Iraq 2015: nowt is simple in this conflict

[Bill Moore]

Yesterday didn't have time to mention this but I published another interview. This time I talked with Paul Brinkley former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense who worked on economic development and Iraq & now CEO of North America Western Asia Holdings a major investor in Iraq. Brinkley was working in Iraq during the fall of Mosul. He discusses what Iraq was like during the summer of 2014, what were some of the political and economic issues that led to the return of the insurgency, and how U.S. policy went wrong in the country. Read the interview here.

Thanks for sharing this interview, it is worthy of posting on the SWJ Blog. The whole interview was informative relative Iraq, but his discussion on our desire to establish democracies where there robust middle classes do not exist is a point that has application well beyond our efforts in Iraq.

Since 9/11, US policy in the region has been focused on the notion that establishing democratic institutions via elections among oppressed and underdeveloped populations will lead to stability, and reduce the appeal of radical Islamist movements.

But democracies emerge from the presence of a vibrant middle class – an economically prosperous majority of a population that has a stake in stability and that demands a seat at the table in governing their own affairs. Throughout history it is almost impossible to find a successful democratic state with liberal institutions that lacks a vibrant middle class as a foundation on which democratic governance rests. American democracy is no exception – our institutions today would not survive without our own generally prosperous middle class.

Our foreign policy continues to ignore this necessity, in spite of repeated failures in efforts to establish democratic government via force (Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya), diplomacy (Sudan), or shifts in alignment of strategic support (Egypt) away from a former dictatorial ally. We still believe that elections are the primary building block to a stable prospering society.

[Bill Moore]

After 16 months of fighting Ramadi finally fell to IS today. ISF units fled Anbar Operations Command and two other parts of city they were holding. Mass displacement. IS now attacking some of the surrounding villages. PM Abadi gave okay for the Hashd to move into area. Big victory for Iranian backed elements who had been attacking premier and US over this issue.

Due to travel I haven't been able to keep up on events, but noted al-Bagdadhi claimed Baghdad was next. Previously you said that wasn't possible due to the strong Shi'a position there, do you still believe that holds true?

Do you believe the Hashd can effectively defeat IS in Ramadi? If so, why do you think they're superior fighters relative to the Iraqi Army? Is the Iraqi Army still a broken institution? Do the Hashd have better motivation? Better supported by Iran? If the Hashd do go in, what does that portend for the conflict in Anbar? Will the Sunnis turn to the IS for protection?

[davidbfpo]

Citing BIll in part:

...what does that portend for the conflict in Anbar? Will the Sunnis turn to the IS for protection?

A SME (whose details I missed) was just on BBC Radio Four stating the Sunni tribal council in Anbar / Ramadi have today called for help from the Shia-dominated militias and the Iranian Minister of Defence was today in Baghdad. HE thought the tribal council's call was significant as a few months ago they had rejected such help.

[JWing]

May 13 while pilgrims where going to the Imam Kadhim shrine in Kadhimiya Baghdad rumors spread that there was a suicide bomber coming from neighboring Adhamiya. Led to a mob ransacking part of Adhamiya. Houses and cars were burned and four people killed. Militias provocateurs were blamed. Could have been a disaster with Shiite pilgrims looting and destroying a Sunni neighborhood. Luckily the government quickly moved in to restore order, people were arrested and actions were roundly condemned by all sides. Read more here.

[JWing]

Just wrote this piece on the political implications of the fall of Ramadi. Winners: IS spent months trying to take Ramadi, finally succeeded. Hashd have been pushing to replace ISF as lead in security and some elements increasingly critical of PM Abadi and anti-America. Can now claim they are indispensable and U.S. advice should be rejected. Iran final winner in pushing Syrian model onto Iraq of having its friendly irregulars take over security in country. Losers Abadi who was just talking about retaking all of Anbar a few weeks ago and who had been pushing U.S. plan of recruiting Sunni tribes and building up ISF in Anbar and U.S. that wanted to keep Hashd out of Anbar to stave off popular resentment. Read more here.

[JWing]

Due to travel I haven't been able to keep up on events, but noted al-Bagdadhi claimed Baghdad was next. Previously you said that wasn't possible due to the strong Shi'a position there, do you still believe that holds true?

Do you believe the Hashd can effectively defeat IS in Ramadi? If so, why do you think they're superior fighters relative to the Iraqi Army? Is the Iraqi Army still a broken institution? Do the Hashd have better motivation? Better supported by Iran? If the Hashd do go in, what does that portend for the conflict in Anbar? Will the Sunnis turn to the IS for protection?

Bill,

Yes think Baghdad is still relatively secure besides the regular terrorist bombings and shootings. Don't think IS is going to start street fighting there any time soon.

With regards to Hashd vs ISF, there are only a couple competent ISF units and they are being used like fire brigades being sent all over the country. When they leave IS usually moves back in and things go back to what they were. The Hashd are not relatively better than ISF units they just have better logistics, etc. because they don't have to go through the Iraqi bureaucracy.

Can they turn the tables in Ramadi? The quicker they move the better chance they have because they can avoid the IED fields, etc. that IS sets up as defenses. IS has not proven to be able to take on a conventional force head on. That being said not sure they can clear the whole city out of IS without emptying it of people like they did in other places. Not sure that's politically tenable in this case.

[JWing]

Citing BIll in part:

A SME (whose details I missed) was just on BBC Radio Four stating the Sunni tribal council in Anbar / Ramadi have today called for help from the Shia-dominated militias and the Iranian Minister of Defence was today in Baghdad. HE thought the tribal council's call was significant as a few months ago they had rejected such help.

There is no consensus in Anbar about the Hashd. Anbar council voted to allow them in to retake Ramadi, and others have welcomed them, while others still want them out. More people are willing to accept them because the situation in Anbar is so desperate and have suffered from benign neglect from Baghdad. The government hasn't helped them, U.S. not enough so Hashd are becoming only alternative.

[JWing]

Just published my weekly security report for 2nd wk of May in Iraq. IS still carrying out large number of VBIEDs. Govt was trying to retake lost territory in Anbar before fall of Ramadi. Baghdad remained a major target of terrorist attacks. 2 major bombings in Diyala. Has been a big jump in dead bodies showing up in Kirkuk. Fighting on going for Baiji refinery in Salahaddin. Read the entire report here.

[davidbfpo]

A British veteran of Afghanistan & Iraq has a short commentary on Al-Jazeera and he is being polite here:

....it is also reasonable to question the effectiveness of the coalition against ISIL, particularly the willingness of Iraq's army to fight for its nation's security. The overall strategy of fighting ISIL using Western-led air power and Iraqi-only land forces is another issue worthy of critical review.

Link:http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opi...050240243.html

[JWing]

Intra-Shiite rivalries are being brought up by the war against IS. Kataibh Hezbollah recently raided an office of the Supreme Council in Basra. Sadr has also attacked what he calls "brazen militias". Established Shiite parties are worried that Hashd will join politics and cut into their base leading to increasing confrontations. Read more here.

[JWing]

Tried to analyze the causes for Ramadi falling to IS. IS used 30 car/truck bombs, including 10 dump truck bombs that each had same explosive capacity of the Oklahoma City bombing. Also deployed sleeper cells, and blocked routes for relief forces to reach city. Finally the ISF units within Ramadi had been fighting there for at least a year without much support, spare parts or pay. Read the whole article here.

[davidbfpo]

After recent events in Iraq, followed by a flurry of news reporting and commentary it is difficult to ignore the criticism of US strategy, plus what is actually done "in country".

Professor John Schindler has a column that takes a longer view and the title explains his stance: 'America’s Top Five Mistakes in Iraq' He apportions blame largely within The White House, he is also scathing about the generals in charge. Judge for yourself:http://20committee.com/2015/05/22/am...takes-in-iraq/

Kenneth Pollack, of Brookings, looks at Iraq today and he is unsparing in his criticism:http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/marka...ate-washington

[Bill Moore]

David,

While my personal bias may not be fair, I read Ken Pollack's book "The Threatening Storm: What Every American Needs to Know Before an Invasion in Iraq," before we went into Iraq. It had almost no footnotes to help validate his opinion, yet this book was all the rage prior to invading Iraq, and was a major propaganda piece advocating the invasion. I didn't like it when I read it, and then when I went to Iraq it seemed like everything I read in the book (surely an exaggeration) was wrong. Right or wrong I tend to discard what he writes. However, since you posted it I read it. I agree with him that the Ramadi loss shifts the balance of influence in Iraq more to Iran, but how long will that last?

Once again, and maybe he is right this time, he is lobbying to get the U.S. more involved militarily, while admitting (this time) that his proposals may not work. Typical CIA talk, if you listened to us and took action when we told you to, then this wouldn't have happened. We're hearing the same narrative about Syria, yet there was no resistance element strong enough to defeat Assad, even with our assistance. Even if by fluke Assad fled the country, there was no viable plan for the morning after, so once again we would have been left holding the bag for another long stability operation.

In Iraq, there simply is no substitute for American assistance, political and military (Iranian assistance will only push the country deeper into civil war) but there is no equilibrium points other than war and peace. Either the U.S. does enough to pull the Iraqis through to peace and stability or the country will descend deeper into chaos and civil war.

The other article from the 20 committee is vindictive, yet not undeservingly. Seems most agree that going into Iraq to begin with was a deeply flawed decision, but was so pulling out lock, stock, and barrel. I think Obama's problem is that he painted himself into a corner with his Iraq party. He gained political power partly, maybe largely, by leveraging the Iraq War in his campaign and promised to pull the U.S. out. One can help but think he believes he can't go back in a meaningful way. Yet, this war and the justification for intervention are very different than Bush's war and his justification. Like the report said, who lost Iraq? We all did. What the report didn't say, is who won Iraq? Increasingly it seems that Iran has, but that is being contested by ISIL.

[JWing]

Just published my weekly security report for 3rd wk of May in Iraq. Very few security incidents were reported due to all the focus upon Ramadi. Large number of casualties however due to fighting in that city. IS executed at around 500 people during the taking of Ramadi. Had hit lists of people it was looking for and went door to door. IS also continues to pick up its car bombs. Due to ISF units being sent to fight IS is growing lawlessness in southern Iraq due to gangs, tribal conflicts and political rivalries. Finally, ISF continued to make progress to relieve Baiji refinery in Salahaddin. Is 5th relief effort showing manpower shortages of government forces. Baghdad only been able to hold areas after security operations if have strong local actors or completely empty a place. Otherwise have to repeatedly go into same areas again and again and again like Baiji. Read the entire report here.

[JWing]

Bill and David

Pollack has always been up and down for me. On this article I think he's argument has some merits. He was saying that the Obama admin's goals are attainable in Iraq but that it is just following through with it. There could be way more air sorties, more troops sent in as trainers, quicker delivery of equipment to Iraq that could really change the situation. Right now it's half assed. I don't know how many IS pics I've seen of convoys rolling through Iraq for an attack that could have been bombed.

[JWing]

I just did my 80th interview for Musings On Iraq. I talked with Fanar Haddad author of Sectarianism In Iraq about the political impact of the Hashd al-Shaabi movement in Iraq. It has become the leading force fighting IS and created a new sense of Iraqi nationalism but with a Shiite flavor to it. How will it change Iraqi politics? Read the interview here.

[JWing]

Iraq insurgency was always made up of various different groups. Now most of them have been subsumed by the Islamic State. Can still breakdown militants into three broad categories. Local chapters often organized around kinship, clans, occupations, mosques. Then the enterprises which can extend across sections of the country and across borders. Usually started off as criminal gangs that were organized during the sanctions period. Finally the transnational IS, which used to work with these other types of Iraqi groups and then eventually took them over. Here's a link to the complete article.

[JWing]

IS declared the caliphate in June 2014 after the fall of Mosul. This was a long term goal of the group. Zarqawi talked about forming an Islamic State back in the 90s. Al Qaeda in Iraq declared the Islamic state in 2006 when it changed its name to Islamic State of Iraq but was largely ignored in the west. That was the actual start of the caliphate but IS was then in decline and didn't have power to create this state. Read the whole development of IS's caliphate here.

[JWing]

Just published my weekly security report for 4th wk of May in Iraq. Heavy fighting to retake Ramadi and Baiji refinery. IS also continued with large car bomb campaign. Read the full article here.

[JWing]

Monthly security figures for 2015 show that attacks are slowly declining but casualties are remaining steady. Executions, discovery of mass graves and a return of car bomb waves have kept up the number of dead and wounded in Iraq this year. Read the full report here.