Sigh, more of usual speculation and guessing...

In all of your regurgitation, there is only thing that's making me curious, Dayuhan: you're all the time emphasising how disunited the insurgents are.

Provided you are able to at least once answer a question: who has ever told you that 'Assadists' are 'unified'?

Assad is meanwhile an Iranian puppet, upheld for the purpose of representing Iranian interests in Damascus and holding together a bunch consisting of different militias.

On the battlefield - and that's all that matters in Syria presently - his regime is supposedly represented through the 'Syrian Arab Army'. Where is this Syrian Arab Army, please? Can you mention me but a single brigade, not to talk about any division of the former Syrian Arab Army that is still existing?

Yes, there is a Ministry of Defence and the usual chain of command, but officers of these have representative roles only: their main duty is to listen to IRGC-QF officers and follow their orders. Technically, the 'Syrian military' (including intelligence services) is under the control of IRGC-QF officers: much of it is actually run by various families that are siding with Assad in interest of their own survival. Result is a mafia-like organization, not a 'military': even somebody with Soleimani's authority has experienced all sorts of problems in attempting to exercise battlefield control of all the diverse forces. His staff has launched seven different offensives through 2013 and in early 2014, and couldn't complete even one of these because of 'disruption' by various of cliques - which often withdrew their forces from the battlefield in disagreement with him. And since Soleimani was sent back to Iraq, the cooperation between different cliques only worsened - which is why we haven't seen any of glorious large-scale offensives being undertaken since months.

The air force is receiving orders from the Ba'ath Party HQ, not from the MOD or down the usual chain of command: the Ba'ath Party is primarily consisting of Sunnis and maintaining its own militia which, at least according to Iranians, has proven more combat effective than any other elements of regime's military. Should it then be surprising the SyAAF proved most-effective in providing CAS when doing so in support of BPM units - which include several former Special Forces regiments? None of BPM-members I managed to contact so far would say he's fighting 'for Assad': 'for Syria', 'defence of my family' etc., but not for Assad. And, they dislike Iranian presence and influence too. So, they're one 'clique' there.

Air Defence Force was disbanded already before the war, and integrated into the SyAAF: majority of its former units were disbanded and their personnel integrated into the NDF.

Theoretically, the core of what is left of the Army would be the Republican Guards Division. This is meanwhile down to only two 'special' brigades, plus air defence assets (most of those operating 'high-tech' systems, like SA-17s and SA-21s) and few artillery regiments equipped with MLRS' and SSMs. One of 'special' brigades has a sole duty of keeping Alawites under control: during the fall of Tabqa, the regime flew out all of its favourites, but left behind hundreds of soldiers to get slaughtered by the Daesh. This caused renewed unrest and some public protest even within supposed 'core support base', which were squashed only through mass-arresting of anybody who expressed critique. And that's the next point of conflict here: loyal Alawites vs. disloyal Alawites (and where one should keep in mind that Alawites are traditionally disunited, and held 'together' only by sheer violence and brutality of the Assadist regime).

Out of RGD's former three mechanized brigades only one remains existent: the 104th (that is: its remnants after three years of war) was sent to save Dayr az-Zawr. The equipment of the other two is now manned by Hezbollah and Iraqis, under command of IRGC-QF officers, of course.

The 4th AD was broken down into detachments that were put in command of countless detachments from various Army units already back in 2011 (in order to prevent defection). All of these were - together with all that's left of the Army - reorganized by the IRGC-QF into the NDF. The NDF is operated in form of about 100+ battalions, sometimes bunched together into makeshift brigades and even divisions for specific tasks, but majority of these are 'territorial' by nature: capable only of limited defensive operations within the area where their members are living. There are ex-intelligence, ex-Army, ex-Shabiha, ex-air defence, and then 'other' battalions, each of them run by their own clique and with its own level/degree of loyalty to the regime. Nobody knows to what side would which of them turn should Assad fall.

Except for the BPM, the other two most effective 'military forces loyal to the regime' are the militia of the Syrian Nationalist Party's (SSNP, which has Nazi-like ideology) and the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA was established already back in the late 1960s, and is meanwhile largely recruited from the West Bank). In essence, the regime's military can barely survive without them (and the BPM): they're involved in every single 'successful' offensive operation of the regime since this spring. The SSNP and the PLA are fighting 'on regime's side', but not for Assad either.

Now try to arrange a 'truce' between these forces and the insurgents: even when Iranians were arranging truces with specific of insurgent held pockets around Damascus and Homs earlier this year, they first had to remove specific regime units from the given area in order to negotiate. Whenever they didn't there were renewed atrocities, looting, raping and all of that sort. Just like on the insurgent side, there are 'commanders' that are disobeying any corresponding orders - if for no other reasons then because they know they have too much blood on their hands and are afraid of retaliation (whether by their own or the 'other' side). And that's 'just for the start'...

And for those shedding crocodile tears over non-cooperation with the Assadist regime... Bashar and Iranians can only thank to Obama, but not complain about him. It's not only that this intervention comes much too late, that Obama has left them three years to save the regime from the collapse, and grow the Daesh for their own purposes. The Daesh's advance on Mosul came just about when the IRGC was about to go bankrupt because of US sanctions - by pure accident, I guess? Thanks to Daesh's advance, they're now free to finance themselves through Iraqi purchases of Iranian arms and ammo, Russian arms and ammo and wholesale raise of Shi'a militias in Iraq.

But 'no', I guess you'll say: that's taking things into context. We're discussing Syria, so who cares about Iraq here.

OK, then let's go back to Syria: this intervention in Syria is coming just about when the Daesh was preparing a major assault on Dayr az-Zawr. Thanks to this intervention, the extremists are never going to launch that attack - and thus Bashar is never going to find himself facing such fierce critique from within 'own' ranks, like after the fall of Tabqa.

On the contrary: withdrawal of major FSyA, SF and SRF contingents for 're-training and re-equipment' in Jordan and KSA is opening major gaps in insurgent frontlines. US attacks on the JAN are likely to open additional gaps in these frontlines, which other insurgent groups can't close on their own: for this, they lack troops, armament and supplies - and they are already lacking troops, armament and supplies to fight both, the Daesh and the regime at the same time. And the US is doing nothing from curbing ever fiercer air strikes by the SyAAF against FSyA, SF, SRF and the IF.

What do you think: attacks on the JAN and the Ahrar are improving position of the FSyA and the IF? On the contrary: given how disillusioned by the USA (and the West) majority of insurgents became after three years of waiting for them, it's no surprise they're all very sceptic about results of this intervention. Indeed, should it turn out the US air power is continuously killing civilians while missing various of Ahrar's and JAN's HQ, it is going to be not the least surprising if insurgents turn against the USA too: such actions are therefore an ill-advised va banque game.

So, where is actually the problem? USA are already 'cooperating' with the regime in Damascus, though indirectly. Run the way it is, the US-led action in Syria is saving that regime. I have said it already, and I'll repeat it: sooner or later, Bashar is going to decorate Obama for his achievements in saving his regime. Khamenei, Vahid & Co are then going to stand in line right behind Bashar...