The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[William F. Owen]

Wilf may have a problem with operational art. I do not, it exists and is useful.

Well I don't have a problem with "Operational Art," if its the art of planning operations. Not just useful. It's essential.

Here are my "problems."

a.) There is simply no need to interject a concept between Strategy and Tactics. It isn't need. Most military men never needed it. Why do it? (it may exist as an "idea", but there are many "ideas" that lack utility)

b.) The idea of "levels of war," is not useful, especially when expressed in terms of Strategic, Operational and Tactical. For example, you can't have Strategic, Operational and Tactical "Mobility" in ways you can usefully define.

c.) The claim that Napoleon "invented" the operational level is without evidence or any form of proof. What Napoleon did was conceptually no different from what Marlborough did in 1704, and Napoleon studied Marlborough! Based on the idea that the operational level of war is "battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces," then this exactly defines how Hannibal and Ghengis Kahn fought. If the Operational level existed for the last 200 years, then it always existed!
If anyone can furnish any actual historical evidence to the contrary, I will happily study it in detail.

d.) The whole concept of "Operational Level" is, IMO, steeped in a lack of clarity. The definitions used in JPub 1-02 are not rigourous. Warfare is done by Command, so Corps, Division, Formation, etc. Commands make plans and issue orders. That is simple, effective and proven to work. What proven advantage does the "Operational level" deliver.

In conclusion, I see the "Operational level" as something like Manoeuvre Warfare, and EBO. Something that at best adds nothing, bar sophistry, and at worst is highly counter-productive.

[M.L.]

c.) The claim that Napoleon "invented" the operational level is without evidence or any form of proof....

I was going to leave this entire entry alone since it is basically a rehash of previous arguments. However, the above statement merits a brief response.

I never claimed that Napoleon "invented" the operational level. Although there has been some discussion to that effect, the broad consensus is that the first vestiges of operational warfare "emerged" during the Napoleonic era.

To say that someone "invented" it is like saying that someone "invented" strategy. On the contrary, operational warfare, like strategy, is an evolving conglomeration of ideas.

[jmm99]

from ML
....the broad consensus is that the first vestiges of operational warfare "emerged" during the Napoleonic era.

As I think has been obvious, my interest in this topic is historical and in the 19th century texts (CvC, Jomini, Mahan, Halleck, Bigelow, as examples). I don't have the professional competence to judge what "operational warfare" and the "operational level of war" are or are not in the present-day; or whether the present-day usage of those terms (obviously replete in US manuals) is good, bad or indifferent.

What I do see in the 19th century is replete with references to the planning and execution of operations and campaigns - and a very rich vocabulary (of what I would call "terms of art") dealing with operations and campaigns; as well as something of a hierarchy of divisions (e.g., theatre of war, theatre(s) of operations, zone(s) of operations).

What are the "vestiges" of "operational warfare" in the Napoleonic era as you see those "vestiges" ? If those "vestiges" exist, they are not readily apparent to me. I see a very well developed "operational art" in what I've read (cited above); but I do not see "operational warfare" and the "operational level of war" until into the 20th century - e.g., Fuller as cited by the Brit LTG in his article.

Regards

Mike

[slapout9]

Copy of an article from (JFQ latest edition) one the other CvC threads. Has some stuff to say about the Operational Level of War, it appears he agrees somewhat but not completely with Wilf. It is a very good article at any rate IMO.


http://www.ndu.edu/press/war-and-its-aftermath.html

[M.L.]

Copy of an article from (JFQ latest edition) one the other CvC threads. Has some stuff to say about the Operational Level of War, it appears he agrees somewhat but not completely with Wilf. It is a very good article at any rate IMO.


http://www.ndu.edu/press/war-and-its-aftermath.html

Ack. I was excited to read this until I saw it was by Steven Melton. You might want to read the first 30 pages or so of his book, The Clausewitz Delusion. IMO, he is pretty mixed up and has some very wrong ideas.

However, just my opinion.

[slapout9]

Ack. I was excited to read this until I saw it was by Steven Melton. You might want to read the first 30 pages or so of his book, The Clausewitz Delusion. IMO, he is pretty mixed up and has some very wrong ideas.

However, just my opinion.

I think this will be under the Kindle tree so I will let you know.

[jmm99]

LTC Melton was the teacher; Cavguy was the student. Some brief (subdued) comments by the latter are here (Wilf Bait: The Clausewitz Delusion; post starting thread), here, and here.

Here is not the place for me to comment on LTC Melton's article, Conceptualizing Victory Anew (2011), which is subtitled "Revisiting U.S. Law, Doctrine, and Policy for War and Its Aftermath" - thus, entering my ballpark.

Basically, Melton mixes military strategy with "grand strategy" (a term he uses; also expressed inter alia as: Policy/Politik; the National Security Strategy; or Beaufre's "total strategy"). I'd argue that the results in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan (whether one calls them victories, half-victories or defeats) were primariily set by Policy/Politik. All four cases involved "first halves" and "second halves" (the latter still being played out in the continuations of OEF and OIF). Tell truth, Melton's article has little content re: either "Law" or "Policy" - and the "Doctrine" discussed is military. The military does not establish Policy/Politik except in the early 1990s science fiction of Charlie Dunlap (one of our great military lawyers, who should visit here), where the military makes a real hash of it.

Like the poltergeist, I'll be back - with discussion of agreement with LTG Kiszely re: Jomini and Fuller; and, taking off from that, my summary of what Jomini included in "Strategy", "Grand Tactics" and "Logistics".

Regards

Mike

[M.L.]

As I think has been obvious, my interest in this topic is historical and in the 19th century texts (CvC, Jomini, Mahan, Halleck, Bigelow, as examples). I don't have the professional competence to judge what "operational warfare" and the "operational level of war" are or are not in the present-day; or whether the present-day usage of those terms (obviously replete in US manuals) is good, bad or indifferent.

What I do see in the 19th century is replete with references to the planning and execution of operations and campaigns - and a very rich vocabulary (of what I would call "terms of art") dealing with operations and campaigns; as well as something of a hierarchy of divisions (e.g., theatre of war, theatre(s) of operations, zone(s) of operations).

What are the "vestiges" of "operational warfare" in the Napoleonic era as you see those "vestiges" ? If those "vestiges" exist, they are not readily apparent to me. I see a very well developed "operational art" in what I've read (cited above); but I do not see "operational warfare" and the "operational level of war" until into the 20th century - e.g., Fuller as cited by the Brit LTG in his article.

Regards

Mike

Mike,

I agree that the operational level as we know it emerged in WWI, specifically 1916-18, as the combined arms battlefield.

However, some of what we now lump into operational warfare did emerge during the Napoleonic wars. The French Revolution gave rise to a new era in warfare in the sense that virtually all the resources of the state were mobilized for war. Among the many impacts of this change, two seem salient here. First, it broadened the necessary scope of strategy (to include non-military considerations, such as a state's economic base). Second, it gave rise to huge land forces, and as you say, the rough outlines of modern command echelons began to emerge.

This meant commanders had to coordinate the activities of large units which were not necessarily collocated, and perhaps even in multiple theaters (think US civil war). Furthermore, these activities had to be linked to broader strategic objectives related not just to military means, but to the state itself, as well as the people of the state.

The operational level did not emerge suddenly and totally in the early 1800s, nor did it do so in 1918. Rather, it emerged over a long period of time between Napoleon and WWI. Certainly, it continues to evolve, but the combined arms battlefield of 1918 is not too much different from, say, Desert Storm in 1991.