New Rules for New Enemies

[Rob Thornton]

Tom,
Here is one my boss and I were bantering back and forth. Is the concept of "Inter-Agency" cooperation soley a military buy in, or does it go both ways? He sent me an article out of the Foreign Affairs Journal that caused me to look hard at this question. In that "90 & 180 day objectives" document I sent you I brought up that regardless of how good ISF gets, without some reconstruction funds to get projects going, the Iraqi public will not establish faith in local government; no faith in local government = en environment in which insurgents can support.

We've heard about the PRTs (Proincial Reconstruction Teams), what we need are CRTs (City Reconstruction teams). Teams that like you had mentioned could be drawn from American Society to function within the role of their acknowledged profession. Doctors, lawyers, Small Buisness gurus, telecommunications specialists, power plant engineers, agricultural engineers, city planners, family planners, firemen, hazordous waste guys,etc. - all the skills that cities have come to rely on to keep a city functioning. Everybody has heard about the National Guard guys who are often more valuable fulfilling their civilian role here then their MOS (they do a good job at both), so why have we not asked the question why?

We need practical experience in these roles, not just well educated OGA (Other Govt. Agency) types. Their would have to be unity of command, and with that would come the provision of personal security. But lets say that at a certain watermark in the transition of security, host nation security forces took up the role securing their AOR (which of course is the plan), and the auxillary role CF (Coalition Forces) took on was the facillitation of reconstruction?

I'll stay away from formng a concrete oppinion about a military draft question because I don't have a resonable comparrison (my PEBD was 85), but I do recall the horror stories of armed FODs going into the barracks, but that may have been more the result of a social/cultural problem associated with the times. However an offer to forego paying back massive student loans and some incentives along the lines of a GI Bill, or other like ideas might get us the kind of professionals we would need for Reconstruction Teams - maybe even offer their kids a free state school 4 year scholarship and offer them & their families Active duty Healthcare benefits, PX, Commissary priviliedges while serving - oh and pay them at the same professional rate you'd pay military doctors, lawyers, etc.

In staying with the theme of the thread, its a new era in warfare with new enemies, and we need to adapt faster then the enemy
Best Regards, Rob

[Tom Odom]

Tom,
Here is one my boss and I were bantering back and forth. Is the concept of "Inter-Agency" cooperation soley a military buy in, or does it go both ways? He sent me an article out of the Foreign Affairs Journal that caused me to look hard at this question. In that "90 & 180 day objectives" document I sent you I brought up that regardless of how good ISF gets, without some reconstruction funds to get projects going, the Iraqi public will not establish faith in local government; no faith in local government = en environment in which insurgents can support.

We've heard about the PRTs (Proincial Reconstruction Teams), what we need are CRTs (City Reconstruction teams). Teams that like you had mentioned could be drawn from American Society to function within the role of their acknowledged profession. Doctors, lawyers, Small Buisness gurus, telecommunications specialists, power plant engineers, agricultural engineers, city planners, family planners, firemen, hazordous waste guys,etc. - all the skills that cities have come to rely on to keep a city functioning. Everybody has heard about the National Guard guys who are often more valuable fulfilling their civilian role here then their MOS (they do a good job at both), so why have we not asked the question why?

We need practical experience in these roles, not just well educated OGA (Other Govt. Agency) types. Their would have to be unity of command, and with that would come the provision of personal security. But lets say that at a certain watermark in the transition of security, host nation security forces took up the role securing their AOR (which of course is the plan), and the auxillary role CF (Coalition Forces) took on was the facillitation of reconstruction?

I'll stay away from formng a concrete oppinion about a military draft question because I don't have a resonable comparrison (my PEBD was 85), but I do recall the horror stories of armed FODs going into the barracks, but that may have been more the result of a social/cultural problem associated with the times. However an offer to forego paying back massive student loans and some incentives along the lines of a GI Bill, or other like ideas might get us the kind of professionals we would need for Reconstruction Teams - maybe even offer their kids a free state school 4 year scholarship and offer them & their families Active duty Healthcare benefits, PX, Commissary priviliedges while serving - oh and pay them at the same professional rate you'd pay military doctors, lawyers, etc.

In staying with the theme of the thread, its a new era in warfare with new enemies, and we need to adapt faster then the enemy
Best Regards, Rob

Rob,

Critical issue one addressed in an opinion piece somewhat disguised as a news report by Austin Bay, a retired colonel, recounting lunch with the SecDef, on the need to realign the Nat Sec Structure to achieve "Unified Action, " yesterday on the Early Bird under the title "...With Forecasts" in the Wash Times.

I saw what I would call somewhat "Unified Action" in the USG reaction to Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The senior leaders "played well" together and the agencies fell in behind them. On the intel side, we had some knife fights but by and large it was a semi-unified effort.

At the pointy end of things in 2 very different embassies, I saw one case of complete and utter chaos and one of true unified action through a country team that worked very well together--so much so that we were altering viewpoints and affecting decisions in Washington. The first was in Zaire and it was a charlie foxtrot which began when the Charge (since we had no ambassador) announced he thought the refugee crisis in July 94 would be over in a couple of weeks. He refused to go to Goma until State ordered him to when the USAID Administrator announced he was coming out. When airlift started to flow, the same guy wanted a by name list of everyone coming so he could decide who would get country clearances; I had to threaten to call the Joint Staff and relay his demand before he backed off. He never got any better and OGA (aside from AID) didn't either.

In contrast, Kigali worked well. DoD mobilized. The NSC mobilized. State mobilized. AID was superb; we had the AID chief of staff with us for months at a time. The effort was truly extraordinary: Rwanda and the Balkans were the 2 standing items of interest in the NSC and the White House--driven of course by a need to recoup much face lost in the USG's stance during the genocide.

The other reason for extending time in grade/service is to provide time for the additional education and developmental experiences required by 21st Century complex warfare. If we want our military to have experience with other USG Agencies or Alliances to experience the rest of the DIME or if we want strong, resident masters Degrees in International Relations, Economics, Social Sciences that takes a couple of extra years not currently provided for in a career with many tactical, military gates

As Jim Greer states above looking at US military culture we have to train ourselves in working across agency boundaries; we have to do the same thing on the State, AID, and other agency basis. The challenge we have is overcoming the cultures inside those agencies--as does the culture inside the military--must be changed. AID actually has the least distance to travel in making such changes. The get it done make it happen culture inside the military exists in AID. Getting such cultures to mesh in PRTs is made more difficult when they form on the fly. OFDA and its Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) are semi-permament teams that form according to need like we form JTFs. I believe we need standing JTFs or at least ready JTFs that form, execrise, and stand down all the while remaining on call. I believe also that we need to increase the JIIM aspects of such JTFs and start forcing other agencies to play with us.


Best

Tom

[Rob Thornton]

Tom,
I had a buddy that did an internship with FedEx, do we do that with OGAs? Could we get them to do it with us? Could logisitican do a year with USAID, or an IO guy with USIS? How about and Infantryman with FBI? Lets say a CPT gets himself BQ'd then instead of going to a CTC - he goes to do a 6 month course for the OGA, then a 2 1/2 year tour with the OGA? Now lets turn the tables and bring the other guy in to our midsts. Would an FBI guy be useful in COIN - you betcha (We've had to create our own wire diagrams on AIF from scratch - what I would not give to have such a resource on the team. Could a USAID guy work at a CTC, deploy on a MEU, work with a transport wing? DOD was pushing hard to break down the barriers and turn us purple - I think we are making significant progress in those areas, but that was brought about in the light of pre-9/11 requirements. Its still valid and still a need, but post 9/11 has brought the same need with OGAs/DoD.

While I'm aware that OGA types sometimes attend the War College, I don't know if they attend something like ILE (maybe I'll find out in Sept 07), and I know they don't attend the CPT's Career Courses. In fact I could not tell you what their professional education system looks like outside of attending a university. What if instead of sending a guy to a CPTs career course or ILE, he went to Georgetown? The reason I bring it up is because its a reource thing - there is only so much time, and while time off for advance degrees is great, there simply is no way everyone can get there given OPTEMPO early enough in their career where it changes their cultural bias (I think its very subtle sometimes, but a natural inclination).

So I guess there are at least two ways to get new DNA into the genetic pool - add to it, or trade it out. Maybe the right answer is a combination of both, mutts are generally more healthy anyway.

[Rob Thornton]

Tom,
I had a buddy that did an internship with FedEx, do we do that with OGAs? Could we get them to do it with us? Could logisitican do a year with USAID, or an IO guy with USIS? How about and Infantryman with FBI? Lets say a CPT gets himself BQ'd then instead of going to a CTC - he goes to do a 6 month course for the OGA, then a 2 1/2 year tour with the OGA? Now lets turn the tables and bring the other guy in to our midsts. Would an FBI guy be useful in COIN - you betcha (We've had to create our own wire diagrams on AIF from scratch - what I would not give to have such a resource on the team. Could a USAID guy work at a CTC, deploy on a MEU, work with a transport wing? DOD was pushing hard to break down the barriers and turn us purple - I think we are making significant progress in those areas, but that was brought about in the light of pre-9/11 requirements. Its still valid and still a need, but post 9/11 has brought the same need with OGAs/DoD.

While I'm aware that OGA types sometimes attend the War College, I don't know if they attend something like ILE (maybe I'll find out in Sept 07), and I know they don't attend the CPT's Career Courses. In fact I could not tell you what their professional education system looks like outside of attending a university. What if instead of sending a guy to a CPTs career course or ILE, he went to Georgetown? The reason I bring it up is because its a reource thing - there is only so much time, and while time off for advance degrees is great, there simply is no way everyone can get there given OPTEMPO early enough in their career where it changes their cultural bias (I think its very subtle sometimes, but a natural inclination).

So I guess there are at least two ways to get new DNA into the genetic pool - add to it, or trade it out. Maybe the right answer is a combination of both, mutts are generally more healthy anyway.

Tom, I found that article on the Earlybird. Bay makes a srong point, which leads me to ponder, if we are aware of, what can/will be done? Below is an excerpt form the article which originally appeared in the OCT 27 Edition of the Washington Times, pg 17 by Austin Bay entitled "With Forecasts"

"I know, that's quite a claim, which is why I need to translate the military-speak: Unified Action means coordinating and synchronizing every "tool of power" America has to achieve a political end -- like winning a global war for national survival against terrorists who hijack economically and politically fragile nations and provinces.
People understand the role of soldiers and cops in a war, but in 21st century wars where economic and political development are determinative, an Agriculture Department arborist and a Commerce Department trade consultant can be a powerful contributors to "Unified Action."
Restoring Iraqi agriculture provides an example. Saddam Hussein's economic and political policies damaged agriculture in the land that eight millennia ago spawned the Agricultural Revolution. (Heck of an achievement, huh?) Agriculture, Commerce and several NGOs have expertise and programs that help revive Iraqi farms. Still, problems occur when trying to tailor programs to meet specific local needs -- like, who pays for the program and is ultimately in charge of oversight and coordination.
While serving in Iraq in 2004, I met a young U.S. Army captain who was running a successful small-scale date palm restoration project. What we really need are joint development and security teams, where agricultural and economic specialists work with that captain "in the field" on a sustained, day-to-day basis. We need to decide who is in charge of that team (the captain or the arborist?) and how we fund it.
Our system for "Unified Action" is still largely a Cold War, 20th-century relic designed to prop up governments (so often corrupt and ill-led), instead of helping individuals and neighborhoods become economically self-sustaining and self-securing. Winning war in the Age of the Internet means improving neighborhoods and individual lives. The 2006 Nobel Peace Prize winner and micro-finance whiz Muhammad Yunus understands this.
We are in a long, global war, where economic and political development programs must reinforce security and intelligence operations -- and vice versa.
We've been improvising "joint development and security operations," and we've learned from our improvisation (Mr. Rumsfeld's "we're better than we were").
But it's time to quit improvising. Effective "Unified Action" requires re-engineering 20th-century Beltway bureaucracies -- which means thoughtful, sophisticated cooperation between the executive branch and Congress.
That means getting past the sensational gossip and confronting an essential issue.
Austin Bay is a nationally syndicated columnist."

[Rob Thornton]

Just a follow up, but what about an Officer Training Program aimed at producing foreign service types? They go to a Basic Camp, and an Advance Camp, get a huge scholarship, and pay it back by doing 4 years Active and 4 years IRR in the Foreign Service?

[marct]

Just a follow up, but what about an Officer Training Program aimed at producing foreign service types? They go to a Basic Camp, and an Advance Camp, get a huge scholarship, and pay it back by doing 4 years Active and 4 years IRR in the Foreign Service?

That would certainly make sense - it could also be adapted to almost any skill set and aimed at any organization.

Marc

[Steve Blair]

Just a follow up, but what about an Officer Training Program aimed at producing foreign service types? They go to a Basic Camp, and an Advance Camp, get a huge scholarship, and pay it back by doing 4 years Active and 4 years IRR in the Foreign Service?

You could easily tool ROTC this way, since there are already ways it interfaces with what are considered the more professional degrees (legal and medical).

[Tom Odom]

Although I agree that a ROTC approach to the Foreign Service would have benefits, I will say that barring a fundamental shift (akin to California opening new waterfront properties adjacent to Ft Irwin after the rest falls into the sea) in the way the Foreign Service approaches life. It remains in its heart an organization founded on Ivy league elitism and it maintains a caste system that would make sense in old school S Africa or India.

Sec State Rice and the former Sec State GEN Powell have attempted to change this; that the Embassy in Baghdad is a rotating door for short termers tells me they have not succeeded.

We are going through the transformation of Civil Service. A larger goal and one easier to manage due to its lesser size should have been creating a National Security Corps that draws all foreign relations oriented organizations into a central being, like we were supposed to have done with Homeland Security.

best
Tom