Insurgency vs. Civil War

[Entropy]

Steve;

Actually S. Vietnam DID fall to insurgency. We tend to put way too much emphasis on the fact that a bunch of Westerners broke off a chunk of Vietnam in the middle of the insurgency and created this tremendous sanctuary for the insurgency called "North Vietnam."

So why was the communist north created? If it wasn't because of poor governance by the south, then how could it be considered an insurgency, especially since the Vietminh were around before the partition and the creation of the RVN? Or, why can't the opposite case be made - that North Vietnam successfully fought off an insurgency from the south?

Similarly, what about the Koreas? Do we consider North Korea to be "insurgents" against the South? Or Germany before reunification? That doesn't make much sense. For all practical purposes, North Vietnam and South Vietnam were distinct states and one of those states conquered the other through conventional means. That the North also fostered an insurgency in the South (which ultimately failed) doesn't, it seems to me, make the entire conflict an insurgency.

[Steve Blair]

This also doesn't really take into account the social and cultural differences between the north and south (and even some ethnic differences). No, I'd say Vietnam actually runs closer to the civil war side of things.

[marct]

Staying away from Vietnam, how would you folks classify the Thirty Years War (outside of exceedingly messy)?

[Steve Blair]

Not one of my big areas of expertise, but I would say that it began as something like an insurgency based on religion (with the inevitable cultural overtones) and then grew into a civil war and finally became a world war (of sorts, anyhow).

[marct]

Not one of my big areas of expertise, but I would say that it began as something like an insurgency based on religion (with the inevitable cultural overtones) and then grew into a civil war and finally became a world war (of sorts, anyhow).

Could be, I honestly have no idea how to classify it using any of the current terms. "A great mutherin' mess" still seems to be the best classification for it .

In more on point terms, it appears to have had elements of insurgency, succession rebellion (e.g. Bohemia), various and sundry religious revolts / counter-revolts, inter-state warfare, military entrepreneurs becoming "legitimate" (e.g. Wallenstein), plus, plus, plus, as well as being a civil war in the HRE.

OTOH, another reason I brought it up is that the treaties that ended it are the foundation of the modern state system and, hence, a lot of our current definitions. Given that, it may be a useful case to look at to see if those definitions still make sense.

[Steve Blair]

I went with my escalation definition because it seems to me to make the most sense based on my conception of both insurgency and civil war. And I do think that, as you pointed out, you can have an insurgency going on within a civil war (depending on the territory in question). I honestly don't see most of these things as being as cut and dried as we might prefer. But then again, I also don't see the Indian Wars as being insurgencies, either....

[ryanmleigh]

Not one of my big areas of expertise, but I would say that it began as something like an insurgency based on religion (with the inevitable cultural overtones) and then grew into a civil war and finally became a world war (of sorts, anyhow).

Sir- Your explanation again takes me back to a sliding scale of violence in conflict. With steps along the way. With insurgency residing somewhere near the bottom, and civil war higher on the steps along the way. Would you agree?

[Entropy]

Staying away from Vietnam, how would you folks classify the Thirty Years War (outside of exceedingly messy)?

Good question!

One theme I'm getting from the discussion here is that people are classifying based on three rough criteria:

1. Classification based on how the conduct of the conflict - ie. guerrilla warfare vs "conventional" warfare.

2. Classification based on the actor's intent or "why they are fighting."

3. Classification based on the actor's type of organization- ei. nation states, tribes, etc.

One problem that makes the 30 years war difficult to classify is that today we base our interpretations of conflict around #3 - the nation state as the "standard" political entity. If two states are in conflict, then it is "war." If the conflict occurs within the borders of what we call a state, then it is civil war/insurgency. So, as long as we put the state at the top of the organizational hierarchy, I don't think we will be able to "fit" many types of conflict, including the 30-years war, into a war/civil war/insurgency construct.

Of course, Wilf will come in and remind us again that these classifications are arbitrary and largely useless because war is war.

Mike,

My point exactly - why can't South Vietnam be viewed as the "insurgents" against the North? This goes back to my earlier point that these classifications are often self-referential.

[marct]

One theme I'm getting from the discussion here is that people are classifying based on three rough criteria:

1. Classification based on how the conduct of the conflict - ie. guerrilla warfare vs "conventional" warfare.

2. Classification based on the actor's intent or "why they are fighting."

3. Classification based on the actor's type of organization- ei. nation states, tribes, etc.

Nice summation, Entropy! Okay, what if we use these three classification, what, "dimensions(?), as the basis for defining a set of boundary conditions and see where that takes us? So,

1. the "How" a conflict is conducted would be tactical and grand tactical (yeah, I use the older system; so sue me ). That "how" or, rather, a group / factions selection of a given "how" at a point in time, should be conditioned by a number of different factors such as technology, social organization, time, ideology, cultural mores. As such, we might want to refer to insurgency / COIN as an "operational" (grand tactical) choice amongst a variety of others such as "conventional", "raising political awareness" (a la Mao), subversion, popular demonstrations, terrorist strikes, counter-terrorism, etc.

2. the "Why" question is a lot "fuzzier" in some ways, but I would suggest it gets back to two core areas: competing narratives / systems and competing faction placement (dynastic wars or which general runs banana republic X this week?). I *think* that this is a more strategic and grand strategic level, and definitely more in line with questions of legitimacy, governance, strat comm, etc.

3. The organizational type question should also feed back into both the first and second types, and is probably the critical one in terms of international law (Mike?). That said, I suspect that it is also the least important in operational terms except inasmuch as it produces operational limitations. The other thing is that if we want to produce a model like this, we would probably have to decompose organizational type into sub-characteristics such as resource control, governance, force "reach" (possibly further sub-divided by battlespace?), etc.

Leaving off how useful this might be for generating definitions, especially by spotting definitional "holes" and overlaps, I think that this might also get to Bob's point about it having some practical use.

[jmm99]

we are on the same page:

Mike,

My point exactly - why can't South Vietnam be viewed as the "insurgents" against the North? This goes back to my earlier point that these classifications are often self-referential.

So, let's then look at Giap's strategy as a counter-insurgency strategy (rather than an "insurgency" strategy), which was quite different from the conventional "clear-hold-build" COIN strategy.

In fact, it was the reverse:

1. build - establish the guerrillas and political cadres (ongoing from 1959 on a generally increasing basis).

2. hold - secure base areas (well accomplished, with some assistance from Kissinger, by the 1973 Paris Accords).

3. clear - achieve juncture of unconventional and conventional forces after causing dispersal of ARVN forces (success in 1975).

In a sense, Jim Gant has suggested something similar without citing Giap.

Regards

Mike

[Steve Blair]

Of course, if we ignore Marc and focus on Vietnam, this could also take on a different aspect. SVN was never really heavily controlled by either the French or the Viet Minh (it wasn't as settled as the north, for one, and lacked the industrial base), and the traditional "seat" of Vietnamese government had been in the center of the country (Hue). So looking at local realities, it doesn't become as simple as a Northern counterinsurgency against the South. Much of SVN was something of a recent acquisition in historical terms, and the people there had developed different cultural patterns and dialects than their northern "cousins." Plus you had certain indigenous populations added to the mix as well.

Still, the Entropy/Mike angle is an interesting one, and might provide some insight into possible reasons for some of Giap's decisions and outlooks.

[slapout9]

1. build - establish the guerrillas and political cadres (ongoing from 1959 on a generally increasing basis).

Mike

Yes,Yes,Yes that is exactly what we did when I went through the "One Minute Guerrilla Warfare Course" this was basic Special Warfare, which we seem to have forgotten and it can be done very fast as Operation Jawbreaker proved (we left out demobilization)as well as several others during the Ike administration. We had one bad one "Bay Of Pigs" and then went off on the COINISM theory.

[Bob's World]

Staying away from Vietnam, how would you folks classify the Thirty Years War (outside of exceedingly messy)?

But it was, as is often the case, one of many insurgencies all aimed against the illegitimate agents of the governance of the Holy Roman Empire. The wars were never about the promotion of Protestantism. (Ideology is always a critical requriement, but never an end unto itself. For some in movement, sure, but for the movement itself? No.)

In fact, Martin Luthor was pretty upset when smart political types recognized the value and power of his fresh thoughts on Christianity and co-opted them to fuel their insurgency against the Catholic governance.

All fueled by the information age created by the invention of the printing press, that served to "democratize" knowledge. Once the Catholic Church lost its monopoly on knowledge, it was only a matter of time before they also lost their monopoly on governance as well.

[jmm99]

at the very end of WWII in 1945 by what they (Ho, Giap, etc.) called the August Revolution. To them, they created the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (the entire country - not just North Vietnam). They claimed governmental legitimacy from the August 25, 1945 abdication of Bao Dai in favor of Ho's government.

The Viet Minh had to deal with four foreign military occupiers during the 1945-1946 period: Japanese, Chinese, British and French. The Viet Minh and the French reached tentative agreements in 1946, which accepted French military forces in both the South and the North (replacing the other occupiers), but also recognized Ho's government. The French-VM accord blew up in the later half of 1946 and the First Indochina War ensued.

The position of Ho-Giap was that that war was the Resistence War - seeing France as a foreign invader with the restored Bao Dai as France's puppet. When that war ended in VM success, the Hanoi government was willing to allow a partition so that it could secure its base areas in the North. It had no intention of limiting itself to the North and its constitutions made clear that the DRV encompssed all of Vietnam.

Diem surprisingly survived and to some extent thrived in 1955-1959, with the US replacing France as South Vietnam's patron. Having completed their build-up of their Northern base areas, the Hanoi government re-instituted the Resistence War (using more of a neo-colonialist theme, and setting up the NLF as its front in the south).

The NLF guerrillas and cadres in the South (augmented by PAVN regulars) were therefore, in the Ho-Giap view, a typical resistence force looking forward to the day when it could achieve final juncture with the North's conventional forces. In short, Hanoi was waging unconventional warfare in the South against a quasi-foreign invader army.

Giap tried to effect a closing juncture in 1965, 1968, 1972 and 1975 (with final success). By that time, ARVN had committed half of its strength to baby sitting its pacification effort in rural areas (which saw some success before the final deluge).

So, what was Indochina-Vietnam in the South - an insurgency, civil war, resistence war, unconventional war with a conventional ending or something else ? Did and does it make a difference in what it's called ?

Regards

Mike

[Bob's World]

So why was the communist north created? If it wasn't because of poor governance by the south, then how could it be considered an insurgency, especially since the Vietminh were around before the partition and the creation of the RVN? Or, why can't the opposite case be made - that North Vietnam successfully fought off an insurgency from the south?

Similarly, what about the Koreas? Do we consider North Korea to be "insurgents" against the South? Or Germany before reunification? That doesn't make much sense. For all practical purposes, North Vietnam and South Vietnam were distinct states and one of those states conquered the other through conventional means. That the North also fostered an insurgency in the South (which ultimately failed) doesn't, it seems to me, make the entire conflict an insurgency.

Ike's assessment, in '56 I believe, was that if an open election was conducted that Ho would have taken some 80% of the popular vote nation-wide. Now, if we had still been proponents of Self-Determination in '56 we would have said "excellent, the people know what they want and by helping them achieve it we will have an ally and have stayed true to our ideals." But of course, the Dulles boys and Ike were well on the path of a new strategy rooted in control of nations on the fringes of Communist China and Russia to help contain that threat. So instead of allowing a pure execution of democratic principles to allow a self-determination of governance that would have made the whole of Vietnam a communist state (perceived reasonably as a "loss" for our team).

Lansdale was already hard at work on the ground in the south working to make Diem into a Magsaysay (which he never was); and we began a concerted effort to slow-roll the election and prop up our illegitimate puppet in order to sustain the false division of "North" and "South" states; knowing that an election would have merged the nation as one under a communist Ho.

Faced with the loss of "Hope" in the blocked access to legal means of changing governance, along with the "Injustice” and "Disrespect" of the same, and the externally provided "Illegitimate" governance of Diem; the insurgency that had been waged against the French picked up steam once again; this time with Ho having the legal sanctuary of a State in North Vietnam to help support and sustain his pursuit of classic Maoist insurgency.


Point being, the machinations of governments do not determine if a movement is an insurgency or not. It is the roots within the populace that determine the nature of it.

Our national pride, coupled with the fear of the expansion of communist ideology, led us to make decisions counter to our national ethos, and embroiled us in an otherwise wholly avoidable conflict. We should learn from this experience. The best COIN is done well in advance of a situation going kinetic, and because we did not appreciate that fact we adopted policies that were largely responsible for what followed.


Korea was a very different situation altogether. I doubt very much that the leadership of the North was the governance desired by the populace of the South; and I doubt very much that the Governance of the North and their Chinese backers would have been willing to sit down with the Governance of the South and their American backers and agree to some nation-wide process of self-determination and everyone agreeing to live by the same. So it began with two states already formed. I would tend to put this then into my civil war category with traditional warfare then being a valid technique for resolving the conflict.

Just my take.

[Ken White]

Our national pride, coupled with the fear of the expansion of communist ideology, led us to make decisions counter to our national ethos, and embroiled us in an otherwise wholly avoidable conflict. We should learn from this experience. The best COIN is done well in advance of a situation going kinetic, and because we did not appreciate that fact we adopted policies that were largely responsible for what followed.

Actually, that's all correct but you left a couple of things out.

Add the fact that Kennedy in addition to wanting to appear tough on Communism (your 'national pride,' part 1) also wanted even more to boost the US economy which was in the doldrums and a small war would fit the bill nicely and aid Democratic electoral hopes.

Eisenhower had been tempted to do the same thing to boost Republican hopes but the then CofS Army, Matthew Ridgeway, talked him out of it. Kennedy moved people to insure no one tried to talk him out of it. He inherited a negatively inclined Lemnitzer as Chairman but replaced him with a recalled from retirement pro-intervention Maxwell Taylor to rid himself of a turbulent priest...

We also DID appreciate the fact that best COIN was done in advance of total deterioration but we deliberately and with full knowledge ignored it mostly for domestic political reasons ('national pride,' parts 2 and 3). That "fear of the expansion of communist ideology" was an excuse, not a reason. We do that kind of stuff a lot...

Our ethos is bi-polar. The ethos you espouse is in the books; the ethos we follow more often than not is keyed to cut throat domestic agendas and our international interests as perceived by the administration of the day. Lately, those all tend to be awfully mediocre...

All that is why for over two years I have continued to say the Jones version is great, ideally could be implemented -- but is not likely to be because it doesn't allow for such machinations which are critical to the survival of the US political class. Add our electoral process and the concomitant lack of continuity and your hopes are unlikely to be realized.

[Bob's World]

Ken,

No version of history is perfect, and I am sure I put my own twist on information that is already "well twisted" by others.

Key is that when we get into these messes that we do so knowingly. I am, based on my own personal experience with senior leadership, not so sure they appreciated the nature of the problem and how the actions they selected were likely to play out in the long run. We will still make political decisions for political reasons as you wisely point out, but armed with a more sophisticated understanding of these types of movements we can create into the original design aspects that can go a long way toward mitigating the downside of the likely consequences.

[Ken White]

...based on my own personal experience with senior leadership, not so sure they appreciated the nature of the problem and how the actions they selected were likely to play out in the long run.

however, with similar experience, I frequently noted that the problem was generally well understood but that the ego of said senior soul overrode his common sense and he presumed he of all people would be able to overcome the obvious downsides.

Usually wrongly...

[Bob's World]

however, with similar experience, I frequently noted that the problem was generally well understood but that the ego of said senior soul overrode his common sense and he presumed he of all people would be able to overcome the obvious downsides.

Usually wrongly...

I was thinking about this. I think they probably defined "The Problem" as that of keeping Vietnam being chalked up as a "loss" in the containment of communism column. Target fixation on that one aspect, coupled with some likely cockiness from recent successes the Dulles Brother concept of covert regime change was having, caused them to think this would all just sort out ok.

So I'll agree they went in eyes wide open and acting "knowingly", but I really don't think they acted "understandingly."

I think there is still a lot of that going around. Over fixate on one aspect of the problem and engage to address that; and then minimize the dangers from other aspects of the problem that we don't fully understand to begin with. Those being what ultimately turn out to be the real threat to achieving our interests all along.

Both in Vietnam and in the GWOT we went in over fixated on ideology; misunderstood both the role of insurgency in the GWOT, and also the (minor) role of ideology in insurgency. We fixated on the wrong aspect of the problem, exposing ourself to greater danger and risk to the aspects of the problem that were the most dangerous all along.

[Ken White]

I think they probably defined "The Problem" as that of keeping Vietnam being chalked up as a "loss" in the containment of communism column. Target fixation on that one aspect, coupled with some likely cockiness from recent successes the Dulles Brother concept of covert regime change was having, caused them to think this would all just sort out ok.

That was the announced reason -- just as "Saddam's WMD" were the announced reason for going to Iraq...

Viet Nam was almost totally over the US economy and 'looking tough' for domestic political reasons. Communism was way down the list of 'why.'

So I'll agree they went in eyes wide open and acting "knowingly", but I really don't think they acted "understandingly."

Depends on who your talking about. Most in State, DoD? I agree. The real decision makers up top -- Not at all, they understood but thought they were smart enough and the Army was good enough to make it work in spite of the drawbacks. They weren't and the Army was not.

It also depends on what specific items are involved in the knowing versus the understanding. Most problems were understood and discounted -- again, just like Iraq...

Egos.

Over fixate on one aspect of the problem and engage to address that; and then minimize the dangers from other aspects of the problem that we don't fully understand to begin with. Those being what ultimately turn out to be the real threat to achieving our interests all along.

Sometimes. Just as often not. As I said, perception of the Administration in power at the time. See Afghanistan...

We fixated on the wrong aspect of the problem, exposing ourself to greater danger and risk to the aspects of the problem that were the most dangerous all along.

We can disagree on that for the real deciders, you're possibly generally correct for the minions.

Egos. Plus we aren't as nice -- or as dumb -- as many would like to believe.