew there was an exception and hours later found it, Mark Urban from the BBC; a photo only of UK soldiers beside a poppy field:http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/newsnight...been_told.html

While it is certainly true that the Coalition is not attacking Poppy at the farmer-level currently (in a system where farmers borrow heavily inadvance on their crops and are ruined if the crops are lost; in a system where the Taliban tax the farmer's heavily regardless of yield; in a system where eradication efforts are all too often employed by shady Police Chiefs who appear to be diligent eradicators to their Western observers, but who the locals all know are only eradicating the crops of their political/economic opponents in an effort that builds their favor with the Coaltion while also builds their relative power in the region.). To attack the populace's livlihood is lose the battle of the narrative with the insurgent.

This does not preclude efforts to attack the product downstream from the farmer. The harvest is concluding in the south, and moves in a clockwise arch across Helmand, Kandahar and Uruzgan. No amount of targeting dope is going to have a (positive) measureable effect in the timelines allowed the Coalition to show such effects, but could certainly have a negative effect if executed clumsily. And given the lack of true understanding of the complex interconnectivity of the drug business with every other business, to include governance, I don't know how we could be other than "clumsy." Meanwhile, all of the migrant workers fresh from the poppy fields are lookng for work, and the TB has cash for work...

[JMA]

While it is certainly true that the Coalition is not attacking Poppy at the farmer-level currently (in a system where farmers borrow heavily inadvance on their crops and are ruined if the crops are lost; in a system where the Taliban tax the farmer's heavily regardless of yield; in a system where eradication efforts are all too often employed by shady Police Chiefs who appear to be diligent eradicators to their Western observers, but who the locals all know are only eradicating the crops of their political/economic opponents in an effort that builds their favor with the Coaltion while also builds their relative power in the region.). To attack the populace's livlihood is lose the battle of the narrative with the insurgent.

This does not preclude efforts to attack the product downstream from the farmer. The harvest is concluding in the south, and moves in a clockwise arch across Helmand, Kandahar and Uruzgan. No amount of targeting dope is going to have a (positive) measureable effect in the timelines allowed the Coalition to show such effects, but could certainly have a negative effect if executed clumsily. And given the lack of true understanding of the complex interconnectivity of the drug business with every other business, to include governance, I don't know how we could be other than "clumsy." Meanwhile, all of the migrant workers fresh from the poppy fields are lookng for work, and the TB has cash for work...

It is so difficult to try and defend corruption and misguided policies.

The income to farmers appears to be $1 billion per annum.

The cost of the war is around $3.6 billion per month.

I put it to you that the exercise in taking poppies out of productions in the fields at an annual cost of $1 billion is the most simple of all propositions.

The problem lies with the other elements in the drug distribution chain who make $3 billion per year.

Neither the US government, the UN, NATO nor anyone else has the guts to take the drug mafia on over the worlds majority heroin supply chain.

Russia blames NATO for the increase of heroin production which enters Russia in increasing quantities. Why blame NATO?

It is due to current US administration policy that Afghan is turning into a NARCO state. The US military should not allow itself and its soldiers to become complicit in this criminal negligence.

This is such a bizarre decision and policy that I would suggest that with out any doubt that drug money has corrupted to a high level within the US administration. Watch them closely.

[jcustis]

After being on deck for only a short while, the single most important factor that stands out over and over again is a simple one...you have to be there. not everywhere, but just be there and be relevant to the people. If not, you are wasting time.

[JMA]

After being on deck for only a short while, the single most important factor that stands out over and over again is a simple one...you have to be there. not everywhere, but just be there and be relevant to the people. If not, you are wasting time.

How do you achieve that?

[jcustis]

Found this in a 26 June edition of The Economist:

NATO's main enemies, the Taliban and two other insurgent groups, both linked to al-Qaeda and led by former commanders of the anti-Soviet jihad, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Jalaluddin Haqqani, are based across the border in Pakistan-in the city of Quetta, in Baluchistan, and the rugged tribal areas. This makes them virtually unbeatable: no counter-insurgency has been won against enemies enjoying such a sanctuary.

I have no idea what the author based this statement off of, but can anyone recite similar facts to take this from the anecdotal and into the historical? The clincher seems to be the term "such a sanctuary," where the discussion could get hung up (happens all the time here already eh?). Anyone able to hazard a guess at what the article is getting at with this statement, or the historical information to support the point?

[davidbfpo]

Jon,

I suspect the part-citation:

no counter-insurgency has been won against enemies enjoying such a sanctuary

comes from an article on the Kings of War website and reflects an associated academic's work on the role of a sanctuary.

After a quick read I think the academic is Mike Innes, who IIRC has posted a few times here and this was the most relevant KoW comment found:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2009/10/deadly-spaces/

IIRC The Economist has a regional correspondent based in New Delhi, who writes on Afghanistan. Personally I find their comments well-written, but with a too mid-Atlantic perspective.

Hopes this helps!

[jcustis]

It did help David, as always.