Influencing and Information Operations

[Hacksaw]

In a sense I think yes and more regarding what IO is simply because it involves both internal and external consumption and it is damn near impossible to narrowly deliver info...

So it is in the end about consistency... and if we aren't consistent we cannot expect anyone to believe our sources/networks... along with Red Rat the sum of our activity conveys a message... if I send a foot patrol through town I am making a statement and that statement is nuanced by how the patrol is executed... what is their combat load, how do they interact with the population... I'm not talking about handing out candy because they makes us nice guys... always thought one of the worst decisions in OIF 1 was not sending a significant force through Fallja and Tikrit... nothing like a little discomfort for folks to understand that they don't control their own destinies...

I'm rambling so i'll stop here, but I disagree vehemently with what you call twaddle as a general rule... IO doctrine in US Army is actually moving towards the wholistic consistency viewpoint and less towards messages, tlaking points and the like

[William F. Owen]

So it is in the end about consistency... and if we aren't consistent we cannot expect anyone to believe our sources/networks... along with Red Rat the sum of our activity conveys a message...

That message is the policy. The other side oppose your policy. Is IO merely the desire for your actions (strategy) to match your message (policy)?

but I disagree vehemently with what you call twaddle as a general rule... IO doctrine in US Army is actually moving towards the wholistic consistency viewpoint and less towards messages, tlaking points and the like

OK, so IO doctrine is a good thing? Is that good thing "Information Operations" or "Influence Operations?" - because these are two different things.

[Hacksaw]

In most things we are in violent agreement...
As for which it depends on whose definitions you use and in the case of the US Army it seems torn as to which it will use internally and whether they will remain consistent with joint doctrine or attempt to influence AGAIN the direction that joint doc takes...

I can certainly agree that the tortuous path that this has taken has been... well toruous...

Agree it is what the policy is or what we want the policy to be in the absence of policy

and this is topic in which we can play parlour word games for as long as we wish... I just never thought any of this was NEW... as a division planner I explicitly/in parallel considered the conduct of operations regardless of intensity... if we are conducting an attack to destroy... reduce to the point that the organization can not be reconstituted (well that has an info content to it in terms of the immediate task and subsequent conduct of operations) that is probably coached in terms of defeat...

and if as a planner I'm not thinking in those terms... well I cheated the CDR and the unit

[Hacksaw]

That was tortuous and incomprehensible...

WILF I think as usual we agree...

Terms mean something and in that regard the US ARMY, and those we touch have been less than disciplined...

but...

If those who are paid to help the commander think, through both the current and future fight, if they aren't considering the info content of their operations... words, images and actions.... they aren't doing their job and they don't need an "Info Specialist"... they just need a new job

[Red Rat]

If those who are paid to help the commander think, through both the current and future fight, if they aren't considering the info content of their operations... words, images and actions.... they aren't doing their job and they don't need an "Info Specialist"... they just need a new job

Yes!!! I am still thinking through Wilf's points, but I am in violent agreement with the above!

IMHO COIN is more complex then conventional operations only because from a military perspective the military is doing more of what other government departments / NGOs / other governments should be doing in conventional warfare.

In COIN we may or may not be dealing more with the Influence side - which should be done by the indigenous government (but if it was doing things right we probably wouldn't be in a COIN scenario in the first case...) Having got sucked into the Influence Activities we have specialised it, instead of subsuming it into generic G3/5/7 activities. The result? A blossoming cadre of specialists and an increasingly esoteric lexicon of terms; the one generating the other!

That is not to say that I do not think that Influence Activities are not practical, effective and necessary, I just think we have lost sight of the woods for trees

[William F. Owen]

IMHO COIN is more complex then conventional operations only because from a military perspective the military is doing more of what other government departments / NGOs / other governments should be doing in conventional warfare.

Complex or just different? In Irregular warfare it is usually harder to physically find, fix, strike, and exploit the enemy. It is also harder to match your policy with your actions, because the enemy is within or close to the population. Agreed.

Now does any of that make it "complex." I agree that linking policy with tactics and strategy may be difficult - but that is why I focus on the enemy and not "armed social work."

[Red Rat]

More difficult quite probably, but more complex I do not think so. Essentially we are doing the same thing in conventional warfare as we are in COIN except with emphasis on different parts of the system.

Digressing slightly, but on the difficulty side; I wonder if we put two evenly matched opponents (in terms of military capability) against each other whether thay would find conventional ops any more difficult then COIN ops? Of the 'find, fix, strike and exploit' elements; in COIN none of them leap out as any more difficult to do then in conventional ops, less I think 'exploit'.

With COIN the insurgent has an assymetric advantage in 'find, fix, strike., exploit' but we tend to regard conventional ops as easier because historically in the mid-late 20th century we've had the advantage in 'find - strike'.